April 26, 1985: Uprising in the Badaber Camp

 

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.

Text taken from a V Kontakte post by THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR from Sergey Veter

UPRISING IN THE BADABER CAMP..... April 26, 1985

IN MEMORY OF THOSE WHO DID NOT RECEIVE CAPTURE

The uprising in the Badaber camp is an episode of the Afghan war, during which on April 26, 1985, an unequal battle took place between detachments of the Afghan Mujahideen and the regular Pakistani units that supported the army, on the one hand, and a group of Soviet and Afghan prisoners of war, on the other. 

The prisoners of war's attempt to free themselves from the camp failed. As a result of the two-day assault on the Badaber camp using artillery, most of the prisoners of war were killed. 

In 1983-1985, in the small village of Badaber in Pakistan, 10 km south of Peshawar and 24 km from the border with the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, there was an Afghan refugee camp. Under him, the “St. Khalid ibn Walid Militant Training Center” was organized, where, under the guidance of military instructors from the USA, Pakistan, China and Egypt, future Mujahideen were trained, intending to return to Afghanistan to continue resistance against the contingent of Soviet troops. 

In total, 65 military instructors worked in the camp, mainly from Pakistan and Egypt. Six of them were US citizens. The training center itself belonged to the Islamic Society of Afghanistan party, one of the most influential and large opposition groups opposing Soviet influence in the region as part of Operation Cyclone. It is known that the camp also enjoyed the tacit support of the Pakistani authorities.

The camp, together with the military base, occupied a huge area - about 500 hectares. In addition to adobe houses and tents, there were six storage rooms with weapons and ammunition and three prisons. Military personnel of the DRA Armed Forces and “shuravi” (Soviet prisoners of war) captured during 1983-1984 in Panjshir and Karabagh were brought here. Before this, they were kept mainly in zindans, equipped by each detachment independently. In total, in Badaber, according to various sources, there were about 40 Afghan and 14 Soviet prisoners of war.

During imprisonment, any communication with Shuravi and Afghan prisoners of war was prohibited. Anyone who tried to speak was scourged. Soviet prisoners were used for the most difficult jobs; they were brutally beaten for the slightest offense; At the same time, the dushmans persuaded the prisoners to accept Islam. The prisoners of war came up with a plan: to seize a weapons warehouse in the camp and demand that the Mujahideen leadership meet with representatives of the Soviet or Afghan embassies in Islamabad. Everyone knew what they were getting into: some had been in captivity for three years already, they had seen enough of the atrocities of the radicals, so they had no way back.

On April 26, 1985 at 21:00, when all the camp personnel were gathered on the parade ground to perform evening prayers, a group of Soviet prisoners of war “removed” two sentries from the artillery warehouses and on the tower, freed the prisoners, armed themselves with small arms and artillery weapons captured in the warehouses and tried to hide. The rebels had at their disposal ammunition for a coaxial anti-aircraft gun and a DShK machine gun, a mortar and RPG grenade launchers. According to another version, their main goal was to seize a radio station in order to go on air to report their coordinates. It is assumed that the organizer of the uprising was a native of Zaporozhye, Viktor Vasilyevich Dukhovchenko, born in 1954.

At 23.00 by order of IOA leader Burhanuddin Rabbani, the site of the clash was blocked by a triple encirclement ring consisting of 100 dushmans and military personnel, armored vehicles and artillery of the Pakistani army. Rabbani personally invited the rebels to surrender and promised to spare the lives of those who surrendered. But they responded with a categorical refusal and, in turn, demanded a meeting with representatives of the Soviet or Afghan embassies in Pakistan, as well as calling representatives of the Red Cross to the scene. The rebels promised to blow up the warehouse if their demands were not met. Rabbani rejected these demands and decided to launch an assault that lasted all night.

By 08.00 on April 27, it became clear that the rebels did not intend to surrender. During the assault, Rabbani was nearly killed by a grenade launcher, while his bodyguard received serious shrapnel wounds. Rabbani decided to end the assault by destroying the camp. At 8 o'clock in the morning, Pakistani heavy artillery shelling of Badaber began, after which the weapons and ammunition depot exploded.

There are different versions about the causes of this explosion. According to one source, a weapons and ammunition depot exploded due to volleys of rocket launchers. The subsequent series of explosions destroyed the Badaber camp. The three shell-shocked survivors were dragged to the wall and blown up with hand grenades.

According to other sources, the rebels themselves blew up the warehouse when the outcome of the battle became clear.

According to Rabbani, the warehouse exploded due to an RPG hit. After which all the prisoners and guards who remained locked inside the warehouse died.

The enormous force of the explosion is confirmed by witness testimony:

A powerful explosion occurred. The missiles exploded and scattered in different directions...

What I saw at the site of the explosion... were fingers in one direction, a hand in another place, ears in a third. We were able to find only the body of Kinet intact and half of the body of another prisoner, which was torn off and thrown aside. Everything else was torn into pieces, and we didn’t find anything whole anymore.

- Ghulam Rasul Karluk, in 1985 - commander of a training company in the Badaber camp

Rabbani left somewhere and some time later a cannon appeared. He gave the order to shoot. When the gun fired, the shell hit the warehouse and caused a powerful explosion. Everything went up in the air. No people, no buildings, nothing remained. Everything was leveled to the ground and black smoke poured out. And there was literally an earthquake in our basement.

Rabbani said: “Drive everyone out of the basement, let them come here.” And he told us: “Come on, gather everyone. All that remains of your fellow countrymen." And the remains were widely scattered. We brought them in pieces and put them in a hole. And so they buried... Mujahideen with machine guns stand: “Come on, come on, faster, faster!” We walk, collect, cry.

— Rustamov Nosirzhon Ummatkulovich, prisoner of the Badaber camp.

The SVR report clarifies that the forces of the regular army of Pakistan helped suppress the Rabbani uprising:

Information about the heroic uprising of Soviet prisoners of war in the Badaber camp is confirmed by the documents of the US State Department at our disposal, materials of the Ministry of State Security of Afghanistan, testimony of direct eyewitnesses and participants in these events from the Mujahideen and Pakistanis , as well as statements by the leaders of the armed formations B. Rabbani (IOA), G. Hekmatyar (IPA) and others...

The area of ​​the uprising was blocked by Mujahideen detachments, tank and artillery units of the 11th Army Corps of the Pakistan Armed Forces. The 122mm BM-21 Grad MLRS and a flight of Pakistani Air Force helicopters were used against the rebels. Radio reconnaissance of the 40th Army recorded a radio interception between their crews and the air base, as well as a report from one of the crews about a bomb attack on the camp. Only the joint efforts of the Mujahideen and Pakistani regular troops managed to suppress this uprising. Most of the rebels died a brave death in an unequal battle, and the seriously wounded were finished off on the spot.

According to documents of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, more than 120 Afghan mujahideen and refugees, a number of foreign specialists (including 6 American advisers), 28 officers of the Pakistani regular troops, and 13 representatives of the Pakistani authorities were killed. The Badaber base was completely destroyed; as a result of the explosion of the arsenal, the rebels lost three 122mm BM-21 Grad MLRS installations, overtwo million rounds of ammunition, about 40 guns, mortars and machine guns, about 2,000  missiles and shells of various types. The prison office also perished, and with it the lists of prisoners.

The incident caused a stir among the Pakistani leadership and the Afghan Mujahideen. On April 29, 1985, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, the President of Pakistan, decided to classify all information about the incident. Between April 29 and May 4, the governor of the North-West Frontier Province, Lieutenant General Fazal-Haq, and personally Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq visited the scene of events, who had a difficult and unpleasant conversation with the leaders of the dushmans. 

After this conversation, his order was distributed among Gulbetdin Hekmatyar’s formations that in future “shuravis” should not be captured, but that if captured, they should be destroyed on the spot.” (this directive was distributed only among the units of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan, was in force during 1985 and was canceled under pressure from American advisers). The Pakistani authorities completely confiscated the issue of the Peshawar magazine "Safir", which talked about the uprising in the fortress. However, the popular leftist Pakistani newspaper Muslim published a report about the uprising of Soviet prisoners. This news was then spread by Western media.

1985, the Soviet leadership also imagined the scale of the incident:

According to the aerospace service, a large explosion destroyed the Mujahideen training camp of Badaber in the NWFP of Pakistan. The size of the crater in the image obtained from the communications satellite reaches 80 meters

- from the report of the Aerospace Service Center, April 28. 1985

The camp's square mile area was covered with a layer of shell fragments, rockets and mines, and human remains were found by local residents at a distance of up to four miles from the explosion site... 14-15 Soviet soldiers were kept in the Badaber camp, two of whom managed to survive after the uprising was suppressed...

On May 27, the general public of the USSR learned about what had happened from the materials of the Novosti press agency. The meaning of the message is purely political; there were no words of condolences to the relatives, no admiration for the feat of the prisoners, no sorrow for their tragic fate. Their deaths were used as a reason to once again criticize the Reagan administration.

Until 1991, Pakistani authorities responded negatively to all inquiries about the incident, citing ignorance. They insisted that there were no Soviet prisoners of war on their territory. According to Yusuf Mohammed, a Pakistani intelligence officer, the incident "could have quickly spiraled out of control or led to an international confrontation."

For the first time, an official representative of Islamabad admitted the fact of the death of Soviet soldiers in Badaber in a conversation with a representative of the Russian embassy in December 1991. This recognition followed only after the fact of their participation in the uprising was previously confirmed by B. Rabbani. In early 1992, Pakistan's Deputy Foreign Minister Shahryar Khan officially announced the names of six participants in the Badaber uprising.

On February 8, 2003, by Decree of the President of Ukraine, “for personal courage and heroism shown in the performance of military, official, and civil duty,” junior sergeant Sergei Korshenko was awarded the Order of Courage, 3rd degree (posthumously), and junior sergeant Nikolai Samin was awarded the Order of the President. Kazakhstan - the Order of “Aibyn” (“Valor”), 3rd degree (“for courage and dedication shown in the performance of military and official duty, as well as for feats accomplished in protecting the interests of the state”, posthumously).

