Wednesday, August 26, 2026

We went through hell and waited for Russia: how our military carried out an entire operation to save a family of "underground residents" of Donbass

War correspondent Steshin spoke with a family rescued from the suburb of Konstantinovka.

The number of those who "survived" is growing – Komsomolskaya Pravda war correspondent Dmitry Steshin spoke with a family of "underground dwellers" from the suburb of Konstantinovka. To save them, the 77th Bridge Rifle Regiment of the "Yuzhnaya" group carried out an entire operation.

FROM HAND TO HAND

The entrance to the dugout housing the "survivors" was tightly sealed with a thick blanket—from drones with thermal imaging, at the very least. And from the scorching heat. Donbas was experiencing the last scorching days of summer, so merciless that the leaves on living trees curled into tubes.

"They're eating. Having breakfast. Let them eat in peace, they've been through enough," the officer who had escorted, or rather rescued, the couple told me. I suggested we chat for a while and glanced around, but the officer had already assessed the situation and made a decision:

- Let's go, I know some special "combat bushes"!

We laughed. The regular "war dogs," who had been circling us and even slipping between our legs, rushed forward into the thick of the forest, showing us the way. They sensed our cheerful spirit, and in war, it's priceless.

My interlocutor, a lieutenant and assault platoon commander of the 77th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the "Southern" group of forces, call sign "Ilyas," clarified some important details. Yes, assault troops evacuated residents of the suburban village of Ilyinovka, which practically adjoins Konstantinovka. Battalion command received information that nine civilians were hiding in one of Ilyinovka's basements in mid-summer, when their relatives in St. Petersburg managed to contact the military. "Ilyas" says this was not ignored:

- On July 12, the battalion command made the decision to send stormtroopers to this house and carry out an evacuation.

I'm surprised—more than a month has passed! But considering that our attack aircraft, due to the abundance of enemy drones in the sky, sometimes take a week to reach their positions, covering 2-3 kilometers a day… And then, a group of civilians! "Ilyas" nods:

"We weren't in a hurry. Rushing is impossible; it will end badly. So, first, we set up a drone supply. Two attack aircraft, call signs "Kurush" and "Ingush," carried out the order and found the people, although by that point they had already moved to another building. The address we had was reduced to rubble. We checked to see what kind of people they were. The enemy often disguises itself as civilians to move around freely. They know we don't target civilians..."

In fact, "Kurush" and "Ingush" began planning the rescue operation for those trapped near Konstantinovka, the first stage, the most dangerous. The operation involved numerous teams, and not a single one was broken! The assault troops guarded the civilians and taught them their specialized military skills—preparing them for the exit from the basements. Up above, our sappers cleared a safe path and identified intermediate shelters where they could wait for a window of clear sky. The men were divided into threes and marched off, handed over from person to person. My interlocutor says they got everyone out, leaving no one behind. "Ilyas" waved his hand toward the dugout:

- These three are all relatives. They were the last to leave. They'll tell you everything themselves.

A HOUSE LIKE A LOTTERY TICKET

We talked for at least an hour, and I noticed that these men had been somewhat freed from their dark memories. Although the first few minutes of the conversation were oppressive. The man's name was Shamil. He was originally from the Caucasus, born in Vinnytsia in western Ukraine, but had lived his entire life in the Donbas. He had served in Afghanistan in the late 1980s. He was a unique type of Caucasian technical intellectual, a blast furnace repairman. I immediately identified his wife, Lena, as a doctor. And rightly so. But Elena's sister was still reeling from the shock. She didn't participate in the conversation, but she listened intently, and out of the corner of my eye, I saw shadows of memory flitting across her face. Lena recounted, without emotion:

"We were hoping to stay in our house for the entire time. We'd been preparing for it for a long time, stocking up on food, water, and medicine. We had a good basement, with a stove."

Lena takes Shamil by the hand, and I notice the pain on his face:

"My husband spent half his life building this house, from the ground up. It was our nest... But it couldn't hold up. They deliberately set it on fire; they saw us trying to put it out, and they kept throwing punches. We were saved by our neighbors' house; they didn't wait for anyone, they just packed up and left. And we won the lottery. You see, a house with a good basement is a lifeline!"

