Saturday, March 14, 2026

From catastrophe to Victory: Air assault troops rescue civilians in daring Ivanovka campaign

 ZELENOGORSK PRAVDA

"Truth in Service of the Nation"

Senior Defense Correspondent Svetlana Golikova Reports on Three Battles That Defined the Regiment

ZELENOGORSK — In the frozen villages of the Ivanovka region, the men of the Chernarus 31st Separate Air Assault Regiment lived through every soldier's nightmare—and then they did something remarkable.

They learned.

Zelenogorsk Pravda has obtained the classified after-action report for three consecutive operations conducted in late February and early March: Troitskoye, Ryakovo, and Belorovka. Together, they tell a story of catastrophic failure, rapid adaptation, and ultimately, the rescue of innocent civilians from the hands of an enemy that showed them no mercy.


PART I: TROITSKOYE — 'THE TANKS COMPLETELY SHOT US UP'

It began as a probe.

Intelligence from local agents, drone overflights, and intercepted communications had revealed that separatist forces were planning to push their front line southward by three to four kilometers. But first, they needed to know exactly where our defenses were positioned. Their chosen instrument was the village of Troitskoye.

"Past experiences at Troitskoye had shown that the enemy wanted to push their vehicles directly into town," the after-action report notes clinically. "But 2nd Battalion is primarily light infantry, so anti-tank weapons are not as effective."

The task force commander knew the risks. His plan was sound: transport helicopters would land 500 meters south of the village, infantry would advance, and six anti-tank teams would establish ambush positions for inbound enemy armor. Two Su-25 ground attack fighters and two Mi-24 gunships would provide support.

The enemy had other plans.

First came the infantry—multiple squads of special forces, including Wagner Group operators and Russian naval infantry. They were "highly motivated and prepared to breach the village's defensive cordon." Our rifle squads fought them back, driving them north with only moderate casualties.

Then came the armor.

"The separatists threw their armor, both wheeled and heavy tracked, into the village. Many of those vehicles were destroyed by infantry anti-tank teams, but three of them our forces were unable to stop."

Those three tanks changed everything.

"The tanks completely shot up our infantry deployment, inflicting catastrophic casualties on our forces."

When the smoke cleared, the task force had suffered approximately 90 percent infantry casualties and 90 percent helicopter losses. Battalion command had failed to make reinforcing infantry available—a decision that would be hotly debated in the aftermath.

"We lost good people and valuable equipment," Regimental Commander Major Vyacheslav Abyshkin would later write. "But the Regiment did not break."


PART II: RYAKOVO — MINES, LOGISTICS, AND HIT LISTS

The Regiment had less than 24 hours to process what had happened at Troitskoye before the next operation presented itself.

Intelligence staffs had been working through the night, tapping cell phones, debriefing agents, piecing together the enemy's next move. The separatists had taken over the village of Ryakovo. They were establishing a logistical base and reinforcing with armor.

This time, the Regiment would be ready.

Corps-level engineers attached a small unit to the infantry, equipped with anti-vehicle mines. Their instructions: plant mines along as many ingress routes as possible, causing mobility problems for heavy armor and outright kills for light wheeled vehicles.

The tactical plan called for troops to land in a straight line as close as possible within 500 meters, then penetrate the enemy's defensive cordon. All four rifle squads would then occupy north-facing positions and hold.

What happened next was almost lost before it began.

Two of the four transport birds were hit and shot down nearly immediately by enemy heavy tracked armor. The other two were seriously damaged and unable to continue.

But the four rifle squads had landed so close to the village—less than 250 meters for Command Squad—that they survived intact and began their penetration.

Command Squad advanced from the southwest, locating and eliminating two civilian criminal command operatives. In the process, they seized intelligence data that would send chills through the local population: a pair of hit lists targeting civilians.

As the infantry continued clearing the village, the commander marched his squad north. Their objective: enemy logistics. They found two ammunition vehicles and one fuel vehicle. All three were destroyed.

