Thursday, February 22, 2024

10 myths about Stalin's role in the Great Patriotic War

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.

Translated material from kavkaz-uzel.eu

The information from the  "Caucasian Knot"  talks about the most famous myths and reliable information related to the role of Joseph Stalin in the events of the Great Patriotic War, the most popular misconceptions based  on his actions before the start of the war and during the fighting, as well as attempts to perpetuate Stalin in the Caucasus. 

Myth No. 1: “ Stalin did not know that there would be a German attack”

“Now there are different versions about whether or not we knew the specific start date and plan of the war. The General Staff learned about the day of the attack by German troops from a defector only on June 21, which we immediately reported to I.V. Stalin. He is here "he agreed to put the troops on combat readiness. Apparently, he had previously received such important information through other channels...", wrote Marshal Georgy Zhukov in his memoirs, fully published in 2002 1 .

Myth No. 2: “ The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact delayed the start of the war”

“This is a widely held point of view, but it is deeply wrong. Firstly, because it is immoral: the Soviet Union entered into a conspiracy with Nazi Germany - this is an immoral fact. This conspiracy implied the division of the territories of other states. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Finland found itself divided between the USSR and Germany - this is also a deeply immoral fact. Secondly, by signing the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, we turned out to be allies of Germany, and it was because of this that Germany started the war in Poland. If we had announced that we - allies of England, France, Poland and in the event of an attack on Poland we would provide assistance to it, then Germany would never dare to attack Poland. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact is not only a crime of the Stalinist regime, but also one of the reasons for the outbreak of the Second World War, an episode of which the Great Patriotic War appeared,” says Soviet and Russian historian, religious scholar and political scientist, Doctor of Historical Sciences, former MGIMO professor Andrei Zubov 2 .

Myth No. 3: “ Stalin himself wanted to attack Hitler”

“This is the most malicious falsification about the war. Even from German documents it follows that those close to Hitler reported to him: the USSR still complies with all the terms of the non-aggression pact, and aggression should not be expected in the coming months,” notes the head of the Center for Military History of Russia at the Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences Georgy Kumanev 3 .

However, historian and researcher of the Second World War Mark Solonin is sure of the exact opposite. He claims that there were at least 13 plans for the USSR to attack Germany, and in May-June 1941 the “hidden strategic deployment” of Soviet troops began 4 .

Myth No. 4: “ Stalin personally won the war”

“It was not Stalin, but the party as a whole, the Soviet government, our heroic army, its talented commanders and valiant warriors, the entire Soviet people - that’s who ensured victory in the Great Patriotic War,” declared First Secretary of the Central Committee Nikita Khrushchev at a historic closed meeting of the 20th Congress CPSU February 25, 1956 5 . An open  letter from 25 figures of Soviet science, literature and art  (1966) expressed the opinion that Stalin was responsible for his unpreparedness for war 6 . Likewise, some veterans are of the opinion that the victory took place not thanks to, but in spite of Stalin 7 .

Myth No. 5: “ Stalin preferred not to talk about his role in the war”

“In general, it would be nice to know that the myth about Stalin’s irreplaceable role in our Victory, about his “genius” that crushed the enemy, was created... by Stalin himself. In 1948, a short biography of the leader was published, the text of which he himself edited. Moreover , it was he who wrote there passages praising his own military merits. And it’s clear why - he had to justify himself for the mediocre, and even criminal decisions that he made, and which he himself knew well about. As millions of people knew, who themselves experienced the consequences of Stalin’s “military genius,” notes Vitaly Dymarsky, editor-in-chief of the historical magazine “Diletant,” professor at MGIMO and the National Research University Higher School of Economics 8 .

Myth No. 6: “ Purges at the top of the army did not have an impact on its combat effectiveness”

“Comrade Stalin is significantly to blame for the extermination of military personnel before the war, which affected the combat effectiveness of the army. That is why, before he began to listen to the plan for the upcoming operation, he turned the conversation to the topic of personnel in order to test me... During this conversation, Comrade Stalin repeatedly spoke about many generals who were released from prison just before the war and fought well. “And who is to blame,” I timidly asked Stalin, “that these poor, innocent people were imprisoned?” - “Who, who ... - Stalin said irritably. “Those who gave sanctions for their arrest are those who stood at the head of the army at that time,” from the memoirs of Marshal of the Soviet Union Andrei Ivanovich Eremenko 9 .

Myth No. 7: “ The soldiers went on the attack shouting: “For the Motherland!” For Stalin!"

“This is an absolute myth, which was already being propagated back then. “For the Motherland!” For Stalin!” the political commissars shouted. They were obliged to shout it. It’s just that if the political commissar had not shouted this, then there would have been very serious consequences for him. Everyone else, privates and even commanders, when they went on the attack, did not remember any Stalin... Therefore, they shouted: “Mom!”, shouted something obscene, just shouted something to drown out the fear, but of course, there was no “Motherland and Stalin”, ask any front-line soldier, of whom, however, there are already few left,” - notes historian and journalist Nikolai Svanidze 10 .

Myth No. 8: “ Under Stalin there were no ethnic conflicts”

“Many people do not know or do not want to know that under Stalin, mass arrests, deportations and executions were carried out on ethnic grounds, that entire nations were declared “hostile”. Did this really contribute to interethnic cohesion? We have many documents about acute conflicts on ethnic grounds. Stalin left a very complex legacy in this matter,” says Oleg Khlevnyuk, a researcher at the International Center for History and Sociology of the Second World War at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, and the author of the biography “Stalin. The Life of a Leader . ”

Myth No. 9: “ They tried to keep quiet about Stalin’s role in the Second World War”

“No one has ever erased Stalin from history and is erasing him, unlike himself, who easily erased his opponents and the people he destroyed from encyclopedias and erased them from all books. Stalin remained in the Great Soviet, and in all other encyclopedias, and in textbooks school history in an even more glamorous form than he deserved,” notes Jan Rachinsky, a member of the board of the Russian Memorial Society 12 .

