A Tactical Victory at Polana: Analysis of a Successful Defense

 ZELENOGORSK PRAVDA

Defense & Analysis Supplement
December 25, 2025

A Tactical Victory at Polana: Analysis of a Successful Defense
By Svetlana Golikova, Senior Staff Writer for Defense Issues

A recently concluded operation near the village of Polana offers a clear, tactical-level case study in effective defense, highlighting improved intelligence work and adaptive command, while also outlining the persistent challenges faced by Chernarus forces in the northern sector.

Intelligence as a Force Multiplier

The operation, conducted on December 24 by the 1st Battalion, 4th Separate Light Mountain Rifle Brigade, was predicated on what after-action reports describe as "highly accurate" pre-operational intelligence. Signals intelligence (SIGINT), including intercepted communications and emails, combined with human intelligence (HUMINT), provided a detailed forecast of the separatist offensive.

Critically, this intelligence did more than warn of an attack; it revealed the enemy's operational context. Intercepts indicated command frustration within separatist ranks stemming from "degraded logistics, poor recruit quality, and equipment shortages." The enemy’s aim for the Polana offensive was to "restore operational momentum." This understanding of adversary intent and pressure points allowed Chernarus commanders to anticipate the move with confidence.

Adaptive Execution Under Fire

The tactical execution demonstrated notable flexibility. Upon securing Polana at approximately 0735, the battalion command issued revised verbal orders at 0741, redirecting the main defensive force one kilometer northwest based on last-minute intelligence refinement. This real-time adjustment positioned the task force directly on the enemy's main axis of advance.

The ensuing engagement was a combined-arms action. Light scout elements conducted a controlled retreat, drawing in enemy armored vehicles. The core infantry elements, occupying the blocking position, engaged dismounted enemy infantry—identified in reports as including Wagner Group operators, Serbian, and Spanish regulars—at close range. The integration of precision artillery strikes on enemy concentrations and vehicles was cited as particularly effective.

Facing mounting pressure, the task force commander executed a phased withdrawal under smoke, utilizing scout elements for blocking maneuvers and calling in final artillery missions to disrupt pursuit. The action concluded with the enemy advance halted 500 meters from Polana and an orderly retreat of Chernarus forces to the village.

Assessed Outcomes and Implications

The confirmed material losses inflicted on the separatists are significant: three BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles, three heavy MRAPs, and six light armored technicals, alongside "significant infantry casualties." Chernarus forces sustained "moderate infantry casualties" but lost no vehicles and saw no squads rendered combat-ineffective.

The analysis within the report draws two primary conclusions. First, it validates a growing proficiency in intelligence synthesis and tactical agility among brigade and battalion-level commands. Second, it underscores a sobering reality: despite their logistical woes and qualitative issues, separatist forces retain the capacity to assemble and launch credible, combined-arms assaults involving foreign infantry specialists.

The Forward Outlook

The report's recommendations and forecast are pragmatic, anticipating no strategic shift from this tactical success. It calls for maintained alert levels, expanded reconnaissance, and sustained logistics to the Polana sector. The assessment states that while the offensive was a "serious setback" for the enemy, their "strategic imperative to regain initiative remains."

The victory at Polana, therefore, is not portrayed as a war-winning event, but as a successful defensive battle within a longer, grinding conflict. It highlights improved defensive capabilities but simultaneously confirms that the initiative in the northern sector remains contested, with further attacks expected as winter conditions stabilize. The enemy's increased reliance on foreign personnel marks a notable evolution in their force composition, one that will require continued analytical focus.

AFTER ACTION REPORT (AAR) Reference: OP2512-19-6

 TOP SECRET

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - INTELLIGENCE DISTRIBUTION

AFTER ACTION REPORT (AAR)
Reference: OP2512-19-6
Date of Operation: 24 December 2025
Reporting Officer: Colonel Alexey Agopyan, Deputy Head of Intelligence Staff, 1st Army Corps
Date of Report: [CURRENT DATE]

TO:
Colonel Aleksandr Bogomolov, Deputy Chief of Staff, 1st Army Corps
Major General Yuri Stytskovsky, Commander, Chernarus 1st Army Corps
Rear Admiral Igor Kasatonov, Commander Intelligence, ChCOG
Major General Vassily Chernyakov, Senior Staff Intelligence Analyst, ChCOG

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Operation OP2512-19-6, conducted by elements of 1st Battalion, 4th Separate Light Mountain Rifle Brigade, successfully defended the village of Polana against a significant separatist offensive. The operation, based on accurate intelligence, resulted in a decisive tactical victory, repelling enemy forces with substantial losses to their armored and infantry elements while preserving friendly forces and securing the objective.

