Monday, December 29, 2025

A Costly Defense in the Dark: Analyzing the Battle for Panteleimonovka

 

A Costly Defense in the Dark: Analyzing the Battle for Panteleimonovka

By Svetlana Golikova, Senior Defense Correspondent

ZELENOIGORSK, NORTH ZAGORIA – A recently disclosed military after-action report, obtained by Zelenoigorsk Pravda, offers a stark, unvarnished look at the brutal night-time combat in the valley of Panteleimonovka on December 28th. The document, authored by Colonel Sergei Glukharev of the 43rd Mountain Rifle Corps, reveals a battle where superior intelligence could not overcome the lethal friction of a fragmented command, unforgiving terrain, and a tenacious enemy exploiting both.

The report outlines a textbook defensive setup, born from sophisticated intelligence work. Our forces, integrating signals intercepts, agent reports, and cyber operations, accurately predicted a separatist assault on the remote village. The enemy force, a potent mix of local militia, Russian-sponsored irregulars, and Wagner Group professionals, aimed to seize Panteleimonovka “straight from the march.”

The initial response was swift and effective. A combined arms task force, featuring modern T-72 tanks, BMP infantry fighting vehicles, and scout elements, moved to intercept. They successfully cleared the village of initial enemy screens. “The intelligence was correct,” a retired Corps officer, speaking on background, told this paper. “We were waiting for them.”

However, the battle’s turning point came not from an enemy action, but from a command decision. Forty minutes into the engagement, with the village secured, brigade headquarters issued a new order. The core of the defense was to shift one kilometer northeast to preempt an expected enemy armored thrust.

“A Very Dangerous Maneuver”
Colonel Glukharev’s report terms this pivot “a very dangerous maneuver.” It forced the commander to divide his already modest force. The Command Squad, reinforced with infantry, advanced into a large, treeless area “devoid of any cover.” Meanwhile, the village and the powerful T-72 tanks remained to the south, separated by the valley’s geography.

This division proved fatal. Isolated on the open plain, the Command element was decimated by a combination of Wagner-operated attack helicopters and concentrated fire from at least four enemy BMPs. The report clinically details a cascade of failure: the command vehicle was damaged and ran out of fuel; a repair truck arrived only to be destroyed alongside a fuel truck; command personnel were eliminated. The logistical chain, the lifeblood of modern combat, was shattered on contact.

The Terrain as an Adversary
A critical analysis within the report highlights the role of terrain as a passive adversary to our own forces. The chisel-sloped valley, which should have been a defender’s asset, became a trap. The T-72 main battle tanks, our most potent anti-armor asset, were rendered “out of range or unable to engage.” The valley’s crest acted as a “defilade,” allowing enemy armor to approach unseen until it was upon the isolated infantry. In the dark winter conditions, technological advantage was neutralized. “Nearly all of the enemy armor kills,” the report admits, “were from infantry anti-tank [weapons].”

A Pyrrhic Withdrawal and Unanswered Questions
The retreat, as described, was a desperate consolidation of survivors onto a single remaining BMP. The task force abandoned four of six major armored vehicles and suffered approximately 50% infantry casualties. While claiming reciprocal losses from the enemy, the operation failed in its primary objective of holding the village. The separatists, according to the report, subsequently withdrew north on their own terms.

Analysis: Lessons in the Valley’s Shadow
Military analysts reviewing the report’s findings point to several concerning themes:

  1. The Perils of Micromanagement: A late, radical change in tactical disposition from a distant headquarters disrupted the tactical commander’s plan and isolated key elements.

  2. The Decisiveness of Logistics: The complete destruction of repair and refueling assets underscores that without sustainment, even successful formations break.

  3. Hybrid War Realities: The effective use of Wagner assets—both elite ground operators and precision air power—highlights the challenge of facing a deniable yet professional adversary.

  4. Terrain and Technology: The report is a sobering reminder that satellites and sensors cannot replace the fundamental commander’s understanding of the ground, especially in limiting conditions.

The report concludes by noting the 10th Tank Brigade has “already planned a rematch.” The soldiers of the 43rd Corps paid a high price for the lessons learned in the dark valley of Panteleimonovka. The nation must hope that these lessons are etched as deeply into operational planning as they are into the memory of the survivors.

This is based on the Arma 3 wargame. The report and reporter are AI generated and represents no individual, living or dead. The text of the transcript, while AI generated, is based on data provided by the channel author.