Myth No. 10 " Stalin's Order No. 227 turned the tide of the war"

"The significance of order No. 227 (Not a step back!) was twofold. On the one hand, it strengthened the resilience of the troops and reduced the number of cases when they retreated without an order. On the other hand, the commanders, fearing to give the order to withdraw without sanction from above, were often late with the retreat , and the troops were surrounded. Stalin hoped that, under the threat of executions and penal battalions, the Red Army soldiers would fight harder and inflict more damage on the enemy. In reality, sometimes the opposite happened. Fearing reprisals, commanders at all levels were sometimes late in withdrawing, and this only led to additional losses ", - from the book of historian Boris Sokolov "Mythical War. Mirages of the Second World War" 13 .

According to Levada Center polls, in 2017 the number of people with a positive view of Joseph Stalin seemed to reach a historic high in 16 years. If in March 2016 37% of respondents treated Stalin with “admiration”, “respect” and “sympathy”, then in January 2017 this number increased to 46%. However, the number of people dissatisfied with Stalin also increased. At the beginning of 2016, 17% regarded him with “dislike,” “fear,” “disgust,” and “hatred,” and in 2017 – already 21% 14 . In 2020, sociologists noted that already 70 percent of Russian residents assess his role in the country’s history as positive, and those who condemn the repressions, in general, are becoming fewer and fewer every year 15 .

Attempts to immortalize Stalin in the Caucasus

Today in the North Caucasus there are several dozen monuments to Stalin, both preserved from Soviet times and newly installed. Most of them are located in North Ossetia. In particular, busts of Stalin stand in Beslan and Vladikavkaz. Monuments stand in Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Stavropol and Kuban. There are streets named after Stalin in Makhachkala, Tskhinvali and several other settlements. There are a lot of monuments in Georgia and South Ossetia, and in two Azerbaijani villages there are full-length monuments.

More than 20 different monuments were installed in North Ossetia, 8 in Dagestan, four sculptures in the Stavropol Territory, two in Kabardino-Balkaria. There are three sculptures in the Krasnodar region, including a memorial composition to Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill in Sochi. Two monuments are located in the Rostov and one in the Volgograd regions.

Among residents of the republics of the North Caucasus, Joseph Stalin is revered by those who mistakenly associate with him the concept of “social justice,” which they despaired of achieving from modern authorities, noted historians interviewed by the Caucasian Knot. They believe that “Stalinophiles” need a “master”, compare the reason for interest in Stalin with the “Weimar syndrome” and hope that among the repressed peoples, in particular in the Caucasus, there is not and will not be a trend in support of Stalin.

On April 29, 2021, a bust of Joseph Stalin was installed on a pedestal in Dagestan Lights. The communists who erected this bust  showed disrespect  for the repressed peoples of the Caucasus, Internet users said, and their opponents recalled Stalin’s role during the war. On May 2, it became known that the bust along with the plaque  had been dismantled  - only an empty pedestal remained in the place where the monument was erected. 

The mayor of the city, Jalalutdin Alirzaev, cited the lack of permission for its installation as the reason for the dismantling, he told the “Caucasian Knot” correspondent. “There was no agreement with the administration about the installation of the bust. Apparently, the communists took responsibility and decided to erect a monument on the street, which is named after Stalin,” said the head of the city. According to him, the initiators of the installation of the monument to Stalin should have first consulted with the townspeople, and first of all, with the residents of this particular street. “Then, after this discussion, the city architect should go to the site to see how it all fits in with the appearance of the city. But nothing of this was done,” the mayor explained.

In March 2015, the authorities of Dagestan Lights already refused to erect a monument to Stalin , including due to an ambiguous attitude towards his figure. “Most of the residents of Dagestan became victims of repression under him, and they still perceive any positive attitude towards Stalin as an insult to the memory of their ancestors. Deported Chechens, Ingush and other peoples live in Dagestan. Therefore, we decided to settle on the fact that there is already a street in honor of him, but a monument would be too much,” said the then mayor of Dagogney, Galim Galimov.

At the end of April 2019, the head of South Ossetia, Anatoly Bibilov, decided to use the name “Stalinir”  to designate the capital of the republic during festivities dedicated to the Great Patriotic War.

In May 2019,  the third monument to Joseph Stalin was erected in the Stavropol region in four years . And on May 8, 2017, a monument to Stalin was erected and opened in the village of Trunovsky, Stavropol Territory 16 . In December 2019, a bust of Stalin appeared in Volgograd, which sparked protests from citizens .

In 2015-2017, new monuments to Joseph Stalin were erected in a number of Russian cities. Thus, on May 9, 2016, a bust of Joseph Stalin was  unveiled in the village of Ozrek, Leskensky district, Kabardino-Balkaria . The decision to install the monument was made at a village meeting, where 70% of residents supported this initiative. A session of local government deputies gave permission to install the bust.

On February 1, 2023, busts of Stalin, Zhukov and Vasilevsky were unveiled in Volgograd on the occasion of the celebration of the 80th anniversary of the Battle of Stalingrad . This happened against the backdrop of another round of discussion about the advisability of renaming Volgograd to Stalingrad. According to the results of a survey by VTsIOM, 67% of citizens are against the renaming.