Repeated appeals to the Russian leadership with the aim of perpetuating the memory of fallen soldiers and posthumously presenting them for state awards did not find a positive response. In 2003, the award department of the Russian Ministry of Defense informed the Committee on the Affairs of Internationalist Soldiers under the Council of Heads of Government of the CIS that the award procedure for fulfilling international duty was completed in July 1991 on the basis of a directive from the USSR Deputy Minister of Defense for Personnel. In 2004, the Committee was also further clarified:

the Ministry of Defense does not have information that would reveal the true picture of the tragic events that occurred in April 1985 in the Badaber Afghan refugee camp. The available fragmentary data are contradictory... Currently, after 20 years, it is difficult to objectively assess those events and the specific personal merits of their participants...

According to V.P. Alaskan, this position of the Russian leadership on this issue looks very ambiguous, since no less 10 people from the above list of participants in the uprising were called up for military service from the territory of the current Russian Federation.

In 2005-2009, V.P. Alaskan, a participant in the Afghan campaign and a member of the government delegation for the release of prisoners of war in 1995-1998, carried out an independent investigation into the circumstances of the events in Badaber, including using documentary materials from the US State Department, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russian and Afghan competent authorities, and established the names of most of the direct participants in the uprising. Numerous eyewitness accounts and archival data led to the conclusion that of the 17 participants in the uprising he identified, at least 10 were called up for military service from the territory of the Russian Federation.

The feat of Soviet military personnel formed the basis of the feature film by T. Bekmambetov and G. Kayumov “Peshawar Waltz” (1993) - according to the “Afghan” veterans, one of the most poignant and truthful films about that war, dedicated to the events in Badaber, which became a real monument to the soldiers.

The song of the Blue Berets group “April 27” and Alexander Rosenbaum’s song “We will return” are dedicated to the uprising in Badaber.

The uprising in Badaber is described in the novel “Sons” by the Belarusian writer Nikolai Cherginets.

In March 2013, the novel by St. Petersburg writer Andrei Konstantinov and Boris Podoprigora “If anyone hears me” was published. The Legend of the Badaber Fortress”, in the center of which is the uprising in the Badaber fortress. The novel is publicly available on the Fontanka.ru website. A film adaptation is being prepared. The plot of the 1991 Ukrainian feature film “Afghan” is based on the uprising.

ETERNAL MEMORY AND GLORY TO THOSE WHO DID NOT RETURN FROM THE BATTLEFIELDS!!!

How the Soviet 2nd Shock Army was saved

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.

Text taken from a  V Kontake post by THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR from Sergey Veter

How the Soviet 2nd Shock Army was saved

About the measures taken to withdraw the 2nd Shock Army from encirclement.

Information from the Chief of Staff of the Volkhov Front to the Commander of the 2nd Shock Army

Copies: The Commander of the 59th and 52nd Armies

To the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army.

June 23, 1942 04:00

1. Since June 10, the troops of the 59th and 52nd armies have been engaged in fierce battles almost continuously. These battles involved the 58th and 24th Rifle brigades, 2,374 and 165 Rifle Division,, 25 Cavalry Division, 87 Cavalry Rifle Regiment, one regiment each from 372 and 191 Rifle divisions, five fully equipped battalions from 378 and 4th Guards Rifle Divisions, courses for lieutenants of the 59th Army, reserve political personnel of the front PU, 7th Guards and 29th Tank brigades, at least 60 tanks. The offensive was supported by 207 guns, 144 mortars and three guards mortar divisions.

During these battles, the troops suffered heavy losses, but without stopping their attacks, they persistently struck blow after blow. On June 19, the enemy's resistance was broken. In the direction of the narrow-gauge railway, rifle units of the 24th Rifle Brigade with tanks, having made a narrow passage, approached the river. Expanding, and the tanks with a small landing party, as it became known from your reports, linked up with units of the 46th Rifle Division and the 25th and 57th Infantry brigades. On the next day, these tanks supported the advance of the 46th Rifle Division.

On June 21, at the cost of exceptional troop tension, the breakthrough was secured. Units of the 53rd Army, reaching the river. Expanding, at the same time they formed the walls of the corridor and on June 22 they turned: to the north - with the forces of 25 Cavalry Division, 2 rifle regiments, 191 and 372 Rifle regiments and 58 Rifle Regiment and to the south - with the forces of 24 Rifle Regiment, 374 Rifle Regiment. At the same time, the 165th Rifle Division / 52nd Army assists the 374th Rifle Division, operating along the southern road. The narrow gauge railway and road will be restored on June 23.

To ensure the passage of vehicles of the 2nd Shock Army on the road on the night of June 24, massive PC and artillery fire is being prepared on both sides of the road.

2. About 3,500 wounded and 800 soldiers and commanders of the 2nd Shock Army entered the formed and consolidated breakthrough on June 22 (as of 22.00). The evacuation continues.

3. The 59th and 52nd armies continue their offensive on 23.6 from 8.00 with the task of expanding the breakthrough to three km.

4. CP of the front commander and his deputy for ABTV - highway north of Myasnoy Bor.

STELMAKH RUBCHIY Central Leningrad Medical

Institute of the Russian Federation. F. 204. On. 47. D L. 45. Original.

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On the need to clarify the position of the 46th Rifle Division

ORDER

from the Chief of Staff of the Volkhov Front to the Chief of Staff

2 1st Shock Army

June 23, 1942 12:00 am

Immediately report where the 46th Rifle Division is located. All parts are not found in the breakthrough (corridor). Send liaison officers to avoid surprise attacks on your troops.

WITH

TELMAKH Ryabchiy

TsAMO RF. F. 204. On. 97. D. 98. L. 57. Original

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About the complication of the situation in the area of ​​operations of the 2nd Shock Army

REPORT

from the Chief of Staff of the Volkhov Front No. 18/781/Op to the General Staff of the Red Army

June 23, 1942 24:00.

1. The situation in the defensive sectors of the 2nd Shock Army has become more complicated. The troops have left Novaya Kerest and are fighting at the first intermediate line along the eastern bank of the river. Cross. In the Maloye Zamoshye area, units of the 305th Rifle Division repelled six enemy attacks, firmly holding their positions. Trophies and one prisoner were captured.

There were no significant changes at the breakthrough site. During the day's fighting, the corridor was slightly expanded in its eastern part and its sides were strengthened. The width of the formed corridor from the east is 1.5 km, from the west - about one km. 6,400 wounded and 930 armed soldiers and commanders from the 2nd Shock Army were evacuated along this corridor by 12.00. In the narrow part of the passage along the river. A selected detachment with five sneakers was sent to ensure the reliability of its hold and normal evacuation.

2. Tomorrow, to expand the corridor, the 4th Guards Rifle Division and the 7th Guards Tank Brigade, replenished with tanks, are brought into battle. All front aviation will be used to support the northwestern defense sector of the 2nd Shock Army.

The 930 soldiers who left on June 23 were put in order and were sent in an organized manner to the reserve of the 2nd Shock Army to strengthen its defense.

3. The 2nd Shock Army carried out the following preparatory measures for the withdrawal of materiel and vehicles. The artillery is partly loaded onto narrow-gauge railway platforms, and partly provided with trailers, vehicles and fuel. Motor transport consisting of 1,300 vehicles is divided into echelons (75% of them are equipped with fuel). Shields have been prepared to block destroyed sections of roads while traveling.

Evacuation is ensured by: a) placing a tank landing along the road; b) the area occupied by the enemy, adjacent to the sides of the roads, will be subjected to heavy fire treatment by the Guards mortar regiments and artillery.

4. On the night of June 23, the Front Air Force dropped seven tons of food, 138,240 cartridges, to the troops of the 2nd Army.  1,940 kg of fuel and lubricants. At the same time, transport aviation suffered heavy losses. Fire and fighters shot down five Douglass and five U-2 aircraft. Due to the current situation, air transportation will no longer be carried out. Under the cover of machine gunners, 6.5 tons of food were sent on packs.

Fighter and bomber aircraft attacked the enemy in the sector of the 2nd Army in the area of ​​Novaya Kerest, Olkhovka. A total of 76 combat missions were carried out. five enemy aircraft were shot down in air battles. Our losses: Five planes did not return.

5. Enemy aviation from dawn until 12.00 was especially active in the battle formations of the 2nd [strike] A troops and in the breakthrough area, where the enemy carried out 294 sorties.

STELMAKH RUBCHIY

TSAMO RF. F. 204. On. 89. D. 99. L. 73-74. Script.

June 25th, 1941: Soviet troops in Romania

 Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.

Text taken from a V Kontakte post by THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR from Sergey Veter

It was the Third day of the war

.......In the south there are Russian wedges on Romanian territory. The Allies are in chaos and confusion." This entry was made in the personal diary of one of the leaders of the Third Reich, Minister of Public Education and Propaganda Joseph Goebbels.

“This is incredible,” military history buffs will say. “When the Red Army entered Europe, he had dozens of such notes a week!”

But under the above entry is the date “June 28, 1941,” and the bridgehead captured by Soviet sailors, border guards and soldiers of the 51st Perekop Division on the right bank of the Danube was already 75 kilometers along the front and several kilometers deep in Romania!

On June 22, 1941, at 4.15 am, Romanian guns opened fire along the entire Soviet bank of the Danube. Infantry units rushed from cover to the water's edge. And then something unexpected happened for the aggressor: already at 4.18, individual ships and part of the coastal batteries of the Danube military flotilla snapped. At 4.20 all her trunks started talking. By half past five the return fire was so strong and organized that the Romanians had to stop shelling. Their infantry could not even reach the middle of the river.

