Unit	Regional Assignment	Last Operation
Chernarus Coastal Operations Group
Chernarus 1st Army Corps	Chernarus
Chernarus 4th Separate Light Mountain Rifle Brigade	Chernarus
1st Battalion	Eastern Chernarus
2nd Battalion	Western Chernarus
3rd Battalion	Reserve
4th Battalion	Reserve
Chernarus 9th Separate Light Rifle Brigade	Chernarus
1st Battalion	Sumava
2nd Battalion	Reserve
3rd Battalion	Reserve
4th Battalion	Reserve
Chernarus 43rd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade	Chernarus
1st Battalion	Reserve
2nd Battalion	Reserve
3rd Battalion	Reserve
4th Tank Battalion	Reserve
5th Tank Battalion	Reserve
Chernarus 1st Tank Brigade	Chernarus
1st Tank Battalion	Reserve
2nd Tank Battalion	Reserve
3rd Tank Battalion	Reserve
4th Motorized Rifle Battalion	Reserve
5th Motorized Rifle Battalion	Reserve
Chernarus 2nd Army Corps	Beketov/Leskovets
Chernarus 7th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade	Leskovets
1st Battalion	Leskovets
2nd Battalion	Reserve
3rd Battalion	Reserve
4th Tank Battalion	Leskovets
5th Motorized Rifle Battalion	Reserve
Chernarus 11th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade	Leskovets
1st Battalion	Reserve
2nd Battalion	Reserve
3rd Battalion	Reserve
4th Tank Battalion	Reserve
5th Tank Battalion	Reserve
Chernarus 17th Separate Light Rifle Brigade	Beketov
1st Battalion	Beketov
2nd Battalion	Beketov
3rd Battalion	Reserve
4th Battalion	Reserve
Chernarus 3rd Tank Brigade	NW Chernarus
1st Battalion	Korsac
2nd Battalion	NW Chernarus
3rd Battalion	NW Chernarus
4th Motorized Rifle Battalion	Reserve
5th Motorized Rifle Battalion	Reserve
Chernarus 43rd Mountain Rifle Corps	North Zagoria
Chernarus 13th Mountain Motorized Rifle Brigade	Werferlingen
1st Battalion	Werferlingen
2nd Battalion	Reserve
3rd Battalion	Werferlingen
4th Tank Battalion	Reserve
5th Tank Battalion	Reserve
Chernarus 33rd Mountain Motorized Rifle Brigade	Cham
1st Battalion	Reserve
2nd Battalion	Cham
3rd Battalion	Reserve
4th Tank Battalion	Reserve
5th Tank Battalion	Reserve
Chernarus 24th Separate Light Mountain Rifle Brigade	Livonia
1st Battalion	Summa
2nd Battalion	Livonia
3rd Battalion	Gabreta
4th Battalion	Reserve
Chernarus 10th Separate Tank Brigade	North Zagoria
1st Tank Battalion	Reserve
2nd Tank Battalion	Reserve
3rd Tank Battalion	North Zagoria
4th Motorized Rifle Battalion	North Zagoria
5th Motorized Rifle Battalion	Reserve
Separate Mechanized Cavalry Regiments
Chernarus 17th Separate Mechanized Cavalry Regiment	Leskovets
1st Mechanized Cavalry Battalion	Leskovets
2nd Mechanized Cavalry Battalion	Sumava
3rd Mechanized Cavalry Battalion	Reserve
Chernarus 19th Separate Mechanized Cavalry Regiment	Chernarus
1st Mechanized Cavalry Battalion	South Chernarus
2nd Mechanized Cavalry Battalion	North Zagoria
3rd Mechanized Cavalry Battalion	Ivanivkova
Chernarus 20th Separate Mechanized Cavalry Regiment	Cham
1st Mechanized Cavalry Battalion	Zagorsk
2nd Mechanized Cavalry Battalion	Cham
3rd Mechanized Cavalry Battalion	NW Chernarus

Soviet Attack Operations in December, 1944

 Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.

Text taken from the V Kontakte page of GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

Meanwhile, almost the entire front line was under fire, with 100 to 160 guns and mortars per kilometer. Such a hurricane of fire brought to mind images of the First World War. It seemed that the Soviet generals were planning a veritable end of the world. The combat diary of the hussar division described the breakthrough of positions near Kapolnashnek, a town located at the very spearhead of the Soviet offensive. “The Soviet infantry rushed into the breach, acting so quickly that we did not have time to explain anything to our hussars in the trenches. They managed to notice the Russians literally a few seconds before they were killed or captured… It was too late to jump out of their houses and ask what had happened, since many houses were collapsing, burying their inhabitants.”