AFTER ACTION REPORT: REFERENCE NUMBER: OP2512-26-3

 AFTER ACTION REPORT

REFERENCE NUMBER: OP2512-26-3
DATE OF REPORT: 29 DEC 2025
REPORTING OFFICER: Colonel Sergei Glukharev, Deputy Head of Intelligence Staff, 43rd Mountain Rifle Corps

TO:
Brigade Commander, 10th Separate Tank Brigade: Colonel Igor Lifanov
Deputy Corps Commander, 43rd Mountain Rifle Corps: Colonel Nikolai Pisarev
Commander Intelligence, Chernarus Coastal Operations Group (ChCOG): Rear Admiral Igor Kasatonov
ChCOG Senior Staff Intelligence Analyst: Major General Vassily Chernyakov

1. SITUATION
a. Enemy Forces: Intelligence fusion from 1st Bn and 10th Sep Tk Bde, derived from SIGINT, HUMINT, and OSINT, indicated separatist preparations for a mobile offensive in Western North Zagoria. The enemy force composition consisted of a reinforced motorized rifle battalion-equivalent, including:

  • Medium and light tracked armor (BMP, tank elements).

  • Light wheeled armored vehicles.

  • Significant infantry elements, assessed to include Russian militia and Wagner Group PMC operators.
    Intent: Seizure of Panteleimonovka via a movement-to-contact, exploiting a perceived gap in friendly patrol coverage.

b. Terrain: Panteleimonovka is situated in a SE-NW oriented valley with steep, chiseled slopes offering commanding positions over the valley floor. A small forest dominates the NW approach; a large, open area devoid of cover exists to the NE.

c. Friendly Forces: Task Force (TF) OP2512-26-3 was composed of:

  • Armor: 3x T-72 (MBT), 2x T-55.

  • Mechanized Infantry: 2x BMP Rifle Squads (24 personnel incl. crews).

  • Scout: 2x BRDM (Scout 1, Scout 2).

  • Dis-mounted Infantry: 4x Rifle Squads (2x Leg, 2x Tank Desant).

  • Air Support: 1x Su-25 (on-call).

  • CSS: 2x Repair Trucks, 1x Fuel Truck (attached during operation).

2. MISSION
Defend the village of Panteleimonovka against separatist attack on the night of 28 DEC 2025.

3. EXECUTION
At approximately 2200, the TF initiated a tactical road march. The TF Commander and 2nd Squad dismounted 300m south of the village at 2210, engaging and neutralizing an enemy militia screening element. The TF cleared the village against sporadic resistance, including Wagner dismounted operators.

At 2250, 10th Tk Bde Ops issued a FRAGO, directing the TF to establish a blocking position 1km NE of the village to preempt an expected enemy armored thrust. The TF Commander split his force:

  • Main Effort (Command Squad + 2x Reinforcing Rifle Squads): Maneuvered to the NE objective and established a defensive perimeter.

  • Supporting Effort (Remaining Elements): Continued to secure Panteleimonovka.

At the NE position, the element was engaged by successive enemy armor attacks (BMPs, tanks). At 2320, the TF Command element was neutralized by enemy rotary-wing attack (Wagner gunship). Intensive direct fire from a concentration of no fewer than 4x enemy BMPs inflicted approximately 50% casualties on the Command Squad.

Logistical support was interdicted. A Repair Truck responded to the disabled Command BMP; however, a following Fuel Truck was destroyed by enemy fire. With the position becoming untenable, the acting commander ordered a retrograde to Panteleimonovka at 0015.

The retreat was conducted under pressure. Elements consolidated in the village, mounting survivors on one serviceable BMP, and withdrew to the southern valley edge. One T-72 (Tank 2) was immobilized; recovery failed due to the loss of the second Repair Truck in a traffic accident. Surviving armor and Scout 1 conducted a fighting withdrawal to friendly lines.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT
Combat Service Support (CSS) was degraded and ultimately ineffective. Both Repair Trucks and the Fuel Truck were destroyed or rendered inoperative. This critically hampered vehicle recovery and sustainment during the defensive fight.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
Command and Control broke down following the elimination of the TF Commander and Executive Officer at the NE objective. Subsequent control was exercised by surviving senior NCOs. Communications with higher and supporting elements are assessed to have remained functional.

