ANALYSIS: OPERATION AT NOVOSELOVKA PERVAYA SECURES VILLAGE BUT EXPOSES COMMAND FRACTURES

 ZELENOGORSK PRAVDA

The Voice of the People
23 JUN 2026 | ISSUE No. 4,782

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ANALYSIS: OPERATION AT NOVOSELOVKA PERVAYA SECURES VILLAGE BUT EXPOSES COMMAND FRACTURES

By Svetlana Golikova, Defense Issues Correspondent

The ongoing stabilization operations in the western districts have yielded a tactical victory for forces of the 4th BTR Battalion, but at a cost that has prompted an urgent restructuring of command and a significant operational response from Corps headquarters.

According to internal after-action reports and a subsequent Warning Order obtained by this correspondent, a task force successfully repelled a determined separatist assault on the village of Novoselovka Pervaya on 20 June. The operation, however, was marred by a critical failure in command and control during the withdrawal phase, resulting in the loss of the task force’s commanding officer and the isolation of friendly elements in the newly secured village.

The Defense and the Cost

Intelligence derived from seized civilian documents indicated that Wagner Group operatives were directing large militia formations towards Novoselovka Pervaya. A rapid assembly of mechanized infantry and attached armor from the 17th Mechanized Cavalry Regiment was executed to intercept the enemy.

The engagement was brutal and immediate. The task force commander, acting on the assumption that hostile forces would be delayed, moved his command squad directly to defensive positions on the northern edge of the village. This assumption proved fatal, as enemy infantry and vehicles arrived simultaneously, forcing the commander to initiate combat from a static posture to stem the tide.

Reinforcements in the form of T-55 tanks arrived to stabilize the line, allowing command to occupy its designated position. The enemy was eventually repelled after approximately an hour of sustained counterattacks. However, the victory was a pyrrhic one for the infantry, with the task force sustaining an estimated 50% casualty rate. 2nd Squad was effectively destroyed as a unit, its survivors—reduced from twelve to five—absorbed into the command squad.

The Withdrawal and the Intelligence Gap

With the village held, the task force commander initiated a withdrawal to the designated rally point at Mikhailovka, two kilometers to the south. It was at this juncture that the failure in the intelligence picture became lethal.

An urgent Warning Order issued on 22 June by Colonel S. Glukharev, Deputy Head of Intelligence Staff for the 43rd Mountain Rifle Corps, confirms a significant intelligence gap. While the initial intention of the enemy strike was known, the rapid insertion of an enemy armor block into Mikhailovka was not detected.

The task force commander, lacking real-time situational awareness, directed his remaining two tanks to secure the southern corridor. They were immediately destroyed by the entrenched enemy armor. In the subsequent engagement, the task force commander and his entire command squad were killed, leaving 3rd Squad—at half strength with a single intact BTR—isolated and surrounded within Novoselovka Pervaya.

The Command Response and Warning Order

The fallout from the engagement has been immediate. While Novoselovka Pervaya remains in friendly hands, the route to the south is severed, and the village is effectively isolated.

Colonel Glukharev’s directive, issued to all subordinate units, acknowledges the precarious situation and outlines a deliberate two-phase operation over the next 24 to 48 hours. The plan is a significant commitment of forces, focused on breaking the enemy’s fixed blocking position in Mikhailovka to prevent a larger encirclement.

• Phase I (24 June): A heavy, armor-led assault from the south and east is ordered to defeat the enemy block in Mikhailovka. The directive warns of "severe and sustained" counterattacks and calls for combined arms tactics using tanks and mechanized infantry with artillery preparation.

• Phase II (25 June): Following the presumed capture of Mikhailovka, forces will push north to Novoselovka Pervaya to extract the stranded 3rd Squad. The operation concludes with a controlled withdrawal back to Mikhailovka to establish a defensive line.

The directive explicitly notes the risk that enemy armor, likely operated by Wagner personnel, may exceed current anti-tank capabilities. The root cause of the initial failure—the lack of real-time intelligence on enemy movements—is also highlighted, with the Intelligence Section ordered to provide continuous updates on Wagner command and control (C2) links.

The Broader Context

The events at Novoselovka Pervaya and the subsequent crisis at Mikhailovka illustrate the fluid and lethal nature of the current operational environment. While the defense of the village is a tactical success, the loss of command leadership and the subsequent isolation of friendly troops demonstrate a continued vulnerability to enemy maneuver warfare and rapid armor insertion.

The success of the pending operation to rectify the situation will likely hinge on whether the forces involved have bridged the intelligence gap that cost them their commander just days prior.

