AFTER ACTION REPORT: Report Number: AAR-2507-INT-02

Classification: SECRET//REL TO CHERNARUS ARMED FORCES//NOFORN

Date: 28 July 2025

Submitted By: Colonel Denis Rozhkov, Deputy Head of Intelligence Staff, Chernarus 2nd Corps

Subject: Analysis of Combat Operations OP2507-18-7 (Salash) and OP2507-25-1 (Baluvitsa), Leskovets Region

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report details two high-intensity combat operations conducted by elements of the 7th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (7SMRB) in the Leskovets region on 27 July 2025. Both operations demonstrated effective adaptation under duress, successful integration of drone reconnaissance, and significant degradation of enemy combat capabilities. Heavy casualties were sustained by friendly forces, but tactical objectives were achieved.

II. OPERATION OP2507-18-7: OFFENSIVE ON SALASH

A. SITUATION

Enemy Forces: Separatist units (reinforced by Spanish/Serbian regulars & SF) occupied Salash. Assets included supply vehicles, T-55 tanks, BMPs, BTRs. Civilian collaborators initiated arrests/deportations.

Friendly Forces: 4th Battalion (Task Force: Command Squad, 2x Rifle Squads (BMP), 2x T-72 Tanks).

B. TACTICAL EXECUTION

Initial Maneuver:

Plan: Tank 3 + 2nd BMP Squad flanked east; Command Squad + Tank 1 assaulted via main road.

Contact: Command Squad penetrated southern defenses but encountered heavy counterfire (SF, Spanish/Serbian units). Comms lost during sustained counterattacks.

Command Transition: Per SOP, 2nd Squad Commander assumed control, withdrew, and reestablished comms with Command Squad.

Drone Deployment:

3x combat drones launched to reconnoiter enemy movements.

Drones detected massing enemy armor (T-55s, BTRs) probing southward.

Counterattack & Reinforcement:

Acting commander’s squad destroyed advancing armor, preventing breakthrough.

Reinforcements secured northern village perimeter by nightfall. Enemy withdrew completely.

Acting Commander’s Observation: "The battle was like a great quiet descended on the battlefield, as if the enemy had never been there."

C. ASSESSMENT

Enemy Losses: 3x T-55, 1x BMP, 1x BTR. Separatist command/control disrupted.

Friendly Losses: Heavy infantry/vehicle casualties (exact figures pending).

Drone Impact: Forced enemy withdrawal by revealing dispositions. Direct damage unconfirmed but psychologically decisive.

III. OPERATION OP2507-25-1: DEFENSE OF BALUVITSA

A. SITUATION

Enemy Forces: Mixed infantry (Serbian regulars, Chechen fighters, Russian Spetsnaz), light armor (technicals, BRDM), and tanks (T-55/T-72).

Friendly Forces: 1st Battalion (Task Force: Command Squad, 3x Rifle Squads (BTR), 3x T-72 Tanks).

B. TACTICAL EXECUTION

Defensive Setup:

East-west line established with tanks anchoring flanks.

Premature Contact: Enemy technicals/infantry attacked before positions consolidated. Destroyed by combined tank/AT fire.

Dynamic Repositioning:

Battalion Command redirected forces northwest (40-min mark) to counter enemy flanking maneuver.

During advance, 3x enemy tanks (1x T-72, 2x T-55) engaged and destroyed by friendly armor.

Sustained Assault & Drone Support:

Serbian-led infantry/armor counterattacks pressed south. Command Squad + reinforcements entered 15-minute close-quarters melee.

Drones detected northern enemy movements despite dusk limitations, enabling interdiction.

Final Action: Command Squad destroyed isolated BMP north of village post-melee.

C. ASSESSMENT

Enemy Losses: 5x T-55, 1x T-72, 2x BMP, 1x BRDM, 3x technicals.

Friendly Losses: Heavy across infantry/armor.

Strategic Outcome: Enemy combat power in sector eradicated; no near-term offensive capability confirmed by battalion intel.

IV. KEY FINDINGS

Drone Effectiveness:

Critical for real-time reconnaissance during comms blackouts and fluid battlespace (Salash command transition, Baluvitsa flank detection).

Limitations in low-light (Baluvitsa) require enhanced night-capable variants.

Command Resilience:

SOPs for command transition (Salash) proved effective. Drone use accelerated situational recovery.

Enemy Composition:

Confirmed multinational involvement: Serbian regulars (primary infantry), Spanish/Russian SF, Chechen auxiliaries.

T-55s remain backbone of enemy armor; T-72s rare but high-value.

Casualty Trends:

High attrition in both attack/defense operations underscores enemy tenacity and firepower parity in armor engagements.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

Prioritize drone allocation to maneuver battalions, with emphasis on night-operation upgrades.

Review armor-infantry coordination SOPs to reduce casualties during repositioning under fire.

Expand intel focus on foreign fighter logistics networks enabling Serbian/Russian force generation.

Commend 4th Battalion’s acting commander (Salash) and 1st Battalion Command Squad (Baluvitsa) for exemplary initiative.