Источник: https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/261982/

© Кавказский Узел

Deportation of Chechens and Ingush

This is posted an an adjunct for related matter in rantburg.com

https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/202258/

© Кавказский Узеl

The situation in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic on the eve of deportation

In the fall of 1921, Chechnya was separated from the Mountain Republic (ASSR), which in 1922 was transformed into the Chechen National District, and then into an autonomous region. In July 1924, by decision of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the Mountain Republic was abolished, creating in its place two autonomous regions - Ingush and North Ossetian. The center of both these regions was the city of Vladikavkaz, which received the status of an autonomous city 1 . At the beginning of 1929, the Sunzhensky Cossack district was also annexed to the Chechen Autonomous Okrug. In mid-January 1934, the Chechen and Ingush Autonomous Regions were united into the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Region. In December 1936, it received the status of an autonomous republic within the USSR (ASSR). 

According to the All-Union Population Census of 1939, Checheno-Ingushetia has 697 thousand inhabitants (0.4% of the USSR population). The majority were Chechens (668.4 thousand people). (52.9%). Ingush - 83.8 thousand people. (12.0%) - were the third largest nationality in the republic. Both Chechens and Ingush were predominantly rural residents (92.6 and 97.8%). Their total share in the rural population (84.9%) was 22.0% higher than their share in the population of the Chi ASSR as a whole. Russians constituted the second largest ethnic group in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic - 201 thousand people. (28.8%). They and the Ukrainians, Armenians, Jews and Tatars who lived in the republic gravitated towards the cities. The share of Russians in the urban population was 71.5%; the second largest urban nation was the Chechens, but they, even together with the Ingush, accounted for only 14.6% 2 .

In 1922-1923, Soviet power in Chechnya and Igushetia was very weak and actually existed only on paper. Real power belonged to the sheikhs and teip structures, which, in order to protect the population from attacks by gangs and counteract food companies, created Sharia units and courts. In response, the population, traditionally united along the teip line, supported the nationalists almost everywhere, with the exception of part of the mountainous regions. In the villages (especially in Chechnya) there was a process of mullahs infiltrating the councils and actually seizing the instruments of secular Soviet power. At the same time, Muslim schools and charitable organizations were still functioning, which were often no less influential than the councils 3 . 

The mountaineers had such a large amount of weapons that regular units were forced to carry out operations to disarm the villages. Therefore, until 1938, Chechens and Ingush were taken into the Red Army as an exception. Fearing the participation of armed police in robberies and raids, in the spring of 1923 Moscow decided to completely abandon the practice of recruiting police officers from among local residents, even if they were pro-Soviet 4 . Soon, however, the only exception was made for the line militia, designed to protect the railway and trains from attacks by bandits.  

The seizure of weapons and the opposition of the revolutionary committees to “political banditry” did not save the territory from a series of uprisings: during the period 1921-1940, at least six major rebel anti-Soviet uprisings took place on the territory of the Mountain and then the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics.  

In 1940, 1055 people were arrested in the Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, 839 rifles and revolvers, a lot of ammunition were confiscated, and 846 deserters were put on trial. In the same year, the rebel organization of Sheikh Magomet-Hadji Kurbanov was identified, and in January 1941, an armed uprising was localized in the Itum-Kalinsky region under the leadership of Idris Magomadov.

After the outbreak of the war, the mobilization of the Chechens and Ingush was actually disrupted, despite the fact that conscription in 1940-1941 was carried out in full accordance with the law on universal conscription. As stated in the collection of documents prepared by the international foundation "Democracy" "Stalin's deportations. 1928-1953": "believing and hoping that the USSR would lose the war, many mullahs and teip authorities agitated for evasion of military service or desertion . "

Due to mass desertion and evasion from service, in the spring of 1942, by order of the USSR NGO, the conscription of Chechens and Ingush into the army was canceled. In 1943, the conscription of approximately 3 thousand people was allowed, but almost two thirds of them deserted. Because of this, it was not possible to form the 114th Chechen-Ingush Cavalry Division; it had to be reorganized into a regiment. After this, desertion also became widespread 5 .

It should be noted that the behavior of the Chechens and Ingush who deserted from the ranks of the Red Army or even went over to the enemy’s side was not something exceptional. In total, from 800 thousand to a million Soviet citizens of all nationalities served the Germans with weapons in their hands during the war.

On the other hand, according to data released by Russian historian Vasily Filkin, 28.5 thousand Chechens and Ingush fought on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War (19.5 thousand who were called up or went to the front as volunteers, plus nine thousand of those whom the war found in the army). According to information from the Chechen Society of War Veterans, the number of war participants reaches 44 thousand people 6 . Many Vainakhs who went to the front showed their best side . During the war years, 10 Vainakhs became Heroes of the Soviet Union. 2,300 Chechens and Ingush died in the war.

With the beginning of the war, anti-Soviet armed groups in the Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic intensified.

In October 1941, two separate anti-Soviet uprisings broke out in the Shatoisky, Itum-Kalinsky, Vedeno, Cheberloevsky and Galanchozhsky districts under the leadership of Khasan Israilov and Mairbek Sheripov. They were directed, first of all, against the collective farm system. At the beginning of 1942, Israilov and Sheripov united, creating the "Provisional People's Revolutionary Government of Checheno-Ingushetia."

As the front line approached the border of the republic in 1942, the rebel forces began to act more actively. In August - September 1942, collective farms were dissolved in almost all mountainous regions of Chechnya, and several thousand people, including dozens of Soviet functionaries, joined the uprising of Israilov and Sheripov.