PART I – AFTER ACTION REPORT (AAR) for June 22, 2026

PART I – AFTER ACTION REPORT (AAR)

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On 20 JUN 2026, intelligence (seized documents from civilian criminal operatives) confirmed that separatist forces, directed by Wagner Group operators, planned to seize the village of Novoselovka Pervaya—within 4th BTR Battalion’s operational area. A Task Force (TF) was rapidly assembled, including reinforcements from 17th Mechanized Cavalry Regiment, to intercept. The operation succeeded in holding the village but at severe cost. The TF commander and his command squad were later destroyed during withdrawal due to an unexpected enemy armor block in Mikhailovka. The village of Novoselovka Pervaya remains in friendly hands, but Mikhailovka is now held by enemy armor, isolating our forward elements.

2. MISSION NARRATIVE

• Initial Plan: TF commander intended to occupy defensive positions on the Northern and Northwestern edges of Novoselovka Pervaya directly from the march, assuming enemy would not arrive in time.

• Reality: Enemy infantry (large militia groups) and vehicles arrived simultaneously, negating the assumption. The TF commander engaged immediately from a defensive posture, pressing the enemy while awaiting reinforcements.

• Reinforcement: T-55 tanks arrived, allowing the command squad to finally occupy its planned NW position. Enemy counterattacks continued for ~1 hour before tapering off.

• Outcome: Village secured, but TF infantry sustained ~50% casualties. 2nd Squad (reduced from 12 to 5 personnel) was folded into Command Squad. 3rd Squad (at 50% strength, BTR intact) was ordered to withdraw to the rally point at Mikhailovka (2 km South).

3. WITHDRAWAL – CRITICAL FAILURE POINT

• Battalion ops staff confirmed Novoselovka Pervaya was secure. TF commander initiated withdrawal.

• Intelligence GAP: TF commander was unaware that enemy had already cut off Novoselovka Pervaya and moved armor into Mikhailovka, trapping 3rd Squad and blocking the southern corridor.

• Orders Given: Tank 1 (then Tank 2) ordered south to break the armor block and secure a safe corridor.

• Result: Both tanks were destroyed by enemy armor. The TF commander and his entire command squad were wiped out in the subsequent engagement.

4. CASUALTIES & STATUS (as of 22 JUN 26)

Unit	Status
TF Command Squad	Destroyed (KIA)
2nd Squad	Folded into Command Squad (now destroyed); original 12→5 survivors absorbed
3rd Squad	~50% strength, BTR intact – currently isolated in Novoselovka Pervaya
Tank 1 & Tank 2	Destroyed
Enemy Armor Block	Confirmed in Mikhailovka – intact and reinforced
Novoselovka Pervaya	Held by friendly forces (but surrounded/enemy nearby)
Mikhailovka	Occupied by enemy armor – blocks all withdrawal and reinforcement routes

5. INTELLIGENCE LESSONS LEARNED

• Late warning: Intelligence on Wagner Group command of armed civilians reached the TF commander only just prior to arrival, allowing no planning adjustment.

• Incomplete enemy picture: Signals intelligence and seized documents indicated the intent to strike, but did not reveal the speed of enemy armor insertion into Mikhailovka.

• Comms shortfall: TF commander lacked real-time situational awareness of enemy armor movement behind his axis of advance during withdrawal.

6. COMMANDER’S ASSESSMENT (AAR)

• The mission to secure Novoselovka Pervaya was tactically successful but operationally unsustainable due to failure to clear/cut enemy reinforcement routes.

• Withdrawal was executed without adequate reconnaissance of the southern route.

• Enemy armor in Mikhailovka represents a fixed blocking position that must be destroyed before any further friendly movement south or resupply north.

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PART II – WARNING ORDER (WARNORD)

TO: All Subordinate Units (4th BTR Battalion, 17th Mechanized Cavalry Regiment, Attached Armor & Mechanized Cavalry Elements)
FROM: Colonel S. Glukharev, per Corps Intelligence Directive
ISSUE DATE: 22 JUN 2026
EXECUTION WINDOW: 24–25 JUN 2026
REFERENCE MAP: Chernarus 1:50,000, Sheets 4743-IV, 4744-III (Mikhailovka & Novoselovka Pervaya)

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1. SITUATION

• Enemy: A reinforced armor block (composition: at least 2+ tanks/IFVs, supported by Wagner-led militia infantry) holds Mikhailovka. They have cut Route South from Novoselovka Pervaya. Enemy counterattacks are expected to be severe and sustained once we engage.

• Friendly: Isolated 3rd Squad (50% strength, 1 BTR) remains in Novoselovka Pervaya. All other forward elements are either destroyed or withdrawn. A new Task Force has been moved to its start line (coordinates to be promulgated in FRAGO) and is preparing for offensive action.