2. INTELLIGENCE APPRECIATION (PRE-OPERATION)
Brigade and Battalion intelligence staffs, utilizing signals intelligence (SIGINT) from tapped cell phones and hacked emails, coupled with HUMINT from local agents, accurately forecasted a major separatist push south toward Polana. Intercepts revealed enemy command frustration due to degraded logistics, poor recruit quality, and equipment shortages following successful summer campaigns by Chernarus forces. The enemy identified an offensive on Polana as a means to restore operational momentum, intending to employ a combined-arms assault led by light armored vehicles (technical, BMP-1, MRAP) followed by infantry.

3. CHRONOLOGY OF OPERATIONS

• 0700: Operation commenced with overland march by rifle squads.

• ~0735: Forward elements (Scout 1, Scout 2 BRDMs) secured Polana, finding it clear of enemy forces. Task force began preparing defensive positions.

• ~0741: Battalion Command issued new orders via verbal transmission, redirecting the task force approximately 1 km northwest of Polana based on intelligence indicating the main enemy axis of advance.

• Initial Contact: Scout 1 engaged an enemy BRDM on the northwest road and conducted a controlled retreat to a prepared ambush position, supported by Scout 2.

• Force Deployment: Task Force Commander retained 2nd and 3rd Squads in Polana with two reinforcing rifle squads. The Command Squad, 4th Rifle Squad, and two additional reinforcing squads (Reinforcing Squads 2 & 3) maneuvered to the new blocking position northwest of the village.

• Enemy Assault: Enemy launched main assault with BMP-1s and MRAPs, followed by dismounted infantry including Wagner Group operators, Serbian, and Spanish regulars. Enemy infantry maneuvered southwest in an attempt to cut the north-south road and isolate Polana.

• Engagement: Command Squad, supported by Reinforcing Squads 2 & 3, engaged enemy infantry at close range. A sustained 10-minute firefight ensued, supported by effective artillery strikes on enemy concentrations and vehicles.

• Controlled Withdrawal: Under increasing pressure, Task Force Commander employed smoke and ordered a phased withdrawal toward Polana. Scout elements conducted blocking maneuvers per SOP. Three final artillery strikes were called on enemy heavy MRAPs and technicals.

• Conclusion: Enemy advance was halted approximately 500 meters from Polana. Command Squad conducted an orderly retreat south along the main road. The village remained under friendly control.

4. ASSESSMENT OF RESULTS

• Enemy Losses (Confirmed):

  • Armored Vehicles: 3 x BMP-1

  • Protected Mobility: 3 x Heavy MRAP

  • Light Armor/Technicals: 6 units

  • Personnel: Significant infantry casualties, including specialized foreign operators.

  • Method of Destruction: Combined arms; direct anti-tank fire and precision artillery.

• Friendly Losses:

  • Vehicles: None.

  • Personnel: Moderate infantry casualties. No squads rendered combat-ineffective.

• Objective Status: SECURED. The village of Polana was successfully defended and remains under Chernarus control.

5. ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

• Intelligence Validation: Pre-operational intelligence was highly accurate regarding enemy intent, timing, and composition, enabling effective force positioning and tactical adaptation.

• Tactical Execution: The Task Force demonstrated flexibility in repositioning under changing orders and effective combined-arms coordination, particularly in the integration of direct fire, artillery support, and maneuver during the withdrawal.

• Enemy Capabilities: Despite command frustrations and logistical shortcomings noted in intercepts, the enemy demonstrated the ability to concentrate a credible, combined-arms force, including foreign infantry, posing a significant tactical threat.