// SIGNED //

Colonel Denis Rozhkov

Deputy Head of Intelligence Staff, Chernarus 2nd Corps

End of Report

Chernarus Military Deploys Combat Drones in Groundbreaking Tactical Shift

 By Svetlana Golikova (Zelenogorsk Pravda) & Galina Timchenko (Novosti Novigrad)

ZELENOGORSK – After 18 months of covert development, Chernarus Defense Forces and Naval Command have initiated mass deployment of armed drones to front-line units, signaling a revolutionary shift in battlefield tactics against separatist forces. The announcement came today from Major General Vassily Chernyakov, Senior Staff Intelligence Analyst for the Chernarus Coastal Operations Group (ChCOG).

"In this era of asymmetric warfare, innovation is our shield," declared Gen. Chernyakov during an exclusive briefing at ChCOG headquarters. "Our analysts and doctrine officers have transformed commercial drone technology into precision combat systems capable of devastating enemy infantry and light vehicles – the primary threats our soldiers face."

Covert Training, Strategic Deployment

According to classified documents reviewed by Zelenogorsk Pravda, over 600 commanders from sergeant to brigade level underwent secret retraining at the Krasnoznamensky Drone Range near Novigrad. Rotated from front-line duty in small groups, they mastered strike techniques using modified quadcopters carrying thermobaric warheads and armor-piercing munitions.

"If used correctly, these systems could fundamentally alter tactical equations," Chernyakov emphasized, noting drones’ ability to bypass traditional defenses and strike from oblique angles. Initial deployments focus on Northwest Chernarus – the restive region bordering separatist strongholds.

---

Commanders’ Perspectives: Cautious Optimism

Front-line officers expressed measured confidence in the new systems:

• "They’re game-changers – in theory," conceded one battalion commander speaking anonymously. "But forests and electronic warfare degrade signals. Real combat will be the test."

• A naval infantry captain described the training as exhaustive: "Every operational concern was addressed – battery life in cold weather, counter-jamming protocols, warhead reliability. This isn’t toy-soldier tech."

• One major drew a darkly humorous parallel: "My twelve-year-old flies a similar drone for photography competitions. The version we’re deploying just... delivers different payloads." His grim chuckle underscored the weapon’s unsettling accessibility.

---

Technical Edge, Tactical Imperatives

ChCOG specifications reveal:

• Range: 8 km (urban) / 15 km (rural)

• Payload: 1.2 kg warheads (anti-personnel/light armor)

• Electronic Resilience: Frequency-hopping encryption

• Unit Cost: 1/20th of a Kornet missile system

Defense analysts note the drones specifically counter separatists’ "swarm tactics" – where technicals (armed pickup trucks) and infantry overwhelm Chernarus positions. "One operator can now eliminate five vehicles before they close within RPG range," explained ChCOG engineer Colonel Irina Volkova (not quoted in release).

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The Human Factor

Despite technological promise, veterans voice concerns. "Drones won’t hold ground," cautioned Sergeant Pavel Durov (3rd Battalion, 19th Mechanized Cavalry). "When mud freezes or batteries die, it still comes down to bayonets and courage."

Gen. Chernyakov acknowledged the limitation: "This isn’t a replacement for infantry. It’s a force multiplier to preserve our most precious resource – soldiers’ lives."

---

What Comes Next

Phase two deployments begin next month, with naval variants targeting coastal infiltration boats. Meanwhile, captured documents reveal separatists scrambling to acquire Chinese jammers – a tacit admission of the drone threat’s potency.

As Chernarus turns technological ingenuity into battlefield advantage, one truth remains: In the frozen forests of the Northwest, theory is now meeting brutal practice.

— END —

Editor’s Note: Per ChCOG security requirements, operational locations and unit identifiers remain classified. Report drone sightings to Military Hotline 119.

---

About the Authors
Svetlana Golikova is Zelenogorsk Pravda’s senior defense correspondent, embedded with Chernarus forces during the 2024 Stepnoye offensive.
Galina Timchenko leads Novosti Novigrad’s investigative team, specializing in asymmetric warfare analysis.

This is based on the Arma 3 wargame. The report and reporter are AI generated and represents no individual, living or dead. The text of the transcript, while AI generated, is based on data provided by the channel author.

Disputed Accounts Emerge After Brutal Battle for Horsingen

 

CDF Claims Victory Amid NGO Allegations of Civilian Harm

By Svetlana Golikova, Zelenogorsk Pravda
HORSINGEN, WERFERLINGEN – July 14, 2025

A leaked military report obtained by the Zelenogorsk Pravda details a bloody, four-day battle by Chernarus Defense Forces (CDF) to recapture the strategic village of Horsingen from separatist forces, culminating in a costly victory. However, these official accounts clash sharply with allegations from the NGO Trees for Peace (TFP), which accuses the CDF of widespread destruction of civilian housing and indiscriminate fire.

Military Report: Costly Success Through Adaptation
The After Action Report, authored by Colonel Sergei Glukharev (Deputy Head of Intelligence, 43rd Mountain Rifle Corps) and endorsed by Colonel Roman Shilov (Commander, 13th Mountain Motorized Rifle Brigade), chronicles four distinct operations between July 10th and 12th:

1. Failed Initial Assault (OP2507-04-3): A task force of 3 BTR infantry squads was nearly annihilated in an aggressive assault on July 10th. The report cites a critical failure of promised reinforcements (only 2 T-55 tanks arrived) and underutilized artillery, allowing enemy forces (identified as Russian Spetsnaz, Chechen fighters, militia, and armored units) to counterattack effectively. Losses were described as "near-total" for the task force.