By the summer of 1941, the Danube military flotilla included 5 river artillery monitors, 22 armored boats, 7 river minesweepers, one minelayer and about two dozen auxiliary vessels. In addition, the flotilla included a separate anti-aircraft artillery division, machine gun and rifle guard companies, six coastal batteries with guns of various calibers and a separate air squadron with fourteen I-153 Chaika fighters.

The flotilla was commanded by Rear Admiral Nikolai Osipovich Abramov.

At the beginning of hostilities, the naval division of the 79th border detachment of the NKVD troops came under his operational control. He had four “sea hunters”, as well as twenty-five small river boats. In addition to this, the 23rd Rifle Regiment of the 51st Perekop Rifle Division, stationed in the area of ​​the city of Kilia, was to act in the interests of the flotilla.

With the outbreak of the war, the position of the flotilla became unenviable. The movement of ships along the Danube and its tributaries was constrained by Romanian artillery fire, and supplies were completely interrupted. The flotilla command faced the question: what to do?

It was possible to follow the path that many commanders of Red Army units chose in the first days of the war - to blow up equipment, burn warehouses and, lightly, with only small arms, catch up with the front rolling back to the east.

But there was another option...

The flotilla did not receive an order to leave. This means we have to fight there, on the Danube. But the enemy dug in at the heights of the right bank, from there he monitored the fairway and constantly fired at the main support bases - Izmail, Renia, Kiliya and Vilkovo. Therefore, in order to facilitate the actions of the ship’s detachments, it is necessary to throw him out of there.

Cape Satul-Nou was chosen as the landing site. NKVD troops came to the aid of the sailors: the commander of the 79th border detachment, Major Savva Grachev, formed a consolidated company from volunteers, entrusting its command to Lieutenant Andrei Bodrunov. Soon the “green caps” were also joined by a platoon of border guard sailors led by Lieutenant Andrei Koshchei.

On June 23, preliminary artillery preparation was carried out.

On June 24 at 2.30, armored boats with border guards left the Kislitskaya channel at low speed and rushed to the opposite bank. Within twenty minutes the first wave of paratroopers rushed towards the Romanian trenches. The appearance of Soviet soldiers came as a complete surprise to the Romanians. And only in a few places did it come to hand-to-hand combat. Basically, the Romanians preferred to surrender or escape. As a result of a short battle, two Romanian companies ceased to exist. The losses of the paratroopers were 10 wounded...

When Abramov was informed about the capture of the cape on the right bank of the Danube, he immediately contacted the commander of the 51st Perekop Division, Major General Pyotr Gavrilovich Tsirulnikov, and asked him for support. The division commander immediately allocated a battalion of the 287th Rifle Regiment of his division, which was immediately loaded onto minesweepers, landed on Romanian territory and began expanding the bridgehead. Soviet infantry, with fire support from armored boats moving in close proximity to the shore, advanced along the Chilia branch down the Danube. And this advance was rapid: in less than a day, the bridgehead expanded by almost 40 kilometers along the front and 2–3 kilometers in depth.

And Soviet officers of not the highest level - the commander of the flotilla, the commander of the border detachment and the commander of the rifle division - were already planning and beginning to prepare the capture of Staraya Kiliya, a city on enemy territory.

It was the third day of the war...

The capture of the Romanian city was not an end in itself. It’s just that the flotilla still could not operate safely in the lower reaches of the Danube and secure access to the Black Sea. In addition, the Romanian garrison in Old Chilia hung over the left flank of the resulting bridgehead. They decided to eliminate this threat on the night of June 26. The main role in this enterprise was assigned to the 23rd Rifle Regiment of the 51st Perekop Rifle Division, which was supposed to land with all three battalions on the right bank of the Danube.

Regimental commander Peter Sirota managed to find a place in one of the river branches with a similar coastline outline, bottom characteristics and coastal depths. In addition, before dark, the captain conducted training on boarding armored boats, placing them on them and unloading them ashore... This is probably why there were no losses in his regiment the next night.

And artillery and aviation solved their problems. The flotilla squadron bombed several times in the area of ​​​​Old Kiliya. By evening, the howitzer regiment of the 51st Rifle Division arrived at the firing positions, and ammunition was replenished on the coastal batteries and in the gun turrets of the river monitors. And with the onset of darkness, a barrage of fire fell on the Romanian coast.

And 14 armored boats under the command of Captain-Lieutenant Ivan Kubyshkin with troops on board left the channel somewhat higher than the city. They moved with the engines turned off - the paratroopers and sailors pushed off from the bottom with poles. Then, using only their rudders and trying to stick to the shadows, the boats moved down the Danube. And only when the explosions dancing on the city outskirts became visible, the mechanics received the command: “Full speed!”

The Romanians noticed the landing only when the boats were two to three dozen meters from the shore. Soviet artillery transferred fire deep into Romanian territory, and turret guns and machine guns of armored boats began to fire at the surviving firing points. The battalion, led by the regimental commander Captain Sirota himself, landed without losses. And river minesweepers and border boats with two other battalions of the regiment were already leaving the left bank.

Two hours later, Old Kiliya was captured. The Romanians lost about 300 people killed, more than 700 surrendered. As trophies, the paratroopers received eight 75-mm guns and about 3,000 shells for them, 30 heavy and light machine guns, just under 1,000 rifles, almost 100,000 rounds of ammunition, 416 anti-personnel and anti-tank mines, and 340 grenades.

The regiment's losses amounted to five dead Red Army soldiers and seen wounded. Of the sailors of the Danube military flotilla, not a single one died that night, only three armored boats were damaged.

With dawn, Soviet units moved towards each other and by the end of June 26, the flanks of the landing forces landed on June 24 and 26 closed, forming a single bridgehead with a length of 75 kilometers along the front and wedged into the depths of Romanian territory from four to nine kilometers.

It was the fifth day of the war...

When Marshal Antonescu was informed that his troops could not land on Soviet territory, he was “upset.” But when reports arrived on June 24 and 26 that the Bolsheviks themselves had entered the territory of Romagna Mare, the marshal became furious. And he ordered to immediately put an end to the insolent people. The Romanians made their first attempt on June 27: an entire regiment rushed to positions at Satul Nou, which were held by 30 border guards armed with Mosin rifles, two light and two heavy machine guns. When the first attack failed, the second, third and fourth followed, which were already preceded by artillery attacks. But the Romanian batteries were immediately covered by naval and coastal artillery of the Danube military flotilla, and the border guards were not lacking in accuracy... As a result, the Romanian regiment, which by the evening had lost a fifth of its soldiers, was forced to abandon further attempts to throw a handful of soldiers in green caps into the Danube.

And Marshal Antonescu’s rage gave way to panic: on June 28, he reported to Berlin that thousands of NKVD commissars in green caps had invaded Romania, and asked an ally for help.

That’s when Goebbels made that very entry in his diary...

The battles for the Danube bridgehead were just approaching their climax.

On June 28, the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 23rd Rifle Regiment were recalled to the left bank. On the narrow strip of the right bank there remained no more than two infantry battalions, two platoons of sailors and a combined company of volunteer border guards.

On June 30, the Romanians again attempted to liquidate the bridgehead. A fierce battle broke out again at Cape Sutul-Nou, where the battalion of Captain Nikolai Turgan was now holding out.

When the situation became critical, its chief of staff, Captain 2nd Rank Grigoriev, arrived at the bridgehead to coordinate the actions of the flotilla’s infantry, ships and aviation. Having assessed the situation, he, at extreme risk, at his own peril and risk, ordered a detachment of armored boats to come out of cover, approach the Romanian coast and support the infantry with fire from turret guns at visible targets. At the same time, at the request of his chief of staff, Admiral Abramov took into the air an air squadron of the Danube military flotilla.

Its fighters successfully stormed the advancing Romanian lines. And then it was the turn of the armored boats, which had to operate under fire from heavy enemy batteries. An unusual tactic came to the rescue: the boats took cover from the shells under a high bank, then in pairs they jumped out at full speed into the middle of the river, fired three or four shells at the Romanian infantry, and rushed as hard as they could back into the dead zone. Then, when Soviet fighters appeared in the air, the boats took a breath for a while in cover. This continued until Grigoriev reported to Abramov that the situation on the bridgehead had been restored... After the failure on June 30, the Romanians made three more attempts - on July 3, 4 and 6 - to put an end to the Soviet bridgehead on the right bank of the Danube, for these days in total rushing into attacks eighteen times. All in vain...

And on July 9, the chief of staff of the 14th Rifle Corps, Colonel Rybalchenko, in a telephone conversation, stunned Rear Admiral Abramov, saying that by order of the headquarters of the Southern Front, all army units were being withdrawn from the Danube and all responsibility for the 90-kilometer section of the border was being withdrawn from the town of Reni to the mouth of the river - is now entrusted to the flotilla. “In general, take the defensive, sailors!” — the colonel cheerfully concluded his report. And literally an hour later, intelligence reported to the flotilla commander that in the Tulcha area the enemy was concentrating up to 6 thousand people for a new attack.

The sailors began to prepare to defend the bridgehead and repel with their own forces a possible landing of the Romanians on the Soviet shore. All observation posts on the left bank of the Danube were turned into strongholds within 24 hours, and only half the crews remained on the ships. The Izmail NKVD fighter battalion of about 600 people, mobilized from port workers, was placed at the disposal of the flotilla. Another hundred and fifty fighters were provided by the Izmail police.

Thus, on July 10, its own consolidated infantry regiment was formed under the Danube Military Flotilla. The head of the air defense section, Colonel Matveev, was appointed its commander. Within a day, he managed to coordinate the units and transport most of them to the bridgehead, where they took up defensive positions. Even the training battery available in the coastal defense sector - four old three-inch horse-drawn guns - became a combat unit...