6. CASUALTIES & EQUIPMENT LOSSES
a. Friendly:

  • Personnel: ~50% infantry casualties (KIA/WIA).

  • Vehicles (Lost/Abandoned): 1x BMP (Cmd), 1x BRDM, 2x T-55, 1x T-72. All CSS vehicles destroyed.
    b. Enemy (Initial Field Assessment): 2x Tanks, 3x BMP, 3x Light Wheeled Armor destroyed.

7. ASSESSMENT & LESSONS LEARNED
a. Tactical Disposition: The FRAGO-mandated shift to the NE objective, while sound in intent to meet the enemy advance, forced an unfavorable division of forces and placed a subordinate element on open, defensively poor terrain.
b. Armor Employment: Friendly main battle tanks (T-72s) were effectively neutralized by terrain and range. The valley's crestline created a defilade position for approaching enemy armor, and winter night conditions degraded direct fire acquisition. The majority of enemy vehicle kills were achieved by infantry AT and BMP fire.
c. Enemy Tactics: The enemy demonstrated effective combined arms coordination, use of aerial assets for precision strikes on command elements, and aggressive exploitation of CSS vulnerabilities.
d. Intent: 10th Separate Tank Brigade staff is planning follow-on operations in northern sectors. Enemy forces, upon TF withdrawal, did not occupy Panteleimonovka in strength and subsequently retreated northwards.

8. RECOMMENDATIONS

  • Review FRAGO issuance protocols to ensure mission feasibility and force preservation are weighted.

  • Conduct training on winter/night armor engagement in defilade terrain.

  • Enhance forward CSS security and redundancy.

  • Analyze enemy use of PMC aerial assets for development of countermeasures.

GLUKHAREV
COL, CRF
Deputy Head of Intelligence, 43rd MR Corps

This is based on the Arma 3 wargame. The report and reporter are AI generated and represents no individual, living or dead. The text of the transcript, while AI generated, is based on data provided by the channel author.

Thursday, December 25, 2025

A Tactical Victory at Polana: Analysis of a Successful Defense

 ZELENOGORSK PRAVDA

Defense & Analysis Supplement
December 25, 2025

A Tactical Victory at Polana: Analysis of a Successful Defense
By Svetlana Golikova, Senior Staff Writer for Defense Issues

A recently concluded operation near the village of Polana offers a clear, tactical-level case study in effective defense, highlighting improved intelligence work and adaptive command, while also outlining the persistent challenges faced by Chernarus forces in the northern sector.

Intelligence as a Force Multiplier

The operation, conducted on December 24 by the 1st Battalion, 4th Separate Light Mountain Rifle Brigade, was predicated on what after-action reports describe as "highly accurate" pre-operational intelligence. Signals intelligence (SIGINT), including intercepted communications and emails, combined with human intelligence (HUMINT), provided a detailed forecast of the separatist offensive.

Critically, this intelligence did more than warn of an attack; it revealed the enemy's operational context. Intercepts indicated command frustration within separatist ranks stemming from "degraded logistics, poor recruit quality, and equipment shortages." The enemy’s aim for the Polana offensive was to "restore operational momentum." This understanding of adversary intent and pressure points allowed Chernarus commanders to anticipate the move with confidence.

Adaptive Execution Under Fire

The tactical execution demonstrated notable flexibility. Upon securing Polana at approximately 0735, the battalion command issued revised verbal orders at 0741, redirecting the main defensive force one kilometer northwest based on last-minute intelligence refinement. This real-time adjustment positioned the task force directly on the enemy's main axis of advance.

The ensuing engagement was a combined-arms action. Light scout elements conducted a controlled retreat, drawing in enemy armored vehicles. The core infantry elements, occupying the blocking position, engaged dismounted enemy infantry—identified in reports as including Wagner Group operators, Serbian, and Spanish regulars—at close range. The integration of precision artillery strikes on enemy concentrations and vehicles was cited as particularly effective.

Facing mounting pressure, the task force commander executed a phased withdrawal under smoke, utilizing scout elements for blocking maneuvers and calling in final artillery missions to disrupt pursuit. The action concluded with the enemy advance halted 500 meters from Polana and an orderly retreat of Chernarus forces to the village.

Assessed Outcomes and Implications

The confirmed material losses inflicted on the separatists are significant: three BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles, three heavy MRAPs, and six light armored technicals, alongside "significant infantry casualties." Chernarus forces sustained "moderate infantry casualties" but lost no vehicles and saw no squads rendered combat-ineffective.