2. Bloody Probe and Partial Intel Recovery (OP2507-04-7): A second assault on July 10th aimed to probe defenses and retrieve stolen documents and High-Value Targets (HVTs). While one HVT (a "female minder") was eliminated and separatist repair depot locations were recovered, the force suffered heavy casualties and failed to retrieve key documents. The report urgently requested substantial reinforcements.

3. Combined-Arms Counterattack (OP2507-11-1): Utilizing newly arrived reinforcements (6 tanks, 4 Mi-24 gunships), the CDF launched a major assault on July 11th. Mi-24s suppressed enemy positions, artillery interdicted river crossings, and HVTs were eliminated. Military documents, hit lists, and informant logs were recovered, and the village was cleared. However, losses were again severe: 23 personnel KIA, 1 T-72, 2 T-55s, and all 4 Mi-24 gunships destroyed.

4. Successful Defense (OP2507-11-2): On July 12th, the CDF repelled a significant separatist counterattack featuring BM-21 "Grad" rockets. Friendly artillery was destroyed early, but Mi-24s, tanks, and timely reinforcements held the northern edge of the village. Losses were comparatively lighter (6 personnel KIA, 1 T-55, 1 BTR).

Military Assessment & Conclusions:
Colonel Glukharev assessed that separatist capabilities in the sector were "crippled" after suffering "catastrophic losses" (15+ armored vehicles, 8+ UAVs, 3x BM-21s). Total CDF losses were 49 KIA and significant equipment, including 4 Mi-24s, 3 T-55s, 1 T-72, and 2 BTRs. The report praised the "tenacity" and "evolving tactical proficiency" of the 3rd Battalion but highlighted critical failures: reinforcement delays, artillery vulnerability, and underutilized intelligence (specifically, known BM-21 locations not being preemptively struck). Recommendations included prioritizing counter-battery radar and improving reinforcement protocols.

Trees for Peace: Allegations of Destruction and Disrespect
Contradicting the military's narrative of precision, TFP operatives visited Horsingen immediately after the fighting subsided. Spokesman Vyacheslav Komorov provided the Zelenogorsk Pravda with their account:

• Widespread Destruction: TFP documented "numerous residential buildings nearly completely destroyed by artillery fire." While military graves details had removed corpses and engineers cleared vehicle wrecks, the physical damage to civilian infrastructure was severe.

• CDF Fire on Civilians: Residents interviewed by TFP alleged that CDF gunships "pursued civilians firing on them indiscriminately" during the operations. Operatives also witnessed CDF artillery firing towards Horsingen during OP2507-11-1.

• Troop Misconduct: TFP operatives reported being mocked by CDF troops in Horsingen who refused to answer questions. Local residents allegedly confirmed this behavior.

• Demand for Apology: TFP demanded an official government apology for attacking civilians and posted photos of the destruction on their website.

Military Rebuttal: Protocols and Context
Vice Admiral Boris Kravchuck, Deputy Commander of the Chernarus Coastal Operations Group, directly responded to TFP's allegations:

1. On Artillery Strikes: Kravchuck vehemently denied any artillery fire landed in Horsingen, citing a strict "300-meter protocol". He explained that both forward observers calling fire and artillery battery commanders are trained and required to abort any fire mission where the impact zone is within 300 meters of built-up areas. A formal record would be made of any refused order, and Kravchuck stated, "We received no data on such an exchange."

2. On Gunship Fire: The Admiral acknowledged the inherent imprecision of high-speed gunship attacks (Mi-24s). "It is impossible to control where these munitions hit," he stated, blaming separatist tactics: "They know... the gunship will make such runs... [so] they will direct their vehicles into town." He also noted that secondary explosions from destroyed enemy vehicles (BMPs, BTRs full of fuel/ammo) contributed significantly to the destruction witnessed by TFP.

3. On Civilian Presence: Kravchuck asserted that civilians typically flee villages before major combat, except when prevented by separatists. This implicitly challenges TFP's accounts of civilians being present and targeted.

4. On Troop Conduct: While promising to "look into" the allegations of troops mocking TFP operatives, Kravchuck expressed skepticism: "I doubt the stories... are true."

Unresolved Contradictions
The battle for Horsingen resulted in a clear, albeit costly, military victory for the CDF, significantly degrading separatist forces in the area according to their own assessment. However, the TFP allegations and the stark evidence of heavy damage to the village raise serious questions about the conduct of the operations and the protection of civilian infrastructure. The fundamental contradiction – TFP's eyewitness account of artillery damage versus the military's absolute denial based on strict protocols and lack of incident reports – remains unresolved. The fate of Horsingen's civilians during the intense fighting and the circumstances surrounding the extensive destruction of their homes demand further independent investigation.

This is based on the Arma 3 wargame. The report and reporter are AI generated and represents no individual, living or dead. The text of the transcript, while AI generated, is based on data provided by the channel author.