One can imagine how many times Elena pondered this precise thought. Shamil joins the conversation, saying that the first arrivals began a year ago, and he remembers the exact day—May 5th:

The roof collapsed on the house, then the stove in the basement collapsed. They piled debris around the house from morning until night, in a cross-shaped pattern and in a circle. A day, a week, a month… The house couldn't withstand it. They moved it under drones, hauling water and food. I transported my father-in-law in a garden cart. He lived in Konstantinovka, in an apartment, until it landed right in the corner of the building, right in his apartment. And it flew from the area of ​​our village through the city, we know that for sure.

And at that time the Ukrainian Armed Forces were stationed there.

I've already spoken to hundreds of "those who waited," from Soledar to Avdiivka, and I know what I'm about to hear, but I still ask Lena—why? She explains:

"There were too many of us left in Konstantinovka. The head of the administration came out to the central square to talk to people, and they started crawling out of the basements—a huge crowd! There were about 40,000 of us left..."

I know for a fact that after the "Russian Spring" of 2014, they deliberately imported administrators from Western Ukraine or seasoned, proven Banderites to the rebellious Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration to make it more docile. Lena recounts that as soon as the "Ukrainian authorities" (or " power" in Ukrainian ) fled Kostiantynivka, the Ukrainian Armed Forces immediately began shelling residential buildings in earnest. To expedite the evacuation of people toward Ukraine, during the most severe frosts, the city's electricity, heat, and water were cut off. But people remained patient and waited.

"THE BAD ONE HAS COME

"Finally, the Ukrainian Armed Forces entered the village to establish positions there; it was inevitable. Lena says:

"I immediately realized they were bad people—they didn't say hello, they turned away. If their pet dog attacked you, they'd never call you back, they'd just watch as it ripped and bit..."

Shamil found himself in the most dire situation—to feed himself, he had to constantly travel to Kostiantynivka, where the "man-catchers" from the Ukrainian military commissariats (TCK) were literally "fulfilling the mobilization plan for the 'waiting ones.'" They rounded up every man, cleaned out, "as a farewell." Shamil had secret routes, but he still had to "meet" the Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers:

"I'll never forget those names or call signs: 'Yurko' and 'Fashionable,' they came to 'educate' us. They dragged an 84-year-old man out of his bed and tried to force him to his knees... They tore his arm until it bled."

Lena is a doctor and makes a professional diagnosis for the "defenders":

"When all this was happening, it was obvious they were out of their minds, because their pupils were small, their eyes were darting around, their speech was incoherent. There he was, aiming his gun at me, and I was asking him: 'Do you need help? Do you need help with anything? Maybe water or food?'

And then he turns back into a normal person... We knew these people were armed, and we couldn't do anything against them. And when they left, I thought, thank God, that the Lord sent these people and then took them away.

Shamil sums up what was said:

We have a lot of friends in Ukraine. They're all sitting at home, hiding, while their wives work. They've been holed up in their apartments for years, trying to avoid joining that army. For them, as for us, Ukraine ended on May 2, 2014 (after the mass burning of people by nationalists in Odessa's Trade Union House – Author). Since then, this country has ceased to exist. If Ukraine's highest authority participates in the extermination of peaceful, ordinary people, its own citizens, it's not a country.

UNDERGROUND LIFEIn the winter, my interlocutors pinpointed the moment when the hunt for civilians began. Lena notes:

"It feels like they've brought in a different breed of Banderovites. We somehow got along with the old ones, but these guys started a full-blown hunt for civilians, even before the fighting started. They were hitting civilians with drones, people on bicycles, cars. Well, I don't know... SS or special forces, trained to destroy. They were clearing the area, yes. They were hitting stores."

And ten people, the entire basement community, practically stopped going upstairs. Elena's father died in the February frosts. At -25°C, hiding from drones, Shamil dug a grave with a crowbar in the neighbor's front garden. The facade of the house collapsed on it.

I console, if this word is appropriate, my interlocutors:

During the fighting in Mariupol, there were many burials in public gardens and courtyards. Almost immediately after liberation, everyone was reburied properly.

I ask about life in the basement. How did they get the news, what did they eat? Lena says they were incredibly lucky:

"There were two computer guys in the basement with us. They were hiding from the shopping center and didn't even want to evacuate. They somehow set up a modem and quickly downloaded the news once a day, in the evening. We read them out loud. We even watched Putin's New Year's greetings!"

