Saturday, September 10, 2022

Stanislav Tarasov about Heydar Aliyev and royal power and intelligence in Transcaucasia

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.

Interview of the historian, editor-in-chief of IA REGNUM Stanislav Tarasov

Modest Kolerov: Dear Stanislav Nikolaevich! I know that you were born in Soviet Azerbaijan, in Kirovabad, the former city of Ganja, now Ganja again, in 1953. I also remember that your grandfather was a royal official. And he was saved from absolutely real repressions in Soviet Azerbaijan with the help of his old acquaintance, the famous Stalinist Prosecutor General Vyshinsky - such an interesting detail. And this tsarist official, an officer, was a Pole. Vyshinsky was also a Pole. In 1975 you graduated from the Faculty of History of the Azerbaijan State University. You graduated from the eastern department of the Faculty of History, studied, in particular, with the future President of Azerbaijan, Elchibey...

Stanislav Tarasov: Yes, we found a certain time, the first time before his arrest he gave a course of lectures.

Modest Kolerov: In 1975, you graduated from the university and entered full-time graduate school at my native history department of Moscow State University, where I studied later. It is clear that you were politely sent to Moscow so that you would not create competition there, in Baku. Did you defend your Ph.D. thesis on the participation of the Bolsheviks in party building in Azerbaijan?

Stanislav Tarasov: It was called, I can name the topic now - the fight against the nationalist counter-revolution in the Transcaucasus and the Middle East in 1918-1921 . And we studied the formation of nationalist parties, movements, and so on, how Musavat, Ittihad, Dashnaktsutyun were formed, what kind of relations they had with the Georgian Mensheviks and all the ins and outs. And what we found in the course of these studies is that we just, frankly, fell into absolute depression, because a completely different picture emerged.

Modest Kolerov: What?

Stanislav Tarasov: I studied for five years at the national university. Unlike other universities, it was a specialized university that singled out national history and gave it paramount importance. Near and Middle East, Ottoman Empire and so on. And after the university we had a clear conviction, an idea of ​​the historical development, the history of this region.

Modest Kolerov: What are the main conclusions from this dissertation?

Stanislav Tarasov: Firstly, the main conclusion was that the tsarist administration of the period of Vorontsov-Dashkov, the governor, after the bloody events of 1905, which were in Transcaucasia, when the Dashnaks practically took control of all Transcaucasia, base centers, even Baku, a decision was made on the special status of the governorship with the prospect of entering the Griboyedov project. Griboyedov's project - at one time, when Griboedov was a diplomat, even before Persia, was to create a Transcaucasian Russian company according to the version of the Russian-American company with the granting of an autonomous status of a protectorate type within Russia.

Modest Kolerov: And what limits was the empire ready to attach to the Russian Transcaucasus to create this protectorate?

Stanislav Tarasov: This is where the Vorontsov-Dashkov project took shape. The Vorontsov-Dashkov project included the following: The Transcaucasian Democratic Republic is the first project, the United States of Transcaucasia. And, by the way, tsarist military intelligence was connected here. The position was very simple: we did not digest the Caucasus, preparations were underway for the First World War, we will not hold the Caucasus, we have no resources, the Caucasus must be given a special status, it is desirable that it be loyal and be under protectorate control. Hence the question arose: what to do with the titular nations? Armenians, Georgians, Transcaucasian Tatars, as the Azerbaijanis were then called. Of all three ethnic groups, the Armenians turned out to be the most politically advanced, the Dashnaktsutyun party was the first political party established in Russia in 1890. It was, by the way, a party of a foreign type. It was not fixed as a Russian party. The only party that had a program of its state building, independence and so on. But the center of state building for her was Western Armenia.

Modest Kolerov: Western Armenia, then part of the Ottoman Empire.

Stanislav Tarasov: Quite right. Hence, by the way, all this struggle, the lawsuit that went on with the Armenians. It is known that, for example, the property of the Armenian Church was arrested. Why? Because it was a special policy, the Young Turks, with whom we also actively worked. Why? Because an interesting thing happened, there was a development, as the future was seen: the Transcaucasian United States or three state formations. For the first time, the political term "Azerbaijan" was used by the tsarist military intelligence in 1911. Subsequently, this term was used as the state name of the Musavat party. The Musavat party is a product of the tsarist military intelligence, it was supposed to build statehood. And for the Dashnaktsutyun party, the center of Armenianism is Western Armenia, the territory of Ottoman Turkey. Now the question arose what about the Georgians? 

Because the Georgians had nationalist parties of the federalist type, then Menshevik deviations, and so on. The Mensheviks did not position themselves autonomously as separatists, they were part of the Russian social democracy, and then their leaders, as you know, headed the Petrograd Soviet. They did not push themselves away from Russia. Nicholas II granted Vorontsov-Dashkov the status of his plenipotentiary governor, the status of almost the supreme ruler. Its own intelligence, its own counterintelligence, its own army, its own bureaucracy. It got to the point that in Transcaucasia Vorontsov-Dashkov received the right to confer general ranks. By the way, Armenian militants received general ranks in Transcaucasia. They did not go through the register of imperial general ranks - general ranks in Russia were assigned by the emperor, and these did not pass through the Russian register. They were not Russian generals. But they wore, got uniforms and so forth.

Modest Kolerov: Were they Russian Transcaucasian generals?

Stanislav Tarasov: Russian Transcaucasian generals. This is a special status. There was a special policy, hence special relations with Persia, special relations with Turkey.

Modest Kolerov: So they wanted to annex part of the Ottoman Empire to Russia or not?

Stanislav Tarasov: The Dashnaks were the main opponent and at the same time the main partner of the tsarist administration. The Dashnaktsutyun party had two bureaus, Eastern and Western. The eastern one was in Tiflis, the western one was in Geneva and partly in Paris. Their task was as follows: these were to use the resources of the Russian Empire, and those were to use the resources of the West. 

Tactically behave differently, and the strategy is a great Armenia. The task was as follows - to drag the Eastern Bureau to the Russian side, and the Western Bureau had to work differently. By the way, this marked the tragedy of the Armenians, because, nevertheless, the Eastern Bureau decided that it was independent, made contacts with the Young Turks, with Enver Pasha, Nazim Pasha, they financed the Dashnak party. And the Dashnaks contributed to the introduction of the Russian version of Pan-Turkism. Hence another conclusion:

Modest Kolerov: Modeled after Austria-Hungary...

Stanislav Tarasov: A multinational empire where the Turks are numerically in the majority, but there are enclaves: strong Armenian, Greek, Jewish enclaves, and so on. The Turks are in second place, there is no dominant Turkish ideology, the Turkish language is not the state language, in the Ottoman Empire the leadership is French-speaking, Francophile. How to destroy this empire? 

You need to take the leading ethnic group and say: build a nation state. This means that other ethnic groups begin to vibrate. This doctrine is subtle, elegant, and was practiced in two centers: in St. Petersburg, at the university, by officers of the General Staff with oriental scholars, and in Kazan. And this ideology was introduced into Turkey. Gasprinsky, Akchura - these are all its products. They worked out the so-called Russian Slavic unity in order to to weaken the Ottoman Empire and to create pseudo-state formations on the fragments of the Ottoman Empire. And all publications of the Pan-Turkic type in the Ottoman Empire, from 1908 to 1914, were financed by the tsarist government. St. Petersburg scientists published a monograph "Young Turks in the Service of the Reaction", or something like that, where they first cited the documents that I used.

Modest Kolerov: Was your dissertation finally closed?

Stanislav Tarasov: Yes.

Modest Kolerov: And it remains closed, and, accordingly, those archival materials that you used have not actually been put into wide circulation?

Stanislav Tarasov: Not included.

Modest Kolerov: And what are these archives? Military-historical archive?

Stanislav Tarasov: No, the military-historical archive is legal. I referred to it.

Modest Kolerov: What about illegal ones?

Stanislav Tarasov: There was a special fund of Vorontsov-Dashkov in the military-historical archive, it still exists, and there is only a special permit.

Modest Kolerov: Good. And what remains classified from your sources? Archive names?

Stanislav Tarasov: There are no names. They are designated by abbreviations: P2832 ...

Modest Kolerov: These are funds. And in what archive?

Stanislav Tarasov: Funds, yes. Mostly in Podolsk.

Modest Kolerov: Is this the archive of the Ministry of Defense?

Stanislav Tarasov: Yes, mostly there.

Modest Kolerov: Are these agent funds?

Stanislav Tarasov: Yes, these are closed-end funds. When I used the documents, I say to Professor Stishov: “Mikhail Ivanovich, well, where can I use this?”

Modest Kolerov: Did he supervise your work in graduate school?

Stanislav Tarasov: Yes, Stishov Mikhail Ivanovich. And he says: Tarasov, look, if you decide to go to the West and refer to these documents, you will be declared crazy, because these funds do not exist.