AFTER ACTION REPORT, 13 July, 2025

 AFTER ACTION REPORT

Subject: Combat Operations in Horsingen, Werferlingen (Operations OP2507-04-3, OP2507-04-7, OP2507-11-1, OP2507-11-2)

Author: Colonel Sergei Glukharev, Deputy Head of Intelligence Staff, 43rd Mountain Rifle Corps

Endorsed By: Colonel Roman Shilov, Commander, 13th Mountain Motorized Rifle Brigade

Date: 13 July 2025

Copy To:

Maj. General Sergey Gladkov, Corps Commander, 43rd Mountain Rifle Corps

Vice Admiral Boris Kravchuck, Deputy Commander, Chernarus Coastal Operations Group

Rear Admiral Igor Kasatonov, Commander Intelligence Section, Chernarus Coastal Operations Group

I. BACKGROUND

Horsingen (pop. ~1,000) is a strategically critical village in northeastern Werferlingen, controlling the only two vehicle crossings (stone bridge and ford) over the river southward. Its western woods provide cover for enemy infantry incursions. Intelligence confirmed separatist forces (Russian Spetsnaz, Chechen fighters, militia, and armored units) occupied Horsingen to stage further southern incursions.

II. OPERATIONAL CHRONOLOGY

A. OP2507-04-3 (Initial Offensive)

Objective: Clear separatist forces from Horsingen.

Forces: 3rd Battalion Task Force (3x BTR Rifle Squads).

Execution:

Faced fierce resistance from well-prepared Russian/Chechen forces.

Ordered aggressive BTR assault to penetrate village; enemy counterattacked with superior troops/vehicles.

Critical Failure: Promised reinforcements did not materialize (only 2x T-55s arrived). Artillery support was underutilized, enabling enemy river crossings.

Outcome:

Near-total destruction of Task Force. 2nd/3rd BTR Squads wiped out; Command Squad decimated.

Withdrawal ordered. No confirmed enemy losses.

Lessons:

Reinforcement coordination and artillery integration failed.

Enemy strength underestimated.

B. OP2507-04-7 (Counterattack One)

Objective: Probe enemy defenses, retrieve intel (stolen military documents, HVTs).

Forces: 3x BTR Rifle Squads.

Execution:

Maneuvered to bypass resistance points; engaged Chechen/militia forces.

Eliminated one HVT (female minder), recovering separatist repair depot locations.

Failed to retrieve military documents from government building.

Outcome:

Heavy casualties: 2nd Squad destroyed; 3rd/Command Squads lost 13 total.

Partial enemy losses: 3x BMP, 2x BTR, 1x T-34, 1x T-55, 1x BRDM, 5x UAV.

General retreat ordered.

Lessons:

Insufficient force strength for sustained assault.

Immediate reinforcement requested: 1x BMP recce, 3x T-72, 4x Mi-24.

C. OP2507-11-1 (Counterattack Two)

Objective: Retake Horsingen using reinforcements.

Forces: 6x Tanks (T-72/T-55), 4x Mi-24, 3x BTR Squads.

Execution:

Mi-24s suppressed enemy in town; artillery interdicted northern river crossings.

HVTs eliminated; retrieved hit lists, informant logs, and military documents.

Ground forces advanced to northern edge but withdrew south due to enemy armor.

Outcome:

Success: Village cleared, intel recovered.

Losses: 10x (2nd Sq), 6x (3rd Sq), 7x (Cmd Sq); 1x T-72, 2x T-55, 4x Mi-24 destroyed.

Enemy losses: 2x BMP, 1x technical, 1x T-34, 1x T-55, 1x BRDM, 2x UAV.

Reinforcements arrived but repelled by northern armor. Separatists did not re-enter.

Lessons: Air support decisive but vulnerable; enemy river-crossing capability persistent.

D. OP2507-11-2 (Defensive Operation)

Objective: Repel separatist counterattack to retake Horsingen.

Forces: 2x Tanks, 3x Mi-24, 3x BTR Squads + reinforcements.

Execution:

Enemy BM-21 battery (10km north) destroyed friendly artillery.

Mi-24s engaged infantry (Russian/Chechen); tanks destroyed armor crossing river.

Timely reinforcements held northern edge.

Outcome:

Success: Attack repelled; village secured.

Losses: 3x (2nd/3rd Sq each), 1x BTR, 1x T-55.

Enemy losses: 6x BMP, 3x BM-21, 2x UAV.

Village left under civilian control at dawn.

III. ASSESSMENT

Enemy: Separatist forces (Russian SF, Chechens, militia, Serbian auxiliaries) demonstrated adaptability but suffered catastrophic losses (15+ AFVs, 8+ UAVs, 3x BM-21). Their capacity for further attacks is degraded.

Friendly Forces:

Adaptation: Evolved from failed assaults to combined-arms success (air/armor/artillery integration).

Shortfalls: Reinforcement delays, artillery vulnerability, and underutilization of intel (e.g., BM-21 location known but not preempted).

Casualties (Total):

Personnel: 49 KIA (including near-total loss of 2nd Squad).

Equipment: 4x Mi-24, 3x T-55, 1x T-72, 2x BTR.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

Horsingen is secured and separatist offensive capabilities in the sector are crippled.

Intelligence coordination must improve pre-operation (e.g., BM-21 threat was identified but not neutralized proactively).

Rapid adaptation of 43rd Corps forces under dynamic conditions ensured eventual success despite heavy losses.

Recommendations:

Prioritize counterbattery/C3ISR assets in future ops.

Review reinforcement protocols to prevent delays.

Commend 3rd Battalion for tenacity and evolving tactical proficiency.