Lena takes out her phone and shows me a video of people sorting through a half-burned bag of buckwheat. But she says they're lucky in some ways:

"In Ilyinovka there are big houses, big cellars, and big supplies. We collected them. Then we shared it all with the dogs, the cats, the rats. We found several sacks of rotten flour and dried them. And we managed to bake bread. Under threat of death, we stoked the stove and baked bread."

Shamil says that it was easier for them than for people in the city:

"We had a stove! We'd always haul in some firewood, cut something up, and cook it. We even found one in the house next door... they have a device like that for heating buses, it runs on diesel fuel. We used it during the day, and only lit the stove at night. We survived the frosts and kept it going until June. It was hot upstairs, but damp and cold in the basement."

OURS WERE GREETED WITH BORSCHT

The "underground dwellers" observed the moment when the Ukrainian Armed Forces troops began to pull back from the village, carrying off their belongings... Their numbers dwindled. Our attack aircraft, or rather, reconnaissance troops, entered. They avoided contact with the civilians, and those "waiting" were also afraid, not quite understanding who these people were. Everyone was understandable under these circumstances. Lena smiled for the first time in the entire conversation:

"They were watching us and realized we were a bunch of clueless civilians scurrying around basements scavenging for food. And then they came. Very cautiously. We made them borscht for joy! Ours! Ours! Ours!"

A little later, the Kurush and Ingush assault aircraft arrived in the basement, carrying out orders from command. They guarded the "waiting" troops in shifts. They stopped lighting the stove at night. Movement was restricted—so the enemy wouldn't spot the gathering. But Shamil was still hit by an enemy drone. Luckily, he managed to jump over the side of the building, only suffering a concussion and shrapnel wounds on his hands. The basement's inhabitants were being prepared mentally and physically for evacuation. The people in the basement moved very little, and the road ahead was difficult. Lena says:

- We were simply flying! Over bricks, over rebar. But still, we were passed from hand to hand 22 times! 22...

In front of Lena, on the table, there are stickers; she wrote down the fighters’ call signs on them:

"We were led along a trail laid by 'Sin.' He'd escorted a wounded man out the day before and led us. He led us to point 'Katso,' where we spent the night. From there, 'Thor' and 'Obrazetz' led us. It was a short section, but drones were buzzing above us, and mines were flying! 'Bek' received us, very calm. He explained how to lie face down by the trail or just freeze, standing still. When to run. From there, 'Magas' and 'Luka' led us; both were wounded, had been coming from the rear, and knew the way. We'd already passed the most dangerous section. We spent the night and were handed over to 'Spets' and 'Lyuty.'

For some reason, my interlocutors remembered a narrow path through the mined reeds. It had been mined with "petals," and not all of them had fallen to the ground, but remained suspended among the stems. If you brushed your shoulder against the edge of the path, you'd drop a mine—it would go off.

As my interlocutors recount, the third place they spent the night at, near "Zazik" and "Kazakh," was a proper hotel, with showers, beds, and linens. It was practically a rearguard action. And people's hands stopped shaking so much they couldn't hold a mug. Drones were still flying around here, but less frequently. Cars were already operating from here, and they carried the suffering people away from the war.

INSTEAD OF AN AFTERWORD

We understand their feat, and we will explain it to our enemies.

When the last shell falls, when the last drone whirs, and Victory and Peace come, we must not forget these people. There was an award called "Resident of Siege of Leningrad." It was given for surviving, for enduring. Even to children and schoolchildren of the heroic city under siege.

I think, even am sure, that it would be fair to also mention those who “waited” for Donbass, those who condemned themselves to earthly ordeals for the sake of returning to Russia.

There was no point in me asking Shamil and Elena why you remained under fire in Konstantinovka. We understand, and we'll explain it to the enemy.


Monday, June 22, 2026

ANALYSIS: OPERATION AT NOVOSELOVKA PERVAYA SECURES VILLAGE BUT EXPOSES COMMAND FRACTURES

 ZELENOGORSK PRAVDA

The Voice of the People
23 JUN 2026 | ISSUE No. 4,782


ANALYSIS: OPERATION AT NOVOSELOVKA PERVAYA SECURES VILLAGE BUT EXPOSES COMMAND FRACTURES

By Svetlana Golikova, Defense Issues Correspondent

The ongoing stabilization operations in the western districts have yielded a tactical victory for forces of the 4th BTR Battalion, but at a cost that has prompted an urgent restructuring of command and a significant operational response from Corps headquarters.