After the appearance of German landing forces (most of them recruited Chechens and Ingush) in Chechnya in the fall of 1942, the NKVD accused Israilov and Sheripov of creating the pro-fascist parties “National Socialist Party of the Caucasian Brothers” and “Checheno-Mountain National Socialist Underground Organization.”

However, there was no “universal participation of Chechens and Ingush in anti-Soviet gangs.” The NKVD registered 150-200 armed groups on the territory of Checheno-Ingushetia with a total number of 2-3 thousand militants. This is approximately 0.5% of the population of Chechnya.

In total, from the beginning of the war until January 1944, 55 armed groups were liquidated in the republic, 973 militants were killed, 1,901 people were arrested - militants or their accomplices.

Justification for deportation

The territory of the Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was practically not under occupation, so it was not easy to accuse its people of direct betrayal. In addition, the deportation took place when the Wehrmacht had already been driven back hundreds of kilometers from the Caucasus, and, therefore, was not a military necessity, but a frankly punitive act.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR motivated the decision to deport Chechens and Ingush by the fact that “during the Great Patriotic War, especially during the actions of the Nazi troops in the Caucasus, many Chechens and Ingush betrayed their Motherland, went over to the side of the fascist occupiers, and joined the ranks of saboteurs and intelligence officers , thrown by the Germans into the rear of the Red Army, created armed gangs at the behest of the Germans to fight against Soviet power, and also taking into account that many Chechens and Ingush for a number of years participated in armed uprisings against Soviet power and for a long time, being not engaged in honest labor, carry out bandit raids on collective farms in neighboring regions, rob and kill Soviet people." In particular, the existence of a mass rebel organization “United Party of Caucasian Brothers” under the leadership of Khasan Israilov (Terloev) and others was asserted.

Although deportation is recognized as a crime in Russian historiography, its reason - “collaboration with the Nazis” - is often described as a proven fact with reference to NKVD documents. However, Wehrmacht archival documents paint a different picture. There were indeed plans to raise an uprising in Checheno-Ingushetia by sending in saboteurs, but they failed due to lack of support from local residents. What the son of one of the surviving participants in Operation Shamil said, what historians assess about her role in the decision on deportation, read in the article “ Operation Shamil: how the failure of the Abwehr became the reason for the deportation of the Vainakhs ” on the “Caucasian Knot”.

In October 1943, Deputy People's Commissar, State Security Commissioner of the 2nd Rank B.Z. traveled to the republic to study the situation. Kobulov. In the memorandum of L.P. He wrote to Beria: “The attitude of the Chechens and Ingush towards Soviet power was clearly expressed in desertion and evasion of conscription into the Red Army. During the first mobilization in August 1941, out of 8,000 people subject to conscription, 719 people deserted. In October 1941, from 4,733 people 362 evaded conscription. In January 1942, during the formation of the national division, only 50 percent of the personnel were conscripted. In March 1942, out of 14,576 people, 13,560 people deserted and evaded service, went into hiding, went to the mountains and joined the gangs. In 1943, out of 3,000 volunteers, the number of deserters was 1,870 . "

According to Kobulov, there were 38 sects in the republic, including over 20,000 people. These were mainly hierarchically organized Muslim religious brotherhoods of murids.

“They are conducting active anti-Soviet work, sheltering bandits and German paratroopers. When the front line approached in August-September 1942, 80 members of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) quit their jobs and fled, including 16 leaders of the district committees of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), 8 leading employees of the district executive committees and 14 collective farm chairmen ,” wrote Bogdan Kobulov.

Operation Lentils - preparation

In November 1943, Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs V. Chernyshev held a meeting with the heads of the NKVD of the Altai and Krasnoyarsk territories, Omsk and Novosibirsk regions. In particular, he discussed with them issues related to the planned Operation Lentils - the deportation of about 0.5 million Vainakhs (Chechens and Ingush). It was tentatively planned to resettle 35-40 thousand people each in the Altai Territory, Omsk Region and Krasnoyarsk Territory, and in the Novosibirsk Region. – 200 thousand people. But these regions apparently managed to evade, and in the plan presented to Beria in mid-December, the dislocation was completely different: the mountaineers were distributed between the regions of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

To maintain order in the areas of new settlements, it was planned to open 145 district and 375 village special commandant's offices with 1,358 employees. The issue of vehicles was also resolved. In order to ensure transportation, the People's Commissariat of Railways of the USSR was ordered to supply 350 covered cars from January 23 to March 13, 1944, from February 24 to 28 - 400 cars, from March 4 to 13 - 100 cars daily. A total of 152 routes of 100 cars each were formed, and a total of 14,200 cars and 1 thousand platforms. 7

On January 29, 1944, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.P. Beria approved the “Instructions on the procedure for the eviction of Chechens and Ingush.”

On January 31, 1944, the State Defense Committee, chaired by I.V. Stalin issued two resolutions on the deportation of Chechens and Ingush: No. PGKO-5073ss "On measures to accommodate special settlers within the Kazakh and Kirghiz SSR" and No. PGKO-5074ss "On the procedure for accepting livestock and agricultural products in the North Caucasus."

On February 17, 1944, Beria reported to Stalin that 459,486 people had been registered as subject to resettlement, including those living in Vladikavkaz and Dagestan. During the first mass operation (the "first echelon" phase), 310,620 Chechens and 81,100 Ingush were to be sent.

On February 20, 1944, L. Beria arrived in Grozny together with I. Serov, B. Kobulov and S. Mamulov to personally supervise the operation. The operation involved large forces - up to 19 thousand operatives of the NKVD, NKGB and SMERSH and about 100 thousand officers and soldiers of the NKVD troops drawn from all over the country to participate in "exercises in the mountainous areas." The operation was scheduled to last eight days.