Respectfully Submitted,

// SIGNED //

Colonel Sergei Glukharev

Deputy Head of Intelligence Staff, 43rd Mountain Rifle Corps

// END REPORT //

This is based on the Arma 3 wargame. The report and reporter are AI generated and represents no individual, living or dead. The text of the transcript, while AI generated, is based on data provided by the channel author.

Heroic Defenders Disrupt Separatist Offensive

Svetalana Golikova

By Svetlana Golikova, National Security Correspondent

ZELENOGORSK — In a series of lightning counter-offensives, the Chernarus 10th Separate Tank Brigade has dealt a severe blow to separatist ambitions in North Zagoria, though command failures prevented total victory, according to confidential military assessments obtained by Zelenogorsk Pravda.

Between 19–22 June, battalions of the 10th Brigade launched pre-emptive strikes against separatist strongholds in the villages of Oktyabrsky, Bogdanova, and Volnovakha. Intelligence indicated separatist forces, significantly reinforced by foreign fighters and heavy weaponry, planned to consolidate control over these strategic points to launch a coordinated offensive.

Triumph Amid Sacrifice

The 3rd Battalion’s assault on Oktyabrsky on 19 June succeeded in liberating the village from entrenched separatists, who included foreign combat specialists. The operation, however, came at a steep cost, with our forces sustaining heavy casualties during fierce counterattacks. Despite this, three local informants held captive by separatists were rescued, yielding critical intelligence on enemy plans.

The 4th Battalion’s strike on Bogdanova (20–21 June) proved a model of efficiency. In a rapid, violent assault, our troops shattered separatist defenses with minimal losses while inflicting catastrophic damage on enemy armor. Preliminary reports indicate dozens of separatist armored vehicles (BMPs, BTRs, and tanks) were destroyed.

Command Failure at Volnovakha

The 2nd Battalion’s operation on 22 June began with promise, as troops secured sectors of Volnovakha and established a foothold on the village’s northern edge. However, senior battalion commanders issued a premature withdrawal order, abandoning reinforcing units during intense enemy counterattacks. This decision left our troops exposed to concentrated tank and infantry fire, forcing a retreat. Volnovakha remains in separatist hands—a failure squarely attributed by the report to "poor command judgment."

Foreign Threat Confirmed

The assessment confirms separatist forces are now bolstered by foreign personnel—including North Korean regulars, Wagner Group mercenaries, and Spanish combatants—granting them enhanced aggression and tactical coordination. Their losses at Bogdanova and Okyabrsky have disrupted their offensive, but they remain a potent threat.

Accountability and Next Steps

The leaked report demands an "immediate investigation" into the 2nd Battalion’s command decisions and calls for reinforced resources to retake Volnovakha. It praises the "exemplary execution" at Bogdanova and the "critical intelligence" gained from local informants, urging expanded support for these networks.

Senior military officials, speaking anonymously, confirmed follow-on operations are already being planned. "Volnovakha will be liberated," one stressed. "Those responsible for failures will answer, and our defenders will finish the job."

— Svetlana Golikova has covered security operations in North Zagoria for 12 years.

This is based on the Arma 3 wargame. The report and reporter are AI generated and represents no individual, living or dead. The text of the transcript, while AI generated, is based on data provided by the channel author.

Operational After Action Report: Combat Operations in North Zagoria

OPERATIONAL AFTER ACTION REPORT: COMBAT OPERATIONS IN NORTH ZAGORIA

REPORTING UNIT: 43rd Mountain Rifle Corps, Intelligence Staff

AUTHOR: Colonel Sergei Glukharev, Deputy Head of Intelligence Staff

DATE: 23 June 2025

REPORT PERIOD: 19 June - 22 June 2025 (Inclusive)

SUBJECT: Combat Operations Conducted by Chernarus 10th Separate Tank Brigade (3rd, 4th, 2nd Battalions)

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Elements of the 10th Separate Tank Brigade (3rd, 4th, and 2nd Battalions) conducted offensive operations between 19-22 June 2025 to disrupt and defeat separatist attacks aimed at capturing the village line Oktyabrsky-Volnovakha-Bogdanova. Operations resulted in the successful recapture and temporary holding of Oktyabrsky (3rd Bn) and Bogdanova (4th Bn) against determined enemy counterattacks. The operation against Volnovakha (2nd Bn) failed to secure the objective due to premature withdrawal orders from Battalion command, leading to the village remaining under separatist control and necessitating follow-on operations. Enemy forces, significantly reinforced with foreign personnel and equipment, displayed increased aggression and capability.

2. BACKGROUND / SITUATION:

Enemy Intent: Intelligence derived from SIGINT (email, text intercepts) and HUMINT (local friendly agents) confirmed separatist plans to launch coordinated attacks to seize and hold the villages of Oktyabrsky), Volnovakha, and Bogdanova. This offensive initiative was assessed as enabled by recent infusions of fresh troops, supplies (including heavy armor), and new leadership.

Friendly Intent: 10th Tank Brigade tasked subordinate battalions with conducting pre-emptive counter-offensives to recapture these villages before separatist attacks could consolidate, disrupt enemy plans, inflict maximum casualties, and liberate the objectives. Operations were to be executed sequentially as forces became available.

3. NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS:

text

*   **a. Operation: OKTYABRSKY RECAPTURE (3rd Battalion - 19 June)**

    *   **Tactical Situation:** Separatist forces, including embedded North Korean regulars, Wagner Group operators, and Spanish regulars, occupied defensive positions within and around Oktyabrsky.