• Civilian: Minimal non-combatant presence reported in Mikhailovka; assume all structures may be occupied by enemy observers/snipers.

2. MISSION

Conduct a two-phase operation over two consecutive days:

• PHASE I (24 JUN 26 – Morning): Advance on Mikhailovka and defeat the enemy armor block in detail. This attack will be reinforced with additional heavy armor and mechanized cavalry. Expect and plan for severe enemy counterattacks attempting to maintain the block.

• PHASE II (25 JUN 26 – Morning): Continue north to Novoselovka Pervaya, provide covering fire to extract all friendly forces (specifically 3rd Squad) from the village, and conduct a controlled withdrawal south back to Mikhailovka. Upon reaching Mikhailovka, establish a defensive line and prepare for a counterattack to permanently restore Novoselovka Pervaya to friendly control.

3. EXECUTION CONCEPT

• Phase I (24 JUN):

  • Main effort: Armor-heavy assault from the south/east into Mikhailovka. Use combined arms (tanks + mechanized infantry) to fix and destroy enemy armor.

  • Support: Suppression of enemy infantry positions via mortar/artillery preparatory fires (call-for-fire plan to be issued).

  • Reserve: One mechanized cavalry company to guard flanks and react to counterattack.

• Phase II (25 JUN):

  • After securing Mikhailovka, push north with covering force (armor + dismounts).

  • Extract 3rd Squad via designated pickup point (NW edge of Novoselovka Pervaya).

  • Withdraw all friendly elements south to Mikhailovka, establish hasty defensive positions, and prepare to repel enemy counterattack.

4. TASKS TO SUBORDINATE UNITS

Unit	Task
4th BTR Battalion (reinforced)	Lead Phase I assault on Mikhailovka; provide infantry support for armor
17th Mechanized Cavalry Regiment	Provide mechanized cavalry for flank security and Phase II extraction coverage
Attached Heavy Armor (T-55/T-72)	Primary breaching force against enemy armor block
Mortar/Artillery Battery	Prep fires on Mikhailovka (H-30 min); on-call fires for Phase II withdrawal
Engineer Support	Prepare breaching assets for possible obstacles in Mikhailovka
Intelligence Section	Provide continuous SIGINT/COMINT updates on enemy movements, particularly Wagner C2

5. COORDINATION INSTRUCTIONS

• Start Line (SL): To be confirmed via FRAGO no later than 23 JUN 1800 hrs.

• Time on Target (Phase I): 24 JUN, 0600 hrs (H-Hour).

• Phase II Jump-off: No earlier than 25 JUN, 0600 hrs (dependent on Phase I success).

• Logistics: Fuel/ammo resupply points established at Corps Logistics Hub (grid to follow). Pre-position repair assets behind the start line.

• MEDEVAC: Casualty collection points to be designated in FRAGO; priority for 3rd Squad extraction.

6. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

• TF Commander (Designate): To be named by Bn CO by 23 JUN.

• Primary Frequency: Bn Tactical Net – Channel 3.

• Alternate: HF backup – 7.825 MHz.

• Call Signs: To be issued in FRAGO.

• Reporting: SITREPs every 30 mins during Phases I & II; immediate contact reports for enemy armor engagements.

7. RISK ASSESSMENT

• High: Enemy armor quality (Wagner-operated) may exceed our current AT capability. Counterattacks will be severe.

• Medium: Isolation of 3rd Squad – extraction under fire carries high risk.

• Low-Medium: Civilian casualties in Mikhailovka – ROE to be disseminated separately.

8. ADMINISTRATIVE REMARKS

• All units will conduct final rehearsals (map/terrain model) on 23 JUN.

• Ammunition state: Report to Bn S-4 by 23 JUN 1200.

• Weather forecast: Clear skies, light winds – no degradation to air/ground observation.

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AUTHORIZED BY:
Colonel S. Glukharev
Deputy Head of Intelligence Staff
43rd Mountain Rifle Corps

DISTRIBUTION: Cdr 4th BTR Bn, Cdr 17th Mech Cav Regt, Corps Ops, Corps Intel, TF (Designate)

END OF COMBINED AAR/WARNORD

OPERATIONS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (OIS) May 18th, 2026

 OPERATIONS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (OIS) – ChCOG-05-2026

TO: ChCOG Deputy Commander; 2nd Army Corps Commander; 43rd Mountain Rifle Corps Deputy Commander
FROM: RADM Igor Kasatonov, Commander Intelligence, Chernarus Coastal Operations Group
SUBJECT: Projected Enemy Summer Offensive – Northwestern Chernarus & North Zagoria
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET//NODIS//CHCOG-INT

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

Enemy forces in two operational theaters—Northwestern Chernarus (3rd Tank Brigade sector) and North Zagoria (10th Separate Tank Brigade sector)—have used a three-week operational lull to conduct deliberate refit, reconstitution, and training. Signals intelligence (SIGINT), human intelligence (HUMINT), and captured enemy materiel indicate a coordinated enemy summer offensive is planned for both regions. Intent: fix or break through our line, accept attrition, and recapture damaged armor for reuse.

2. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE & CAPABILITIES

2.1 Northwestern Chernarus

• Enemy holds a fixed defensive line contested during winter operations.

• Mixed conventional force supplemented by civilian criminal command elements.

• Demonstrated high risk tolerance: willing to absorb severe losses to maintain positions.

• Receiving new armor and recovering damaged vehicles from previous battles. Repairs slow but methodical, enabling crew training cycles.

2.2 North Zagoria

• Primary adversary: Russian special operations groups.

• Past engagements costly to both sides: 4th BTR battalion’s after-action reports confirm friendly infantry losses offset by successful blunting of enemy counterattacks.

• Enemy currently reconstituting same SOF units, integrating replacement personnel and repaired armor.

3. FRIENDLY FORCE STATUS

3.1 Northwestern Chernarus – 3rd Tank Brigade

• 2nd Battalion sustained catastrophic losses (infantry and armor) during attack on village of Yalmta.

• Supporting mechanized cavalry units crippled by winter operations.

• Decision: 2nd Battalion will withdraw from line. 4th BTR Battalion will deploy in its stead.

• Assessment: BTR units offer speed and dismounted tactical flexibility but possess reduced weaponry and lighter armor. Unsuitable for prolonged direct armored confrontation. Army Corps has no viable alternative.

3.2 North Zagoria – 10th Separate Tank Brigade

• No combat operations for >3 weeks. Period used for resupply, refit, and retraining.

• Battalion and brigade staffs report improved unit proficiency.

• Army Corps, brigade, and battalion command expect to reliably defeat enemy incursions into Chernarusan territory.

4. EXPECTED ENEMY OPERATIONS (SUMMER OFFENSIVE)

• Timeline: Late spring to early summer, following completion of enemy reconstitution.

• Method: Synchronized pressure in both theaters to hold gained line and inflict punishing losses on Chernarusan armor.

• Logistics: Enemy is deliberately stockpiling repaired armor and training new crews. Slow but deliberate buildup indicates an attritional rather than breakthrough-oriented plan.

5. ASSESSMENT & RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Northwestern Chernarus – HIGH RISK

• 4th BTR Battalion is improperly matched for line-holding or counterattacks against enemy mixed armor.

• Expect heavy friendly losses if committed to sustained offensive or defensive operations without mechanized cavalry or tank support.

• Recommend: Limit 4th BTR Battalion to screening, rapid dismounted ambushes, and reserve counter-penetration roles. Request emergency reinforcement of at least one mechanized company from 2nd Army Corps reserve.

5.2 North Zagoria – CONTROLLED RISK

• 10th Tank Brigade is tactically ready. Enemy also reconstituted, but not superior.

• Most likely outcome: draw, with friendly forces inflicting disproportionate enemy losses if engagements remain in prepared defensive zones.

• Recommend: Aggressive patrolling and pre-registered artillery counter-preparation to disrupt enemy assembly areas before offensive begins. Deny enemy freedom to choose engagement tempo.

6. COMMANDER’S FINAL IMPRESSION

The enemy has used the lull more effectively than we have in Northwestern Chernarus. Our command there is improvising with unsuitable BTR light armor because heavy units are broken. In North Zagoria, we are matched. The difference in summer casualties will be determined by how many of their tanks we kill before they cross their start lines.

RADM Igor Kasatonov
Commander Intelligence, Chernarus Coastal Operations Group

DISTRIBUTION: ChCOG Deputy Commander; 2nd Army Corps Commander; 43rd Mountain Rifle Corps Deputy Commander
ACTION OFFICER: ChCOG Intel Analysis Section, LTC M. Volkov
DOCUMENT REFERENCE: ChCOG/INT/2026-02-15/OPFOR-SUMMER

COASTAL COMMAND CONFIRMS HIT LISTS, ENGINEERING PUSH IN GARMANDA AS TANK BATTLES RAGE NORTH

By Svetlana Golikova, Senior Defense Writer, Zelenogorsk Pravda

NOVIGRAD – In a terse and carefully worded press conference Monday morning at Chernarus Naval Forces Headquarters, senior military officials from the Chernarus Coastal Operations Group (ChCOG) revealed details of intensified armored combat in North Zagoria, confirmed the seizure of so-called “hit lists” by their forces, and acknowledged a new engineering deployment to the contested Garmanda region.