• Enemy Intent: The failed offensive is assessed as a serious setback for separatist forces in the sector. However, their strategic imperative to regain initiative remains.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Maintain heightened alert and intelligence collection efforts in the northern sector. Separatist commands are likely to plan further offensive actions to regain momentum, especially as winter conditions stabilize.

2. Commend the leadership of the Task Force Commander and the performance of the 1st Battalion, 4th Separate Light Mountain Rifle Brigade. Their actions exemplify effective adaptive tactics under pressure.

3. Continue and expand artillery and aerial reconnaissance patrols to detect future enemy concentrations before they can launch coordinated attacks.

4. Logistics and reinforcement pipelines to the Polana sector should be maintained at current levels to deter and defeat subsequent attacks.

7. OPERATIONAL FORECAST
Brigade and Battalion staffs assess that separatist forces, though bloodied, retain offensive capacity. The victory at Polana is viewed as a critical defensive success, but further attacks are expected to continue as winter progresses. The enemy's reliance on foreign infantry specialists indicates a possible shift in their force generation strategy, warranting continued close intelligence scrutiny.

Report Ends.

Colonel Alexey Agopyan
Deputy Head of Intelligence Staff
1st Army Corps, Chernarus Armed Forces

CLASSIFIED REPORT DETAILS CATASTROPHIC MILITARY FAILURE NEAR TROITSKOYE

by  Svetlana Golikova 

Senior staff writer for Chernogorsk Pravda

CHERNOGORSK – A recently obtained and heavily redacted after-action report from the 19th Separate Mechanized Cavalry Regiment reveals a devastating military operation on 15 OCT that resulted in the near-total destruction of a government task force, the failure of its primary objectives, and the deaths of dozens of soldiers.

The document, authored by Captain Esedulla Abachev, the Deputy Head of Intelligence for the regiment, and provided to this publication by a confidential source within the Ministry of Defence, paints a stark picture of the engagement, attributing the failure to "effective enemy action" and a "critical intelligence failure."

The operation, involving a Task Force from the regiment's 3rd Battalion, was launched with the objective of attacking and clearing enemy-occupied positions, starting at the Landfill sector and proceeding to the village of Troitskoye to re-establish government control.

According to the report, the day-long battle was a series of brutal engagements that systematically dismantled the Task Force.

Disaster on the Heights

The initial assault on the Landfill in the morning hours began with success, as friendly armor destroyed enemy tanks and armored personnel carriers. However, the operation quickly turned. A key maneuver element, "2nd Squad," was positioned on high ground to block enemy reinforcements. There, they were assaulted by an estimated three squads of enemy special forces. The report states the grim outcome in blunt military terminology: "the annihilation of 2nd Squad." All twelve soldiers were killed in action.

This devastating loss forced the Task Force Commander to commit his reserves prematurely and order a "tactical withdrawal" from the Landfill to proceed to the main objective: the village of Troitskoye.

"Catastrophic Loss" in Troitskoye

The situation deteriorated further in the afternoon during the assault on Troitskoye. The report identifies a "critical intelligence failure" as the core reason for the subsequent disaster. The Task Force Commander's plan relied on intelligence that placed an enemy T-72 tank on the western edge of the village.

Acting on this flawed information, "3rd Squad," mounted on two older T-55 tanks, was ordered to advance on the western approach. The intelligence was tragically wrong. The enemy tank was, in fact, positioned on the eastern edge of the village, giving it a clear line of fire.

The result was a slaughter. The enemy T-72 engaged and "destroyed both friendly T-55s and eliminated 3rd Squad within two (2) minutes." Another twelve soldiers were lost in a matter of moments.

With his force crippled, the Task Force Commander personally led the remnants of his Assault Squad in a desperate clearing operation of the village. Just as the sweep was completed, a lone enemy armored vehicle emerged, destroying two regimental gunships providing close air support and inflicting over 50% casualties on the Assault Squad.

With the unit's combat effectiveness "critically degraded," the order for a full withdrawal was given.

A Regiment Broken

The final tally is harrowing. The operation cost the lives of at least 24 soldiers from 2nd and 3rd Squads, with the Assault Squad suffering over 50% casualties. The material losses included two T-55 tanks and two gunships. Captain Abachev's conclusion is unequivocal: "The unit is no longer combat effective and requires reconstitution."