The analysis within the report draws two primary conclusions. First, it validates a growing proficiency in intelligence synthesis and tactical agility among brigade and battalion-level commands. Second, it underscores a sobering reality: despite their logistical woes and qualitative issues, separatist forces retain the capacity to assemble and launch credible, combined-arms assaults involving foreign infantry specialists.

The Forward Outlook

The report's recommendations and forecast are pragmatic, anticipating no strategic shift from this tactical success. It calls for maintained alert levels, expanded reconnaissance, and sustained logistics to the Polana sector. The assessment states that while the offensive was a "serious setback" for the enemy, their "strategic imperative to regain initiative remains."

The victory at Polana, therefore, is not portrayed as a war-winning event, but as a successful defensive battle within a longer, grinding conflict. It highlights improved defensive capabilities but simultaneously confirms that the initiative in the northern sector remains contested, with further attacks expected as winter conditions stabilize. The enemy's increased reliance on foreign personnel marks a notable evolution in their force composition, one that will require continued analytical focus.

This is based on the Arma 3 wargame. The report and reporter are AI generated and represents no individual, living or dead. The text of the transcript, while AI generated, is based on data provided by the channel author.

AFTER ACTION REPORT (AAR) Reference: OP2512-19-6

 TOP SECRET

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - INTELLIGENCE DISTRIBUTION

AFTER ACTION REPORT (AAR)
Reference: OP2512-19-6
Date of Operation: 24 December 2025
Reporting Officer: Colonel Alexey Agopyan, Deputy Head of Intelligence Staff, 1st Army Corps
Date of Report: [CURRENT DATE]

TO:
Colonel Aleksandr Bogomolov, Deputy Chief of Staff, 1st Army Corps
Major General Yuri Stytskovsky, Commander, Chernarus 1st Army Corps
Rear Admiral Igor Kasatonov, Commander Intelligence, ChCOG
Major General Vassily Chernyakov, Senior Staff Intelligence Analyst, ChCOG

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Operation OP2512-19-6, conducted by elements of 1st Battalion, 4th Separate Light Mountain Rifle Brigade, successfully defended the village of Polana against a significant separatist offensive. The operation, based on accurate intelligence, resulted in a decisive tactical victory, repelling enemy forces with substantial losses to their armored and infantry elements while preserving friendly forces and securing the objective.

2. INTELLIGENCE APPRECIATION (PRE-OPERATION)
Brigade and Battalion intelligence staffs, utilizing signals intelligence (SIGINT) from tapped cell phones and hacked emails, coupled with HUMINT from local agents, accurately forecasted a major separatist push south toward Polana. Intercepts revealed enemy command frustration due to degraded logistics, poor recruit quality, and equipment shortages following successful summer campaigns by Chernarus forces. The enemy identified an offensive on Polana as a means to restore operational momentum, intending to employ a combined-arms assault led by light armored vehicles (technical, BMP-1, MRAP) followed by infantry.

3. CHRONOLOGY OF OPERATIONS

  • 0700: Operation commenced with overland march by rifle squads.

  • ~0735: Forward elements (Scout 1, Scout 2 BRDMs) secured Polana, finding it clear of enemy forces. Task force began preparing defensive positions.

  • ~0741: Battalion Command issued new orders via verbal transmission, redirecting the task force approximately 1 km northwest of Polana based on intelligence indicating the main enemy axis of advance.

  • Initial Contact: Scout 1 engaged an enemy BRDM on the northwest road and conducted a controlled retreat to a prepared ambush position, supported by Scout 2.

  • Force Deployment: Task Force Commander retained 2nd and 3rd Squads in Polana with two reinforcing rifle squads. The Command Squad, 4th Rifle Squad, and two additional reinforcing squads (Reinforcing Squads 2 & 3) maneuvered to the new blocking position northwest of the village.

  • Enemy Assault: Enemy launched main assault with BMP-1s and MRAPs, followed by dismounted infantry including Wagner Group operators, Serbian, and Spanish regulars. Enemy infantry maneuvered southwest in an attempt to cut the north-south road and isolate Polana.

  • Engagement: Command Squad, supported by Reinforcing Squads 2 & 3, engaged enemy infantry at close range. A sustained 10-minute firefight ensued, supported by effective artillery strikes on enemy concentrations and vehicles.