Modest Kolerov: Are there any other important conclusions from your dissertation, which remained closed? Did the Bolsheviks, following in the footsteps of Vorontsov-Dashkov, also accept these developments of Russian military intelligence?

Stanislav Tarasov: The question of the Sovietization of the Transcaucasus is also unwritten facts. Lenin recognized and demanded the Sovietization of Azerbaijan, but with the provision of attributes of an independent state. Because oil was needed and resources. As for Georgia and Armenia, Lenin was against Sovietization, and he believed that the Georgian Mensheviks should be generally left alone as one of the experimental reserves of Menshevik-type social democracy and through them, since the Second International, as is known, condemned the Bolsheviks, go to the International and achieve, for the International to unblock Soviet Russia. He gave Georgia to the West. 

As for Armenia, Dashnak Armenia, the Dashnaks came to power, they maintained relations with Denikin, naturally, they entered into problems, entered into conflict. They were guided by the West, it was a purely pro-Western party. And Lenin believed that they should leave. And when the draft of the Sevres Treaty of 1920 arose, in general, Lenin was not against it. But what happens at the top of the Central Committee? Stalin, corresponding with Ordzhonikidze, declares: “Sergo, if we are left without territory (Transcaucasia), Lev Davidovich will throw us out, as the party does not need us as theoreticians. 

But Lev Davidovich has no territory - he has an apparatus, a historical role - and we have a territory. Lev Davidovich was informed about this ... He had good intelligence, tsarist military intelligence, he used it very much. But Lev Davidovich has no territory - he has an apparatus, a historical role - and we have a territory. Lev Davidovich was informed about this ... He had good intelligence, tsarist military intelligence, he used it very much. But Lev Davidovich has no territory - he has an apparatus, a historical role - and we have a territory. Lev Davidovich was informed about this ... He had good intelligence, tsarist military intelligence, he used it very much.

Modest Kolerov: So, in the fight against Trotsky, Stalin decided to keep the Transcaucasus as his territory for the future struggle.

Stanislav Tarasov: Yes, they carried out the sovietization of Transcaucasia. And moreover, they took advantage - this moment is still mysterious - an alliance with Atatürk, a project to create a socialist Turan ...

Modest Kolerov: Yes, this is the Trotskyist Red East.

Stanislav Tarasov: But the fact is that the Turan project was worked out by the tsarist military intelligence. Moreover, the task was to work out the project of pan-Turkism in their own interests. I already have this document, where the Russian resident writes: "The 20 million Turks living in the Russian Empire are the material with which we can conquer the East." That is, turn pan-Turkism towards Russia.

Modest Kolerov: Has it been published, this document?Stanislav Tarasov: It has not been published.

Modest Kolerov: So, maybe we will publish it?

Stanislav Tarasov: Yes, I have it, issued, link. The idea was that Russia, as a Turkic state with 20 million Turks, could become the leader of the Turkic world. And by the way, this project was supported by Vorontsov-Dashkov. Pay attention, after Sovietization: Soviet Socialist Republic of Armenia - Armenians live, official status; Georgia, Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic - Georgians live. But until 1932, in the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic, the ethnos was the Turks. Why did Stalin refuse the ethnonym "Azerbaijanis" up to this point? Why was the common Turkic grammar practiced? Why was a common Turkic history written? Because we hatched a project until 1932 on the creation of a single Turkic state. And what type of Turkic state? Ottoman Empire, Turks, Azerbaijan joins, leader, and on the southern underbelly - these are Iranian Azerbaijanis. Here, please, the Vorontsov-Dashkov project ...

Modest Kolerov: Well, the Bolshevik project of creating a red Turan.

Stanislav Tarasov: There was a question, if you think logically, how did Stalin behave further? 1920s–1930s: Red Kurdistan project on the territory of Karabakh. After World War II: The Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan. See what experiments are being carried out on the territory of Iran. Then in 1946, territorial claims against Turkey, then a furious controversy broke out between the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of Armenia and Georgia, a commission of academician Javakhishvili was created, which specially traveled to the territory of Eastern Anatolia, where they described the remains of Christian monuments ...

Modest Kolerov: But they left in 1917.

Stanislav Tarasov: There were several expeditions.

Modest Kolerov: The first Georgian expedition to Turkey was back in 1916, under our occupation, and then in 1917.

Stanislav Tarasov: Yes, they did. The Georgians wrote that it was a Georgian monument, the Armenians otherwise. The question is this: this region was in an uncertain geopolitical state. The borders along the Araks, up to the collapse of the Soviet Union, were never considered stable from the point of view of military logic. Never.

Modest Kolerov: Yes, when you underwent military training at the military department at the Azerbaijan State University, did you study this issue with your teachers?

Stanislav Tarasov: They simply trained translators, political workers, propaganda workers from us, we even had impromptu classes when some colonel, the future commandant of Istanbul, spoke. Everyone told us how to conduct it, what kind of agitation, how to conduct interrogations - an ordinary military department, there was nothing special here.

Modest Kolerov: About the dissertation. So, the Bolshevik factor in the formation of national political parties in Transcaucasia. Can we say that the Bolsheviks were, if not the main customers, then the main beneficiaries of this party building or not?

Stanislav Tarasov: Yes, they actually became them. But here the question was: howthey became? They began to repeat, step on the same rake as the tsarist administration. Sovietization took place, formally, legally, but only Russification did not take place. And without the Russification of the region, there were no carriers of this so-called revolutionary ideology, because the national intelligentsia or the national element that joined the Communist Party, to the last, before the collapse of the Soviet Union, they used Soviet power in their own interests. They never considered that they would live forever in the Soviet Union. I, a former student of Azerbaijan University, who attended a course of outstanding professors, heard how we were openly told in the 1970s about the impending collapse of the USSR. 

We argued with the Armenians about the history of Caucasian Albania, we were taken out on buses to see these monuments, we traveled from Karabakh to all of Transcaucasia, all the ruins. We knew that the upcoming struggle between Azerbaijan and Armenia was an ideological struggle. At the level of Soviet historiography, separate monographs were published in Azerbaijan and Armenia, where the controversy was on individual monuments. We understood that the problem between Azerbaijan and Armenia would end in a war. The professor told us: we will even sacrifice Karabakh if ​​we get the opportunity to unite with Iran, Iranian Azerbaijanis, and Turkey. And then, he said, we will strangle the Armenians. if we get the opportunity to unite with Iran, Iranian Azerbaijanis, Turkey. And then, he said, we will strangle the Armenians. if we get the opportunity to unite with Iran, Iranian Azerbaijanis, Turkey. And then, he said, we will strangle the Armenians.

Modest Kolerov: I remember from your stories how Heydar Aliyev, whom you knew personally, told you before or after the collapse of the USSR…

Stanislav Tarasov: Before the collapse.

Modest Kolerov: Yes, in the last years before the collapse of the USSR, he expressed to you the idea of ​​uniting Azerbaijan with Turkey so that Azerbaijan would lead this association.

Stanislav Tarasov: Who is Heydar Aliyev? I can now say more frankly that the fact that I ended up in foreign broadcasting of the USSR after graduate school is a division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, you can’t just get in from the street - it was a pure accident, I was placed there by the Andropov family, chairman of the KGB of the USSR. I was offered to become a teacher at the Higher School of Intelligence. But I found out that you won’t write under your last name there, you won’t be allowed to leave. I came across specialists of the general level who brilliantly mastered all this material.

Modest Kolerov: But were they all closed too?

Stanislav Tarasov: Yes. There was nothing new for them, and when I talked to them, they did not interrogate me, they understood what I wanted to say, I understood what they were thinking.

Modest Kolerov: And so you went to work after graduate school for foreign broadcasting.

Stanislav Tarasov: Yes, to the Turkish department. Came, a young Ph.D. And what is foreign broadcasting, the Near and Middle East? Four hundred people: former employees of special services, trade missions, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, legal and illegal immigrants, and so on and so forth. It doesn't smell like journalism. They were unique, they knew countries, regions so well…

Modest Kolerov: You worked from 1978 to…

Stanislav Tarasov: Until 1983. They are such connoisseurs: Afghanistan… Later I came across when I was already in Afghanistan, if it wasn’t for them, I could have made such mistakes there… They had such knowledge of the country that you can’t subtract anywhere, in any documents. Knowledge of psychology, stories ... But they have everything in the past. They looked at me like I was some kind of prodigy. "What are you going to do here?" spoke. And when the main edition of the international life of Central Television was created, in 1985 ...

Modest Kolerov: You went there.

Stanislav Tarasov: I was invited there. The elite gathered there, the strongest world-class journalists, this is the State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company. What was the strength of foreign broadcasting? The materials with which we appeared on the air, they could not be printed in Pravda, Izvestia - these were completely different materials. I performed under my own name. We were known in the Middle East, there was even a provocation against me. In July, I published an article, “The CIA in Turkey,” or something, the Milliyet newspaper ... Two weeks later, the permanent representative calls me ...