The report's analysis leaves little room for interpretation. The failure is attributed to the "devastating counter-attack by enemy special forces" and the "critical intelligence failure regarding enemy armor disposition." Among its key recommendations is a pointed question about the army's own equipment, urging a review of "the viability of committing T-55 platforms against modernized MBTs."

Attempts to secure an official comment from the Ministry of Defence or the press office of the Chernogorsk Combined Operational Command (ChCOG) were met with no response. The silence from official channels stands in stark contrast to the detailed account of valor and failure contained within the leaked pages. This report raises serious questions about the quality of military intelligence, the equipment provided to our frontline soldiers, and the true human cost of the ongoing conflict in the region.

This is based on the Arma 3 wargame. The report and reporter are AI generated and represents no individual, living or dead. The text of the transcript, while AI generated, is based on data provided by the channel author.

After Action Report, Task Force 3rd Battalion Combat Operations, 15 OCT

 FROM: Deputy Head of Intelligence Staff, 19th Separate Mech Cav Regt

TO: Regimental Commander, 19th Separate Mech Cav Regt
COPY TO: Deputy Commander ChCOG; Commander Intelligence ChCOG; ChCOG Senior Staff Intelligence Analyst
REF: AAR-19MECH-28OCT
SUBJECT: AFTER ACTION REPORT - Task Force 3rd Battalion Combat Operations, 15 OCT

1. SITUATION
a. Enemy Forces: Separatist elements of significant strength, including local levy infantry, special forces teams (estimated 3 squads), and mixed armor (T-72 MBT, BTR-80A APC). Demonstrated capability for coordinated counter-attacks and armor ambushes.
b. Friendly Forces: Task Force from 3rd Battalion, 19th Separate Mechanized Cavalry Regiment. Composition: Command/Assault Squad, 2nd Squad (12x effectives), 3rd Squad (12x effectives), Armor Element (2x T-72, 2x T-55).

2. MISSION
Attack and clear enemy-occupied locales, commencing at the Landfill and proceeding to the village of Troitskoye, to re-establish government control.

3. EXECUTION
a. Phase 1: Assault on Landfill (Morning, 15 OCT)

• (1) Command/Assault Squad, supported by 2x T-72, initiated primary assault, penetrating enemy infantry cordon.

• (2) Armor Element (T-72s) engaged and destroyed 1x enemy T-72 and 1x enemy BTR-80A.

• (3) 2nd Squad, mounted on 2x T-55, maneuvered to occupy and secure high ground Northeast of the objective to block enemy reinforcement.

• (4) Upon clearing the initial objective, Command/Assault Squad established a blocking position between the main road and 2nd Squad's position, engaging and destroying medium enemy armor moving along the road.

• (5) Enemy special forces (3x squads) conducted a concentrated assault on the heights, resulting in the annihilation of 2nd Squad.

• (6) Task Force Commander committed operational reserves to stabilize the flank and prevent enemy exploitation.

• (7) Task Force conducted a tactical withdrawal from the Landfill to proceed to secondary objective.

b. Phase 2: Assault on Troitskoye (Afternoon, 15 OCT)

• (1) Task Force Commander's plan relied on prior intelligence indicating an enemy T-72 was positioned on the western edge of the village.

• (2) 3rd Squad, mounted on 2x T-55, was ordered to advance and dismount on the western approach.

• (3) Command/Assault Squad began its penetration of the village's defensive perimeter.

• (4) Enemy T-72, positioned on the eastern extent of the village, engaged and destroyed both friendly T-55s and eliminated 3rd Squad within two (2) minutes.

• (5) Friendly Armor Element (Tank 2) subsequently engaged and destroyed the enemy T-72.

• (6) With no reinforcements available, the Task Force Commander personally led the remaining Assault Squad in a west-to-east clearing operation of the village.

• (7) Upon completion of the sweep, a lone enemy BTR-80A engaged, inflicting 50% casualties on the Assault Squad and destroying both regimental gunships providing CAS.