The third stage of the encirclement of Budapest. Soviet troops encircle from the north and west

But in the end, the Soviet infantry managed to advance only 5-6 kilometers on the first day of the offensive. The Jassy breakthrough was stopped by a counterattack by German tanks. During this German sortie, about 30 Soviet tanks were destroyed. However, the onslaught of the Soviet rifle corps was able to break through the German-Hungarian defense. In fact, the Germans and Hungarians did not have enough infantry to hold the positions they had won back. On December 23, 1944, Marshal Tolbukhin gave the order to send mechanized units into battle. This was supposed to finally crush the enemy defense. His plan proved effective. Literally the next day, 82 tanks from the 2nd Mechanized Corps and 228 tanks from the 18th Tank Corps made a powerful attack to break through the defense on a 60-kilometer-wide section of the front, penetrating 30 kilometers into the enemy positions. The situation became critical for the Germans near Székesfehérvár, which was attacked by the 20th and 31st Guards Corps, supported by the 7th Mechanized Corps of the 4th Guards Army. A total of 107 tanks and self-propelled artillery units took part in the assault on the city. On the same day, Soviet troops were able to penetrate the city. Bloody street battles ensued. The German command decided to use special units dressed in Soviet uniforms (they even had several T-34s in their arsenal). These units, formed for their own German offensive, were able to hold back the Soviet advance only for a short time.

However, the breakthrough of the German-Hungarian line of defense proceeded more slowly than planned by the Soviet generals. The lack of reserves, especially infantry units, began to tell. However, Fretter-Pico's army group was unable to take advantage of this circumstance. Only immediately before Székesfehérvár was it possible to slightly hold back the avalanche of Red Army units. On December 21, 1944, Marshal Tolbukhin, based on the information available, came to the conclusion that it would be very advantageous to accelerate the offensive on the right flank of his sector of the front. For this reason, he gave the 2nd Guards Mechanized Corps the order to avoid the battles imposed on it and to advance north as quickly as possible. By the evening of December 22, these troops were to capture the Etyek district, the Herceghalom railway station and the town of Bicske. At the same time, the Soviet infantry was to reach the Pusztazamor - Alcsut line. From these positions, the attack on Lovasberény was to be carried out. In essence, the idea was to make a small detour of 10-15 kilometers and reach Budapest from the west.

On December 22, 1944, Soviet troops came close to the settlement of Bicske, which was an important railway junction linking Budapest with Eastern Hungary. In addition, the Red Army took Vertesacsa, where all desperate counterattacks undertaken by the forces of the 8th Panzer Division were repelled. The next day after that, Pál and Bicske. The road to Buda was virtually free.

The dilemma facing the German and Hungarian leadership

Unlike the military command, neither the German nor the Hungarian political leadership could accept the idea that Budapest could become a frontline city. Almost immediately after coming to power, Ferenc Szálasi voiced his own concept of government: “I am inclined to worry about the defense of Budapest only when offensive operations are underway in its vicinity. But if this happens, the Budapest population must be evacuated, after which it is necessary to retreat to the militarily advantageous Danube Mountains.”

Like many fanatical fascists, Szálasi was a dreamer who, like the officers of the General Staff, could not realistically assess the situation. This is evidenced by at least one of the answers that came from his lips at a press conference held in November 1944. “By defending Budapest, the Germans want to gain time,” Szálasi told the editor of one of the newspapers.

On November 2, Szálasi convened a council in the palace castle. After he had sworn an oath to the Hungarian nation, a very long report was read on the proposed development of Japanese-Hungarian relations (!). Virtually not a word was said about martial law. The dumbfounded people present at this event could see how Szálasi and his retinue left without giving an intelligible answer to the most pressing questions. Meanwhile, even in the castle one could hear the cannonade of guns approaching each day.

The next day, Szálasi took the liberty of calling Colonel General Friessner. The German military man was asked to forward his statement to the highest authorities in Germany. Friessner recalled on this occasion: "In view of the fact that fighting was already underway on the approaches to Budapest, he considered it necessary to emphasize that this was not his fault, but merely a legacy inherited from the previous regime. "Horthy's unfortunate domestic and foreign policy activities had paralyzed the will of the nation and the army. He regretted that Germany had intervened too late in Hungarian affairs. Now his government could only correct individual shortcomings. As long as the struggle for the nation was going on, genuinely restorative measures were impossible."

At the same time, Szálasi did not limit himself to angry reproaches addressed to his predecessor. He assured that he could mobilize 300 thousand people, provided that Germany would arm them. Szálasi was not focused on the defense of Budapest. This was connected not so much with the possible destruction of the city, but rather because of the population (in his jargon "the rabble of the big city"), which could strike the defenders of Budapest in the back, and there would be no forces to suppress this resistance. In addition, to protect the Pest side, military units would be needed, which the Germans so badly needed to resist Tolbukhin. This point of view was understood by the command of Army Group South. 