Before withdrawing, the commander moved to the main north-south road west of the area of operations and planted a series of M6 SLAM mines. Then he pulled his forces back into the village, established a defensive cordon, and awaited the counterattack that never came.

Battalion command ordered a withdrawal. The mission was complete.


PART III: BELOROVKA — 'TORTURED AND KILLED'

The third operation in the series was different from the start.

Intelligence on enemy deployment at Belorovka was light. But local friendly agents sent urgent messages: three, possibly four civilians were being held prisoner in the village by an enemy counterintelligence unit.

At the time, planning staffs did not know who the prisoners were or their importance.

They would learn soon enough.

One of the female prisoners was a village chief from a nearby settlement, arrested earlier that day along with her husband and her sister. A fourth prisoner—another woman—would be discovered by our forces having been tortured and killed.

The task force commander, having learned the brutal lesson of Troitskoye, ordered transport birds to land no closer than 500 meters from the village edge. The terrain around Belorovka enabled forces to penetrate the enemy defensive cordon effectively.

Along the way, the task force encountered several Wagner Group operators. They were cleared away efficiently. The remainder of the force moved into defensible positions within the village as Command Squad continued pushing north.

M6 SLAM mines were deployed. Enemy counterattacks, when they came, were scattered and light.

When the order came from battalion command to withdraw, the task force boarded their birds. There were zero losses among transport helicopters, zero losses among gunships. Infantry casualties were very light.

And the village chief, her husband, and her sister were alive.

The fourth prisoner—the one who had been tortured—was not.


THE LINE THEY HOLD

Today, our forces hold a thin line ranging from Belorovka to Ryakovo.

"It's not expected to hold in the coming weeks," the after-action report admits with brutal honesty.

But for the moment, it holds. And the civilians of those villages sleep in their own homes, not in separatist basements.

"The two air assault operations following the catastrophic Troitskoye operation were demonstrative of how flexible headquarters command and tactical command staffs are in wide-ranging operations," the report concludes.


'THIS IS WHAT LEARNING LOOKS LIKE'

In his formal comments appended to the report, Regimental Commander Major Vyacheslav Abyshkin wrote words that deserve to be read by every citizen of Chernarus:

"The Troitskoye operation was a catastrophe. We lost good people and valuable equipment. But the Regiment did not break. Within days, we returned to Ryakovo and Belorovka and accomplished our missions with minimal losses.

"This is what adaptability looks like. This is what learning looks like.

"We have identified the failures at Troitskoye. They will not be repeated."


WHAT COMES NEXT

The Regiment's after-action report includes a series of recommendations:

  • Reinforce the Belorovka-Ryakovo line immediately

  • Expand minefields along enemy approaches

  • Maintain 500-meter minimum insertion distances when enemy armor is confirmed

  • Issue additional disposable anti-tank weapons to light infantry units

For the families of those lost at Troitskoye, the recommendations are cold comfort. For the villagers of Belorovka who now sleep safely, they are everything.

And for the enemy who thought they could push our lines south, who thought they could torture and kill civilians with impunity, the message is clear:

The 31st Separate Air Assault Regiment learned from catastrophe. They adapted. They came back.

And they will come again.


Contact Svetlana Golikova at s.golikova@zelenogorsk-pravda.chernarus


Editor's Note: Some operational details have been withheld or altered at the request of Chernarus Coastal Operations Group. The names of certain personnel and rescued civilians have been omitted to protect operational security and individual privacy.