Modest Kolerov: Did the Milliet newspaper respond to this?

Stanislav Tarasov: Then we found out that this was a provocation from Moscow. Two weeks later, the ambassador's encryption, then the Milliet newspaper arrives by special mail, and my editor-in-chief is summoned. And I have an Armenian editor-in-chief, a specialist in the Kurds: “Listen, what have you done? Did you write about Turkey, about the CIA?” I say I wrote. He: "give me the text." And we have three copies. I give him a text, he: I can’t understand anything, but what is special here? The recording is being listened to - there are no distortions, the text that was translated was heard on the air. And "Milliet" writes: "Tarasov, close to the ruling circles of the Kremlin, a well-known observer, claims that 60% of the members of the Turkish government are agents of the CIA."

Modest Kolerov: Did they just attribute this formula to you?

Stanislav Tarasov: The Ambassador gave a code, I was suspended from the air for two weeks. For two weeks my fate was being decided. What's the matter, they can't prove anything. Then I was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and at that time Eduard Amvrosievich Shevardnadze was the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and for the first time I ran into him as a Minister. He told me: "Is that you?"

Modest Kolerov: Disgusted?

Stanislav Tarasov: No, he is. He has a manner like this: “is that you”? I say yes". And there are still his assistants. And he: "what are you writing"? I say: "I write correctly." And I already know that I have broadcast there confirmed that this is a provocation. And he told me: "Yes, go, you will be thanked." I went, I’m waiting for gratitude, they don’t let me on the air for another week, then Eduard Amvrosievich says: “You haven’t written something for a long time, come on, write.” Then it turned out that we had a man recruited by the Turkish special services. For some reason they did not like me, and they decided to set me up in this way through the Milliet newspaper. There were such cases. And this edition of international life had a special status, it served the International Department.

Modest Kolerov: International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

Stanislav Tarasov: We caused a lot of dissatisfaction on television, because there was the program "Time", there was Leonid Petrovich Kravchenko, who headed the television. All international topics were removed from under it and transferred to the Central Committee. He hated us. He ruined us, ripped off everything. There were constant problems. And here all the intelligence officers, counterintelligence officers, well-known observers and so on gathered. We were in sight. The second point: we had a correspondent network, we were all traveling. I came to work and did not know where I would end up in the evening: in Korea, in Iran, or where. There was perestroika, there was a need - television eats like a dragon, we need materials, our own picture. And the battle for your picture was leading. Western TV channels imposed a picture on us, we used it in rare cases, we had to give our own picture. And its own picture is an operator. Correspondents - 60 correspondents.

Modest Kolerov: Seconded from the special services.

Stanislav Tarasov: Yes, they were limited in scope.

Modest Kolerov: And they are not about this, they are about something else.

Stanislav Tarasov: Quite right. And we are in the Warsaw Pact, and in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, and in the NATO Council. I have been to Belgium twice. NATO Council, I was in his building twice, we interviewed there. We went out all the time, we had to give a picture. And the correspondents ... The correspondent of the State Radio and Television in Warsaw says: "Why send Tarasov, I could do it myself." And the curator replies: “no, you didn’t manage it, let ours go.” And we had problems with the corset. I remember that I flew to Belgium, for the first time in a foreign country, with equipment, two engineers, an operator. We were supposed to be met by a local Soviet correspondent, but he did not. And it appeared only when we made the first report from Charleroi, made a rebroadcast of the NATO competitions, and it went on the Vremya program. And he wanted to break us.

Modest Kolerov: Yes.

Stanislav Tarasov: And we were especially status, and we had to communicate and so on. Here's how I got into the machine...

Modest Kolerov: Apparatus of the Central Committee.

Stanislav Tarasov: Then the apparatus of the Central Committee, first ... At one fine moment, they call to Staraya Square. Let's go, instructions, generals say. And we are on normal terms, Brutents...

Modest Kolerov: Karen Brutents, Deputy Head of the International Department of the Central Committee.

Stanislav Tarasov: Yes, and Gorbachev's assistant Georgy Nersesovich Shakhnazarov. They are friends, Baku people. Brutents, himself a physician by education, is a native of Baku. And this Caucasian, Karabakh. And they hold on, and here I am. And we are talking about Azerbaijan, about Karabakh and so on. With Brutents, we developed a variant of sympathy, a certain trust. I want to tell you how I was sent to Afghanistan to make a film about the politics of national reconciliation. And there the situation was bad.

Modest Kolerov: What year was that?

Stanislav Tarasov: 1988. We went with the director, traveled all over Afghanistan. And there is such a nuance. There are women in veils. Girls in a veil of one color, before marriage of another, a matchmaker in this and so on. And there is nothing under the burqa. And when the wind blows there, they are like naked. And our operator Grigoryan Serezha filmed like this, and close-ups.

Modest Kolerov: Erotica.

Stanislav Tarasov: And our task was to show that the situation is bad. In the text, Karen Nersesovich claimed it, everything is written normally. You said once, you are silent twice, music, wind. Then a close-up - a face. And the picture led the viewer to one thing, and my voice-over said something completely different. And when it went on air on Sunday, I come on Monday, I look, the boss says to me: Karen Nersesovich called me, he said, “I will arrange for this Tarasov” ...

Modest Kolerov: In 1987, Gorbachev removed Aliyev from the post of first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. Aliyev, a member of the Politburo, oversaw relations with Eastern countries, with Arab countries. But Gorbachev removed it, and this caused a powerful movement for the secession of Karabakh - they thought that the allied "roof" over Azerbaijan was leaky.

Stanislav Tarasov: I will tell you what I know about Heydar Aliyev. I treat him with great sympathy, because if it were not for his quota on the basis of nationality for admission to the university, I would not have entered Baku University. I got into the national quota: 15 people, six of them must be Russians, and among the Russians there are competitions, benefits, and so on. Aliyev introduced this, because there was an outflow of Russians and Armenians from Azerbaijan, and he decided to stop: the Russians are brothers. And I was appointed headman of the group, secretary of the Komsomol organization of the faculty, went to the king, an excellent student. Moreover, I was lucky that I was a Lenin scholarship holder, the only one at the faculty. My father died tragically when I was in my second year. Scholarship - 40 rubles. Mother alone, work to be done...

Modest Kolerov: Was the Lenin scholarship 100 rubles?

Stanislav Tarasov: Yes, 100 rubles, a lot of money. While my father helped me, I felt calm, but here ... My middle sister is also a student, the youngest was at school, her mother was a telephone operator ...

Modest Kolerov: Did you receive 80 rubles?

Stanislav Tarasov: Well, yes. Naturally, there was a question for me: to switch from full-time to part-time or evening studies in order to work. And I had to study perfectly in order to get a Lenin scholarship. And I passed all the subjects on the top five. Therefore, I am grateful to Heydar Aliyev in this respect.

Modest Kolerov: Did his daughter study with you?

Stanislav Tarasov: Yes, I studied at our class. The question is the following. It so happened that the Andropov family, when they told me that this was a friend of the Andropov family…

Modest Kolerov: Who, Aliev?

Stanislav Tarasov: Yes, Aliyev is a friend of Yuri Vladimirovich's family. And I want to say that this is a real Bolshevik, he spoke about internationalism, fought against corruption. Baku was international. There are two very conflicting issues here. What happened to Karabakh, why did the Karabakh party play against Aliyev? Aliyev was running for promotion. Two people who were nominated: Aliyev and Nazarbayev. Third in the echelon was Shevardnadze. 

Shevardnadze then, under Gorbachev, became the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Gorbachev snarled Aliyev, allegedly for some business. Aliyev was supposed to head the government under Andropov, and he had a plan ready to reform and preserve the USSR. I am one hundred percent sure, knowing Aliyev, his power, that he was highly respected in Moscow by the special services. He was a unique person in the sense that even being in Baku,

Modest Kolerov: I personally remember how, in a narrow but official circle, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia in 2008-2018 Edward Nalbandian literally proudly recalled how he accompanied the First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Government Heydar Aliyev on one of his trips to Arab countries...

To be continued

September 9, 2022

Modest Kolerov

Wednesday, August 24, 2022

Soviet intelligence activity in Asia in 1960–1980

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited

Soviet intelligence activity in Asia in 1960–1980

By Yuri  Totrov

This study focuses on the activities of Soviet intelligence in Asia in the second half of the Cold War, which was the result of a global confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. The article focuses on the US Central Intelligence Agency as the main object of foreign counterintelligence of the First Main Directorate of the KGB, as well as the activities of the CIA and various cover-ups that it used during this period in Asian countries.