According to internal after-action reports and a subsequent Warning Order obtained by this correspondent, a task force successfully repelled a determined separatist assault on the village of Novoselovka Pervaya on 20 June. The operation, however, was marred by a critical failure in command and control during the withdrawal phase, resulting in the loss of the task force’s commanding officer and the isolation of friendly elements in the newly secured village.

The Defense and the Cost

Intelligence derived from seized civilian documents indicated that Wagner Group operatives were directing large militia formations towards Novoselovka Pervaya. A rapid assembly of mechanized infantry and attached armor from the 17th Mechanized Cavalry Regiment was executed to intercept the enemy.

The engagement was brutal and immediate. The task force commander, acting on the assumption that hostile forces would be delayed, moved his command squad directly to defensive positions on the northern edge of the village. This assumption proved fatal, as enemy infantry and vehicles arrived simultaneously, forcing the commander to initiate combat from a static posture to stem the tide.

Reinforcements in the form of T-55 tanks arrived to stabilize the line, allowing command to occupy its designated position. The enemy was eventually repelled after approximately an hour of sustained counterattacks. However, the victory was a pyrrhic one for the infantry, with the task force sustaining an estimated 50% casualty rate. 2nd Squad was effectively destroyed as a unit, its survivors—reduced from twelve to five—absorbed into the command squad.

The Withdrawal and the Intelligence Gap

With the village held, the task force commander initiated a withdrawal to the designated rally point at Mikhailovka, two kilometers to the south. It was at this juncture that the failure in the intelligence picture became lethal.

An urgent Warning Order issued on 22 June by Colonel S. Glukharev, Deputy Head of Intelligence Staff for the 43rd Mountain Rifle Corps, confirms a significant intelligence gap. While the initial intention of the enemy strike was known, the rapid insertion of an enemy armor block into Mikhailovka was not detected.

The task force commander, lacking real-time situational awareness, directed his remaining two tanks to secure the southern corridor. They were immediately destroyed by the entrenched enemy armor. In the subsequent engagement, the task force commander and his entire command squad were killed, leaving 3rd Squad—at half strength with a single intact BTR—isolated and surrounded within Novoselovka Pervaya.

The Command Response and Warning Order

The fallout from the engagement has been immediate. While Novoselovka Pervaya remains in friendly hands, the route to the south is severed, and the village is effectively isolated.

Colonel Glukharev’s directive, issued to all subordinate units, acknowledges the precarious situation and outlines a deliberate two-phase operation over the next 24 to 48 hours. The plan is a significant commitment of forces, focused on breaking the enemy’s fixed blocking position in Mikhailovka to prevent a larger encirclement.

  • Phase I (24 June): A heavy, armor-led assault from the south and east is ordered to defeat the enemy block in Mikhailovka. The directive warns of "severe and sustained" counterattacks and calls for combined arms tactics using tanks and mechanized infantry with artillery preparation.

  • Phase II (25 June): Following the presumed capture of Mikhailovka, forces will push north to Novoselovka Pervaya to extract the stranded 3rd Squad. The operation concludes with a controlled withdrawal back to Mikhailovka to establish a defensive line.

The directive explicitly notes the risk that enemy armor, likely operated by Wagner personnel, may exceed current anti-tank capabilities. The root cause of the initial failure—the lack of real-time intelligence on enemy movements—is also highlighted, with the Intelligence Section ordered to provide continuous updates on Wagner command and control (C2) links.

The Broader Context

The events at Novoselovka Pervaya and the subsequent crisis at Mikhailovka illustrate the fluid and lethal nature of the current operational environment. While the defense of the village is a tactical success, the loss of command leadership and the subsequent isolation of friendly troops demonstrate a continued vulnerability to enemy maneuver warfare and rapid armor insertion.

The success of the pending operation to rectify the situation will likely hinge on whether the forces involved have bridged the intelligence gap that cost them their commander just days prior.

PART I – AFTER ACTION REPORT (AAR) for June 22, 2026

PART I – AFTER ACTION REPORT (AAR)

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On 20 JUN 2026, intelligence (seized documents from civilian criminal operatives) confirmed that separatist forces, directed by Wagner Group operators, planned to seize the village of Novoselovka Pervaya—within 4th BTR Battalion’s operational area. A Task Force (TF) was rapidly assembled, including reinforcements from 17th Mechanized Cavalry Regiment, to intercept. The operation succeeded in holding the village but at severe cost. The TF commander and his command squad were later destroyed during withdrawal due to an unexpected enemy armor block in Mikhailovka. The village of Novoselovka Pervaya remains in friendly hands, but Mikhailovka is now held by enemy armor, isolating our forward elements.