For another week, the sailors, with these tiny forces, held a multi-kilometer bridgehead, and at the same time stopped several attempts by the Romanians to cross the Danube. And they even made a desperate attempt to destroy enemy batteries in the Periprava area. Alas, it ended in failure: a sabotage detachment of 25 Red Navy men, led by the head of the intelligence department of the flotilla headquarters, Senior Lieutenant Zaitsev, died...

Meanwhile, the situation on the Southern Front continued to deteriorate. Soviet troops left Chisinau... And the military council of the Black Sea Fleet gave the order to the ships of the Danube military flotilla to break into the Black Sea and go to Odessa. Preparations for evacuation began. But even in this tense situation, the sailors managed to slap the Romanians in the face. On the night of July 18, monitors “Zheleznyakov”, “Martynov” and “Zhemchuzhin” with a detachment of armored boats approached Vilkov. At dawn, the ships and two coastal batteries opened up a hurricane of fire on the areas where manpower and transport facilities were concentrated. The bombers called from near Odessa and directed by the sailors completed the rout. The blow was so strong that even a few days after the departure of the flotilla, the Romanians did not attempt to land on the already empty Soviet shore...

The evacuation of the Danube bridgehead was carried out no less brilliantly than its capture and retention. The calculation was based on secrecy and surprise. All evening, methodical fire was conducted from the left bank on the Romanian positions as usual, which did not stop even after dark. The armored boats, which took the paratroopers on board gradually and at different points, approached the right bank so that it was similar to the maneuvering of a night ship patrol. And already at 0200 hrs, all rifle units were delivered to the concentration points on the left bank without losses and without stragglers. At dawn they were brought together into a single group and in an organized column they went to Akkerman and Odessa.

As soon as the landing force was removed from the bridgehead, the ships of the flotilla began to break through into the Black Sea. The command and headquarters of the flotilla were on the Udarny monitor. The rest followed him - 101 pennants in total. By the end of the day on July 18, 1941, the Danube military flotilla had so many combat units. They moved in groups, so as not to create a continuous hum of cars, and at large intervals inside each one. On the approach to Periprava, where the Danube fairway narrowed to 300–350 meters, all engines were turned off. And the ships, held by the rudders, were carried forward only by the current...

The Romanians were able to detect only the rearguard of the flotilla and brought down the full power of six coastal batteries on it. In this hell, the armored boats covering the trailing group rushed about, laying a smoke screen and firing as intensely as they could. In this battle, BK-133 and its crew were killed, about a dozen ships were seriously damaged and had crew losses.

But the flotilla still escaped from the Danube. She spent the whole morning in its delta, preparing for the sea crossing. Around noon on July 19, already off the coast of the Black Sea, she was met by the cruiser Comintern and several destroyers. And on July 20, at about 9 am, the ships of the Danube military flotilla - 100 pennants - moored at the walls of the Quarantine Harbor in Odessa.

The first month of the war was ending...

PS Only after 3 long years would the Soviet boats of the Danube flotilla return to the Danube again. But then they will already reach Budapest and Vienna...

June 22nd, 1941: Memories of the beginning of the War

 Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.

Text taken from a website of the Russian Ministry of Defense.

Available only through a VPN

Marshal of the Soviet Union, Andey Eremenko,from June 30 to July 2, 1941 - commander of the troops of the Western Front

On June 22, suddenly at 12 o’clock Comrade Smirnov (Lieutenant General, Chief of Staff of the Far Eastern Front) called me on the phone and told me an amazing thing. He conveyed the following verbatim: “The Germans began bombing our cities on the morning of June 22.” After that, it became completely clear to me why I was being called to Moscow.

Arriving at the direction of Headquarters in Moscow on June 28, Andrei Eremenko learned that his predecessor, the commander of the Western Front, Army General Dmitry Pavlov, had been removed due to the complete defeat of a very powerful Red Army group and the surrender of Minsk to the enemy. It was necessary to take emergency measures to correct the situation in the central direction.

He (People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko) acquainted me with the situation, from which I saw that the situation on the Western Front was extremely difficult. At the end of the conversation, while studying the situation, he informed me that by decision of the Government I had been appointed commander of the Western Front, and immediately handed me an order and a certificate.

Before Eremenko’s arrival, everything on the Western Front could not have been worse. The strategic initiative was firmly held by the enemy. The front troops constantly retreated, with significant losses.

From a conversation (with Army General D.G. Pavlov) it became clear to me that the front does not exist. I saw and felt that the department commanders bore the imprint of terrible depression and confusion. The headquarters itself was a completely uncoordinated organism. I told the assembled staff that we would restore the front and fight.

Commanding the front, Lieutenant General Eremenko paid special attention to air combat tactics.

In two days, 120 enemy aircraft were destroyed. This was, in fact, the first defeat inflicted on the enemy. When I reported this to Moscow, they asked me over the phone if I had made a mistake. Zhukov himself spoke about this when he was Chief of the General Staff.

In addition, thanks to the efforts of Andrei Ivanovich Eremenko, work was launched on the territory of Belarus to organize partisan detachments.

I organized 30 partisan detachments. This was the beginning of the partisan movement. He armed everyone, put them in boots, and gave them uniforms. He gave everyone rifles and armed each group with a light machine gun. These were the first partisans.

Having commanded the main front of the war for only four days, Lieutenant General Eremenko managed to somewhat stabilize the situation in the Western direction.

--Excerpts from the manuscript of Colonel General A. I. Eremenko

Colonel General Basil Popov in 1941 - commander of the 28th Rifle Corps

Major General V.S. From the first day of the war, Popov took part in the defensive battle in Western Belarus. With heavy losses, he managed to withdraw the remnants of the corps from encirclement, but already on July 15, after replenishment, the corps again entered the battle near Propoisk. Soon there he was seriously wounded.

At 4.00 on June 22, Brest-Litovsk came under air and artillery attack. The attack was completely unexpected for the troops, since there was no warning. At the time of the attack in the city of Brest-Litovsk, electrical and telephone communications immediately stopped working, since the Shtakor had no field communication with the divisions, and control was disrupted. Communication was maintained by sending messages in officers' vehicles. The air squadron was immediately destroyed by the enemy at the airfield. There was, as far as I remember, up to ammunition capacity. The artillery operated with the troops as long as there was fuel in the tractors; as soon as the fuel was used up, and there was nowhere to refuel along the retreat route, most of the artillery had to be blown up.

After recovery from September 1941, V.S. Popov is deputy commander of the 50th Army on the Bryansk and Western fronts. From January 1942 to April 1944 he commanded the troops of the 10th Army of the Western Front. At the head of the army he took part in the offensive in the battle of Moscow, in the Rzhev-Vyazemsk, Spas-Demensk, and Smolensk offensive operations.In April–May 1944, Lieutenant General V.S. Popov - Deputy Commander of the 1st Belorussian Front. From May 1944 until the end of the war, Colonel General V.S. Popov is the commander of the 70th Army on the 1st Belorussian Front and, from November 19, 1944, on the 2nd Belorussian Front.

For successful actions during the Great Patriotic War, the troops commanded by General Vasily Popov were noted 19 times in the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Joseph Stalin.

-- Memoirs of Colonel General V.S.Popov

Lt. General Gregor Revunenko in 1941 - chief of staff of the 37th Infantry Division

In June 1941, the 37th Infantry Division, whose headquarters was headed by Colonel G.V. Revunenkov, took an active part in the border battle on the Western Front.

On June 22, the division headquarters at 12.00 was at Bogdanow station, near Lida, where on the radio I heard Comrade Molotov’s speech about the war with Germany. On the afternoon of June 23, the division commander ordered me to personally go to the city of Lida to see the corps commander to find out the situation, receive a task and organize communications with corps headquarters. During the day, the city of Lida was heavily bombed by the enemy. I arrived in Lida in the evening, the city was all on fire, the corps headquarters was not there.

In accordance with the decision made by him (the corps commander, General Borisov), the division retreated through the Nalibokskaya Pushcha. Since the fuel reserves ran out, the majority of the horse train was disabled by enemy aircraft, all the material was left in the forests of Nalibokskaya Pushcha and rendered unusable. After this, the division, by decision of the division commander, went out in small groups to the Kalinkovichi area, where the division headquarters and corps headquarters partially reached on June 22–23, the remaining groups continued to go out even later, but the division as such no longer existed.

--Memoirs of Lt. General G.V. Revunenko

Major General Fedor Smegotvorov in 1941 - commander of the 135th Infantry Division

Without accurate information from the troops about the development of events, the commanders and headquarters of the Red Army were unable to assess the seriousness of the situation. The People's Commissar of Defense's directive No. 1 “not to succumb to any provocations that could cause major complications” was still in effect, which limited the decisive actions of the commanders of formations and units of the covering armies.

There were no orders to put units of the 135th Rifle Division on combat readiness before the start of hostilities, and when the division on the march, on the morning of June 22, was subjected to machine-gun fire by German planes, an order was received from the headquarters of the 5th Army not to succumb to provocation and not to shoot at the planes.

The commanders of most formations and units acted similarly in other areas covering the State Border. Orders from above came much later. Thus, the Military Council of the Western Front sent a directive to the commanders of the 3rd, 4th and 10th armies only at 5:25 a.m.: “In view of the massive military actions that have emerged from the Germans, I order: raise troops and act in a combat manner.”

The order to bring the division into combat readiness and to implement the mobilization plan was received only on the morning of June 23, 1941. In the area of ​​\u200b\u200bTorchin, the commander of the 27th infantry regiment took into his reserve the second regiment of the division, which was the most combat-ready. The rest of the forces ordered me to attack the advanced units of the enemy, who occupied the heights in the area of ​​Cape Torchin.I deployed all the remaining units, including the division headquarters, which I personally led into the attack. The height was occupied, the advanced enemy units hastily retreated to the west. In this first battle 24.6. The commander of the third regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Sery, and his chief of staff were killed.