On November 26, 1944, a request was even sent to the Supreme Command of the German Ground Forces about whether German units should participate in the suppression of civil unrest if any occurred. The answer was not encouraging: the "rabble of the big city" had to be evacuated promptly or kept under constant control. Friessner was not enthusiastic about this idea. He did not have enough troops to carry out this task. 

As a result, he turned to SS General Winkelmann, who had once headed the management group of the Main Directorate of the Order Police. This SS man knew more about restoring order in cities than a career soldier. In addition, Friessner significantly hinted that he "would not be hurt by sapper-assault battalions similar to those operating in Warsaw." In addition, Friessner asked the Supreme Command to withdraw German troops to the western bank of the Danube in the event of a breakthrough of the defensive line by units of the Red Army. He was refused. Friessner tried at all costs to avoid protracted and bloody street battles. As a pretext, he used the anti-German sentiment that reigned among the inhabitants of Budapest. But in this situation he should have emphasized military reasons, since the responsibility for the fall of Budapest would have been placed on him, and not on the abstract "population". But apparently Friessner lacked the courage to admit this to himself.

The Hungarian military command also considered the defense of Budapest possible only in the defensive zone of the "Attila Line". It intended to refrain from street fighting as a matter of principle. In early December 1944, it even gave orders to army units to disarm public service employees (transport workers, firefighters, etc.). All this was to take place under the pretext that Budapest was to remain a free city under any circumstances. In December, Szálasi once again raised the question of whether the defense of Budapest was really necessary. He pointed out that the destruction of the river bridges could have stopped the Red Army. His question, naturally, remained unanswered.

In that situation, the only figure who insisted on the armed defense of Budapest was Adolf Hitler. On November 23, 1944, he issued an order (the first of a series). In this document, the Fuhrer insisted that battles were to be fought for every house. At the same time, civilian casualties could be ignored. 

On December 1, Hitler's order No. 11 was issued, in which he declared Budapest a "fortress". SS General Obergruppenführer Winkelmann was appointed the city commandant. The 9th SS Mountain Corps, commanded by Karl Pfeffer-Wildenbruch, was transferred to his command. This military unit was only tactically subordinate to the command of the 6th Army. In fact, it could act independently, which said a lot. At that time, its main task was to prepare the city for the upcoming assault. Every street, every building was to be turned into a small bastion. In addition, to nip any unrest among the civilian population in the bud, units of the German and Hungarian gendarmerie were assigned to assist this combat group. The police were put on alert. The city commandant's office began forming special units.

On December 4, Szálasi was informed of the German dictator's decision. Although on the same day, Guderian assured the Hungarian "Führer" that the enemy would not be allowed near the city. In this case, they were talking about destroying bridges and introducing a special regime in those areas that were to be surrendered to the Red Army. The remark that the Russians would have done this anyway, if they had been in the Hungarians' place, was very little consolation. German diplomacy refused to proclaim Budapest an "open" city. In Germany, they were already planning that battles would be fought for every stone. 

The German ambassador, Edmond Fesenmayer, who served as Hitler's special representative, expressed himself very clearly. Hitler did not care whether Budapest was destroyed. "If this sacrifice allowed Vienna to be held, Budapest could be destroyed dozens of times." Meanwhile, Friessner repeatedly tried to persuade the Supreme Command to allow him to change the front line. But each time these requests were decisively rejected. At the same time, Winckelmann was to begin his duties. Since Hitler considered that the plans for the defense of the Hungarian capital presented to him were unconvincing, he instructed this SS man to personally take charge of preparations for the defense of Budapest.

The command of Army Group South had no illusions about holding the city. As early as 1 December 1944, Colonel General Friessner had given the order to evacuate all military institutions and civil services under his command from Budapest. “The remaining service authorities must be mobile. All women from the German auxiliary services must be evacuated from the city without delay. I hold the combat commanders responsible for the fact that during possible fighting in the city no one should cast a shadow on the authority of the German Reich and the German Wehrmacht.”

On 12 December, when plans were being made to use the promised reinforcements, there was still the possibility of surrendering the Pest bridgehead. But it was rejected, not least because, according to the war diary, it was doubtful whether the eastern part of Budapest could be held in German hands. This means that the Germans considered the defense of the Hungarian capital a failed undertaking! Colonel General Fretter-Pico had already approached the Supreme Command on December 6 with a request to retreat behind the Attila Line, as he feared a sudden breakthrough by the Soviet troops. Hitler once again forbade this retreat. This time he referred to the fact that in the event of such a retreat the defense would not have sufficient strategic depth. 