  • Controlled Withdrawal: Under increasing pressure, Task Force Commander employed smoke and ordered a phased withdrawal toward Polana. Scout elements conducted blocking maneuvers per SOP. Three final artillery strikes were called on enemy heavy MRAPs and technicals.

  • Conclusion: Enemy advance was halted approximately 500 meters from Polana. Command Squad conducted an orderly retreat south along the main road. The village remained under friendly control.

4. ASSESSMENT OF RESULTS

  • Enemy Losses (Confirmed):

    • Armored Vehicles: 3 x BMP-1

    • Protected Mobility: 3 x Heavy MRAP

    • Light Armor/Technicals: 6 units

    • Personnel: Significant infantry casualties, including specialized foreign operators.

    • Method of Destruction: Combined arms; direct anti-tank fire and precision artillery.

  • Friendly Losses:

    • Vehicles: None.

    • Personnel: Moderate infantry casualties. No squads rendered combat-ineffective.

  • Objective Status: SECURED. The village of Polana was successfully defended and remains under Chernarus control.

5. ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

  • Intelligence Validation: Pre-operational intelligence was highly accurate regarding enemy intent, timing, and composition, enabling effective force positioning and tactical adaptation.

  • Tactical Execution: The Task Force demonstrated flexibility in repositioning under changing orders and effective combined-arms coordination, particularly in the integration of direct fire, artillery support, and maneuver during the withdrawal.

  • Enemy Capabilities: Despite command frustrations and logistical shortcomings noted in intercepts, the enemy demonstrated the ability to concentrate a credible, combined-arms force, including foreign infantry, posing a significant tactical threat.

  • Enemy Intent: The failed offensive is assessed as a serious setback for separatist forces in the sector. However, their strategic imperative to regain initiative remains.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

  1. Maintain heightened alert and intelligence collection efforts in the northern sector. Separatist commands are likely to plan further offensive actions to regain momentum, especially as winter conditions stabilize.

  2. Commend the leadership of the Task Force Commander and the performance of the 1st Battalion, 4th Separate Light Mountain Rifle Brigade. Their actions exemplify effective adaptive tactics under pressure.

  3. Continue and expand artillery and aerial reconnaissance patrols to detect future enemy concentrations before they can launch coordinated attacks.

  4. Logistics and reinforcement pipelines to the Polana sector should be maintained at current levels to deter and defeat subsequent attacks.

7. OPERATIONAL FORECAST
Brigade and Battalion staffs assess that separatist forces, though bloodied, retain offensive capacity. The victory at Polana is viewed as a critical defensive success, but further attacks are expected to continue as winter progresses. The enemy's reliance on foreign infantry specialists indicates a possible shift in their force generation strategy, warranting continued close intelligence scrutiny.

Report Ends.

Colonel Alexey Agopyan
Deputy Head of Intelligence Staff
1st Army Corps, Chernarus Armed Forces

This is based on the Arma 3 wargame. The report and reporter are AI generated and represents no individual, living or dead. The text of the transcript, while AI generated, is based on data provided by the channel author.

Monday, October 20, 2025

CLASSIFIED REPORT DETAILS CATASTROPHIC MILITARY FAILURE NEAR TROITSKOYE

by  Svetlana Golikova 

Senior staff writer for Chernogorsk Pravda

CHERNOGORSK – A recently obtained and heavily redacted after-action report from the 19th Separate Mechanized Cavalry Regiment reveals a devastating military operation on 15 OCT that resulted in the near-total destruction of a government task force, the failure of its primary objectives, and the deaths of dozens of soldiers.

The document, authored by Captain Esedulla Abachev, the Deputy Head of Intelligence for the regiment, and provided to this publication by a confidential source within the Ministry of Defence, paints a stark picture of the engagement, attributing the failure to "effective enemy action" and a "critical intelligence failure."

The operation, involving a Task Force from the regiment's 3rd Battalion, was launched with the objective of attacking and clearing enemy-occupied positions, starting at the Landfill sector and proceeding to the village of Troitskoye to re-establish government control.

According to the report, the day-long battle was a series of brutal engagements that systematically dismantled the Task Force.