--Memoirs of Major General F. N. Smegotvorov

Major General Mikhail Zashinbalov in 1941 - commander of the 86th Red Banner Rifle Division

Before the start of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet military-political leadership sought to take into account the lessons of the outbreak of World War II. The conclusion previously made by the General Staff that Germany is the main and most dangerous enemy of the USSR was confirmed.

The General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces proceeded from the fact that the war would inevitably become protracted, and that the victory would be won by those who could supply the front with everything necessary for waging war for a long time.

To this end, a year before the start of the war, the troops of the Red Army, in the context of the escalating situation in neighboring countries, began preparing for the impending threat from the West. Thus, the 86th Red Banner Rifle Division under the command of Major General MA. Zashibalova erected fortifications on the State border with neighboring Poland. On June 21, 1941 of the Great Patriotic War, Major General Mikhail Zashibalov personally inspected the progress of the defensive work plan in the area of ​​​​Smolekha, Khmelevo, Dombrovo by the 330th Infantry Regiment.

At the end of the inspection at 20 o'clock, returning to the location of the division headquarters, he visited the commandant of the border section in Myanovo. The commandant of the border sector believed that, probably, fascist German units located 8–20 km west of our State Border were conducting defensive work and field exercises.

By this time, combat alert plans had been developed for all units of the division in sealed envelopes. Envelopes with top secret data were to be opened only upon the established "Storm" signal.

At 2.00 on June 22, 1941, the chief of staff of the division reported information received from the head of the Nurskaya border outpost that fascist German troops were approaching the Western Bug River and were bringing up crossing facilities. After the report, the chief of staff of the division at 2 hours 10 minutes on June 22, 1941 ordered to give the signal “Storm” and raise the rifle regiments on alert and set out in a forced march to occupy sections of defense areas in a 50% prepared divisional defense zone.

Late at night on June 22, the artillery and rifle regiments of the 86th Infantry Division were alerted and areas of firing positions moved forward. Formation of Major General M.A. Zashibalov quickly entered intense fighting on the border territory of the Soviet Union.

-- Memoirs of Major General Mikhail Zashinbalov

Lt. General Nikoloi Polyansky in 1941 - commander of the 9th Separate Anti-tank Artillery Brigade

From June 22 to June 26, 1941, the 9th Separate Anti-tank Artillery Brigade of the 8th Army of the Baltic Special District under the command of Colonel N.I. Polyansky heroically led the defense in the area of ​​the city of Siauliai (Lithuania).

On June 22 at 4 o'clock the engines of enemy and our planes began to rustle in the air. An air battle began in front of our batteries. Having explained the general situation to the unit commanders, I gave orders to be ready to meet fascist tanks, destroy them and not let them pass through the occupied defense line, and to pay special attention to the Taurage-Siauliai highway.

At 15:00 on June 23, the enemy, with a force of up to a battalion of tanks, approached the third division, commanded by Captain Khakhalev, along the highway from Taurage. During the battle from 15 to 22 hours on June 23, Captain Khakhalev’s division destroyed up to 50 enemy tanks. In the first intense battle, the soldiers and commanders showed exceptional courage, heroism, and ability to wield their weapons.

Since June 29, the 9th separate anti-tank artillery brigade under the command of N.I. Polyansky held the crossing of the Western Dvina for four days. For his skillful leadership of the brigade in November 1941, he was awarded the rank of major general of artillery.

-- Memoirs of Lt. General Nikoloi Polyansky

First Aerial Rams

Despite all the tragedy of the first days of the Great Patriotic War, the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army did not lose their fighting spirit. They en masse showed exceptional courage, perseverance, and dedication. During this difficult time, they, stubbornly resisting the Nazi invaders, accomplished a huge number of outstanding feats, which were forever preserved in reports and award materials. Soviet pilots showed particular heroism in the first days of the Great Patriotic War.On the very first day of the Great Patriotic War, German pilots were faced with such a technique as an air ram. Brave Soviet pilots not only destroyed the most trained Luftwaffe crews with rams, but also knocked down the arrogance of others who witnessed the disasters. Most of the heroes of such battles died along with their planes...

Captain Aleksandr Avdeev, squadron commander, 43rd Short Range Bomber Wing

Deputy squadron commander of the 43rd LBAP, Captain Avdeev A.N. a true Hero of the Socialist Motherland, on June 25, 1941, when destroying the enemy’s motorized mechanized units that had broken through in the Oshmyany area, regardless of his life, he mercilessly crushed the enemy with bomber and machine-gun fire, on this day Comrade. Avdeev A.N. died heroically from enemy anti-aircraft artillery. Being hit by enemy fire and unable to bring the plane to his territory, Captain Avdeev A.N. deliberately hits an enemy tank with his plane and sets it on fire. In total he made 10 combat missions. Worthy of being awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union,- indicated on the award sheet for captain Alexander Avdeev.

--Award sheet for Captain Aleksandr Avdeev

Lieutenant Stepan Gudimov, deputy squadron commander of the 33rd Fighter Wing

On the morning of the first day of the war (at 05:20), the deputy squadron commander of the 33rd Fighter Aviation Regiment (10th Mixed Aviation Division, 4th Army Air Force, Western Special Military District), Lieutenant Stepan Mitrofanovich Gudimov, performed his feat in the sky.

As part of a squadron on an I-16 fighter, he flew to repel a German air raid (20 He-111 bombers, accompanied by a small group of Me-109s) on an airfield near the city of Kobrin, Brest Region. Three more squadrons returning from combat patrols joined the attack.

In an air battle S.M. Gudimov shot down an enemy bomber with accurate shooting, and hit the second one (due to lack of ammunition) with a ramming strike. While trying to escape, the pilot's parachute lines got caught in the wreckage of the plane, which led to his death. Later, for his feat, Lieutenant S.M. Gudimov was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, II degree (posthumously).

--Personal file and service record card of Lieutenant Stepan Gudimov

Battalion Commissar Andrey Danilov, Deputy Commander of the 1st Squadron for Political Affairs of the 127th Fighter Wing

At about 10:00 on June 22, 1941, near the Cherleny airfield (45 km southwest of the city of Lida, Belarus), the feat was accomplished by the deputy commander of the 1st squadron for the political part of the 127th Fighter Aviation Regiment (11th Mixed Aviation Division, Western Special Military district) battalion commissar Andrei Stepanovich Danilov. In the first battle, he managed to shoot down a German plane. Then a series of new air battles followed. When repelling a raid on the airfield of the 16th high-speed bomber aviation regiment of the enemy bomber group A.S. Danilov, who received several bullet wounds, rammed an enemy Me-110 and shot it down. Despite the damaged plane, he managed to land it safely near the village of Cherleny, Skidelsky district. For some time it was believed that senior political instructor Andrei Danilov had died. On July 8, 1941, a Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was issued on awarding him the Order of Lenin (posthumously). After long treatment in the hospital, a well-deserved reward found the hero.

-- Personal file, combat reports and operational reports of the 11th Mixed Air Division, 127th Fighter Aviation Regiment and award material for Battalion Commissar Andrey Danilov

Guard Lieutenant Colonel A.S. Danilov went through the entire war, ending it in defeated Berlin as commander of an aviation regiment. In August 1945, as part of the Transbaikal Front, he participated in the war with Japan. During the war, he made 134 combat missions, in air battles he shot down nine enemy aircraft personally and one as part of a group. He is the only one who lived to see Victory out of all the pilots who carried out an aerial ramming attack on the first day of the Great Patriotic War.

Senior Lieutenant Ivan Ivanov, deputy squadron commander of the 46th Fighter Wing

At dawn (04:25) on June 22, 1941, the deputy squadron commander of the 46th Fighter Aviation Regiment, Senior Lieutenant Ivan Ivanovich Ivanov, took his first and last battle in the skies over the Rivne region. Alerted, he flew at the head of a flight of I-16 fighters to intercept an enemy air group (6 to 9 He-111 bombers) approaching the Mlynov airfield. During a swift attack, our pilots shot down one of the German bomb carriers. 

The rest, dropping bombs randomly, turned back. When returning to his airfield, Ivan Ivanov noticed another German bomber directly ahead. Without hesitation, the Soviet pilot approached him. By this time he had run out of ammunition and was running out of fuel.

-- From a political report from the political department of the 14th Air Division, award material conferring the title of Hero of the Soviet Union:

Despite the dense enemy machine-gun fire, the Soviet pilot managed to overtake the enemy plane and shoot it down with a ramming attack. Eyewitnesses who observed the ram from the ground noted that the German pilot saw a Soviet fighter coming into his tail and, trying to avoid the attack, began to fall onto the wing to go into a dive, but I.I. Ivanov, making a slide, slashed the wine at the tail of the bomber. After the ramming of the I-16, Senior Lieutenant Ivanov took a strong list to the side. Something fell off the car, but it was clear that the pilot was trying to control the heavily damaged fighter and land it in the field. However, a few meters from the ground, the plane began to sway violently, and then fell down almost vertically. The brave pilot died from his injuries and wounds in a hospital in the city of Dubno. By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of August 2, 1941, senior lieutenant I.I. Ivanov was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. He turned out to be the only Soviet pilot who carried out an aerial ramming on June 22 and was awarded a high award from the Motherland for this feat.

Ensign Dmitry Kokorev, flight commander of the 124th Fighter Wing

One of the first to deliberately collide with an enemy aircraft was the flight commander of the 124th Fighter Aviation Regiment, Junior Lieutenant Dmitry Vasilyevich Kokorev. At the beginning of the war, the air regiment was based at the border airfields of Wysoko-Mazowiecki, Lomza, and Bialystok (Western Special Military District). To repel the second air raid (German aviation carried out the first raid between 04:30 and 05:10 on June 22, 1941, without any losses), several groups of MiG-3 fighters were launched into the air. According to an extract from the regiment's combat log, D.V. Kokorev took off with 10 MiG-3s at 05:10 (Moscow time). His target was a Do-17Z from the headquarters squadron of the German bomber squadron KG-2. Having fired all the ammunition (during the shelling the crew received injuries of varying severity), the Soviet pilot decided to finish off the enemy aircraft with a ramming attack. Later, he continued to honorably fulfill his military duty, defending the air approaches to Moscow and besieged Leningrad.