• (8) With combat effectiveness critically degraded, the Task Force Commander ordered a full withdrawal to base.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT
Logistics and recovery operations performed adequately. No issues reported.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
Command and control was maintained throughout the operation. Loss of key assets (gunships) severely degraded situational awareness and fire support capability during final phase.

6. CASUALTIES & EQUIPMENT LOSSES

• PERSONNEL: 2nd Squad (12x KIA), 3rd Squad (12x KIA), Assault Squad (>50% casualties).

• EQUIPMENT: 2x T-55 Destroyed, 2x Gunships Destroyed.

7. ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS
a. Analysis:

• The operation failed to secure two of its three primary objectives.

• Failure was attributable to two primary factors:

  • (1) Effective and devastating counter-attack by enemy special forces at the Landfill, which eliminated a key maneuver element and forced the premature commitment of reserves.

  • (2) Critical intelligence failure regarding enemy armor disposition at Troitskoye. The misidentification of the enemy T-72's position led to the catastrophic loss of 3rd Squad and its armor support, crippling the Task Force's combat power for the main objective.

b. Recommendations:

• (1) Review and enhance battlefield reconnaissance and intelligence verification procedures to prevent repeat of armor disposition errors.

• (2) Develop and drill contingency plans for rapid response to enemy special forces infiltration and counter-attack on flanking positions.

• (3) Assess the viability of committing T-55 platforms against modernized MBTs without significant stand-off or top-attack capability.

8. CONCLUSION
Task Force 3rd Battalion displayed courage and maintained offensive momentum despite initial setbacks. However, due to effective enemy action and a critical intelligence oversight, the operation culminated at Troitskoye without achieving its primary goals. The unit is no longer combat effective and requires reconstitution.

CAPTAIN ESEDULLA ABACHEV
DEPUTY HEAD OF INTELLIGENCE STAFF
19TH SEPARATE MECHANIZED CAVALRY REGIMENT

This is based on the Arma 3 wargame. The report and reporter are AI generated and represents no individual, living or dead. The text of the transcript, while AI generated, is based on data provided by the channel author.

43rd Mountain Rifle Corps Intelligence Staff North Zagoria Region Operational Summary

TOP SECRET//NOFORN
43rd Mountain Rifle Corps Intelligence Staff
North Zagoria Region Operational Summary
12 October 2025

TO:

• Major General Sergey Gladkov, Corps Commander

• Colonel Nikolai Pisarev, Deputy Corps Commander

FROM:
Colonel Sergei Glukharev
Deputy Head of Intelligence Staff, 43rd Mountain Rifle Corps

REF: OP2510-10-1 After Action Analysis & Enemy Capability Assessment

---

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Separatist forces in North Zagoria have transitioned from guerrilla tactics to conventional warfare preparations, evidenced by recent armored reinforcements and established supply chains. Operation IVANOVKA successfully disrupted enemy forward positioning but revealed concerning strategic developments, including planned winter offensives with foreign reinforcement and mass irregular recruitment.

---

2. OPERATION IVANOVKA (OP2510-10-1) TACTICAL ASSESSMENT

2.1 Enemy Dispositions & Capabilities

• Forces Identified: T-62 (1), T-55 (1) main battle tanks, plus logistical support elements

• Tactical Posture: Defensive preparations indicated intent to establish forward supply base

• Terrain Utilization: Village of Ivanovka employed as defensive strongpoint with limited western approach cover

2.2 Friendly Force Execution

• Task Force Commander: Senior Lieutenant Belobadorov

• Scheme of Maneuver:

  • Primary assault along western creek axis using urban cover

  • Eastern tank position established for overwatch and counter-armor operations

• Modification to Plan: Squad roles reversed during advance with successful document capture

2.3 Combat Effectiveness

• Armor Engagements: Friendly forces neutralized enemy T-72, T-62, T-55, and T-34 counterattacks with minimal losses

• Intelligence Capture: One civilian criminal command operative eliminated, securing critical planning documents

---

3. CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE FINDINGS

3.1 Enemy Winter Campaign Planning

Captured documents outline sophisticated offensive operations scheduled winter 2025-2026:

• Armor Reinforcements: Significant increases in medium/heavy tracked armor promised

• Foreign Combat Elements: Iranian regulars identified as imminent reinforcement

• Escalated Violence: Planned intensification of pogroms beyond summer 2025 levels

3.2 Force Generation & Recruitment

• Irregular Mobilization: Plans to recruit ~150 local irregulars for light infantry attacks

• Resource Stockpiling: Northern supply depots accumulating fuel, ammunition, cash, and non-combatant personnel (including women)

3.3 Enemy Logistics & Communications

• Communications Security: Marked improvement in electronic security measures

• Supply Chain Development: Established resupply networks evident in forward positions

---

4. SOURCE EVALUATION

4.1 Human Intelligence (HUMINT)

• Local Agents: Remain primary intelligence source; reliability assessed HIGH

• Enemy Territory Agents: Most valuable intelligence gained through extraordinary measures (kidnappings/interrogations); reliability assessed HIGH

• Prisoner Interrogations: Corroborated document findings; reliability assessed MEDIUM-HIGH

4.2 Technical Intelligence (TECHINT)

• Drone Surveillance: Effective for force disposition mapping; limited against improved enemy COMSEC

• Document Exploitation: Critical for strategic forecasting; reliability assessed HIGH

---

5. ENEMY CAPABILITY PROJECTION

5.1 Immediate (0-30 Days)

• Continued probing attacks with armored elements

• Expansion of supply depots in northern sectors

• Recruitment campaigns for irregular forces

5.2 Medium-Term (1-3 Months)

• Winter offensive initiation with foreign reinforcement

• Massed irregular attacks to overwhelm defensive positions

• Increased armored company-level operations

5.3 Strategic Implications

Enemy transitioning to conventional force capability requiring corps-level combined arms response. Iranian regular integration suggests external state sponsorship escalation.

---

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Preemptive Operations: Authorize immediate disruption campaigns against northern supply depots

2. Force Enhancement: Prioritize anti-armor capabilities and electronic warfare assets to battalion level

3. Counter-Intelligence: Increase monitoring of local population for irregular recruitment activities

4. Strategic Preparation: Prepare winter warfare contingency plans accounting for 150+ irregular combatants

5. External Action: Request Foreign Intelligence Directorate (SVR) analysis of Iranian regular deployment channels

---

APPENDICES

• A: Document Translation Excerpts

• B: Prisoner Interrogation Summaries

• C: Ivanovka Terrain Analysis

DISTRIBUTION: Corps Command Staff, Operations Directorate, 1st/2nd Rifle Division Commanders

---

Colonel S. Glukharev
Deputy Head of Intelligence Staff
43rd Mountain Rifle Corps
Zelenogorsk, Chernarus

This is based on the Arma 3 wargame. The report and reporter are AI generated and represents no individual, living or dead. The text of the transcript, while AI generated, is based on data provided by the channel author.

A Costly Stalemate in the North: Analysis of Recent Tank Brigade Operations

 Zelenogorsk Pravda

September 24, 2025

Page A3: Defense & Analysis

By Svetlana Golikova, Defense Analyst

ZELENOGORSK – A recently disclosed summary of military operations in the North Zagoria region paints a picture of a grinding, high-intensity conflict where tactical successes are being achieved at a significant and sustained cost. The after-action report, covering the activities of the 10th Separate Tank Brigade from September 4 to 14, details a series of fierce engagements that halted separatist advances but revealed concerning patterns in the conduct of the war.

The document, a sanitized version of which has been obtained by this publication, acknowledges the "high resilience" of frontline units. However, a careful reading points to a conflict that is rapidly consuming both material and junior leadership at an alarming rate.

Throughout the reported period, Brigade task forces were consistently engaged by a well-equipped adversary, identified as a mix of Russian militias, international mercenaries, and what the report terms "international regulars" from Spain, North Korea, and Serbia. This composition underscores the complex, hybrid nature of the threat facing Chernarus.

The chronology of battles—from Panteleimonovka to Mikhailovka—follows a disturbing rhythm. In four of the five detailed operations, the initial commanding officer was killed in action, with command repeatedly devolving to junior sergeants or squad leaders. While the adaptability of these junior ranks is noted as a positive, the frequency of such command disruptions suggests that enemy forces are capable of effectively targeting leadership elements from the outset of an engagement.