Operation "Lentil" - active phase

February 21 L.P. Beria issued NKVD order No. 00193 on the deportation of Chechens and Ingush.

On February 22, Beria met with the leadership of the republic and senior spiritual leaders, warned them about the operation scheduled for the early morning of February 23, and offered to carry out the necessary work among the population. 8

The influence of spiritual leaders was enormous and their cooperation in this matter was considered extremely important. “Both the party-Soviet and clergy, who are used by us, were promised some resettlement benefits (the norm of things allowed for export will be slightly increased) ,” Beria told Stalin.

Operation Lentil began on February 23, 1944 at 02:00 local time, when the code signal "Panther" was broadcast over the radio.

At six in the morning, the military began knocking on houses and waking up the owners, giving them two hours to get ready. They were then transported by truck to the nearest railway stations and loaded into “tevushki”.

It was allowed to take up to 500 kg of cargo per family, but in fact most of the things had to be left behind, since each carriage had to fit 45 people with all their property. “Special settlers” were supposed to hand over livestock and grain and receive in return a similar amount from the authorities at their new places of residence, but in most cases this rule was not followed.

On February 23, the first day of the operation, 333,739 people were evicted, of which 176,950 were loaded into wagons. By March 1, 478,479 people were deported, of which 387,229 were Chechens and 91,250 Ingush (among them were about 500 representatives of other peoples, mainly Avars, evicted by mistake). About 6 thousand Chechens were stuck in the mountains in the Galanzhoi region due to snow; the operation there lasted until March 2.

According to official data, 780 people were killed during the operation, 2,016 “anti-Soviet elements” were arrested, and more than 20,072 firearms were seized. 6,544 people managed to hide in the mountains.

At the end of the 1980s, an operation in the high-mountainous village of Khaibakh in the Galanzhoi (now in the territory of the Achkhoy-Martan) region received wide publicity. On February 23, heavy snow began to fall in the area of ​​the village of Khaibakh, blocking the roads and preventing residents from descending from the mountains, thereby disrupting the deportation schedule. Commissar of State Security of the 3rd rank Mikhail Gvishiani ordered people - about 200 people, according to other evidence - 600-700 people - to be driven into a collective farm stable and burned. Those who tried to escape were shot with machine guns. Residents of the surrounding farms were also shot 9 .

Two commissions were created to investigate the operation in this area - in 1956 and 1990, but the criminal case was never brought to an end. The official report of the 3rd rank State Security Commissioner M. Gvishiani, who led the operation in this area, spoke only of several dozen killed or died along the way.

In addition, according to the collection of documents published by the Democracy Foundation "Stalin's deportations. 1928-1953", in one of the villages three people were killed, including an eight-year-old boy, in another - "five old women", in a third - " according to unspecified data" "arbitrary execution of the sick and crippled up to 60 people."

Some employees of the People's Commissariat of State Security reported “a number of ugly facts of violation of revolutionary legality, arbitrary executions of old Chechen women, sick, cripples who remained after the resettlement, who could not follow,” but no one was punished.

The last to leave their homeland, on February 29, were the national political elite of the Chi ASSR: they were sent in separate echelons to Alma-Ata. The only relief for the elite was that they were transported in normal passenger carriages and were allowed to take more things. A few months later, in the summer of 1944, several spiritual leaders of the Chechens were summoned to the republic to help persuade the militants and Chechens who had evaded deportation to stop resisting.

In total, as follows from the report of the head of the NKVD convoy troops, General Bochkov Beria, 493,269 people were sent in 180 trains of 65 cars each (an average of 2,740 people per train). On the way, 56 babies were born and 1,272 people died, mainly from colds or exacerbation of chronic diseases.

“In “veal cars” crowded to the limit, without light or water, we followed for almost a month to an unknown destination... - said the head of the department of the former North Ossetian regional committee of the CPSU Ingush Kh. Arapiev. - I went for a walk with typhoid. war... During short stops, on remote deserted sidings near the train, the dead were buried in snow black from locomotive soot (going further than five meters from the carriage threatened death on the spot)..." 10

By March 20, 491,748 deported Chechens and Ingush had arrived.

In July 1944, Beria presented final information to Stalin : “In pursuance of the resolution of the State Defense Committee of the NKVD, in February-March 1944, 602,193 people from the North Caucasus were resettled for permanent residence in the Kazakh and Kyrgyz SSR, of which 496,460 were Chechens and Ingush, Karachais - 68,327, Balkars - 37,406 people."

The vast majority of Vainakh migrants were sent to Kazakhstan (239,768 Chechens and 78,470 Ingush) and Kyrgyzstan (70,097 Chechens and 2,278 Ingush). The areas of concentration of Chechens in Kazakhstan were Akmola, Pavlodar, North Kazakhstan, Karaganda, East Kazakhstan, Semipalatinsk and Alma-Ata regions, and in Kyrgyzstan - Frunzensk and Osh. Hundreds of special settlers who worked in their homeland in the oil industry were sent to fields in the Guryev region.

By decree of March 8, 1944, 714 participants in the deportation were awarded “for exemplary performance of special tasks,” including the military orders of Suvorov, Kutuzov and the Red Banner.

However, the deportation did not end there. Until the end of 1945, it was subjected to Chechens and Ingush who remained for various reasons on the territory of the republic, who lived in neighboring regions and republics, who were serving sentences in penal colonies and labor camps located on the territory of the European part of the RSFSR, and who were mobilized into the Red Army. According to the Department of Special Settlements of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, among the special settlers of the North Caucasus who returned from the front, there were 710 officers, 1,696 sergeants, and 6,488 privates.