If the first half of the Cold War (1949-1954) was marked by active subversive activities of the US and British intelligence services, which secretly sent their agents to the territory of the USSR by air, sea and land, then the wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan fell on its second half.

It is well known that Soviet intelligence tried to stay away from the Vietnam War. As for American intelligence, on the contrary, it took an active part in the Afghan war, providing all kinds of assistance to the Afghan Mujahideen.

From the very beginning of the war in Afghanistan, Soviet intelligence was also forced to take an active part in it. Special forces units played a special role here. On the Soviet side, the foreign intelligence of the KGB (First Main Directorate - PGU) and the military intelligence of the USSR Ministry of Defense (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff - GRU) were participants in a sharp confrontation with the intelligence services of the United States and their allies.

During this period, the main task of Soviet intelligence, assigned to it by the Politburo of the CPSU and the government of the USSR, was to obtain preemptive information about the preparations of the United States and NATO for a nuclear strike on the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries.

In this regard, the main objects of interest of the KGB and GRU residencies in Asian countries were American diplomatic missions, as well as the US military bases and facilities in these countries. Among the objects of interest of Soviet intelligence were also the headquarters of the military blocs SEATO and CENTO, located respectively in Bangkok and Ankara.

In addition to the American intelligence services, the British intelligence SIS / MI-6 also traditionally operated in Asian countries. But given the relatively small size of the British residencies in the British embassies, as well as the fact that Soviet intelligence directed its main efforts against the CIA and other American intelligence services, most of the KGB residencies in Asia, as well as in other countries during this period, unfortunately, practically did not pay due attention to SIS.

A. M. Sakharovsky (1956-1971), [1, p. 453-459] F. K. Mortin (1971-1974) and V. A. Kryuchkov (1974-1988). This was the period when Yu. V. Andropov, who came from the Central Committee, was appointed chairman of the KGB, paying special attention to the needs of intelligence. [2, p. eight; 4, p. 229-236]

The most famous heads of the operational departments that carried out reconnaissance operations of the PGU in Asian countries during this period were V. I. Startsev, Ya. P. Medyanik and Yu. I. Popov. All of them later became generals and deputy chiefs of intelligence. [3, c. 724, 620, 674; 4, p. 129, 131, 136-137]

In Soviet times, the party committees of departments, departments, Glavka, and the KGB took an active part in raising the level of operational work of the KGB residencies. At that time, it was quite natural that a resident or employee who was in the Center was invited by one or another party organ and offered, as a communist, to report on his intelligence work, without going into operational details. There were cases when the work of one or another residency was discussed even at the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and then appropriate decisions were made.

It was at this time that the Office of Foreign Counterintelligence - "K" - managed to prove that if our propaganda organs were waging an ideological struggle against "American imperialism", then the KGB had to deal with a real enemy - the American special services. In particular, Soviet intelligence abroad is confronted by a serious specific adversary - the US Central Intelligence Agency. And it is represented in each specific country by operational officers of the local CIA residency. In this regard, the Department "K" was tasked with identifying American intelligence officers working abroad under various covers, and their active development. The Office created a very effective system for identifying US intelligence officers and set up their targeted development, in particular, in Asian countries. [5; 6, p. 31; 7, p. 71]

In many Asian countries under American influence, Soviet intelligence had to overcome the "defense in depth" of the enemy intelligence services to acquire sources of information. This should include both the opposition of local security agencies, most of whose employees received special training in the United States, and the counterintelligence activity of the so-called "Soviet" sections or groups in the CIA residencies. And in those countries where American military bases or facilities were located, counterintelligence units of the US ground, air and naval forces also actively acted against Soviet intelligence officers (respectively, CIC army counterintelligence (CIC), Air Force Special Investigation Directorate (OSI) and Naval Investigation Service (NIS).

However, the Americans themselves and, to some extent, the British, helped solve this very difficult task for Soviet intelligence to acquire sources of information. The fact is that in addition to “well-wishers, who were specially trained in large numbers by the US intelligence services, persistently trying to “set them up” for Soviet intelligence, as well as mentally deranged persons who periodically visited Soviet foreign missions, Soviet intelligence officers in Asian countries (as in other countries ) quite often came out American citizens who really had access to the secret information of interest to us. Here it must be frankly said that in most cases, the motivating motive for the willingness of such Americans to cooperate with Soviet intelligence, passing it secret information and documents, was a frank desire to "make money."There were, of course, those who agreed to such cooperation, risking their lives, purely for ideological reasons ...

In terms of size, the KGB and GRU residencies in Asian countries were much smaller than those of the CIA, and in some countries they were completely absent. Their size depends on many factors. At the same time, the presence in a particular country of important objects of the “main enemy”, i.e., played an important role here. USA, as well as the need to obtain information of a scientific and technical nature, which the Soviet industry and economy badly needed. However, often the main criterion in determining the optimal number of Soviet intelligence officers in a particular country was the level of relations between the USSR and this country, since most Asian countries that were in the orbit of US policy introduced a “quota” on the quantitative composition of diplomatic and other Soviet institutions.

The KGB residencies consisted mainly of employees of the linear (geographical) department, who were engaged in the collection of information of a political nature (“PR line” - political intelligence). Residents were usually also appointed from among the employees of this department.

In addition to political intelligence officers, in some KGB residencies there were also representatives of scientific and technical intelligence (“line X”), who were faced with the task of obtaining information about the latest achievements of foreign science and technology.

In most residencies there were also employees of foreign counterintelligence (Department "K", which until 1972 was called Service 2). These employees - "line K" - were responsible for the security of intelligence operations, as well as Soviet citizens and institutions in a given country. They were entrusted with the task of obtaining preemptive information of a counterintelligence nature about the preparation of hostile actions by local security agencies, anti-Soviet organizations, as well as the CIA and other American intelligence agencies against Soviet intelligence officers, citizens and institutions. [7, p. 70] In those Asian countries where there was an operational need, there were illegal residencies of Soviet intelligence.

As you know, from the very beginning of the Cold War, the United States began to create a network of its military bases, radio interception points and electronic intelligence stations along the perimeter of the border of the Soviet Union on the territory of a number of states bordering the USSR. In Asia, such military facilities have been equipped in Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, South Korea, Japan and Taiwan. In this regard, along with obtaining information about the policies of the governments of these countries, which is usually of interest to the Center, one of the priority tasks of Soviet intelligence in these countries was to penetrate the objects of the “main enemy” and obtain the information necessary to develop effective countermeasures.


In addition to the CIA residencies under diplomatic cover in Ankara and Istanbul, our intelligence interests were also CIA special operations units in these cities under the cover of "research departments" under the Joint US Military Advisory Group (JUSMATT/Survey Unit). By the way, it was there, in Ankara, that Aldrich Ames first came into our field of vision. And a little earlier in Istanbul - Richard Stoltz, who later became the Deputy Director of the CIA and the head of the Operations Directorate. [8, c. 704; 9.]

Our residency in Turkey directed significant efforts to cover the activities of the US top secret facilities in Karamursel, Trabzon, Samsun, Diyarbakir, Sinop, Ankara, Kavak and a number of others. It was found that all these objects together constituted one "Big Ear" of the National Security Agency (NSA) of the United States, directed towards the USSR. So, in particular, it turned out that in the small town of Karamursel, located 37 miles southeast of Istanbul, there was one of the main objects of US electronic intelligence in Turkey. Its main target was the Soviet missile range at Tyuratam. Although the object belonged to the NSA, it was serviced jointly by specialists from the Air Force and the US Navy. Electronic intelligence bases in Trabzon and Sinop closely monitored the Kapustny Yar missile range, and established in 1964. 

At the Diyarbakir base, a powerful long-range radar was targeted at the Tyuratam missile test site. [10, p. 208-209] It must be said that the work of Soviet intelligence in this direction was seriously hampered by the Turkish special services themselves. Turkey is the most important strategic partner of the US and NATO on the southern flank of the European theater of operations. During the period under review, it had the largest army in Europe (about 900 thousand people). Since the beginning of the 60s, American Jupiter-type missiles (with a flight range of 2400 km) with nuclear warheads have been located here, which greatly worried the Soviet Union; finally, SAK strategic bombers aimed at the USSR were also based here. that the work of Soviet intelligence in this direction was seriously hampered by the Turkish special services themselves.

Turkish intelligence agencies worked closely with the CIA and SIS. Since ensuring the security of military facilities was the unconditional prerogative of the Counterintelligence Directorate in the system of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces, in order to be interested in electronic surveillance objects, we had to first of all overcome the obstacles built by the Turkish military counterintelligence. No less dangerous for our agents were the employees of the Main Directorate of Internal Intelligence of MIT (Milli Istihbarat Teskilati) - the National Intelligence Organization, which until the early 1990s. was the basic unit that ensured the conduct of counterintelligence activities throughout the territory of the Republic of Turkey. The General Directorate of Security under the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Turkey (GDBT) actively cooperated with these special services.