Disaster on the Heights

The initial assault on the Landfill in the morning hours began with success, as friendly armor destroyed enemy tanks and armored personnel carriers. However, the operation quickly turned. A key maneuver element, "2nd Squad," was positioned on high ground to block enemy reinforcements. There, they were assaulted by an estimated three squads of enemy special forces. The report states the grim outcome in blunt military terminology: "the annihilation of 2nd Squad." All twelve soldiers were killed in action.

This devastating loss forced the Task Force Commander to commit his reserves prematurely and order a "tactical withdrawal" from the Landfill to proceed to the main objective: the village of Troitskoye.

"Catastrophic Loss" in Troitskoye

The situation deteriorated further in the afternoon during the assault on Troitskoye. The report identifies a "critical intelligence failure" as the core reason for the subsequent disaster. The Task Force Commander's plan relied on intelligence that placed an enemy T-72 tank on the western edge of the village.

Acting on this flawed information, "3rd Squad," mounted on two older T-55 tanks, was ordered to advance on the western approach. The intelligence was tragically wrong. The enemy tank was, in fact, positioned on the eastern edge of the village, giving it a clear line of fire.

The result was a slaughter. The enemy T-72 engaged and "destroyed both friendly T-55s and eliminated 3rd Squad within two (2) minutes." Another twelve soldiers were lost in a matter of moments.

With his force crippled, the Task Force Commander personally led the remnants of his Assault Squad in a desperate clearing operation of the village. Just as the sweep was completed, a lone enemy armored vehicle emerged, destroying two regimental gunships providing close air support and inflicting over 50% casualties on the Assault Squad.

With the unit's combat effectiveness "critically degraded," the order for a full withdrawal was given.

A Regiment Broken

The final tally is harrowing. The operation cost the lives of at least 24 soldiers from 2nd and 3rd Squads, with the Assault Squad suffering over 50% casualties. The material losses included two T-55 tanks and two gunships. Captain Abachev's conclusion is unequivocal: "The unit is no longer combat effective and requires reconstitution."

The report's analysis leaves little room for interpretation. The failure is attributed to the "devastating counter-attack by enemy special forces" and the "critical intelligence failure regarding enemy armor disposition." Among its key recommendations is a pointed question about the army's own equipment, urging a review of "the viability of committing T-55 platforms against modernized MBTs."

Attempts to secure an official comment from the Ministry of Defence or the press office of the Chernogorsk Combined Operational Command (ChCOG) were met with no response. The silence from official channels stands in stark contrast to the detailed account of valor and failure contained within the leaked pages. This report raises serious questions about the quality of military intelligence, the equipment provided to our frontline soldiers, and the true human cost of the ongoing conflict in the region.

This is based on the Arma 3 wargame. The report and reporter are AI generated and represents no individual, living or dead. The text of the transcript, while AI generated, is based on data provided by the channel author.

After Action Report, Task Force 3rd Battalion Combat Operations, 15 OCT

 FROM: Deputy Head of Intelligence Staff, 19th Separate Mech Cav Regt

TO: Regimental Commander, 19th Separate Mech Cav Regt
COPY TO: Deputy Commander ChCOG; Commander Intelligence ChCOG; ChCOG Senior Staff Intelligence Analyst
REF: AAR-19MECH-28OCT
SUBJECT: AFTER ACTION REPORT - Task Force 3rd Battalion Combat Operations, 15 OCT

1. SITUATION
a. Enemy Forces: Separatist elements of significant strength, including local levy infantry, special forces teams (estimated 3 squads), and mixed armor (T-72 MBT, BTR-80A APC). Demonstrated capability for coordinated counter-attacks and armor ambushes.
b. Friendly Forces: Task Force from 3rd Battalion, 19th Separate Mechanized Cavalry Regiment. Composition: Command/Assault Squad, 2nd Squad (12x effectives), 3rd Squad (12x effectives), Armor Element (2x T-72, 2x T-55).

2. MISSION
Attack and clear enemy-occupied locales, commencing at the Landfill and proceeding to the village of Troitskoye, to re-establish government control.

3. EXECUTION
a. Phase 1: Assault on Landfill (Morning, 15 OCT)

  • (1) Command/Assault Squad, supported by 2x T-72, initiated primary assault, penetrating enemy infantry cordon.

  • (2) Armor Element (T-72s) engaged and destroyed 1x enemy T-72 and 1x enemy BTR-80A.