The briefing, held at 0700 hours, was led by Rear Admiral Igor Kasatonov, ChCOG Commander for Intelligence, who was joined by a panel of senior army and engineering officers. While the Admiral projected confidence in ongoing tank operations, his responses to questions regarding civilian targeting and future military planning were notably guarded.

ARMORED DOMINANCE, BUT AT A COST

Admiral Kasatonov opened by detailing four separate engagements over the past week involving the 10th Separate Tank Brigade. He reported that government forces had recaptured three towns—Novoselovka Pervaya, Panteleimonovka, and Volnovakha—and prevented the capture of a fourth settlement at Shirokoye.

“10th Tank Brigade maintains a dominance on the battlefield and has severely crippled the enemy in their operations,” Kasatonov said. “Our troops in North Zagoria are well trained and well supplied.”

When pressed by this reporter, Anna Rodicheva of Zelenogorsk Pravda, about heavy armor losses reported by sources at Shirokoye and Volnovakha, the Admiral offered a starkly different assessment.

“Combined losses for those two operations, irreplaceable losses, totals one,” Kasatonov replied. “The other damaged armored vehicles were quickly recovered and are being repaired.”

He declined to elaborate on broader casualty figures, stating only that losses were “expected and necessary.”

‘HIT LISTS’ CONFIRMED, NO WARNINGS FOR CIVILIANS

Galina Timchenko of Chernarus Radio Channel 1 pressed the Admiral on unverified social media reports alleging that government forces had seized documents resembling execution lists.

Kasatonov confirmed the seizure. “I can confirm that we did seize a number of hit lists,” he said. “But I cannot describe the actual detailed content. They involved local citizens, both victims and perpetrators.”

When asked whether intelligence staff had warned potential targets among the civilian population, the Admiral’s response drew a sharp line.

“Our citizens residing in these regions are very well aware of the dangers they face because of their politics, their relations, or other social factors,” Kasatonov said. “So, no, we do not want to tip off citizens about potential dangers. Our enemy monitors these conferences.”

The statement left several reporters visibly unsettled. No further details on the lists’ origins or specific targets were provided.

ENGINEERING TEAMS UNDER FIRE IN GARMANDA

The focus then shifted north. In response to media reports of fresh operations in the remote Garmanda region, Admiral Kasatonov introduced Colonel Aleksandr Polovtsev, commander of the 9th Separate Light Mountain Rifle Brigade, and Colonel Irina Volkova, ChCOG Senior Staff Engineer Analyst.

Colonel Polovtsev confirmed that his 2nd Battalion has been deployed to Garmanda, but he emphasized their mission is strictly defensive: providing security for military engineering reconnaissance.

Colonel Volkova described the challenging terrain—dense forests, no improved roads, rugged highlands—and revealed that her lightly armed engineering teams have already come under enemy fire.

“Our teams have come under enemy fire and have withdrawn simply because they are too few and very lightly armed,” Volkova said. “My engineering teams have been conducting patrols to map out the region and to get some kind of idea of what the separatists are planning.”

ARTILLERY DEPLOYMENT RAISES QUESTIONS

When Ms. Timchenko noted reports that an artillery battery from the 9th Brigade Artillery had also deployed to Garmanda—hardly a necessity for “simple engineering surveys”—Colonel Polovtsev declined to answer.

“You all know I can’t discuss operations as they are going on,” he said.

Asked directly whether artillery has already engaged the enemy, Polovtsev offered only: “No comment.”

The exchange underscored growing speculation that Garmanda may become the next flashpoint in the conflict. Separatists currently hold approximately 65% of the region’s terrain, according to Colonel Polovtsev.

INTELLIGENCE BLACKOUT

Admiral Kasatonov refused to answer any questions regarding the separatists’ future military plans for North Zagoria, citing enemy monitoring of the press conference.

“The enemy listens in, so I am fairly certain they want to know what we know,” he said. “We will not be releasing any information about how we perceive the separatists’ military plans.”

As the briefing concluded, one fact was clear: Chernarus’s military is fighting on multiple fronts, both in the tank country of North Zagoria and in the dark forests of Garmanda. But the full scope of those operations—and the true toll they are taking—remains shrouded in operational secrecy.

— Svetlana Golikova is the senior defense writer for Zelenogorsk Pravda, covering military affairs and national security.