ZELENOGORSK PRAVDA
The Voice of the People
23 JUN 2026 | ISSUE No. 4,782
ANALYSIS: OPERATION AT NOVOSELOVKA PERVAYA SECURES VILLAGE BUT EXPOSES COMMAND FRACTURES
By Svetlana Golikova, Defense Issues Correspondent
The ongoing stabilization operations in the western districts have yielded a tactical victory for forces of the 4th BTR Battalion, but at a cost that has prompted an urgent restructuring of command and a significant operational response from Corps headquarters.
According to internal after-action reports and a subsequent Warning Order obtained by this correspondent, a task force successfully repelled a determined separatist assault on the village of Novoselovka Pervaya on 20 June. The operation, however, was marred by a critical failure in command and control during the withdrawal phase, resulting in the loss of the task force’s commanding officer and the isolation of friendly elements in the newly secured village.
The Defense and the Cost
Intelligence derived from seized civilian documents indicated that Wagner Group operatives were directing large militia formations towards Novoselovka Pervaya. A rapid assembly of mechanized infantry and attached armor from the 17th Mechanized Cavalry Regiment was executed to intercept the enemy.
The engagement was brutal and immediate. The task force commander, acting on the assumption that hostile forces would be delayed, moved his command squad directly to defensive positions on the northern edge of the village. This assumption proved fatal, as enemy infantry and vehicles arrived simultaneously, forcing the commander to initiate combat from a static posture to stem the tide.
Reinforcements in the form of T-55 tanks arrived to stabilize the line, allowing command to occupy its designated position. The enemy was eventually repelled after approximately an hour of sustained counterattacks. However, the victory was a pyrrhic one for the infantry, with the task force sustaining an estimated 50% casualty rate. 2nd Squad was effectively destroyed as a unit, its survivors—reduced from twelve to five—absorbed into the command squad.
The Withdrawal and the Intelligence Gap
With the village held, the task force commander initiated a withdrawal to the designated rally point at Mikhailovka, two kilometers to the south. It was at this juncture that the failure in the intelligence picture became lethal.
An urgent Warning Order issued on 22 June by Colonel S. Glukharev, Deputy Head of Intelligence Staff for the 43rd Mountain Rifle Corps, confirms a significant intelligence gap. While the initial intention of the enemy strike was known, the rapid insertion of an enemy armor block into Mikhailovka was not detected.
The task force commander, lacking real-time situational awareness, directed his remaining two tanks to secure the southern corridor. They were immediately destroyed by the entrenched enemy armor. In the subsequent engagement, the task force commander and his entire command squad were killed, leaving 3rd Squad—at half strength with a single intact BTR—isolated and surrounded within Novoselovka Pervaya.
The Command Response and Warning Order
The fallout from the engagement has been immediate. While Novoselovka Pervaya remains in friendly hands, the route to the south is severed, and the village is effectively isolated.
Colonel Glukharev’s directive, issued to all subordinate units, acknowledges the precarious situation and outlines a deliberate two-phase operation over the next 24 to 48 hours. The plan is a significant commitment of forces, focused on breaking the enemy’s fixed blocking position in Mikhailovka to prevent a larger encirclement.
Phase I (24 June): A heavy, armor-led assault from the south and east is ordered to defeat the enemy block in Mikhailovka. The directive warns of "severe and sustained" counterattacks and calls for combined arms tactics using tanks and mechanized infantry with artillery preparation.
Phase II (25 June): Following the presumed capture of Mikhailovka, forces will push north to Novoselovka Pervaya to extract the stranded 3rd Squad. The operation concludes with a controlled withdrawal back to Mikhailovka to establish a defensive line.
The directive explicitly notes the risk that enemy armor, likely operated by Wagner personnel, may exceed current anti-tank capabilities. The root cause of the initial failure—the lack of real-time intelligence on enemy movements—is also highlighted, with the Intelligence Section ordered to provide continuous updates on Wagner command and control (C2) links.
The Broader Context
The events at Novoselovka Pervaya and the subsequent crisis at Mikhailovka illustrate the fluid and lethal nature of the current operational environment. While the defense of the village is a tactical success, the loss of command leadership and the subsequent isolation of friendly troops demonstrate a continued vulnerability to enemy maneuver warfare and rapid armor insertion.
The success of the pending operation to rectify the situation will likely hinge on whether the forces involved have bridged the intelligence gap that cost them their commander just days prior.