2. MISSION NARRATIVE

  • Initial Plan: TF commander intended to occupy defensive positions on the Northern and Northwestern edges of Novoselovka Pervaya directly from the march, assuming enemy would not arrive in time.

  • Reality: Enemy infantry (large militia groups) and vehicles arrived simultaneously, negating the assumption. The TF commander engaged immediately from a defensive posture, pressing the enemy while awaiting reinforcements.

  • Reinforcement: T-55 tanks arrived, allowing the command squad to finally occupy its planned NW position. Enemy counterattacks continued for ~1 hour before tapering off.

  • Outcome: Village secured, but TF infantry sustained ~50% casualties. 2nd Squad (reduced from 12 to 5 personnel) was folded into Command Squad. 3rd Squad (at 50% strength, BTR intact) was ordered to withdraw to the rally point at Mikhailovka (2 km South).

3. WITHDRAWAL – CRITICAL FAILURE POINT

  • Battalion ops staff confirmed Novoselovka Pervaya was secure. TF commander initiated withdrawal.

  • Intelligence GAP: TF commander was unaware that enemy had already cut off Novoselovka Pervaya and moved armor into Mikhailovka, trapping 3rd Squad and blocking the southern corridor.

  • Orders Given: Tank 1 (then Tank 2) ordered south to break the armor block and secure a safe corridor.

  • Result: Both tanks were destroyed by enemy armor. The TF commander and his entire command squad were wiped out in the subsequent engagement.

4. CASUALTIES & STATUS (as of 22 JUN 26)

UnitStatus
TF Command SquadDestroyed (KIA)
2nd SquadFolded into Command Squad (now destroyed); original 12→5 survivors absorbed
3rd Squad~50% strength, BTR intact – currently isolated in Novoselovka Pervaya
Tank 1 & Tank 2Destroyed
Enemy Armor BlockConfirmed in Mikhailovka – intact and reinforced
Novoselovka PervayaHeld by friendly forces (but surrounded/enemy nearby)
MikhailovkaOccupied by enemy armor – blocks all withdrawal and reinforcement routes

5. INTELLIGENCE LESSONS LEARNED

  • Late warning: Intelligence on Wagner Group command of armed civilians reached the TF commander only just prior to arrival, allowing no planning adjustment.

  • Incomplete enemy picture: Signals intelligence and seized documents indicated the intent to strike, but did not reveal the speed of enemy armor insertion into Mikhailovka.

  • Comms shortfall: TF commander lacked real-time situational awareness of enemy armor movement behind his axis of advance during withdrawal.

6. COMMANDER’S ASSESSMENT (AAR)

  • The mission to secure Novoselovka Pervaya was tactically successful but operationally unsustainable due to failure to clear/cut enemy reinforcement routes.

  • Withdrawal was executed without adequate reconnaissance of the southern route.

  • Enemy armor in Mikhailovka represents a fixed blocking position that must be destroyed before any further friendly movement south or resupply north.


PART II – WARNING ORDER (WARNORD)

TO: All Subordinate Units (4th BTR Battalion, 17th Mechanized Cavalry Regiment, Attached Armor & Mechanized Cavalry Elements)
FROM: Colonel S. Glukharev, per Corps Intelligence Directive
ISSUE DATE: 22 JUN 2026
EXECUTION WINDOW: 24–25 JUN 2026
REFERENCE MAP: Chernarus 1:50,000, Sheets 4743-IV, 4744-III (Mikhailovka & Novoselovka Pervaya)


1. SITUATION

  • Enemy: A reinforced armor block (composition: at least 2+ tanks/IFVs, supported by Wagner-led militia infantry) holds Mikhailovka. They have cut Route South from Novoselovka Pervaya. Enemy counterattacks are expected to be severe and sustained once we engage.

  • Friendly: Isolated 3rd Squad (50% strength, 1 BTR) remains in Novoselovka Pervaya. All other forward elements are either destroyed or withdrawn. A new Task Force has been moved to its start line (coordinates to be promulgated in FRAGO) and is preparing for offensive action.

  • Civilian: Minimal non-combatant presence reported in Mikhailovka; assume all structures may be occupied by enemy observers/snipers.