    *   **Friendly Actions:** 3rd Battalion assault squad launched a swift attack to seize the village. Initial penetration was achieved.

    *   **Enemy Actions:** Enemy forces mounted fierce, coordinated flanking counterattacks utilizing infantry and likely supporting fires. Resistance was significantly heavier than anticipated due to the presence of embedded foreign specialists.

    *   **Result:** The village was successfully recaptured. However, the assault squad sustained **heavy casualties** during the initial assault and subsequent counterattacks. Reinforcements were committed to consolidate the position. Three (3) local friendly agents, held captive by separatists, were successfully recovered during the operation and evacuated for debriefing. HUMINT gathered during/after the operation strongly indicated imminent separatist attacks targeting Bogdanova and Volnovakha. The initial 3rd Bn task force withdrew once reinforcing troops were in position. These reinforcing troops executed a planned withdrawal under cover of darkness approximately 12 hours later, having confirmed the disruption of the enemy's immediate plan against Oktyabrsky.

*   **b. Operation: BOGDANOVA STRIKE (4th Battalion - 20/21 June)**

    *   **Tactical Situation:** Separatist infantry had established a defensive cordon within Bogdanova in preparation for their planned offensive.

    *   **Friendly Actions:** 4th Battalion task force conducted a rapid and violent assault, penetrating the enemy's defensive perimeter.

    *   **Enemy Actions:** Separatist forces defended their positions but were overwhelmed by the speed and violence of the friendly assault. Enemy medium and heavy tracked armor units were committed in counterattack or were caught in position.

    *   **Result:** Bogdanova was successfully secured. Friendly infantry casualties were reported as **minimal**. While the initial Task Force Commander's summary lacked detail on enemy losses, subsequent debriefs of participating NCOs confirmed the destruction of a **prodigious number** of enemy medium and heavy armored vehicles (BMPs, BTRs, Tanks). The 4th Bn task force withdrew in good order once reinforcing troops were established in the village. The reinforcing troops later withdrew per operational plan.

*   **c. Operation: VOLNOVAKHA SECURE (2nd Battalion - 22 June)**

    *   **Tactical Situation:** Separatist forces occupied Volnovakha, consolidating for their offensive operation.

    *   **Friendly Actions:** Initial elements of the 2nd Battalion task force rapidly entered and secured sectors of Volnovakha. Reinforcing friendly infantry and armor units seized and established a hold on the northern edge of the village.

    *   **Enemy Actions:** Enemy forces regrouped and launched strong combined arms counterattacks utilizing infantry and armor.

    *   **Friendly Command Decision:** 2nd Battalion Command Staff issued an order for the *entire task force*, including the reinforcing elements holding the northern edge, to withdraw back to base *prematurely*.

    *   **Result:** The premature withdrawal order left the reinforcing troops on the northern edge exposed and unsupported during their disengagement. These elements became **highly vulnerable** to concentrated enemy tank and infantry attacks during their retreat. Unable to maintain their foothold under pressure, friendly forces were driven back south. **Volnovakha remains under separatist control.**

4. ANALYSIS / ASSESSMENT:

Enemy: Demonstrated significantly enhanced combat power, coordination, and aggression due to foreign reinforcements (NK, Wagner, Spanish) and new leadership. Capable of launching determined, well-supported counterattacks. Their operational plan (seizing the 3 villages) was effectively disrupted at Oktyabrsky and Bogdanova. Losses in armor, particularly at Bogdanova, were severe.

Friendly:

3rd Battalion: Achieved the objective at Oktyabrsky but at high cost, highlighting vulnerability to complex enemy counterattacks and the effectiveness of embedded foreign specialists. Successful recovery of agents provided critical intelligence.

4th Battalion: Exemplary execution at Bogdanova. Achieved rapid penetration, minimized friendly losses, and inflicted devastating damage on enemy armor. A model operation under the circumstances.

2nd Battalion: Initial tactical success in securing parts of Volnovakha was squandered by poor command judgment at the Battalion level. The premature withdrawal order disregarded the tactical situation of committed reinforcing troops, leading directly to their vulnerability, failure to hold ground, and the loss of the objective. Command Staff decision-making requires urgent review.

Intelligence: SIGINT and HUMINT provided accurate warning of enemy intentions and objectives, enabling pre-emptive operations. Agent recovery in Oktyabrsky yielded timely confirmation of secondary targets. Effectiveness of enemy foreign reinforcements was confirmed in combat.

Volnovakha Failure: The primary cause was the ill-timed withdrawal order from 2nd Battalion Command Staff. This decision ceded the initiative, abandoned a tenable foothold, and exposed withdrawing troops unnecessarily. The responsibility for this failure rests clearly at the Battalion command level.

5. CONCLUSIONS:

The 10th Tank Brigade successfully disrupted the separatist offensive plan at Okyabrsky and Bogdanova, inflicting significant losses, particularly in armor at Bogdanova.

The operation at Volnovakha was a failure directly attributable to faulty command decisions by 2nd Battalion Command Staff.

Enemy forces, bolstered by foreign personnel and supplies, remain a potent threat capable of complex counterattacks.

The recovery and intelligence from local agents proved highly valuable.