Personal file, registration card for Ensign Dmitry Kokorev.

On October 12, 1941, Dmitry Kokorev did not return from his next combat mission. In total, at that time he made more than 100 combat missions and shot down four enemy aircraft: three personally, one in a group. A few days before the death of the brave pilot, a proposal was signed to award him the Order of the Red Banner, which became, among other things, recognition of his feat in first day of the war.

Testimony of German prisoners of war

Testimony of the General of Artillery of the German Army, Commander of the Defense and the last Commandant of Berlin Helmut Weidling.

The moment of surprise was of decisive importance for the entire strategic concentration and deployment: everything that was connected with the concentration and deployment of German troops was subordinated to it.

To do this, on the border strip 15–20 km deep, no changes should have been made in the deployment of units, the construction of fortifications, etc., so as not to give the enemy the opportunity to suspect preparations for an offensive. The troops that had been guarding the border over the past months were supposed to remain in the same composition, regardless of whether they were infantry divisions, police formations, landwehr units, etc.

The troops intended for the offensive, to make a breakthrough, were pulled closer and closer to the border strip, which I will conditionally call the “first zone.” The offensive troops could carry out the necessary reconnaissance of roads, the area of ​​​​the starting positions, observation posts of firing positions, etc. in the “first zone”. only in separate groups of the smallest possible composition, while observing the most thorough camouflage. Under no circumstances should the enemy suspect the arrival of any reinforcements in the border zone.

Surveys of captured German generals in 1941:

Only on the night before the offensive did the infantry divisions, which were supposed to march in the first wave of the breakthrough, move from the “second zone” to the previously reconnoitered area of ​​the initial positions of the “first zone.” In the same way, the heavy weapons assigned to the infantry divisions to carry out the breakthrough moved forward. His positions were also scouted out in advance in the most thorough manner, and all the initial data for firing were prepared in advance.

The tank divisions that were concentrated and deployed in the “third zone” were to move forward only upon receiving news that the breakthrough of the infantry divisions through the system of fortified enemy lines was crowned with success. Some of these tank divisions were transferred from the “third zone” to the “second” already in the first half of the first day of the offensive.

-- Testimony of the captured Major General Dietrich von Müller.

The strategic deployment took place at such a distance from the demarcation line that troops could reach it during the night. The distances from the border at which the forces were deployed ranged from 7 to 20 km, depending on the visibility from the Russian side and the type of troops (tank and infantry divisions). The divisions stationed on the border in most cases followed the troops advancing across the border as a reserve.

A breakthrough of the front line was achieved by creating the direction of the main attack in the intended area, while in other sectors of the front the offensive was not carried out or it was carried out only with the aim of diverting enemy forces from the direction of the main attack. The formation of the direction of the main attack was expressed by the concentration of artillery fire and heavy infantry weapons on the intended breakthrough area. This fire was especially intensified by the use of aviation in the breakthrough area, which, in addition, also acted against reserves and rear communications behind the breakthrough area. The attacking troops themselves received only a narrow offensive zone. Depending on the terrain, the first line of attack consisted of tank or infantry divisions, designed to develop success in the depths of the breakthrough.

The publication of declassified documents about the beginning of the Great Patriotic War from the funds of the Central Archive of the Russian Ministry of Defense is aimed at protecting historical truth, countering the falsification of history, and glorifying the heroic feat of the Soviet people.

First Palmyra. Bride of the Desert. Part No. 2

 

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. See the link for maps and photos

Text taken from Commissioner Yarrick post

Commentary by Russian military journalist Boris Rozhin is in italics

First Palmyra. Bride of the Desert. Part No. 2

The Path to the East

As we remember from previous articles, in the very first days of the Russian operation in the SAR, together with the air group of the Russian Aerospace Forces and the “Syrian Express”, a group of Russian volunteers and military veterans under the command of Dmitry Utkin (“Wagner”, “Ninth”), which was supposed to support the actions of the Syrian army, as well as ensure the implementation of the most complex and dangerous operations. The first meeting of the “musicians” with Syrian militants was the battles in Northern Latakia in the fall of 2015: it was the fighters of the “orchestra” who were in the vanguard of the Syrian troops clearing the approaches to the Russian Khmeimim airbase. Then, with the direct participation and activity of Russian attack aircraft, the fighters of the Syrian army for the first time managed to show a phenomenal result - move from positional warfare to an offensive, shift the front in the mountainous regions of Latakia and divert any threat from the Russian airbase.


Over the next few months, the fighters of the Wagner Group were transferred to the Palmyra area, where they received a new task. The Orchestra fighters had to begin advancing along the route, while the Syrian army was churning the mud near Mkhin and Khavarin, cutting a road directly to Palmyra - but so far without storming the city itself. Having accepted the task, in parallel with the advance of the Syrian army near Jebel al-Hazm, supported by attacks from Russian cruise missiles, the “musicians” began an assault on the eastern slopes of the Jebel Khayal mountains, captured several points and advanced east towards Palmyra.

As the GRAY ZONE Telegram channel notes, by this time the Wagner Group had been completed with new fighters from the assault squads. The total number of the “Orchestra” in Syria by this time reached almost 2.5 thousand people. Since the Palmyra operation already required specialized military equipment, units of heavy armored vehicles, as well as pickup trucks with installed large-caliber weapons, were transferred to the balance of the Wagner Group through the mediation of the Russian Ministry of Defense. Some equipment was captured from the militants, some weapons were transferred to Russian fighters from Syrian units. As a result, by the winter of 2015/16, the Wagner Group was armed with several infantry fighting vehicles, T-90, T-72 and T-62 tanks, armored vehicles, recoilless rifles, ATGMs, numerous variations of Kalashnikov assault rifles (from Russian manufacturers to low-quality Chinese "Samsungs") and even foreign sniper rifles (in particular, Austrian Steyr-Mannlicher).

From the book “Eight Years with Wagner” by Kirill Romanovsky (AST, Leninigrad, 2024)

“We walked through the mountains, along the mountain ridge to the junction. There the road led to Iraq. In principle, from this height we controlled the ridge, but it was difficult to deliver artillery there and, due to the complexity of the terrain, there were problems with the delivery of food. It was both mentally difficult and physically difficult, plus the business trip was long and there were a lot of fights. And if before that I went without losses, then here I already lost my guys.
First, the “Fatimids” disappeared - as if they had disappeared into the ground, although at first everyone said: “Rus, Rus, we are with you everywhere.” And then, just like that, they disappeared. I gave the command to the Syrians so that they, too, began to carry out an offensive - we had all already reached our positions and by time we should have already begun actions. But when I went to the center, I found myself alone with my group. The whole trio - Syrians, Russians and "Fatimids" - were supposed to separate the militants into small groups, and then, in principle, we would quickly, quickly knock them out of there. But we were left alone - and it turned out that for the enemy we were like in a shooting gallery. They concentrated all their fire on us.
As we later found out, the forces of some Indonesians were concentrated there against us. At the same time, there were crests there, which is the most interesting thing. How did we determine? They had our camouflages and “dots,” that is, “assholes,” but in the SAR no one uses “assholes.”

After a series of fierce battles with ISIS, the Wagner Group fighters occupied the area of ​​​​marble quarries, gained a foothold in the mountainous region of Jebel al-Mazar and entered the village of Ad-Dawa, two kilometers west of Palmyra. On November 23, Russian assault troops also took control of the Al-Qadri farms and reached the Jebel Hayyan ridge, coming very close to the “Palmyra Triangle” - the intersection of key routes at the western entrance to the city.

From Kirill Romanovsky’s book “Eight Years with Wagner” (AST, Leningrad, 2024):

“When we reached the height, we hung a vest at the top. Then the Syrians arrived, television, all the bullshit - they dragged themselves there, they wanted to take off the vest and hang a Syrian flag instead. They could have taken it off, but then the Afghans, the “Fatimids,” stood up to defend the vest. They flew up to the Syrians, started shooting at their feet, and pointing to their vest, they said: “Rus, we won’t let anyone hang another flag here.” That's the kind of respect they had.
But the battle was, of course, very difficult. To be honest, we couldn’t even count the number of the enemy - because he was running away from us, taking cover on the sun loungers. But judging by these sun loungers, there were about 30 people. Consider it a whole platoon. Such a good, high-quality support point. First echelon, second echelon, holes. Well, at least aviation helped - if it weren’t for the “flyers”, we would have had to fight for this height for a long time. Now, if the Syrians and “Fatimids” had come with us, then everything would have been simpler, the terrain would have allowed them to see and shoot through everything. By the way, I was very disappointed in the Afghans then. I thought they were a more warlike people. But, as it turned out, no.”

Despite the defeat at Mkhin and the advance of the “musicians” to the outskirts of Palmyra, IS continued stubborn resistance on several sectors of the front. Naturally, the weakest links in this chain turned out to be the positions of the Syrian army: on December 10, while the forces of the Wagner Group were busy clearing the route, mobile units of militants again stormed Mkhin and Khawarin, and also captured the mountainous region of Jebel al-Hazm. During the counterattack, the Syrian army was able to regain control of Khawarin, but the re-liberation of Mkhin took almost three weeks. It was not until December 29 that Syrian government forces established full control over Mkhin and its surroundings.



Things were much better in the main theater of military operations near Palmyra. By December 7, thanks to the successful advance of Wagner fighters, it was possible to establish complete control over the Palmyra-Homs highway, driving out militants from the villages of Bayrat and Bir Murhatan, the last points on the highway that were controlled by IS. On December 19, 2015, the fighters of the “orchestra” came close to the Palmyra Citadel - the castle of Fakhr ad-Din after a fierce battle with the Islamic State. This Wagner Group attack brought government forces within 400 meters of the castle and less than two kilometers from the city gates.