2. MISSION

Conduct a two-phase operation over two consecutive days:

  • PHASE I (24 JUN 26 – Morning): Advance on Mikhailovka and defeat the enemy armor block in detail. This attack will be reinforced with additional heavy armor and mechanized cavalry. Expect and plan for severe enemy counterattacks attempting to maintain the block.

  • PHASE II (25 JUN 26 – Morning): Continue north to Novoselovka Pervaya, provide covering fire to extract all friendly forces (specifically 3rd Squad) from the village, and conduct a controlled withdrawal south back to Mikhailovka. Upon reaching Mikhailovka, establish a defensive line and prepare for a counterattack to permanently restore Novoselovka Pervaya to friendly control.

3. EXECUTION CONCEPT

  • Phase I (24 JUN):

    • Main effort: Armor-heavy assault from the south/east into Mikhailovka. Use combined arms (tanks + mechanized infantry) to fix and destroy enemy armor.

    • Support: Suppression of enemy infantry positions via mortar/artillery preparatory fires (call-for-fire plan to be issued).

    • Reserve: One mechanized cavalry company to guard flanks and react to counterattack.

  • Phase II (25 JUN):

    • After securing Mikhailovka, push north with covering force (armor + dismounts).

    • Extract 3rd Squad via designated pickup point (NW edge of Novoselovka Pervaya).

    • Withdraw all friendly elements south to Mikhailovka, establish hasty defensive positions, and prepare to repel enemy counterattack.

4. TASKS TO SUBORDINATE UNITS

UnitTask
4th BTR Battalion (reinforced)Lead Phase I assault on Mikhailovka; provide infantry support for armor
17th Mechanized Cavalry RegimentProvide mechanized cavalry for flank security and Phase II extraction coverage
Attached Heavy Armor (T-55/T-72)Primary breaching force against enemy armor block
Mortar/Artillery BatteryPrep fires on Mikhailovka (H-30 min); on-call fires for Phase II withdrawal
Engineer SupportPrepare breaching assets for possible obstacles in Mikhailovka
Intelligence SectionProvide continuous SIGINT/COMINT updates on enemy movements, particularly Wagner C2

5. COORDINATION INSTRUCTIONS

  • Start Line (SL): To be confirmed via FRAGO no later than 23 JUN 1800 hrs.

  • Time on Target (Phase I): 24 JUN, 0600 hrs (H-Hour).

  • Phase II Jump-off: No earlier than 25 JUN, 0600 hrs (dependent on Phase I success).

  • Logistics: Fuel/ammo resupply points established at Corps Logistics Hub (grid to follow). Pre-position repair assets behind the start line.

  • MEDEVAC: Casualty collection points to be designated in FRAGO; priority for 3rd Squad extraction.

6. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

  • TF Commander (Designate): To be named by Bn CO by 23 JUN.

  • Primary Frequency: Bn Tactical Net – Channel 3.

  • Alternate: HF backup – 7.825 MHz.

  • Call Signs: To be issued in FRAGO.

  • Reporting: SITREPs every 30 mins during Phases I & II; immediate contact reports for enemy armor engagements.

7. RISK ASSESSMENT

  • High: Enemy armor quality (Wagner-operated) may exceed our current AT capability. Counterattacks will be severe.

  • Medium: Isolation of 3rd Squad – extraction under fire carries high risk.

  • Low-Medium: Civilian casualties in Mikhailovka – ROE to be disseminated separately.

8. ADMINISTRATIVE REMARKS

  • All units will conduct final rehearsals (map/terrain model) on 23 JUN.

  • Ammunition state: Report to Bn S-4 by 23 JUN 1200.

  • Weather forecast: Clear skies, light winds – no degradation to air/ground observation.


AUTHORIZED BY:
Colonel S. Glukharev
Deputy Head of Intelligence Staff
43rd Mountain Rifle Corps

DISTRIBUTION: Cdr 4th BTR Bn, Cdr 17th Mech Cav Regt, Corps Ops, Corps Intel, TF (Designate)

END OF COMBINED AAR/WARNORD

Monday, May 18, 2026

OPERATIONS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (OIS) May 18th, 2026

 OPERATIONS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (OIS) – ChCOG-05-2026

TO: ChCOG Deputy Commander; 2nd Army Corps Commander; 43rd Mountain Rifle Corps Deputy Commander
FROM: RADM Igor Kasatonov, Commander Intelligence, Chernarus Coastal Operations Group
SUBJECT: Projected Enemy Summer Offensive – Northwestern Chernarus & North Zagoria
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET//NODIS//CHCOG-INT


1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

Enemy forces in two operational theaters—Northwestern Chernarus (3rd Tank Brigade sector) and North Zagoria (10th Separate Tank Brigade sector)—have used a three-week operational lull to conduct deliberate refit, reconstitution, and training. Signals intelligence (SIGINT), human intelligence (HUMINT), and captured enemy materiel indicate a coordinated enemy summer offensive is planned for both regions. Intent: fix or break through our line, accept attrition, and recapture damaged armor for reuse.

2. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE & CAPABILITIES

2.1 Northwestern Chernarus

  • Enemy holds a fixed defensive line contested during winter operations.

  • Mixed conventional force supplemented by civilian criminal command elements.

  • Demonstrated high risk tolerance: willing to absorb severe losses to maintain positions.

  • Receiving new armor and recovering damaged vehicles from previous battles. Repairs slow but methodical, enabling crew training cycles.

2.2 North Zagoria

  • Primary adversary: Russian special operations groups.

  • Past engagements costly to both sides: 4th BTR battalion’s after-action reports confirm friendly infantry losses offset by successful blunting of enemy counterattacks.

  • Enemy currently reconstituting same SOF units, integrating replacement personnel and repaired armor.

3. FRIENDLY FORCE STATUS

3.1 Northwestern Chernarus – 3rd Tank Brigade

  • 2nd Battalion sustained catastrophic losses (infantry and armor) during attack on village of Yalmta.

  • Supporting mechanized cavalry units crippled by winter operations.

  • Decision: 2nd Battalion will withdraw from line. 4th BTR Battalion will deploy in its stead.

  • Assessment: BTR units offer speed and dismounted tactical flexibility but possess reduced weaponry and lighter armor. Unsuitable for prolonged direct armored confrontation. Army Corps has no viable alternative.

3.2 North Zagoria – 10th Separate Tank Brigade

  • No combat operations for >3 weeks. Period used for resupply, refit, and retraining.

  • Battalion and brigade staffs report improved unit proficiency.

  • Army Corps, brigade, and battalion command expect to reliably defeat enemy incursions into Chernarusan territory.

4. EXPECTED ENEMY OPERATIONS (SUMMER OFFENSIVE)

  • Timeline: Late spring to early summer, following completion of enemy reconstitution.

  • Method: Synchronized pressure in both theaters to hold gained line and inflict punishing losses on Chernarusan armor.

  • Logistics: Enemy is deliberately stockpiling repaired armor and training new crews. Slow but deliberate buildup indicates an attritional rather than breakthrough-oriented plan.

5. ASSESSMENT & RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Northwestern Chernarus – HIGH RISK

  • 4th BTR Battalion is improperly matched for line-holding or counterattacks against enemy mixed armor.

  • Expect heavy friendly losses if committed to sustained offensive or defensive operations without mechanized cavalry or tank support.

  • Recommend: Limit 4th BTR Battalion to screening, rapid dismounted ambushes, and reserve counter-penetration roles. Request emergency reinforcement of at least one mechanized company from 2nd Army Corps reserve.

5.2 North Zagoria – CONTROLLED RISK

  • 10th Tank Brigade is tactically ready. Enemy also reconstituted, but not superior.

  • Most likely outcome: draw, with friendly forces inflicting disproportionate enemy losses if engagements remain in prepared defensive zones.

  • Recommend: Aggressive patrolling and pre-registered artillery counter-preparation to disrupt enemy assembly areas before offensive begins. Deny enemy freedom to choose engagement tempo.

6. COMMANDER’S FINAL IMPRESSION

The enemy has used the lull more effectively than we have in Northwestern Chernarus. Our command there is improvising with unsuitable BTR light armor because heavy units are broken. In North Zagoria, we are matched. The difference in summer casualties will be determined by how many of their tanks we kill before they cross their start lines.

RADM Igor Kasatonov
Commander Intelligence, Chernarus Coastal Operations Group

DISTRIBUTION: ChCOG Deputy Commander; 2nd Army Corps Commander; 43rd Mountain Rifle Corps Deputy Commander
ACTION OFFICER: ChCOG Intel Analysis Section, LTC M. Volkov
DOCUMENT REFERENCE: ChCOG/INT/2026-02-15/OPFOR-SUMMER