The failure at Volnovakha necessitates an immediate follow-up operation by 2nd Battalion to seize the objective that should have been secured on 22 June.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS:

2nd Battalion Command Review: Immediate investigation and review of the command decision-making process within 2nd Battalion Command Staff that led to the premature withdrawal order from Volnovakha. Consideration of remedial training or personnel changes as warranted.

Reinforce 2nd Battalion: Ensure 2nd Battalion receives adequate resources (potentially including Corps-level assets) and a robust plan for the imminent operation to recapture Volnovakha. Emphasis on maintaining the objective once seized.

Foreign Adversary Tactics: Disseminate detailed lessons learned regarding tactics employed by embedded North Korean, Wagner, and Spanish elements encountered at Okyabrsky to all Brigade and Corps units. Adapt training accordingly.

HUMINT Network Sustainment: Continue efforts to support and expand the local friendly agent network in North Zagoria. Their contribution was operationally significant.

Continued Vigilance: 10th Tank Brigade and Corps Intelligence must maintain high alert for indications of further enemy reinforcement or shifts in strategy following these setbacks.

7. NEXT STEPS: 10th Separate Tank Brigade will continue offensive operations in North Zagoria during the coming week, with the recapture of Volnovakha by 2nd Battalion being an immediate priority. Corps Intelligence will continue monitoring enemy communications and agent reports for shifts in force disposition or intent.

ATTACHMENTS: None referenced in this summary. (Note: Full Tactical Summaries from Battalion Commanders, Agent Debrief Summaries, SIGINT reports, and detailed CASREP/Loss reports would typically be appended or available separately).

// SIGNED //

COLONEL SERGEI GLUKHAREV

Deputy Head of Intelligence Staff

43rd Mountain Rifle Corps

This is based on the Arma 3 wargame. The report and reporter are AI generated and represents no individual, living or dead. The text of the transcript, while AI generated, is based on data provided by the channel author.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE APPRECIATION, June 10th, 2025

 

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE APPRECIATION

SUBJECT: Separatist Offensive Preparations in Ivanovka Region
UNIT: Chernarus 43rd Mountain Rifle Corps (MRC)
AUTHOR: Colonel Sergei Glukharev, Deputy Head of Intelligence Staff
DATE: 10 JUNE 2025
REFERENCE: Corps Intelligence Summaries, SIGINT/IMINT Reports, HUMINT Sources

1. SITUATION:
Staff analysts assess with HIGH CONFIDENCE that separatist forces are in the final stages of preparing a major offensive operation aimed at capturing key settlements within the Ivanovka Region. This assessment is based on convergent reporting from Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) via drone and combat aircraft overflights, and Human Intelligence (HUMINT) from local agents and constabulary actions.

2. ENEMY FORCES (SEPARATIST & AUXILIARIES):

• a. Composition & Strength:

  • Core Combat Elements: Battalion-sized combined arms groups forming. Elements include:

    • Armor: Multiple companies of medium (T-72 variants) and heavy tanks (T-62/T-55), supported by tracked IFVs/APCs (BMP-2/BMP-3, MT-LB).

    • Mechanized Infantry: Significant numbers of motorized infantry, including dismounted elements.

    • Artillery/Mortars: Identified mortar batteries (82mm) and potential for tube/rocket artillery not yet observed in assembly areas.

    • Air Defense: Multiple batteries of mobile anti-aircraft artillery (ZU-23-2, possibly S-60 on trucks, MANPADS probable).

    • Combat Support: Observed combat engineers, signals units, and significant logistical tail.

  • Foreign Personnel: HUMINT and limited IMINT confirm embedded foreign elements providing cadre and combat power:

    • Russian SOF (Spetsnaz GRU/Wagner veterans - tactical leadership, spec ops).

    • Wagner Group Operators (experienced infantry/assault elements).

    • North Korean Regulars (discipline, likely infantry/AA roles).

    • Serbian Volunteers (infantry/possible artillery).

    • Spanish Volunteers (infantry role).

  • Local Militias: Active recruitment/training of local shooters observed; likely used for screening, sabotage, and holding captured terrain.

• b. Disposition & Movement:

  • Concentration Areas: Northern Ivanovka Region, specifically wooded areas and concealed valleys near road networks leading to objectives.

  • Timing: Exploiting prolonged mild, dry weather for rapid movement. Major equipment and troop movements primarily nocturnal (2200-0400 hrs local).

  • Logistics: Extensive logistics network established. Confirmed:

    • Multiple Forward Munitions Depots (FMDs).

    • Forward Arming and Refueling Points (FARPs).

    • High volume of supply trucks (ammunition, fuel, spares) - numbers exceeding reliable HUMINT count estimates. Indicates preparation for sustained combat.

• c. Capabilities & Limitations:

  • Strengths: Significant armored punch; substantial, well-equipped, and disciplined infantry core augmented by experienced foreign elements; robust short-range AD coverage threatening our air assets; effective camouflage and deception during movement; demonstrated night operations capability; substantial logistical stockpiling.

  • Weaknesses: Potential coordination friction between diverse foreign units and local militias; logistical tail vulnerable to interdiction; concentration areas becoming known; limited long-range AD or counter-battery radar observed so far; armor vulnerable in approach routes if identified early.

3. ENEMY INTENTIONS & OBJECTIVES:

• Primary Objective: Seize control of the Ivanovka Region through a coordinated multi-axis offensive.