When conducting intelligence operations in Iran, Soviet intelligence had to take into account the tough counterintelligence regime established by the local intelligence service SAVAK, which was created in 1956 with the help of the CIA and MOSSAD. Despite this, among the tasks of the KGB residency in Iran was the infiltration of both SAVAK and various US intelligence units in the country. These primarily included a fairly large CIA residency under the cover of the US Embassy, ​​as well as a special unit under the fictitious military cover of the "Research Support Group" (RSG). This unit worked closely with SAVAK to develop Soviet citizens and institutions in Iran. Some of the former employees of this unit then worked on the "Soviet line" in other countries and even in Moscow.

Considering the very advantageous strategic position of Iran, the US has deployed its electronic intelligence bases on its territory. And they, in turn, were the objects of penetration of the KGB residency. Soviet intelligence efforts revealed that the small mountain village of Kabkan, 840 miles east of Mashhad, was home to one of the most important NSA bases monitoring space launches and testing of Soviet missiles from the Tyuratam test site. This base was encrypted as "Tracksman 2" and, given its special importance, was used by the NSA in conjunction with the CIA.

Another important NSA electronic intelligence facility was located in Kuchan, 50 miles west of Mashhad. As if by chance, it was equipped not far from the Soviet border - 60 miles from the capital of the Turkmen SSR, Ashgabat.

The third point of electronic intelligence of the NSA-CIA was located in Behshahr, on the shores of the Caspian Sea. [10, p. 256, 258]

In 1979, during the Islamic Revolution, among the hostages of Iranian students who seized the US embassy, ​​along with other American diplomats, were members of the CIA station, headed by their resident Tom Ahern. The CIA station in Iran ceased to exist. At the same time, the Iranian authorities closed all American military installations. After that, the KGB residency, working in very difficult conditions, switched completely to collecting information about the course of the Islamic revolution and regularly gave its forecasts about the future situation in the country.


Japan, as a neighboring country, with which Russia had to fight twice for half a century, naturally, was of particular interest to Soviet intelligence.

One of the main obstacles to the successful work of the KGB residency in Japan was the constant surveillance of many Soviet citizens by the local counterintelligence and police, which had an extensive network of informers. It should also be noted that many employees of the Japanese police and the Office of Public Security Investigation of the Ministry of Justice (DOJ) were trained and retrained in American police academies, as well as in the CIA.

Despite the fact that in the CIA residency in Tokyo there was a special department for communications with local intelligence services that provided the Americans with all the information they were interested in about the USSR and specific Soviet citizens, it was very popular among Japanese police and counterintelligence officers to “earn money” as CIA agents.

It goes without saying that in order to ensure the successful activities of Soviet intelligence in Japan, as well as the security of Soviet institutions and Soviet colonies, the KGB residency had to seriously deal with the numerous US intelligence agencies in the country.

The CIA station in Japan has traditionally been the largest in Asia - Class A (with the exception of the station in Saigon, which during the Vietnam War, there were up to 800 people). Its quantitative composition can be judged from the fact that at the beginning of 1960, only the "Soviet" section under the leadership of Jacques Richardson consisted of 30 people - 24 regular and 6 contract employees of the CIA. [11, p. 127] It is established that at this time the total number of CIA employees in Japan reached 200 people.

Given the special role of the Japanese CIA station, high-ranking intelligence officers were usually appointed as its leaders in Tokyo. It is known that two of them later became deputy directors of the CIA, heading the Operations Directorate (William Nelson and William Wells).

The leadership of the residency operated under the cover of the US Embassy. Moreover, a significant number of CIA employees under the cover of the State Department were also located in the additional building of the embassy (the building "Mantetsu"), where until 1945 there was an office of the "South Manchurian Railway" (SMZhD) - "Mantetsu").

It was noteworthy that of the several dozen of these "diplomats", only five were listed in the "Diplomatic List" for 1967 - the official list of foreign diplomats accredited to the Japanese Foreign Ministry. [12, p. 138-141]. However, the bulk of the CIA personnel in Japan worked under "military" covers. All of them were listed as "civilians" (civilians) of the Ministry of the Army, Air Force or Navy.

At various times, CIA units under fictitious names operated at various American military bases in Japan. So, the Field Research Unit (FRU) was stationed at the Yokosuka naval base. Atsugi Naval Air Station was home to a large branch of the Joint Technical Advisory Group (JTAG). For a while, a major CIA unit was also based at Pershing Heights in Tokyo. Tokyo's Washington Heights base near Meiji Park was home to the Composite Analysis Group (CAG) and Area Liaison Coordination Detachment (ALCD), which was the site of the Olympic Village during the 1964 Olympics. [13, p.11] In the Fukide-cho area, not far from the American embassy, ​​the Provost Marshal Liaison Division (PMLD) was located in a two-story mansion for some time. CIA officers worked in the 6-story Hardy Barax building next to the Aoyama cemetery and along with the army newspaper Stars and Stripes and Air Force counterintelligence (OSI). [14, p. 351-367] Fuchu Air Force Base was home to the Joint Plans & Programs Office (JPPO). Then the ALCD unit was partially relocated there. [fifteen; 16; 17.]

In 1968, under the cover of the American embassy in the Mantetsu building, a division of the CIA Regional Program Analysis Office (RPAO) began to function. His employees, although they were not under the cover of the State Department, had cars with diplomatic plates.

On the island of Okinawa, at the base of Chinan, under the cover of the US Army Composite Service Group (US CSG), a regional branch of the CIA Operational Equipment Service (Office of Technical Service -OTS) operated, whose employees served residencies in most Asian countries. [eighteen; 19]

The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), which first represented the Information and then the CIA Science and Technology Department, had its own branch at the Chitose base in Hokkaido. Then it was transferred under the roof of the US Embassy in Tokyo, and subsequently reorganized and relocated to Okinawa.

In 1975, an 11-story modern building was built in Tokyo on the site of the old two-story historic building of the US Embassy. Most of the CIA personnel operating under the cover of PMLD and ALCD were transferred there. They were located on the 8th floor. The Mantetsu building was also demolished, and instead of RPAO, a new cover appeared in the embassy - the US Army Support Office (USASO). It was located on the 6th floor. Employees under cover of the political section occupied the 9th floor. The CIA cryptographers were located on the 10th floor next to their State Department counterparts, but completely separate. Some CIA officers still continued to be stationed at Yokota Air Force Base. [twenty]

The KGB residency paid special attention to identifying the so-called "deep", or "unofficial, covers" of the CIA in Japan (non official cover - NOC officers). Since it was established that some of these "illegals" purposefully worked on Soviet citizens and institutions, special attention was paid to their development. At different times, more than 20 such covers were opened. Only at the beginning of the 80s, more than a dozen of them were installed. [21, c. 3; 22]

As for military intelligence, in addition to the intelligence department (J-2) of the headquarters of the US Armed Forces in Japan and the second (intelligence) departments of the headquarters of the army, navy and air force (G-2, N-2, and A-2), the object of interest of the KGB was also a large military intelligence unit "500th Military Intelligence Detachment" (500 MID), which was located at the North Camp Drake base. In Okinawa, the US Army Pacific Intelligence School functioned, where military intelligence and counterintelligence officers of Asian countries (US Army Intelligence School Pacific) were trained.

Among the objects of special interest of Soviet intelligence in Japan during this period of the Cold War were the US electronic intelligence units, which were purposefully engaged in intercepting and listening to Soviet communication lines of varying degrees of security. These facilities primarily included the Japanese branch of the National Security Agency (NSA), located at the highly guarded base "Camp Futinobe" a dozen miles west of Tokyo. This branch reported to the NSA Pacific Center at Camp Smith, north of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. [10, p. 216] At the northernmost tip of the island of Hokkaido in the Wakkanai region, 40 miles from the territory of the USSR, the US Army Electronic Intelligence Service (Army Security Agency - ASA) equipped its intelligence post on 185 acres. An even larger ASA radio interception center was located in the southern part of the island, 4 miles southwest of Chitose. The other two points were at the bases of Sakata (Honshu Island) and Hakata (Kyushu Island). *[10, c. 208]

The electronic intelligence service of the Navy did not lag behind the army. By the mid-60s, the world's largest US Navy electronic intelligence center (Naval Security Group Activity) was created on the basis of Kamisei, more than a thousand of whose employees were engaged in intercepting Soviet and Chinese communication lines. It also had a branch in Okinawa. [23, p. 156] At Misawa Air Force Base, US Air Force electronic intelligence officers were engaged in similar activities.

Soviet military intelligence was interested in the US naval bases of Yokosuka and Sasebo, where naval ships were based, including nuclear aircraft carriers and submarines.