31st Separate Air Assault Regiment After Action Report: Ivanovka Region Operations

 RESTRICTED//OPERATIONAL SECURITY

31st Separate Air Assault Regiment After Action Report: Ivanovka Region Operations

TO:
Major Vyacheslav Abyshkin, Regimental Commander, 31st Separate Air Assault Regiment
Colonel Irina Volkova, ChCOG Senior Staff Engineer Analyst
Vice Admiral Boris Kravchuck, Deputy Commander, ChCOG
Rear Admiral Igor Kasatonov, Commander Intelligence, ChCOG

FROM:
Captain Ilya Kostritsa, Deputy Head of Intelligence Staff, 31st Separate Air Assault Regiment

DATE: 7 March 2026

CLASSIFICATION: RESTRICTED//OPERATIONAL SECURITY


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report analyzes three consecutive air assault operations conducted by 2nd Battalion, 31st Separate Air Assault Regiment in the Ivanovka region between late February and early March 2025:

  • OP2602-27-3 (Troitskoye) — Catastrophic losses; nearly 90% infantry and helicopter casualties

  • OP2602-28-7 (Ryakovo) — Successful clearance; enemy logistics destroyed; prisoners' hit lists recovered

  • OP2603-06-1 (Belorovka) — Successful rescue operation; civilian prisoners recovered; minimal casualties

The operations demonstrate the Regiment's ability to adapt and learn from catastrophic failure. Following the near-destruction of the task force at Troitskoye, tactical and intelligence lessons were applied immediately, resulting in two successive victories at Ryakovo and Belorovka. However, the current defensive line from Belorovka to Ryakovo remains thin and is not expected to hold in the coming weeks without reinforcement.


1. OPERATION TROITSKOYE (OP2602-27-3)

1.1 Intelligence Preparation

43rd Mountain Rifle Corps intelligence staff compiled information from multiple sources:

Source TypeIntelligence Gathered
Local friendly agentsScattered reports across northern tier villages in corps AO
Drone overflightsIncidental surveillance of enemy positions
Social mediaCivilian and military accounts indicating enemy movements
Prisoner interrogationsConfirmation of enemy operational planning

Key Finding: Separatists planned a series of operations to push their front line southward 3-4 kilometers. However, enemy command staffs remained uncertain of our frontline positions despite heightened reconnaissance. To resolve this uncertainty, separatist command ordered an operational-level probe into Troitskoye.

Enemy Tactical Pattern: Past experiences at Troitskoye demonstrated the enemy's preference for pushing vehicles directly into town to eliminate any forces encountered.

1.2 Friendly Forces & Limitations

  • Unit: 2nd Battalion, 31st Separate Air Assault Regiment

  • Composition: Primarily light infantry

  • Challenge: Anti-tank weapons less effective against heavy armor

  • Air Support: 2x Su-25 ground interdiction fighters, 2x Mi-24 gunships

1.3 Battle Plan

The task force commander ordered:

  1. Insertion: Transport helicopters land 500 meters south of village; infantry advances into town

  2. Deployment:

    • 3rd Squad designated as fire brigade

    • 2nd and 4th Squads positioned near main north-south road

    • Six infantry anti-tank teams inserted into village to establish ambush positions for inbound enemy armor

  3. Final Preparation: Command Squad ordered to dig in and prepare to intercept inbound enemy vehicles

1.4 The Battle

Phase 1: Infantry Engagement

  • Enemy committed multiple squads of special forces, including:

    • Wagner Group operators

    • Russian naval infantry special forces

  • All were highly motivated and prepared to breach the village's defensive cordon

  • All three rifle squads performed well, driving back enemy infantry attacks to the north

  • Friendly casualties: Moderate

Phase 2: Armor Engagement

  • Enemy committed both wheeled and heavy tracked armor into the village

  • Infantry anti-tank teams destroyed many vehicles

  • Three enemy tanks could not be stopped

  • These tanks completely suppressed our infantry deployment

Casualties:

  • Infantry: Approximately 90%

  • Helicopters: Approximately 90%

  • Additional Factor: Battalion command failed to make reinforcing infantry available for Troitskoye

1.5 Enemy Losses (Troitskoye)

CauseVehicles Destroyed
Infantry anti-tank5
Air support (Su-25/Mi-24)7 damaged or destroyed

1.6 Outcome

Remnants of the task force retreated to base. The operation was a catastrophic failure in terms of friendly losses, though it absorbed a significant enemy assault that might otherwise have been directed elsewhere.