Furthermore, the report highlights a persistent vulnerability to pre-planned enemy fire. The operation in Chervonopopovka on September 12th saw two main battle tanks destroyed by accurate mortar fire during the approach march. Similarly, the engagement in Khromovo began with the immediate loss of friendly vehicles. These repeated instances indicate a potential deficiency in counter-battery radar coverage or reconnaissance, leaving advancing columns exposed.

On a tactical level, the Brigade’s missions were successful. Enemy attacks were repelled, and key villages were denied to the separatists. The recovery of intelligence, including hit lists and informant networks, is noted as a significant achievement, potentially disrupting terrorist campaigns against local authorities.

Yet, the strategic picture remains opaque. The report concludes that these brutal, company-level battles likely "disrupted" a larger enemy offensive. While this is a positive tactical outcome, it does not address whether the underlying initiative remains with the separatist forces, who appear to have the resources to sustain such high-end, multinational attacks repeatedly.

The recommendations within the report are telling. They call for enhanced forward deployment of anti-tank and counter-drone assets, and a review of tactical approaches to reduce vulnerability to indirect fire. These are prudent suggestions, but they read as reactive measures to problems that have already extracted a heavy price.

In essence, the account from the North Zagoria front suggests our forces are fighting with tenacity and courage. They are achieving their immediate objectives. However, the consistent narrative of high casualties, decapitated command structures, and destructive opening blows from the enemy raises critical questions about the long-term sustainability of such a defensive posture. A war of attrition, even when tactically favorable, is a costly affair. The resilience of the soldier is undeniable, but one must ask if the current strategy fully accounts for the caliber and backing of the forces they are facing.

This is based on the Arma 3 wargame. The report and reporter are AI generated and represents no individual, living or dead. The text of the transcript, while AI generated, is based on data provided by the channel author.

After Action Report, 15 September 2025

 

CLASSIFIED: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Distribution List: See Addressee Block

FROM: Deputy Corps Commander, Chernarus 43rd Mountain Rifle Corps // Colonel N. Pisarev
Brigade Commander, 10th Separate Tank Brigade // Colonel I. Lifanov

TO: Deputy Head of Intelligence Staff, 43rd MR Corps // Colonel S. Glukharev
Deputy Commander, ChCOG // Vice Admiral B. Kravchuk
Commander Intelligence, ChCOG // Rear Admiral I. Kasatonov
ChCOG Senior Staff Intelligence Analyst // Major General V. Chernyakov

SUBJECT: AFTER ACTION REPORT (AAR) - Combat Operations of the 10th Separate Tank Brigade, North Zagoria Region, 04-14 September 2025

REF: A. Previous AAR, 29 August 2025, Col. N. Pisarev
DTG: 15 September 2025

1. PURPOSE. This report details a series of combat actions undertaken by elements of the Chernarus 10th Separate Tank Brigade in the North Zagoria region between 4-14 September 2025. It aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of enemy strength, disposition, and intentions, addressing deficiencies noted in the reference report.

2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.
Over the reporting period, the Brigade successfully conducted multiple defensive and counter-attack operations against a determined and well-equipped separatist force. Enemy composition included Russian militias, Wagner Group operators, and international regulars (Spanish, North Korean, Serbian). Operations were characterized by intense, high-casualty engagements. Despite significant losses, Brigade task forces successfully denied the enemy their objectives, blunting a suspected larger offensive operation. Key intelligence, including enemy hit lists and informant networks, was recovered.

3. CHRONOLOGY OF OPERATIONS.

a. Operation OP2508-29-7: Panteleimonovka (4 Sep 25)

• Situation: Separatist forces occupied Panteleimonovka in a probing action, later reinforcing it upon discovering minimal friendly presence.

• Action: A friendly task force cleared the village, destroyed enemy supplies, and repelled weak, disorganized counterattacks. Command transferred to Sergeant Martinik after Lieutenant Mishchenko (KIA).