Toponymic repressions

On March 7, 1944, by Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was liquidated, and in place of the areas inhabited by Chechens, the Grozny District was created as part of the Stavropol Territory. It included, however, less than 2/3 of the former territory of the Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic; at the same time, the northeastern regions of the Stavropol Territory, inhabited by Nogais, Dargins, Kumyks (until 1937, these lands were part of Dagestan) and Russians, were added to its composition. Later, the Grozny district was transformed into the Grozny region (with the inclusion of the former Kizlyar district).

The part of Checheno-Ingushetia not included in the Grozny district - its former western and, in part, southern regions (that is, Ingushetia itself) - were transferred to Georgia and North Ossetia, and the eastern and southeastern ones (in particular, Vedensky, Nozhayurtovsky, Sayasanovsky, Cheberloevsky within the existing borders, as well as, partially, Kurchaloevsky, Sharoevsky and Gudermes districts) are annexed to Dagestan.

Most of the regions inhabited by the Ingush were included in the SO ASSR, with the exception of the Sunzhensky and Galashkinsky (Assinskaya Valley) regions, included in the Grozny District, as well as the southern part of the Prigorodny District (Dzherakhovskaya Valley), which was transferred to Georgia. Part of the Kurpsky district of Kabardino-Balkaria, where Ingush also lived before the deportation, also went to North Ossetia. Even earlier, by Decree of March 1, 1944, the city of Mozdok with a Russian population was assigned to North Ossetia from the Stavropol Territory. The “liberated” lands after the deportation are populated mainly by Ossetians from Georgia (in the Prigorodny district) and Russians (in Sunzhensky).

Accordingly, all Ingush names were repressed and replaced with Ossetian or Russian ones. Thus, by the Decree of the PVS of the RSFSR dated April 29, 1944, the areas that separated from Checheno-Ingushetia to North Ossetia were renamed: a) Psedakhsky - to Alansky; b) Nazranovsky - to Costa-Khetagurovsky; c) Achaluksky - to Nartovsky (with the transfer of the center from the village of Achaluki to the village of Nartovskoye - former Kantyshevo). By another Decree of the PVS of the RSFSR (dated August 30, 1944), all districts and their centers in the Grozny region were renamed.

IDPs, including children, were required to report weekly to special commandant's offices. Leaving one's place of residence without permission was punishable by 20 years in the camps.

The authorities were not everywhere able to provide new arrivals with food, work and housing. It is difficult to say what was more here: cruelty towards the “traitors”, or the usual confusion inevitable with a hasty and mass relocation.

Rehabilitation and return

On June 16, 1956, restrictions on special settlements were lifted from Chechens and Ingush, but without the right to return to their homeland.

On January 9, 1957, by decrees of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces and the Presidium of the RSFSR Armed Forces, the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was restored, which included three regions taken from the Stavropol Territory and populated mainly by Cossacks and Nogais - Kargalinsky, Shelkovsky and Naursky. The Chechen lands that went to Dagestan and Georgia were completely returned, and Chechen and Ingush names were restored for most regions.

A number of mountainous regions, under the pretext of the economic inexpediency of conducting agriculture in them, were closed for Chechens to live in (Itumkalinsky, Galanzhosky and Sharoevsky districts; before the deportation, more than 75 thousand people lived in them), and their inhabitants began to be settled in Cossack villages and in flat villages three districts transferred from the Stavropol Territory. The return to their native villages of Akkin Chechens who lived before deportation in the Khasavyurt, Novo-Lak and Kazbekovsky regions of Dagestan was prohibited: for them, according to a special resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Dagestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic No. 254 of July 16, 1958, a special passport regime was established for them.

Approximately 1/6 of the former Ingush lands was not returned, in particular, the Prigorodny district adjacent to Vladikavkaz and somewhat truncated during deportation (one of the five Ingush districts transferred after deportation to North Ossetia), a narrow strip on the right side of the Daryal Gorge from the border from Georgia to the Armkhi River (this section, like the Dzherakhov Gorge, was part of Georgia from 1944 to 1956), as well as part of the former Psedakh region - a narrow 5-7 km strip connecting the main territory with the Mozdok region (the so-called "Mozdok Ossetian Corridor").

Immediately after the decree, tens of thousands of Chechens and Ingush in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan quit their jobs, sold off their property and began to seek emigration to their previous place of residence.

In the spring of 1957, 140 thousand people returned to their homeland. (with a plan of 78 thousand people), and by the end of the year - about 200 thousand people. The authorities were forced in the summer of 1957 to temporarily suspend the return of Chechens and Ingush to their homeland.

One of the reasons was the tense situation developing in the North Caucasus - local authorities were not prepared for the massive return and conflicts between the Vainakhs and settlers from Central Russia and land-poor regions of the North Caucasus who occupied their homes and lands in 1944.

In August 1958, after a domestic murder, riots broke out, about a thousand people seized the regional party committee in Grozny and staged a pogrom there. 32 people were injured, including four employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, two civilians died and 10 were hospitalized, almost 60 people were arrested.

Ossetian population from Nazran, Psedakh and Achaluk districts during 1957–1958. was resettled - but not to Georgia, from where he was brought according to a random order, but to the Prigorodny district, in which Ossetian settlers who had settled there also remained.

The Ingush were not prohibited from returning to the Prigorodny district. But they had to return to villages occupied by strangers, to build on the outskirts and backyards, under the oblique, unfriendly glances of uninvited neighbors, or even out of nowhere (this is how, for example, the completely new Ingush village of Kartsa arose). As a result, the Prigorodny district became an area of ​​interstriated, mixed and very dense settlement of two ethnic groups with strained relations with each other.