In order to gain access to the secrets that were located at the above American facilities, Soviet intelligence had to overcome the security system carefully designed by the Americans, which, in addition to their own security services for the facilities, was actively engaged in army counterintelligence of the army, air force and navy. These special services constantly tried to infiltrate their double agents into the KGB agent network in order to divert the attention of Soviet intelligence to an “unusable object”, bring directed misinformation to it, inflict material damage on it, and if the opportunity presents itself, then organize a capture “red-handed” our intelligence officers and launch another campaign of spy mania in the press.

As you know, in Japan, in addition to American military personnel, there were always a large number of civilians. And for some reason, a certain percentage of this huge number of Americans definitely wanted to "earn extra money" or "get rich" with the help of the KGB or the GRU. Moreover, as they say, such a trend appeared already from the beginning of 1946. In this regard, our residency had to spend a lot of time and effort to figure out with whom it was dealing: with a genuine "initiator" who had access to classified information, or with "set-up" of the American intelligence services. Ultimately, Soviet intelligence managed to develop a fairly effective system for quickly identifying the "setups" of the enemy. Moreover, given the persistent desire of American intelligence to acquire agents from among the citizens of the USSR,

Despite the fact that American intelligence in Japan had an overwhelming numerical superiority over the KGB and GRU residencies combined, and also had a powerful operational resource of Japanese counterintelligence acting in close contact with the Americans, the CIA, in its secret confrontation with Soviet intelligence, basically adhered to the unwritten " rules of the game." However, there were also exceptions. Such exceptions include the so-called “Pokrovsky case”.

In 1966, David Murphy, head of the CIA's "Soviet" department, and Thomas Ryan, head of the KGB section of this department, arrived in Tokyo under the guise of "tourist businessmen". Both are Japanese. Murphy worked in Japan from the founding of the CIA from 1947 to 1950. Ryan in 1957–1961 also served in Japan under military cover. According to an employee of the "Soviet" department of the CIA, George Kizewalter, Murphy intended to "talk" with Pokrovsky. [24, p. 213-214]

After Washington and Delhi, where Georgy Petrovich Pokrovsky proved himself to be an active intelligence officer, in Japan he, as a resident of the KGB, was in the development of the CIA, in which, among its agents, as it became known, it used the Colombian José Miguel Monev Calderon and the Japanese Matsumoto Masaki. Murphy, as the head of the "Soviet" department, was going to "show the guys how it's done." However, from the very beginning, this CIA operation, which could have ended in the kidnapping of a Soviet intelligence officer, thanks to the courage and decisive actions of Pokrovsky, went “wrong” and ended in an international scandal. 

An attempt to “talk” with Pokrovsky resulted in a brawl, during which Pokrovsky’s wife beat one of the Americans with an umbrella, breaking his glasses. And then another had to give an expensive Swiss watch for repair. But the most offensive for the Americans was that, although this operation was prepared in advance, the Japanese police, who appeared at the scene of the fight, took the CIA officers to the Takanawa district police station, where they had to sit "uncomfortable" all night until the morning, until representatives of the embassy arrived for them. [6, c. 33; 25, p. 371, p.33; 26; 27; 28.]

This failure of the CIA in Japan occurred under CIA Resident William Nelson. However, despite this, upon his return to the United States in 1968, he received the highest rank of GS-18 and was appointed head of the Asia Department, and in 1970 headed the CIA Operations Directorate. The "scapegoat" for this failure Murphy apparently decided to make Thomas Sawyer, who since 1964 represented the "Soviet" department in the residency and the US Embassy in Tokyo. After leaving Japan in 1966, he "rested" for four years from business trips abroad in America, until he was sent to residency in Moscow under the cover of a security officer. Yes, and here he worked for only a year ...

Joseph Smith, who replaced Nelson in 1968, was more peaceful. On his initiative, an informal meeting was held with KGB resident Yu. I. Popov, during which an agreement was reached that both sides would behave in a “civilized” manner. This, of course, did not mean that the CIA and the KGB stopped their intelligence work against each other. Both sides continued to use any mistake of the enemy to their advantage. And if Soviet intelligence officers were caught on “set-ups” or as a result of their operational errors, then they were expelled from Japan or arrested, and a campaign of spy mania against Soviet intelligence was inflated in the local press.

Against some particularly active Soviet intelligence officers, the CIA organized "active measures" in the press, believing that Moscow should immediately recall such "deciphered" KGB officers. However, such actions of the Americans were not always successful. In response, the KGB organized the publication of materials exposing the activities of the CIA in Japan and other Asian countries. Naturally, it was still better and more “civilized” than kidnapping each other…

It should be noted that the KGB station in Tokyo during this period also had to obtain information about the very large CIA stations in Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and also in the Philippines, where there were no Soviet representatives at that time.

Vietnam, Laos, Thailand

During the Vietnam War, the government of the USSR, at the request of the government of the DRV, provided certain military assistance to the Vietnamese side. Thus, in particular, air defense missile systems were sent to Vietnam to repel American air raids on Hanoi and other vital facilities. The training of the Vietnamese anti-aircraft gunners serving these installations was carried out by Soviet specialists. This is where Soviet intelligence information, obtained from reliable sources, came in handy, allowing combat crews of Vietnamese air defense missile systems to prepare in advance for American air raids. Even the former CIA resident in Vietnam, Theodore Sheckley, drew attention to this in one of his interviews.

The CIA station in Vietnam, which had its own sub-residences, branches and representatives in various areas of South Vietnam, sometimes numbered up to 800 people. The Americans were very lucky that, for a well-known reason, during this period there were no close relations between Soviet intelligence and the intelligence of the DRV. Otherwise, a number of CIA facilities, such as the Duk Hotel in Saigon, where only CIA employees lived, would definitely have been targeted by Viet Cong saboteurs ...

For the same reason, the staff of the SIS station in Hanoi, who served in the DRV as "eyes and ears" for their "senior partners", were able to work quietly under consular cover.

During the Vietnam War, Vietnam's neighboring countries of Laos, Thailand, and Cambodia became springboards for subversive operations against both the South Vietnamese Liberation Front and the DRV. Soviet intelligence residencies in these countries received documentary evidence of this. A special role in these operations was played by the CIA station in Laos, the quantitative composition of which reached 300 people. One of the main CIA fronts in Laos was the RMB (Research Management Branch) of the Office for International Development - UID (USAID). In addition to Vientiane, the CIA had its stations in Pakse, Savannaket, Long Tien, Luang Prabang, Xianglom and Nam Yue. To conduct reconnaissance and sabotage operations against the Armed Forces of the Viet Cong and the Pathet Lao, the CIA trained and armed numerous detachments of the Hmong mountain people, led by General Vang Pao.

Although most American intelligence officers in Laos were directly involved in the Vietnam War, a large "Soviet" section was active in the CIA station in Vientiane. Its employees, staffed mainly by veterans of the "Soviet" department, were engaged in the development of Soviet institutions and citizens in Laos, with an emphasis on intelligence officers. The "Soviet" section even had its own surveillance team, consisting of specially trained and equipped Thais. [29] After the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, Thailand began to play a special role in the military-strategic plans of the United States. With the beginning of American military operations in Vietnam, the CIA residency reached a very large size. In addition to the State Department and the SID, the CIA in Thailand also used the military cover of MASTHAI (groups of military advisers),

As part of the CIA residency in Bangkok, a large "Soviet" section was also active. At her service were always employees of the Thai counterintelligence "Santiban" (Special Branch), which had long had the closest contact with the American intelligence services.


The Soviet Union has always maintained friendly relations with its southern neighbor Afghanistan. The situation in this country favored the work of Soviet intelligence. During the Cold War in Afghanistan, as in other countries of the world, an active struggle unfolded between Soviet and American intelligence.

The CIA station in Kabul became one of the main targets of Soviet intelligence. Having information that American intelligence was persistently trying to acquire a source from among Soviet citizens, the KGB residency decided to "help" the Americans in this matter. The CIA operation initially developed quite successfully. The local resident was already rubbing his hands. For the final recruiting conversation, an experienced CIA officer who speaks Russian arrived from neighboring Iran. However, in the end, this operation, which was under the control of foreign counterintelligence, fell through with the Americans. Since the American recruiter introduced himself to a Soviet citizen under a false name, he was detained by local intelligence agencies, who were conducting a roundup of criminals, to determine his identity. After presenting his diplomatic passport, he was released and immediately left Afghanistan. The failure of this operation had negative consequences for a number of CIA employees who participated in its preparation. It is believed that one of them, hard experiencing this failure, even shot himself.

After December 27, 1979, when the Amin regime was overthrown in Kabul, the nature of the confrontation between the Soviet and American intelligence services in Afghanistan changed radically. It should be clarified that Amin was actually overthrown and liquidated by Soviet intelligence by decision of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. As a result of this short-sighted decision, the Soviet Union was drawn into an exhausting and bloody war, from which it hardly emerged 10 years later with huge human, material and moral losses...