  • (3) 2nd Squad, mounted on 2x T-55, maneuvered to occupy and secure high ground Northeast of the objective to block enemy reinforcement.

  • (4) Upon clearing the initial objective, Command/Assault Squad established a blocking position between the main road and 2nd Squad's position, engaging and destroying medium enemy armor moving along the road.

  • (5) Enemy special forces (3x squads) conducted a concentrated assault on the heights, resulting in the annihilation of 2nd Squad.

  • (6) Task Force Commander committed operational reserves to stabilize the flank and prevent enemy exploitation.

  • (7) Task Force conducted a tactical withdrawal from the Landfill to proceed to secondary objective.

b. Phase 2: Assault on Troitskoye (Afternoon, 15 OCT)

  • (1) Task Force Commander's plan relied on prior intelligence indicating an enemy T-72 was positioned on the western edge of the village.

  • (2) 3rd Squad, mounted on 2x T-55, was ordered to advance and dismount on the western approach.

  • (3) Command/Assault Squad began its penetration of the village's defensive perimeter.

  • (4) Enemy T-72, positioned on the eastern extent of the village, engaged and destroyed both friendly T-55s and eliminated 3rd Squad within two (2) minutes.

  • (5) Friendly Armor Element (Tank 2) subsequently engaged and destroyed the enemy T-72.

  • (6) With no reinforcements available, the Task Force Commander personally led the remaining Assault Squad in a west-to-east clearing operation of the village.

  • (7) Upon completion of the sweep, a lone enemy BTR-80A engaged, inflicting 50% casualties on the Assault Squad and destroying both regimental gunships providing CAS.

  • (8) With combat effectiveness critically degraded, the Task Force Commander ordered a full withdrawal to base.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT
Logistics and recovery operations performed adequately. No issues reported.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
Command and control was maintained throughout the operation. Loss of key assets (gunships) severely degraded situational awareness and fire support capability during final phase.

6. CASUALTIES & EQUIPMENT LOSSES

  • PERSONNEL: 2nd Squad (12x KIA), 3rd Squad (12x KIA), Assault Squad (>50% casualties).

  • EQUIPMENT: 2x T-55 Destroyed, 2x Gunships Destroyed.

7. ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS
a. Analysis:

  • The operation failed to secure two of its three primary objectives.

  • Failure was attributable to two primary factors:

    • (1) Effective and devastating counter-attack by enemy special forces at the Landfill, which eliminated a key maneuver element and forced the premature commitment of reserves.

    • (2) Critical intelligence failure regarding enemy armor disposition at Troitskoye. The misidentification of the enemy T-72's position led to the catastrophic loss of 3rd Squad and its armor support, crippling the Task Force's combat power for the main objective.

b. Recommendations:

  • (1) Review and enhance battlefield reconnaissance and intelligence verification procedures to prevent repeat of armor disposition errors.

  • (2) Develop and drill contingency plans for rapid response to enemy special forces infiltration and counter-attack on flanking positions.

  • (3) Assess the viability of committing T-55 platforms against modernized MBTs without significant stand-off or top-attack capability.

8. CONCLUSION
Task Force 3rd Battalion displayed courage and maintained offensive momentum despite initial setbacks. However, due to effective enemy action and a critical intelligence oversight, the operation culminated at Troitskoye without achieving its primary goals. The unit is no longer combat effective and requires reconstitution.

CAPTAIN ESEDULLA ABACHEV
DEPUTY HEAD OF INTELLIGENCE STAFF
19TH SEPARATE MECHANIZED CAVALRY REGIMENT

This is based on the Arma 3 wargame. The report and reporter are AI generated and represents no individual, living or dead. The text of the transcript, while AI generated, is based on data provided by the channel author.

Monday, October 13, 2025

43rd Mountain Rifle Corps Intelligence Staff North Zagoria Region Operational Summary

TOP SECRET//NOFORN
43rd Mountain Rifle Corps Intelligence Staff
North Zagoria Region Operational Summary
12 October 2025

TO:

  • Major General Sergey Gladkov, Corps Commander

  • Colonel Nikolai Pisarev, Deputy Corps Commander

FROM:
Colonel Sergei Glukharev
Deputy Head of Intelligence Staff, 43rd Mountain Rifle Corps

REF: OP2510-10-1 After Action Analysis & Enemy Capability Assessment


1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Separatist forces in North Zagoria have transitioned from guerrilla tactics to conventional warfare preparations, evidenced by recent armored reinforcements and established supply chains. Operation IVANOVKA successfully disrupted enemy forward positioning but revealed concerning strategic developments, including planned winter offensives with foreign reinforcement and mass irregular recruitment.