In 1959, only no more than 60% of Chechens and 50% of Ingush lived in their homeland (including the Prigorodny district). By 1970, this share had reached 90% and 85%, respectively.

In general, the rate of return of Chechens and, especially, Ingush to their homeland was significantly lower than that of other repressed peoples. In the case of the Ingush, this is largely due to the non-return of lands.

Unlike other national formations within the USSR, the post of first secretary of the Chechen-Ingush regional party committee has always been occupied by Russians. The only exception was the last party head of the republic, Doku Zavgaev .

On November 14, 1989 and April 26, 1991, the laws of the USSR and the RSFSR “On the rehabilitation of repressed peoples” were adopted, mostly duplicating each other.

On the one hand, they provided for “the recognition and implementation of their right to restore the territorial integrity that existed before the unconstitutional policy of forcibly redrawing borders, to restore the national-state formations that existed before their abolition, as well as to compensate for damage caused by the state.”

On the other hand, it was stated that “the rehabilitation process should not infringe on the rights and legitimate interests of citizens currently living in these territories.”

The intractable contradiction led to conflicts that were never fully resolved.


Attitudes towards mourning in Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan

The Day of Remembrance and Sorrow was celebrated in Chechnya on the day Stalin's deportation of the Vainakhs began  on February 23 , but in 2011 it was moved to May 10. The head of Chechnya,  Ramzan Kadyrov,  explained this decision by saying that the republic should celebrate Russian national holidays together with other regions. As a result, according to local residents, May 10, the Day of Remembrance and Sorrow,  was replaced by mourning for the former president of the republic, Akhmat Kadyrov, who died on this day in 2004 as a result of a terrorist attack.

The head of the Assembly of the Peoples of the Caucasus , Ruslan Kutaev , who publicly spoke out in 2014 against the ban on February mourning events, was convicted on falsified charges and sent to prison for almost four years, says the information published on the "Caucasian Knot" " How Kadyrov made a funeral out of February 23 holiday ".

However, on February 23, 2019, on the 75th anniversary, ceremonies were held in mosques throughout Chechnya, and a funeral meeting was held in Grozny. A year later, Ramzan Kadyrov and other Chechen officials took part in a mourning event dedicated to the 76th anniversary. The legalization of mourning was a consequence of the strengthening of Kadyrov’s positions, say Caucasian experts interviewed by the Caucasian Knot.

In 2021, the Elgas and Chechen Tour companies offered a special forces tour to Chechnya as an idea for the “ideal gift” for Defender of the Fatherland Day . And, although this proposal caused many negative comments on social networks, the fact itself indicates the erosion of a clear understanding of the historical tragedy of deportation among the Chechen establishment.

Ingushetia annually holds commemorative events . The Akkin Chechens living in Dagestan also did not interrupt the mourning tradition.

In the Novolaksky region of Dagestan, commemorative events marking the anniversary of the deportation of the Vainakhs were prohibited in 2022. Representatives of the local Chechen community considered such actions on the part of the republican authorities offensive. Despite the ban, several dozen people gathered at the mourning rally . In 2023, the authorities recommended that organizers of commemorative events marking the anniversary of the deportation of Chechens and Ingush in the Novolaksky district not discuss political topics and problems of the Aukhovsky district at rallies.

In 2024, on the eve of the 80th anniversary of the deportation of the Vainakhs, the local prosecutor's office warned  organizers of mourning Muslim rites of remembrance in the Novolaksky region of Dagestan about the inadmissibility of holding unauthorized actions, including rallies and pickets.

Notes

Actual link can be found on the original page

Akopyan V. On the history of the Armenian community of Vladikavkaz in the 20s of the twentieth century. Bulletin of North Ossetian State University named after K.L. Khetagurova (Vladikavkaz). ISSN: 1994-7720 ↑ 

All-Union Population Census of 1939. Main results. M., 1992. ↑ 

On May 1, 1930, in Chechnya there were 675 public and 2000 cubic mosques, 450 public and 800 cubic mullahs, 34 sheikhs, 250 descendants of the Prophet Mohammed and other religious authorities, 150 healers, 168 Arab schools of higher and lower type, 32 sects operated : Vainakhs and imperial power: the problem of Chechnya and Ingushetia in the internal politics of Russia and the USSR (beginning of the 19th - mid-20th centuries) / V. A. Kozlov, F. Benvenuti, M. E. Kozlova, P. M. Polyan et al. M.: Foundation "Presidential Center of B. N. Yeltsin", 2011. P. 448-449. ↑ 

Chechnya: Armed struggle in the 20-30s // Military-historical archive, No. 2, 1997, P. 124. ↑ 

Punished people. How Chechens and Ingush were deported // RIA Novosti, 02.22.2008. ↑ 

Artem Krechetnikov. Operation "Lentil": 65 years of deportation of the Vainakhs // BBC Russian*, 02/23/2009. ↑ 

Bugai N.F. The truth about the deportation of the Chechen and Ingush peoples // Questions of History, No. 7, 1990. ↑ 

P. Polyan. Not of your own free will... History and geography of forced migrations to the USSR. O.G.I - Memorial**, Moscow, 2001. ↑ 

Body resistance // Izvestia, 03/17/2004. ↑ 

Bugai N.F. Deportation of peoples. Sat. "War and Society", 1941-1945 book two. M., 2004. ↑ 