The author does not have documents showing which of the four leading figures of the Politburo - Brezhnev, Andropov, Gromyko or Ustinov - was the initiator of the removal of Amin and the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. However, it is reliably known that in November 1979, the head of the PGU, V. A. Kryuchkov, summoned his deputy, Lieutenant General V. A. Kirpichenko, and, given the information received that the Afghan dictator Amin, "an inveterate executioner and fascist", intending to reorient in his policy on the United States, instructed him to fly to Kabul to help the opponents of the dictator "do away with him." [25, c.350-365]

In early December, Kirpichenko was already in Kabul. Preparations for the overthrow of President Amin were in full swing. Approximately a week before "Day X" - December 27 - to the KGB office, headed by Lieutenant General B. S. Ivanov, the chief military adviser, Colonel General S. K. Magomedov and the senior representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, it was proposed, together with Amin's opponents, to eliminate the dictator. Given the special secrecy of the operation, neither the Soviet ambassador nor the GRU resident were informed about it.

According to the plan of the operation, key objects were outlined, which were to be occupied by units of the GRU special forces under the command of Colonel V. V. Kolesnik, PGU special forces under the leadership of Major General Yu. Major General I. F. Ryabchenko.

The development of an operation plan to take the well-fortified Amin's palace was entrusted to Kolesnik. The chief military adviser, Magomedov, and the chief representative of the KGB, Ivanov, verbally approved the final version of the Storm-333 operation plan, but refused to sign it. Kolesnik, in their presence, made an appropriate entry on the plan, set the date, time and signed. The general management of the operation was entrusted to Colonel Kolesnik, General Drozdov was appointed his deputy.

The operation to capture the palace and eliminate Amin was carried out successfully - with minimal losses and in the shortest possible time. On December 31, 1979, KGB generals Kirpichenko and Drozdov were already reporting to KGB Chairman Yu. V. Andropov in Moscow on the results of the operation in Kabul. And on January 3, 1980, Kolesnik reported to the head of the GRU, P.I. Ivashutin. The next day, he was already reporting to Minister of Defense Ustinov. By this time, the “Muslim battalion” of the GRU special forces, which, under the leadership of Kolesnik, stormed the Taj-Bek Palace, had already returned to Tashkent, and units of the 40th Army entered Afghanistan. The Afghan war began. [thirty; 31, p. 140; 32.] 

For Soviet intelligence, Afghanistan became the main objective. In the leadership of the PSU, four people were engaged in Afghan affairs from morning to evening - Kryuchkov himself and his three deputies - Kirpichenko, Medyanik and Drozdov. Among the primary tasks that the KGB had to solve was the need to strengthen the Afghan security agencies. Experienced intelligence and counterintelligence officers of the KGB were sent to Afghanistan as advisers. At the same time, hundreds of personnel for Afghan intelligence and counterintelligence began to be trained on the territory of the USSR and Afghanistan.

The representative office and residency of the KGB in Afghanistan switched to round-the-clock operation.

The local CIA residency, which practically found itself at the forefront of not the “cold”, but the real “hot” war, immediately felt tighter control from the Afghan counterintelligence, feeling the familiar “hand of the KGB”. In this regard, the CIA in Afghanistan was forced to drastically change its style of work, as well as the forms and methods of communication with agents. The term of the "voluntary" business trip of CIA officers to this "hot spot" was set at 18 months. CIA officers appeared in Afghanistan, immigrants from the republics of Soviet Central Asia, who during the Great Patriotic War became deserters and served in Hitler's "Muslim division". In its intelligence work in Afghanistan, the CIA placed special emphasis on agents from among third-country nationals, including employees of international organizations, as well as from among thrill-seekers, ready to perform a one-time task for a reward of 1000 dollars, visiting a certain area of ​​Afghanistan under the guise of a journalist, photojournalist, etc. The local KGB residency and the Afghan intelligence services, for their part, continued to successfully infiltrate their people into the CIA agent network. As a result of the implementation of such operations, the failed American intelligence officer was declared persona non grata and left Kabul.

A special place in the CIA's intelligence operations in Afghanistan was occupied by the electronic intelligence station at the US Embassy, ​​whose employees were camouflaged as State Department communications specialists. The employees of this point, who spoke Russian, were engaged in radio interception and listening to the communication channels of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The information obtained in this way was then transferred to the CIA by the Pakistani intelligence, which led the actions of the Mujahideen, or to some of the leaders of the Mujahideen, who were directly in the pay of the Americans.

An important role in the "Afghan operation" of the CIA was assigned to the Pakistani station in Islamabad. One of its main tasks was to establish the closest contact with the Pakistani intelligence ISI, which created bases for training Afghan Mujahideen combat groups on its territory and threw them into the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. It was quite difficult for the CIA resident sinologist John Regan to solve this problem quickly. He arrived in Pakistan in mid-1979, and in November he already witnessed an attack by a raging mob of Muslim fanatics on the American embassy. Nevertheless, he was actively involved in organizing the supply of modern weapons to the Afghan Mujahideen. Active assistance to Regan in this matter was provided by the SIS station in Pakistan, headed by Nicholas Adamson.

In early 1980, a BND station was opened in Islamabad. It was headed by Jan Kleffel, a former deputy. resident in Japan, who came to intelligence from the Bundeswehr. West German intelligence was assigned a specific role in working with the Afghan Mujahideen. [33]

CIA assistance to dushmans fighting the Soviet army reached particular activity and scope under Howard Hart, who replaced Regan in May 1981. Its scale can be judged by how the CIA residency budget grew over the three years under Hart. If in 1981 it was about 30 million dollars, then in 1984 it already reached 200 million. It should also be taken into account that, by agreement between President Reagan and the royal family of Saudi Arabia, the latter agreed to provide the Afghan “fighters against communism” with the same amount. (In 1986, under resident Milt Bearden, the annual budget for the CIA station in Pakistan already reached a billion dollars!) [34, p. 219] Under the new SIS resident, the energetic Peter Price (Prhees), who arrived in Islamabad in 1982,

In connection with the information received by the KGB about secret deliveries of weapons to dushmans from Pakistan and Iran, as well as the activation of various bandit groups that commit sabotage, terrorist acts against supporters of the Karmal government, attacks on government institutions, etc., it was decided to send a special unit to Afghanistan with codenamed Cascade. In this combat unit, there were more than 700 people. In addition to Kabul, where the headquarters of the Cascade was located, its branches were also in the seven main provinces of the country. Among other tasks, Cascade was instructed to provide the army command with information about impending terrorist attacks and sabotage, to detect the bases of dushmans, their weapons and ammunition depots, and to identify ways to deliver weapons and equipment from Pakistan. By the nature of their activities, the employees of the "Cascade" had to engage in both intelligence and operational work, and participate in military operations against Afghan militants. A number of KGB officers were killed in such operations.

In 1984, the leadership of the KGB decided not to send Cascade units to Afghanistan anymore.

Sober-minded heads in the KGB intelligence leadership did not approve of the Politburo's decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan as soon as they learned about it. Very soon, a number of generals who were directly involved in the preparation of the December 1979 events in Kabul realized the fallacy and tragedy of this decision. And only the leadership of the KGB could not realize in any way what grave consequences for the country the further continuation of the Afghan war could lead to.

In September 1987, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze informed Secretary of State Shultz of his intention to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan. However, the CIA did not believe this. On New Year's Eve in one of the Washington restaurants and. about. During a lunch with Deputy Secretary of State Armacost, CIA Director Robert Gates, relying on the forecasts of his analysts, bet him for 25 dollars. However, on February 15, 1989, the last Soviet soldier left Afghanistan, and Gates, as the loser of the bet, had to pay… [35, p. 169]

According to the former deputy of the PGU, Lieutenant General V. A. Kirpichenko, "it was not the entry of troops into Afghanistan itself, but their presence there for ten years, that was a tragic mistake." [25, p. 348]


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Dreyfuss R. The CIA Crosses Over. Mother Jones, Jan./Feb. 1995

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Kirpichenko V. Intelligence, faces, personalities. 1998.

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August 24, 2022

Yuri Totrov

Wednesday, August 3, 2022

Abstracts of the speech of the Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, Colonel-General A.V. Fomin on the topic: "On the humanitarian aspects of a special military operation"

 Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.

Text taken from a socialist media Telegram post via Armed Forces of Novorossiya post on Russian socialist media.

 (VSN) Abstracts of the speech of the Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, Colonel-General A.V. Fomin on the topic: "On the humanitarian aspects of a special military operation"

August 03, 2022

Ladies and gentlemen!

I would like to inform you about the efforts being made by the Russian Federation to comply with the norms of international humanitarian law in relation to prisoners of war.