2. OPERATION RYAKOVO (OP2602-28-7)

2.1 Intelligence Preparation

Immediately following the Troitskoye operation, intelligence staffs at corps and regiment level began collecting on subsequent enemy plans:

Source TypeIntelligence Gathered
Tapped/recorded cell phonesConfirmed enemy intentions
Local friendly agentsReported enemy takeover of Ryakovo

Key Findings:

  • Enemy had occupied Ryakovo

  • They were establishing a logistical base

  • Village was reinforced with armor (specific types unknown)

Engineer Support: Corps-level engineer commanders attached a small engineer unit to the infantry, equipped with anti-vehicle mines. Their mission: plant mines along ingress routes to create mobility problems for enemy heavy armor and destroy light wheeled armor.

2.2 Battle Plan (OP2602-28-7)

  1. Insertion: Troops landed in a straight line as close as possible within 500 meters of village

  2. Initial Assault: All four rifle squads penetrate enemy defensive cordon

  3. Defensive Position: Squads occupy north-facing positions and prepare to hold against enemy attack

  4. Command Squad Insertion: Transport bird lands less than 250 meters from southern edge of village

2.3 Critical Incident

  • Two of four transport birds were hit and shot down nearly immediately by enemy heavy tracked armor

  • The other two transport birds were seriously damaged and unable to continue

  • All four rifle squads survived intact due to proximity to village edge and began penetration operations

2.4 The Battle

Command Squad Actions:

  • Advanced from southwest into village

  • Located and eliminated two civilian criminal command operatives

  • Intelligence Recovered: Critical documents including a pair of hit lists targeting local civilians

Logistics Destruction:

  • Command Squad marched north

  • Located enemy logistics assets:

    • 2x ammunition vehicles

    • 1x fuel vehicle

  • Destroyed all three, completely eliminating enemy logistics in the area

Mine Deployment:

  • Commander moved to main north-south road west of AO

  • Planted series of M6 SLAM mines

  • Withdrew forces back into village and established defensive cordon

Withdrawal:

  • Battalion command staff issued order to withdraw and return to base

  • Enemy counterattack did not materialize before extraction

2.5 Outcome

Successful clearance operation. Enemy logistics destroyed. Critical intelligence recovered.


3. OPERATION BELOROVKA (OP2603-06-1)

3.1 Intelligence Preparation

Intelligence on enemy deployment at Belorovka was limited. Primary intelligence came from local friendly agents reporting that 3-4 civilians were being held prisoner in the village by an enemy counterintelligence unit.

Prisoner Identification (Post-Operation):

  • Female village chief from nearby village

  • Her husband

  • Her sister

  • A fourth female prisoner discovered tortured and killed

3.2 Battle Plan

Based on lessons from Troitskoye:

  • Insertion: Transport birds required to land no closer than 500 meters from village edge

  • Terrain Advantage: Surrounding terrain enabled covered penetration of enemy defensive cordon

3.3 The Battle

Penetration:

  • Task force encountered Wagner Group operators during advance

  • Enemy cleared away efficiently

  • Remainder of task force moved into defensible positions within village

Command Squad Actions:

  • Continued push north

  • Deployed M6 SLAM mines to cover approaches

Enemy Response:

  • Counterattacks were scattered and light

  • Quickly defeated

Extraction:

  • Battalion command staff ordered withdrawal

  • Task force boarded transport birds

  • Village secured by reinforcing forces

3.4 Casualties

CategoryLosses
InfantryVery light
Transport birdsZero
GunshipsZero

3.5 Outcome

Successful rescue operation. Village secured. Civilian prisoners recovered (one deceased, tortured).