Источник: https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/202258/

© Кавказский Узел

Chernarus Defense Forces Deployments

- no title specified

Unit

Regional Assignment

Last Operation

Chernarus Coastal Operations Group

Chernarus 1st Army Corps

Chernarus

Chernarus 4th Separate Light Mountain Rifle Brigade

Chernarus

1st Battalion

Eastern Chernarus

2nd Battalion

Western Chernarus

3rd Battalion

Reserve

4th Battalion

Reserve

Chernarus 9th Separate Light Rifle Brigade

Chernarus

1st Battalion

Sumava

2nd Battalion

Reserve

3rd Battalion

Reserve

4th Battalion

Reserve

Chernarus 43rd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade

Chernarus

1st Battalion

Reserve

2nd Battalion

Reserve

3rd Battalion

Reserve

4th Tank Battalion

Reserve

5th Tank Battalion

Reserve

Chernarus 1st Tank Brigade

Chernarus

1st Tank Battalion

Reserve

2nd Tank Battalion

Reserve

3rd Tank Battalion

Reserve

4th Motorized Rifle Battalion

Reserve

5th Motorized Rifle Battalion

Reserve

Chernarus 2nd Army Corps

Beketov/Leskovets

Chernarus 7th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade

Leskovets

1st Battalion

Leskovets

2nd Battalion

Reserve

3rd Battalion

Reserve

4th Tank Battalion

Leskovets

5th Motorized Rifle Battalion

Reserve

Chernarus 11th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade

Leskovets

1st Battalion

Reserve

2nd Battalion

Reserve

3rd Battalion

Reserve

4th Tank Battalion

Reserve

5th Tank Battalion

Reserve

Chernarus 17th Separate Light Rifle Brigade

Beketov

1st Battalion

Beketov

2nd Battalion

Beketov

3rd Battalion

Reserve

4th Battalion

Reserve

Chernarus 3rd Tank Brigade

NW Chernarus

1st Battalion

Korsac

2nd Battalion

NW Chernarus

3rd Battalion

NW Chernarus

4th Motorized Rifle Battalion

Reserve

5th Motorized Rifle Battalion

Reserve

Chernarus 43rd Mountain Rifle Corps

North Zagoria

Chernarus 13th Mountain Motorized Rifle Brigade

Werferlingen

1st Battalion

Werferlingen

2nd Battalion

Reserve

3rd Battalion

Werferlingen

4th Tank Battalion

Reserve

5th Tank Battalion

Reserve

Chernarus 33rd Mountain Motorized Rifle Brigade

Cham

1st Battalion

Reserve

2nd Battalion

Cham

3rd Battalion

Reserve

4th Tank Battalion

Reserve

5th Tank Battalion

Reserve

Chernarus 24th Separate Light Mountain Rifle Brigade

Livonia

1st Battalion

Summa

2nd Battalion

Livonia

3rd Battalion

Gabreta

4th Battalion

Reserve

Chernarus 10th Separate Tank Brigade

North Zagoria

1st Tank Battalion

Reserve

2nd Tank Battalion

Reserve

3rd Tank Battalion

North Zagoria

4th Motorized Rifle Battalion

North Zagoria

5th Motorized Rifle Battalion

Reserve

Separate Mechanized Cavalry Regiments

Chernarus 17th Separate Mechanized Cavalry Regiment

Leskovets

1st Mechanized Cavalry Battalion

Leskovets

2nd Mechanized Cavalry Battalion

Sumava

3rd Mechanized Cavalry Battalion

Reserve

Chernarus 19th Separate Mechanized Cavalry Regiment

Chernarus

1st Mechanized Cavalry Battalion

South Chernarus

2nd Mechanized Cavalry Battalion

North Zagoria

3rd Mechanized Cavalry Battalion

Reserve

Chernarus 20th Separate Mechanized Cavalry Regiment

Cham

1st Mechanized Cavalry Battalion

Zagorsk

2nd Mechanized Cavalry Battalion

Cham

3rd Mechanized Cavalry Battalion

NW Chernarus

Thursday, February 1, 2024

Chernarus Military Denies War Crimes in Kosovo, Controversy Erupts

Zelenogorsk, Chernarus - In a tense press conference, officials with the Chernarus Coastal Operations Group (ChCOG) vehemently denied accusations of war crimes and atrocities committed by Chernarus Defense and Naval forces in Kosovo. The charges, leveled by journalists from several publications, including the Zelenogorsk Pravda, stem from the recent discovery of a young Kosovar woman, Tatiana Meshchuk, found dead in Chernaya Bay.

Reporters pressed ChCOG officials on the cause of Meshchuk's death, the lack of public release of autopsy results, and alleged substance abuse issues surrounding the victim. Military officials deflected, offering an off-the-record glimpse of the autopsy while expressing disapproval of media reports mentioning Meshchuk's personal struggles.

The conference shifted focus to accusations of civilian massacres in Kosovo, with ChCOG placing blame squarely on separatist forces. Officials presented "hacked" materials, allegedly depicting atrocities committed by separatists, obtained during a raid on the peace group Trees for Peace, Meshchuk's employer. This move drew criticism from military analysts, who questioned the authenticity of the photos and criticized the lack of further investigation.

ChCOG countered these concerns, citing the chaotic nature of battlefield operations and the dangers of prolonged investigations under fire. Critics, however, pointed to the routine seizure of enemy intelligence, suggesting the military had ample opportunity for deeper investigation.

The press conference concluded with no clear resolution. Meshchuk's family will receive her remains next week, while the fate of potential charges against individuals or groups associated with the case remains uncertain. The incident has sparked public debate and media scrutiny, raising questions about accountability and the conduct of the Chernarus military in its ongoing conflict with separatist forces.

This is a fictional account based on the wargame Arma 3. While the text was rewritten and styled by Google Bard, the base facts were compiled by the author.