Since the beginning of the special military operation in Ukraine, the Russian Federation has taken comprehensive measures to comply with the norms of international humanitarian law.

The corresponding instructions to the Russian servicemen were given by the President of the Russian Federation VV Putin and the Minister of Defense of Russia SK Shoigu.

In our work, we rely on the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the Manual on International Humanitarian Law for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, approved by order of the Minister of Defense of Russia. The manual is an addition to the statutory documents and includes the main provisions of the norms of international humanitarian law, as well as for its application in preparation for and during the conduct of hostilities.

Painstaking work is underway to treat the detained Ukrainians in accordance with the norms of international humanitarian law, primarily the Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War.

Close contacts have been established with the specialized structures of the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross in order to provide humanitarian assistance to the population living in the territories liberated from the Ukrainian Nazis, as well as to work with prisoners of war.

On a regular basis, in a weekly format, meetings are held with representatives of international organizations, primarily the UN and the ICRC, to discuss the most pressing humanitarian issues in the Ukrainian direction. Since February 2022, more than 40 such meetings have been held.

In accordance with Article 122 of the Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War, in February of this year, the Russian Ministry of Defense formed an Information Bureau for Prisoners of War.

Through the Bureau, information about Ukrainian prisoners of war in the possession of the Russian side is transmitted to the ICRC.

In accordance with Art. 126 of the Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War organized visits by ICRC staff to their places of detention.

All detainees are treated in strict accordance with the norms of international humanitarian law - they are provided with decent living conditions, food standards comply with the standards of the military personnel of the RF Armed Forces, and all necessary medical care is provided, including complex high -tech operations using modern equipment.

In addition, in accordance with Art. 71 of the Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War, all detainees are given the opportunity to contact their relatives in Ukraine. Detainees make international telephone calls, write letters to their homeland.

Thanks to the assistance of the ICRC, more than 1,500 such letters have been sent to Ukraine.

Together with the UN and the ICRC, in April-May 2022, operations were successfully carried out to evacuate the civilian population from the Azovstal plant and withdraw the military personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and militants of the Azov regiment from this facility.

In total, more than 3,000 people left Azovstal, of which more than 2,400 were servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and fighters of nationalist formations.

The operations were exclusively humanitarian in nature. Employees of international organizations confirmed the strict observance of the norms of international humanitarian law during their conduct.

With the participation of the ICRC, it was also possible to organize a dialogue with Kyiv on the issue of the exchange of prisoners of war and the bodies of dead servicemen. To date, 27 such operations have been carried out.

In accordance with Article 112 of the Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War, a permanent medical commission has been formed in the Russian Ministry of Defense to examine sick and wounded prisoners of war and to make the necessary decisions on them.

The Commission carries out its work in accordance with the recommendations and principles prepared on the basis of the Geneva Convention.

Examination of the sick and wounded, as well as their repatriation, is carried out in a timely manner.

To date, according to the decisions of the commission, 18 people have been transferred to the Ukrainian side.

Unfortunately, the situation with Ukraine's compliance with the norms of international humanitarian law is completely different. Videos about torture and abuse posted by the perpetrators of monstrous acts of violence against captured servicemen of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the DPR and the LPR are widely known on the Internet. Numerous cases of beatings, deliberate infliction of injuries, extrajudicial executions, and failure to provide medical assistance to our servicemen have been recorded.

In addition, the Ukrainian Nazis exert psychological pressure on the relatives of delayed servicemen, extorting money from them is widely practiced.

I would like to share with you statistical data summarized by the results of a survey of servicemen of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, DPR and LPR released from captivity.

81% of servicemen were subjected to beatings and physical violence.

55% of servicemen were forcibly involved in filming propaganda videos and videoconferences.

Medical care was not provided to 46% of servicemen.

79% of servicemen were not given the opportunity to contact relatives.

19% of servicemen were provided with insufficient food or food of unsatisfactory quality. Thus, in the place of detention of detainees belonging to the SBU in Kyiv, food was provided once a day: a piece of bread, 50 gr. porridge, a glass of water. At the same time, the servicemen were constantly wearing masks covering their eyes.

We regularly send information about all these facts to specialized humanitarian structures with a request to influence official Kyiv.

However, we continue to record cases of violations by the Ukrainian military of the norms of international humanitarian law, obligations under international conventions, and rules of war.

The SU uses the civilian population as a human shield, deploying heavy weapons in densely populated areas at social facilities, medical institutions and cultural heritage sites.

Shelling of residential areas in the DPR and LPR continues, including with the use of Western-made weapons.

Anti-personnel mines and booby-traps prohibited by the 1997 Ottawa Convention are used against civilians, and cluster munitions are also used.

And this is being done despite Kyiv's statements about the alleged observance of its international obligations under this Convention.

Taking advantage of the patronage of the West, the Kyiv authorities do not limit themselves to any moral or legal norms. Every day, military personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and nationalist battalions commit crimes that are not properly appreciated by the international community.

Shelling of railway stations, residential areas, places of distribution of humanitarian aid and other places of mass congestion of people continues: in Donetsk, Yasinovataya, Gorlovka, Makeevka, Svyatogorsk and many other markets settlements and cities of Donbass.

At the same time, a lot of falsified information about crimes allegedly committed by servicemen of the Russian Armed Forces is posted on the Internet.

Such connivance by the international community, as well as the desire of the Ukrainian authorities to hide their crimes, in our opinion, led to the tragedy in the settlement of Yelenovka - the shelling of the place of detention of Ukrainian prisoners of war by the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

I will dwell on this story in more detail.

On July 29, 2022, at 00.20, the armed forces of Ukraine purposefully delivered a blow with an American-made Hymars multiple launch rocket system at a temporary detention facility in the settlement of  Yelenovka of the Donetsk People's Republic - Correctional Colony No. 120, which is located 12 km south of Donetsk.

At the time of the strike, POWs were being held in the colony, including Azov soldiers who had surrendered.

There were 193 people in the block that was hit. Most of them were members of the Azov regiment.

As a result of the shelling, 50 prisoners of war were killed and 73 were wounded. Eight employees of the pre-trial detention center were also injured.

Please pay attention to slide #14. The direction of the roof breach and the source of fire directly indicate that the blow was delivered from the northwest direction. Shooting was carried out from the direction of Maryinka - Kurakhovo - Sergeevka - Pokrovsk - Udachnoe.

The photograph shows the characteristic fragments of a rocket that hit a building with Azov soldiers - these are fragments of the American MLRS "Haymars".

I draw your attention to the analysis of the chronology of events:

On May 20, 2022, servicemen of the Azov National Regiment who had surrendered were taken to a pre-trial detention center in the settlement Yelenovka. The Ukrainian side insisted on this particular place of detention.

On July 28, 2022, a video confession of Dmitry Kozatsky's “Azov” crimes was published.

As a result, on the night of July 28-29, 2022, a blow was struck at the pre-trial detention center in Yelenovka.

The leadership of Ukraine gave the order to launch a missile attack, as the captured militants of the Azov regiment began to testify, exposing their crimes, including those against civilians.

I would like to acquaint you with the statements of the Ukrainian servicemen who were in the pre-trial detention center in the settlement. Yelenovka.

Currently, many Ukrainian servicemen voluntarily lay down their arms, knowing about the truly humane attitude towards prisoners of war on the Russian side. The provocation in Yelenovka is intended to intimidate the servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and is an attempt to counteract their surrender.

According to the already established practice, the Ukrainian authorities, without providing any evidence, are trying to shift the responsibility for the death of Ukrainian prisoners of war to the Russian Federation.

Unfortunately, representatives of the leadership of Western countries are increasingly joining the chorus of unsubstantiated accusations against us.

At the same time, the United States indirectly admitted to the fact of attacking Yelenovka by the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

The Pentagon website posted a statement by a senior US Department of Defense official that the quote: "if this happened - a Ukrainian strike, they did not want to do it ..." end of quote. We regard this statement as a clumsy attempt to justify the provocation of the Kyiv regime.

According to the US, the Hymars system is highly accurate and hits exactly the targets they were aimed at.

At the same time, Kyiv emphasizes that when planning a fire engagement, the Armed Forces of Ukraine actively use space and aerial reconnaissance data received from the US Armed Forces and their allies, and US representatives are preparing tasks for firing. The totality of these facts only confirms the guilt of the Kyiv regime in the murder of its citizens.

Concluding my briefing, I would like to once again note the reasons why the Armed Forces of Ukraine attacked the pre-trial detention center in the settlement. Yelenovka.

Kyiv authorities seek to eliminate witnesses and perpetrators of their crimes against their own people.

Zelensky advocates that the Western community should give a unified assessment that coincides with the Ukrainian interpretation of these events, accusing the Russian side of attacking Yelenovka.

As for the goals of the special military operation, they will be fulfilled in full.

Thank you for attention!