• Specific Named Objectives: Villages identified as primary targets:

  • Serebryanna

  • Vychesgrad

  • Belgorvka

  • Troitskoye

  • Malenovka

  • Rebovo
    (Additional villages likely on subsidiary axes)

• Method: Likely combined arms assault utilizing armor spearheads to breach defenses, followed by mechanized infantry to clear and hold, supported by mortars and direct fire. Expect supporting attacks/feints on flanks. Offensive likely imminent (within 72-96 hours).

4. ENEMY COVERT & SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES (CONFIRMING INTENT):
HUMINT reports a significant uptick in destabilizing actions within government-held towns proximal to Ivanovka:

• Assassinations of local officials and pro-government leaders.

• Kidnappings for ransom/extortion/intimidation.

• "Strong-arm" robberies targeting residents (funding/logistics).

• Covert recruitment and training of local militia ("new shooters").

• Agent Detention: Local constabularies have detained numerous separatist agents masquerading as civilians. Captured material includes:

  • Large quantities of cash (funding operations).

  • Personal weapons (pistols, SMGs, grenades).

  • Critical Intelligence: Documents and maps corroborating drone/aircraft sightings of troop concentrations, logistics points, and specific offensive timetables/targets (aligning with villages listed above). This provides irrefutable confirmation of offensive planning.

5. FRIENDLY SITUATION:

• 43rd MRC holds defensive positions in and around the Ivanovka Region.

• Constabulary forces are active but overstretched dealing with internal subversion.

• Air assets (drones, limited combat aircraft) are providing vital reconnaissance but face increased threat from enemy ADA buildup.

• Local population in target villages is vulnerable; loyalty may be coerced if separatists gain foothold.

6. ASSESSMENT:

• a. Enemy Capability: The separatists have assembled a VERY HIGH level of combat power in the Ivanovka Region, combining potent armored forces, substantial and capable infantry (including experienced foreign elements), effective tactical air defense, and extensive logistics. Their night movement discipline indicates professional planning.

• b. Enemy Intent: The convergence of IMINT (equipment/logistics concentrations), SIGINT (intercepted comms), HUMINT (agent reports on morale/targets), and crucially, captured enemy documents leaves NO REASONABLE DOUBT that a major offensive targeting the specified villages (Serebryanna, Vychesgrad, Belgorvka, Troitskoye, Malenovka, Rebovo) is in its final preparatory stages and is imminent.

• c. Imminence: Based on logistical emplacement completion, concentration of forces, and indicators from captured documents, the offensive is assessed as likely to commence within the next 72-96 HOURS, potentially sooner. Expect preparatory recon/sabotage to increase sharply.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Immediate Alert: Place all 43rd MRC units in the Ivanovka AO at HIGHEST COMBAT READINESS (READINESS STATE 1).

2. Enhanced Reconnaissance:

   • Maximize drone surveillance (day/night) on identified concentration areas, approach routes, and logistics nodes.

   • Conduct targeted artillery reconnaissance (adjustment fires) on suspected assembly areas if feasible without compromising positions.

   • Task SOF/Recon elements for close-target reconnaissance on critical choke points and armor positions.

3. Preemptive Fires: Initiate planned counter-preparation artillery and MLRS strikes on confirmed and suspected enemy assembly areas, FARPs, FMDs, and ADA positions AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY, leveraging precise targeting data.

4. Air Operations:

   • Plan and execute preemptive airstrikes on high-value armor concentrations and logistics hubs, prioritizing night strikes.

   • STRESS: Air operations must assume heavy, low-altitude ADA threat. SEAD/DEAD support is critical but likely limited; extreme caution required.

5. Force Protection: Harden forward positions against anticipated armor/infantry assaults. Emplace additional ATGM teams, mines (if available), and prepare fallback positions. Enforce strict light/noise discipline.

6. Counter-Subversion: Direct constabularies to intensify counter-intelligence operations and security sweeps in rear areas. Protect key leaders and infrastructure. Exploit captured agents for further intelligence.

7. Logistics: Ensure forward units have maximum basic loads (ammo, AT, water, med). Pre-position additional stocks where possible.

8. Civil Affairs: Prepare contingency plans for civilian evacuation from targeted villages if feasible, without compromising defense. Issue warnings to populace via secure channels.

CONCLUSION:
The separatist force in Northern Ivanovka represents the most significant and well-prepared offensive threat faced by the 43rd MRC in recent months. Their capabilities are substantial, their intentions are clear and confirmed by multiple intelligence disciplines, including captured enemy plans, and their attack is imminent. Failure to act decisively and preemptively risks the loss of critical territory, significant friendly casualties, and a major strategic setback. Immediate and aggressive counter-preparation is essential to disrupt the enemy's timetable, degrade their combat power, and defend the Ivanovka Region.

// SIGNED //
Colonel Sergei Glukharev
Deputy Head of Intelligence Staff
Chernarus 43rd Mountain Rifle Corps
10 JUNE 2025

DISTRIBUTION:
Corps Commander, Chief of Staff, Operations Staff (G3), Logistics Staff (G4), Artillery Commander, Air Liaison Officer, All Brigade/Regimental Commanders (Ivanovka AO), National Intelligence Directorate (Copy).

This is based on the Arma 3 wargame. The report and reporter are AI generated and represents no individual, living or dead. The text of the transcript, while AI generated, is based on data provided by the channel author.