2. OPERATION IVANOVKA (OP2510-10-1) TACTICAL ASSESSMENT

2.1 Enemy Dispositions & Capabilities

  • Forces Identified: T-62 (1), T-55 (1) main battle tanks, plus logistical support elements

  • Tactical Posture: Defensive preparations indicated intent to establish forward supply base

  • Terrain Utilization: Village of Ivanovka employed as defensive strongpoint with limited western approach cover

2.2 Friendly Force Execution

  • Task Force Commander: Senior Lieutenant Belobadorov

  • Scheme of Maneuver:

    • Primary assault along western creek axis using urban cover

    • Eastern tank position established for overwatch and counter-armor operations

  • Modification to Plan: Squad roles reversed during advance with successful document capture

2.3 Combat Effectiveness

  • Armor Engagements: Friendly forces neutralized enemy T-72, T-62, T-55, and T-34 counterattacks with minimal losses

  • Intelligence Capture: One civilian criminal command operative eliminated, securing critical planning documents


3. CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE FINDINGS

3.1 Enemy Winter Campaign Planning

Captured documents outline sophisticated offensive operations scheduled winter 2025-2026:

  • Armor Reinforcements: Significant increases in medium/heavy tracked armor promised

  • Foreign Combat Elements: Iranian regulars identified as imminent reinforcement

  • Escalated Violence: Planned intensification of pogroms beyond summer 2025 levels

3.2 Force Generation & Recruitment

  • Irregular Mobilization: Plans to recruit ~150 local irregulars for light infantry attacks

  • Resource Stockpiling: Northern supply depots accumulating fuel, ammunition, cash, and non-combatant personnel (including women)

3.3 Enemy Logistics & Communications

  • Communications Security: Marked improvement in electronic security measures

  • Supply Chain Development: Established resupply networks evident in forward positions


4. SOURCE EVALUATION

4.1 Human Intelligence (HUMINT)

  • Local Agents: Remain primary intelligence source; reliability assessed HIGH

  • Enemy Territory Agents: Most valuable intelligence gained through extraordinary measures (kidnappings/interrogations); reliability assessed HIGH

  • Prisoner Interrogations: Corroborated document findings; reliability assessed MEDIUM-HIGH

4.2 Technical Intelligence (TECHINT)

  • Drone Surveillance: Effective for force disposition mapping; limited against improved enemy COMSEC

  • Document Exploitation: Critical for strategic forecasting; reliability assessed HIGH


5. ENEMY CAPABILITY PROJECTION

5.1 Immediate (0-30 Days)

  • Continued probing attacks with armored elements

  • Expansion of supply depots in northern sectors

  • Recruitment campaigns for irregular forces

5.2 Medium-Term (1-3 Months)

  • Winter offensive initiation with foreign reinforcement

  • Massed irregular attacks to overwhelm defensive positions

  • Increased armored company-level operations

5.3 Strategic Implications

Enemy transitioning to conventional force capability requiring corps-level combined arms response. Iranian regular integration suggests external state sponsorship escalation.


6. RECOMMENDATIONS

  1. Preemptive Operations: Authorize immediate disruption campaigns against northern supply depots

  2. Force Enhancement: Prioritize anti-armor capabilities and electronic warfare assets to battalion level

  3. Counter-Intelligence: Increase monitoring of local population for irregular recruitment activities

  4. Strategic Preparation: Prepare winter warfare contingency plans accounting for 150+ irregular combatants

  5. External Action: Request Foreign Intelligence Directorate (SVR) analysis of Iranian regular deployment channels


APPENDICES

  • A: Document Translation Excerpts

  • B: Prisoner Interrogation Summaries

  • C: Ivanovka Terrain Analysis

DISTRIBUTION: Corps Command Staff, Operations Directorate, 1st/2nd Rifle Division Commanders


Colonel S. Glukharev
Deputy Head of Intelligence Staff
43rd Mountain Rifle Corps
Zelenogorsk, Chernarus

This is based on the Arma 3 wargame. The report and reporter are AI generated and represents no individual, living or dead. The text of the transcript, while AI generated, is based on data provided by the channel author.