By all logic, it was at this moment that government forces should have begun a direct assault on Palmyra - since all the preparatory work had already been done for them by the fighters of the Wagner Group. However, unforeseen circumstances intervened in the situation; the Palmyra offensive was suspended for three months, and the Syrian troops switched to positional battles around the city.

Delay There

are several reasons and versions why Palmyra was not taken after the first breakthrough of the Wagner Group to the citadel in December 2015. Apparently, the command of the operation assumed that the city would be taken exclusively by Syrian units, without the participation of Russian volunteers, so as not to raise unnecessary fuss about involving the Russians in the war in the Middle East. For these purposes, motorized units of the Tiger Forces of Colonel Suheil al-Hassan, the forces of the 4th Armored Division of the SAA under the command of the brother of the Syrian President Maher Assad, as well as the Desert Falcons unit, created with the money of the Syrian businessman Ayman Jaber, were transferred to Palmyra. However, the situation on other fronts of the Syrian conflict, as well as the workload of the SAA fighters, did not allow them to coordinate efforts on the Palmyra salient.

In particular, on January 12, the Syrian army, with the active support of the Russian Aerospace Forces, liberated the city of Salma from terrorists, which was a key stronghold of the Jabhat al-Nusra militants (a terrorist organization banned in the Russian Federation) in the north of Latakia province. On February 3, after the start of clearing the outskirts of Aleppo, the Syrian army, with the support of the Russian Aerospace Forces, broke the four-year blockade of the Shiite enclaves of Nubbol and Al-Zahra in the north of Aleppo province. At the same time, IS militants tried to cut off the group of troops in Aleppo from supplies along the strategic “lifeline” by capturing the city of Khanasser. Let me remind you that fighters of the Wagner Group also took part in this clash, who held back the onslaught of militants, first on the approaches to the city, and then on the heights near Khanasser, together with Russian officers from the operational group of the Russian Armed Forces.

As a result, it was possible to stabilize the situation in Syria and return to the vital issue of returning Palmyra to the control of the Syrian army only after the declared ceasefire, which Russia and the United States agreed on on February 22, 2016. In addition to official Damascus, 97 armed opposition groups, as well as Kurdish armed forces, agreed to these conditions. The truce did not apply to the Islamic State, Jabhat al-Nusra and other organizations designated as terrorist by the UN Security Council. Under these conditions, there could be no question of a complete regime of silence in Syria. However, a respite in the battles on several fronts made it possible to redistribute forces for the final push towards Palmyra.

During this time, the fighters of the Syrian army, remaining as the “second echelon” in positions near Palmyra, did not take a single step towards the city. Despite the fact that the fighters of the Wagner Group had prepared everything for a rapid advance into the city, the SAA forces were unable to coordinate their efforts and were forced to go on the defensive so as not to lose their positions. At the same time, no one assigned the fighters of the Wagner Group the task of breaking through further path to Palmyra - which is why the entire front around Tadmor fell silent for two months of winter.

From the book “Eight Years with Wagner” by Kirill Romanovsky (AST, Leningrad, 2024):

“It was very cold then, the guys had frostbite before the amputation. Someone's fingers were cut off. The newly arrived soldiers, who had just been recruited, were given “slides” - and there the frosts were from zero to good minus, and the wind was crazy. And this is Palmyra, the heights have already risen - and frostbite has begun. Everything is serious there: you live on the street, there are no tents, there was nothing like that. You lay down the foam and you sleep, and then you catch your kidneys. And you look at the Syrians - they brought a tent, they brought a stove, a bunch of blankets, a bunch of mattresses. The platoon leader and I look at it like this - but we just live on the street, sleep on rocks, the cold is terrible. I was lucky, I was lucky, I also had a fashionable Austrian sleeping bag - it was an amazing save. This is what the company provided at the beginning. And we go straight to the Syrians - can we sleep with you? Well, at least they have a tent and a stove, it’s absolutely amazing. Just when active hostilities entered a slow phase, we spent the night with them for a couple of serious, frosty nights.”

But the militants of the “Islamic State” have more than benefited from the current situation. Realizing that the Syrian army had the first access to Palmyra, the forces of the self-proclaimed “caliphate” threw significant resources at the walls of Tadmor, including experienced fighters from Iraq and other countries. As a result, when a new stage of the battle for Palmyra began in March 2016, the moment of surprise due to the forced downtime was partially lost: the enemy prepared to repel the attack and waited for the attack.

Through thorns...

On March 9, 2016, massive airstrikes by the Russian Aerospace Forces began against the Palmyra area, as well as along the Islamic State’s supply routes from Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor. By March 10, IS losses had grown to 32 militants: according to terrorist statistics, 80 air strikes and up to 200 missile and artillery strikes were carried out. After a massive artillery barrage, the command of the Syrian army announced the start of the assault on Palmyra. It was then reported that the key task for the army was to encircle the city to interrupt Islamist communications - and to occupy the powerful defensive system of fortifications built by IS forces along the perimeter of Palmyra.
The only thing that was not indicated in the media then was who would actually get the keys to Palmyra in battle.

On March 12, fighters of the Wagner Group began fighting for the village of Ad-Dawa, two kilometers west of Palmyra. By March 13, strategic heights were taken under control, which made it possible to open the terrorists’ defenses and advance to the city limits. One of the control points was El Barda (“Height 800” and “Height 853”) - two peaks in the Jebel Hayyan mountain range, which covered the southwestern entrance to the city.


El Barda.

From the book “Eight Years with Wagner” by Kirill Romanovsky (AST, Leningrad, 2024):

“El Barda is two heights. On one side stood the “Carpathians”, and the railway ran in the middle. They called her "Neck". They also wanted to roll a train along it, mine it and launch it towards the spirits. Nearby there was a ridge leading to Palmyra. 

It was an interesting fight, but we had a good laugh then. Then the weapons were good, the equipment was supplied. We went to a height on the left flank, the commander of the soldiers standing there told us: “You sit for now, there is still spirit activity there.” We went out, secured a foothold, sat at night, and then my observers reported: “Spirits!” I command “For battle”, everyone went to their positions. The spirits pulled out the DShK, t-r-r-r-r-r in the air, fired - apparently they thought that the Syrians were standing on the high-rise, and just the sounds of the DShK would make them crap their pants.

They walk in tens of them - satisfied, happy: they say the Syrians will leave now, and they will take a position. And we have night vision devices. Plus, one of ours had the Pierce system, it helps the night devices, like the moon - you turn it on and the night devices see well. True, the enemy also sees you well, if he has “night lights”, you can light up. So, the guy turns on “Pierce” - and everyone in the “night lights” sees the territory as during the day. Well, we sat down and, as if at a shooting gallery, started clicking them. We then killed three spirits, the rest literally immediately evaporated.”

It was in this place that the tragic events of March 13, 2016 took place, when the members of the “orchestra” suddenly found themselves under attack from Russian aviation. While firing at the positions of Islamic State militants, an airstrike was carried out with four air bombs from a Su-25 of the Russian Aerospace Forces at the point of temporary deployment of Wagner Group fighters at the heights of El Bard. As a result of the incident, the 4th reconnaissance and assault company of the Wagner PMC, led by Andrei Bogatov (call sign “Brodyaga”), came under attack.

Two fighters died on the spot - “Memphis” and “Cascade”; another fighter with the call sign “Moskvich” subsequently died in a Syrian hospital. “Tramp” himself was seriously wounded - as a result of an explosion of an aerial bomb, Bogatov lost his arm, but subsequently he continued his activities as commander of the “Orchestra”.
For a long time, a semi-official version of the incident near El Barda circulated on the Internet. According to it, the pilot saw a black pirate flag with the Jolly Roger flying over the camp and mistook it for the flag of the Islamic State. According to another version of events, the coordinates of the strike were received by the pilot at the flight control center - however, history is silent about why the MCC did not note that at the indicated point it was not ISIS militants, but “Tramp” and fighters of the 4th SHO.

Kirill Romanovsky, military correspondent for the Federal News Agency:

“The Su-24 aircraft actually “unloaded” four FAB-500s at the position of the Wagner PMC. The coordinates of the temporary deployment point of 4 SHO were entered into the target log... After this incident, the Tramp, having lost one arm, climbed the mountains for three days and pulled out his fighters. There were many wounded, several people died.”


Military correspondent Stepan Yatsko and Hero of Russia Andrei Bogatov.

Following the incident near El Barda, another tragic situation occurred in the ranks of the “orchestra”. Moving along the Jebel Hayyan ridge, the fighters of the 1st assault detachment of the Wagner PMC under the command of Alexander Kuznetsov (call sign “Ratibor”) had to prepare for the assault on the next point of control - the legendary “Height 939”, which actually opened fire control over the road junction at the southwestern entrance to Palmyra, the so-called “Palmyra triangle”. However, on March 16, 2016, in area 939, three Wagner Group fighters were killed during a violent clash with IS militants. Due to the density of fire, it was not possible to remove the bodies of the dead from the battlefield - on the same day, the resources of the “Islamic State” published photographs of one of the dead volunteers, Ivan Sumkin (call sign “Varyag”).



In the same battle, as reported by the GRAY ZONE Telegram channel, an unknown Orchestra fighter with the call sign "Altai" died, as well as a legendary personality - one of the most experienced sappers of the 1st SHO "Ratibor" Evgeniy "Bertolet", who came to " Wagner Group" in 2015. According to participants in the events, a group of fighters set out to carry out mining, but the enemy managed to cut them off from their retreat routes. Subsequently, the story of the death of “Bertolet” became overgrown with legends, since the bodies of the dead could not be pulled out from the battlefield.