4. ENEMY LOSSES (AGGREGATE)

OperationVehicles Destroyed (Infantry)Vehicles Destroyed (Air)Notes
Troitskoye57Heavy enemy special forces commitment
RyakovoUnconfirmedUnconfirmedLogistics vehicles destroyed
BelorovkaLightNoneScattered counterattacks

5. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

5.1 Operational Progression

The three operations demonstrate a clear learning curve:

  1. Troitskoye (Failure):

    • Over-reliance on anti-tank teams against heavy armor

    • Insufficient reinforcing infantry

    • Catastrophic losses: 90% infantry and helicopters

  2. Ryakovo (Success):

    • Mine warfare integrated effectively

    • Logistics destruction achieved

    • Intelligence recovered (hit lists)

  3. Belorovka (Success):

    • Proper insertion distance (500m)

    • Minimal casualties

    • Civilian rescue accomplished

5.2 Critical Success Factors

  1. Intelligence Adaptability: Immediate collection on enemy follow-on plans after Troitskoye

  2. Engineer Integration: Mines proved decisive at Ryakovo

  3. Tactical Flexibility: Commanders adjusted insertion distances based on lessons learned

  4. Air Support Coordination: Su-25 and Mi-24 effectively engaged armor at Troitskoye despite friendly losses

5.3 Critical Failures (Troitskoye)

  1. Reinforcement Failure: Battalion command did not make infantry available

  2. Armor Vulnerability: Light infantry insufficient against heavy armor without adequate support

  3. Insertion Distance: 500 meters proved too close with enemy armor present

5.4 Current Situation

  • Friendly forces hold a thin line from Belorovka to Ryakovo

  • Assessment: Line is not expected to hold in coming weeks without reinforcement


6. RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Immediate Actions

  1. Reinforce the Line: Commit additional infantry to Belorovka-Ryakovo sector immediately

  2. Minefield Expansion: Deploy additional engineer assets to layer minefields along approaches

  3. Intel Collection: Aggressive drone coverage to detect enemy buildup

6.2 Future Operations

  1. Air Assault Doctrine Update: Mandate 500m minimum insertion distance when enemy armor confirmed

  2. Anti-Tank Enhancement: Issue additional disposable anti-tank weapons to light infantry units

  3. Reinforcement Protocol: Establish clear chain for requesting reinforcing infantry

6.3 Long-Term Recommendations

  1. Develop dedicated anti-armor platoons within air assault battalions

  2. Pre-position mine stocks at battalion forward operating bases

  3. Integrate prisoner rescue protocols into standard operating procedures

  4. Document and disseminate lessons from Troitskoye to all air assault units


7. COMMANDER'S COMMENTS

The Troitskoye operation was a catastrophe. We lost good people and valuable equipment. But the Regiment did not break. Within days, we returned to Ryakovo and Belorovka and accomplished our missions with minimal losses.

This is what adaptability looks like. This is what learning looks like.

We have identified the failures at Troitskoye. They will not be repeated.

The line from Belorovka to Ryakovo is thin. But it is ours. We will hold it until reinforcements arrive.

— Major Vyacheslav Abyshkin
Commander, 31st Separate Air Assault Regiment


8. DISTRIBUTION

  • Regimental Commander, 31st Separate Air Assault Regiment (Maj. Abyshkin)

  • ChCOG Senior Staff Engineer Analyst (Col. Volkova)

  • Deputy Commander, ChCOG (Vice Adm. Kravchuck)

  • Commander Intelligence, ChCOG (Rear Adm. Kasatonov)

  • 43rd Mountain Rifle Corps Intelligence Staff

  • 2nd Battalion, 31st Separate Air Assault Regiment


Captain Ilya Kostritsa
Deputy Head of Intelligence Staff
31st Separate Air Assault Regiment
Chernarus Defense Forces

CLASSIFICATION: RESTRICTED//OPERATIONAL SECURITY