• Result: Village secured. One enemy command operative eliminated; a hit list recovered and transferred to local authorities. Interrogations confirmed the operation was an opportunistic probe.

b. Operation OP2509-06-2: Ivanovka (5 Sep 25)

• Situation: Intelligence indicated an imminent enemy mobile assault to seize Ivanovka.

• Action: A task force intercepted the enemy, engaging heavy armor. Initial contact resulted in the loss of the Task Force Commander and most of Command Squad. Command devolved to 2nd Squad Commander.

• Result: Enemy attack repelled with significant losses. Friendly forces held the objective until relieved.

  • Enemy Losses: 4x T-55, 3x BMP, 1x BTR, 3x BRDM, 3x Technicals, 1x MRAP.

  • Friendly Losses: 1x T-72.

c. Operation OP2509-06-3: Khromovo (7 Sep 25)

• Situation: Enemy movement on Khromovo was assessed as a subsidiary action to a larger planned offensive.

• Action: Task force advanced under heavy fire, suffering initial vehicle losses. Reinforcements stabilized the line against counterattacks by multinational forces (Wagner, Spanish, North Korean, Serbian).

• Result: Line held. A downed Su-25 pilot was successfully located, treated, and evacuated by Command Squad.

  • Enemy Losses: 8x BMP, 2x T-55, 2x BRDM, 4x UAV, 1x Technical.

  • Friendly Losses: 2x BMP, 2x Scout Cars, 1x Su-25 (pilot rescued).

d. Operation OP2509-12-1: Chervonopopovka (12 Sep 25)

• Situation: Enemy forces occupied Chervonopopovka, establishing a mortar position.

• Action: Approach march was disrupted by accurate mortar fire, destroying two tanks. Dismounted infantry cleared the village against Wagner and Spanish defenders. Reinforcements at the northern edge suffered heavy losses but allowed for a successful withdrawal.

• Result: Enemy position neutralized. Two command operatives eliminated; informant and kidnap victim lists recovered for local authorities. Intelligence assessed the enemy intended to use the village as a launch point for eastern operations.

  • Enemy Losses: 1x T-34, 1x Gunship, 3x BRDM, 1x Technical.

  • Friendly Losses: 2x T-72, 2x KIA (including Task Force Commander).

e. Operation OP2509-12-3: Mikhailovka (14 Sep 25)

• Situation: Separatist forces began an assault on Mikhailovka.

• Action: Task force established a defensive line but was subjected to intense attacks by special forces (Wagner, Russian Naval Infantry) supported by drones and armor. Two rifle squads were wiped out before reinforcements stabilized the situation, enabling a withdrawal under the command of 2nd Squad Commander.

• Result: Enemy takeover prevented, albeit at near-catastrophic cost.

  • Enemy Losses: 4x BMP, 1x T-55, 1x BTR-80A, 2x BRDM, 3x Technicals, 1x MRAP.

  • Friendly Losses: 1x T-72, 1x BRDM, significant infantry casualties.

4. ANALYSIS.

• Enemy Conduct: The enemy demonstrated capability for complex, multi-pronged operations using a mix of conventional and irregular tactics, including terror campaigns against civilians. Their reliance on international mercenaries and regulars indicates substantial external support.

• Friendly Performance: Despite heavy casualties and frequent loss of command elements, Brigade units displayed high resilience and adaptability. Junior leadership effectively assumed command, and units consistently achieved their tactical objectives.

• Intelligence Value: Recovered documents and electronic intercepts confirm systematic enemy intelligence operations and intent to conduct large-scale offensives. The operations detailed herein likely disrupted these plans.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS.

• Enhance forward deployment of anti-tank and counter-drone assets to mitigate initial vehicle losses.

• Review tactical approaches to villages to reduce vulnerability to pre-registered indirect fire.

• Prioritize intelligence operations to further illuminate the network of external actors supporting separatist forces.

N. PISAREV
COLONEL, CHERNARUS ARMED FORCES

I. LIFANOV
COLONEL, CHERNARUS ARMED FORCES

This is based on the Arma 3 wargame. The report and reporter are AI generated and represents no individual, living or dead. The text of the transcript, while AI generated, is based on data provided by the channel author.