Telegram channel GRAY ZONE:

“The patrol missed the flash and the enemy pulled them into a fire bag. After the battle, there were many legends, rumors and gossip. Those who missed the flash said that Bertolet himself went to the spirits and is now teaching them his skills. The version that the participants told is a little closer to reality - he was wounded or stunned, after which he lost consciousness. And only when the group was leaving did they see that Bertolet was being dragged away by the spirits to their side.”


Another tragic incident around Palmyra - which, unlike the tragedy near El Barda and the death of three “musicians”, became known almost immediately - occurred on March 17, 2016. On this day, Islamist forces, taking advantage of a sandstorm, launched a counterattack in the Jebel Hayyan mountains southwest of Palmyra, trying to push back the advancing “orchestra” troops from Hill 939. In response to the intensification of IS operations, government forces were deployed near Palmyra as reinforcements Syrian marines from the province of Latakia and units of the Lebanese Hezbollah movement.


Alexander Prokhorenko.

The attack was repelled, but on the same day, near Palmyra, while carrying out the task of directing airstrikes against the most important ISIS targets, a serviceman of the Russian Special Operations Forces, senior lieutenant Alexander Prokhorenko, was killed. Finding himself surrounded by militants, the soldier called fire on himself.



For the courage and heroism shown in the performance of military duty, Senior Lieutenant Prokhorenko was awarded the title of Hero of Russia (posthumously). Due to the current situation during the battle, Prokhorenko’s body could not be taken away immediately - later, after the battle, in the morning, ISIS militants would publish videos and photos from the scene of his death. In the future, Prokhorenko’s body will be returned to his homeland through negotiations and ransom through the mediation of Kurdish forces.
By the way, the place of death of Alexander Prokhorenko was only a few hundred meters from the death of Varyag, Bertolet and Altai a day earlier...



Keys to Palmyra

By March 18, full-scale military operations had already unfolded directly under the walls of Palmyra. After taking the heights of Jebel al-Mattar, the fighters of the Wagner Group went along the heights and occupied two key positions in the area of ​​​​the Ancient Palmyra aqueduct. The next few days in the Palmyra direction were marked by positional battles and cleansing. In parallel with the actions of the “musicians” on the ground, Russian strike aviation provided support to the attackers: according to the statement of the Chief of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Lieutenant General Sergei Rudsky, the Russian Aerospace Forces forces carried out up to 25 sorties per day during these days.



The work of the “orchestra” fighters on the heights around Palmyra brought its successes: on March 22, the former villa of the Qatari Sheikh Tamim ibn Hamid, located in the center of the “Palmyra Triangle” road junction, was occupied. During the 10 months of occupation, IS militants converted the former possessions of the sheikh into a training base and a powerful fortified area. The capture of the “Qatari villa” predetermined the outcome of the battles for the “triangle”: after the Jebel Hayyan ridge was completely cleared of militants, the fighters of the “orchestra” were able to get close to the “Gardens of Palmyra” - an oasis in the desert, where several thousand years of cultivation had taken place. dozens of generations of city residents.

The first assault on Palmyra was officially launched on March 24, 2016. On this day, as reported in the media, Syrian troops came very close to the historical part of Palmyra - although, in reality, the Syrian army only got close to the Palmyra necropolis. But the fighters of the Wagner PMC, continuing the cleanup before the final push on Palmyra, completely occupied the ancient quarries of Palmyra. The battle for the area of ​​​​the old marble quarries began during the advance to 939, but after clearing the ridge, the militants could no longer hold this area and were forced to retreat to Palmyra.

From the book by Kirill Romanovsky “Eight Years with Wagner” (AST, Leningrad, 2024):

“I remember my first fight. It was a good fight. 939 had a task when we entered the quarry. Before this, I had never been in a serious battle, when you directly see the enemy. Before that, the Caucasus, all this, but everything was a little different there. And in this fight - yes, direct contact.
We found the spirits - they were just praying, and that’s why they fucked us up. We approached - on the right there was 939, a quarry, and we were hanging around there because there was no clear task. There was another unit to our right. We went to the left, there’s a “boob” about 300-400 meters away - and there’s a parapet on it.
There were guys next to me that I looked at and that was it. Yes, at first, of course, there was a moment, I was with a machine gun, at first there was a slight stupor, as if they had fallen onto the parapet. I also found a radar gun at the very beginning of the battle. This comrade who later ran away from a grenade. So what - the fight started, I worked, I looked - I fell and that’s it. Then it was already flooded.”

IS militants, who set up a layered defense on the outskirts and in the center of the city, tried to delay the advance of groups of “musicians” in certain areas in order to tie the fighters into dense urban battles. The main firing points of the terrorists were former hotels converted into bunkers - in particular, Semiramis and Didiman in the southwest of Palmyra. These two hotels attempted to block passage from the Palmyra Gardens after the capture of Az Ziraa.
Another direction of attack was Mount Jebel Kasyoun and the citadel of Palmyra located on it - the medieval castle of Fakhr ad-Din. After the fighters of the “orchestra” managed to completely clear the mountainous region of Jebel al-Mattar, which covered the castle on the western side, on March 25, the fighters of the “Wagner Group” began an assault on the citadel. The first strike established control over the communications tower and Al-Mantar peak. These two points became the last strongholds of ISIS on the way to Jebel Kasyoun: by evening, the citadel, which is the control point of the entire Palmyra oasis, came under the control of Russian volunteers.


The flag of the Islamic State, which had flown for 10 months over the Fakhr ad-Din castle, was handed over to Syrian units - and the soldiers of the Tiger Forces of Colonel Suheil al-Hassan demonstratively burned it.



Already on March 26, it became clear: IS is rapidly losing control of Palmyra. The capture of height 939 by the Ratibor detachment predetermined the complete defeat of the militants under the walls of Tadmor: realizing that they could not hold the city, the militants turned around and hastily began to leave Palmyra. At this moment, the defeat was completed by the attack of the 1st SHO of the Wagner PMC, which began an assault on the Tadmor airport, which the militants had turned into a major defense hub. Attacks by Russian volunteers and the intensive work of the Russian Aerospace Forces, which during these days carried out up to 40 sorties per day, forced the IS forces to retreat from the city. On March 27, the Syrian Central Command announced the complete liberation of Palmyra.



At this moment, the Syrian army, following the mysterious fighters from the Wagner Group, occupied Palmyra and its archaeological complex. And on March 28, in the center of Palmyra at 15:00 local time, the state flag of the Syrian Arab Republic was raised again.


“By the competent decision of the commander and the coordinated actions of our employees, the ancient city was liberated by the end of March 2016. This operation was carried out exclusively by soldiers of the Wagner PMC. We cannot remain silent about our fallen comrades during the liberation of the ancient city. But as a result, the role of the Wagner PMC in the fight against terrorism was hidden from the public. Our unit did not pursue fame, awards and “copper pipes”, but simply fulfilled the assigned tasks with honor and dignity by the leadership of our Country and the management of our company.”

“Musicians with machine guns”

The liberation of Palmyra after 10 months of occupation by IS militants was the first truly key event in the Syrian conflict. Thanks to the help of the Wagner PMC fighters, as well as the close work of the Russian Aerospace Forces and Special Operations Forces, the Syrian army was able to regain control of an important strategic hub in the central part of the country. In addition, this victory marked the gradual liberation of Syria from the yoke of an international terrorist group: after Palmyra, fierce battles began for El-Qaryatein, and by April 3, the city was completely liberated.

However, the IS militants, despite the defeat, retained a powerful offensive potential. First of all, this concerned the situation in the Palmyra area: despite the liberation, several problems remained unresolved after the capture of the city and it was not possible to create a full-fledged “security zone” around Palmyra. Under these conditions, Islamic State militants repeatedly carried out raids against Syrian troops on gas fields northwest of Palmyra and near the eastern border of the city - in the area of ​​​​the destroyed grain elevator. Finally, it was the continued instability in the Palmyra salient that predetermined the events in December 2016, when IS forces launched a new large-scale offensive on Palmyra.


Symphony orchestra concert in Palmyra

But all this will happen later. In the meantime, a symphony orchestra conducted by Valery Gergiev played in the ancient amphitheater of Palmyra. And few of those who watched the concert in the heart of the Syrian desert knew that very close by were “musicians” of a completely different kind. By the way, it was then that the nickname “musicians” was assigned to the Wagner PMC, just as the PMC prefix itself, which was born in the publications of the liberal press, was firmly attached to the fighters of the battalion tactical group. The nickname “Orchestra” will finally take shape in December 2016 - when Palmyra is again captured by ISIS militants, and journalists will write about how Wagner fighters stormed Palmyra for the first time:

“After the liberation of Palmyra, the Russian Ministry of Defense held a concert in the ancient amphitheater of the city. They played Prokofiev's music. It is quite possible that musicians may appear in this city again. Only these will be “musicians” with machine guns - a ghostly “Wagner group.”



Ahead of the Wagner PMC will be a difficult return to Russia, a new business trip to Palmyra with the goal of the final liberation of the city and the return of light to the homes of ordinary Syrian citizens. We have already talked about this on the pages of our chronicle, but there is still something to be said.

In the meantime...

From Kirill Romanovsky’s book “Eight Years with Wagner” (AST, Leningrad, 2024):

“Heroism is such a strange concept - it’s an adrenaline rush in a person. After all, all this happens under the influence of drugs that our body produces, hormones. And all this heroism... yes, the guys are great, sometimes they show such things that you are shocked, but this is all under the influence of hormones, and not the human factor.
I remember I once observed near Palmyra, from a distance of 800 meters I looked through the optics. Our first unit was moving, Detachment No. 1. I don’t know who it was, but I see: a guy runs into a trench, throws a grenade, makes a long burst there, jumps into the trench, and immediately jumps out of it. There's an explosion behind him - that's right, someone threw a grenade at him - and he shoots again, into the enemy trench, and only then climbs back in, and gets lost in the ISIS trenches. It was just like in the movies, in action films. I don’t know who this is, but the action is awesome. You only see this in action movies.”