With the breakthrough of the Red Army near Hatvan, the situation of the German group worsened significantly, as the defenders of Budapest were forced to take up a 20-kilometer-wide defense line in the northern part of Budapest. But the Germans did not have enough military units to hold this section. On December 9, 1944, Soviet artillery began shelling the northeastern outskirts of Budapest. The first sign of the upcoming life-and-death struggle was the formation of combined companies, into which cooks, secretaries, fitters, and drivers were driven. In a similar manner, 7 companies were formed in the Feldherrnhalle Division, and 4 companies in the 13th Panzer Division.

In early December 1944, the defense of the city began with the realization that Budapest would soon fall to the Red Army. As a result, a wide network of agents began to be created in the Hungarian capital. In total, 19 explosive devices were installed at important transport hubs. At the same time, plans were being developed to blow up important structures. This process was commanded by people who hid under the operational pseudonyms of "Arpad" and "Margareten" (Margarita). They trained recruited civilians in explosives. Both men and women were equally among the agents. They did not know each other and had contact only with special liaisons. Looking ahead, we will say that this enterprise ended in complete failure - not a single explosion thundered. 

Leaked Military Documents Expose Tactical Failures and Fragile Victory in Cham Region: A Chronicle of Bloodshed and Bureaucracy

By Svetlana Golikova, Zelenogorsk Pravda

February 5, 2025

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ZELENOGORSK — Classified documents leaked from the Chernarus Ministry of Defense reveal a harrowing account of tactical blunders, catastrophic losses, and a fragile recovery during recent military operations in the contested Cham region. The reports, marked OP2501-31-2 (Trosendorf) and OP2501-31-3 (Ast), detail two high-stakes battles waged by the Chernarus 33rd Separate Mountain Motorized Rifle Brigade’s 2nd Battalion. A subsequent evaluation by the 43rd Mountain Rifle Corps condemns systemic failures in leadership and planning, raising urgent questions about the military’s readiness to counter separatist forces.

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Operation Trosendorf: A "Catastrophic" Defeat

On the morning of January 31, the 2nd Battalion launched Operation Trosendorf, targeting a separatist anti-aircraft unit in the village of Trosendorf. The mission quickly unraveled.

Tactical Missteps:
The brigade split its forces into two assault groups—one advancing from the southwest with Tank 1 and Command Squad, the other from the southeast with Tank 2, 2nd Squad, and 3rd Squad. This divided approach allowed enemy militias (composed of Serbian regulars, Chechen fighters, and Russian-backed mercenaries) to isolate and overwhelm both flanks. Command Squad, led by the battalion commander, faced relentless counterattacks as they pushed northeast. Despite destroying one enemy technical (improvised fighting vehicle), the squad was decimated after their BTR armored personnel carrier was obliterated.

Leadership Under Fire:
The commander’s decision to halt the advance to repair Tank 1—rather than consolidate gains—proved fatal. As mechanics worked, separatists regrouped, launching coordinated strikes from three directions. Command Squad and 3rd Squad were annihilated, the commander killed, and Tank 1 abandoned. The surviving forces retreated under heavy fire, ceding the village.

Losses:

• 75%+ casualties in Command and 3rd Squads.

• Both BRDM scout cars and Tank 1 destroyed.

• Enemy losses: 4 BTR-80As, 3 anti-aircraft trucks, 2 T-34 tanks.

Ironically, separatists abandoned Trosendorf the next day, fearing Chernarus air strikes—a retreat unrelated to the brigade’s failed assault.

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Operation Ast: A Pyrrhic Victory

Two days later, the battered 2nd Battalion redeployed to Ast, another village housing anti-aircraft emplacements. Under a new acting commander, the operation narrowly succeeded—but at a steep cost.

Adaptive Tactics:
Learning from Trosendorf, the battalion advanced along a single axis from the southwest. Command Squad and Tank 1 spearheaded the assault, while BRDM scouts screened the eastern flank. Despite 2nd and 3rd Squads refusing to advance (a recurring discipline issue), the force cleared Ast of enemy positions. Tank 2 was sacrificed to destroy an aircraft truck, while RPG-18 teams eliminated three anti-aircraft units.

Critical Intel Secured:
Command Squad recovered documents outlining separatist plans to seize Trosendorf, Ast, and other villages—a strategic coup. However, counterattacks by Spanish and Serbian regulars nearly overran the battalion. Reinforcements, including outdated T-34 tanks, barely stabilized the front.

Losses:

• Tank 2 destroyed, Scout 1 BRDM damaged.

• Command Squad lost 5; Rifle Squad 1 wiped out.

• Enemy losses: 4 BTR-80As, 3 aircraft trucks, 2 UAVs.

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43rd Corps Evaluation: "Systemic Shortcomings Demand Rectification"

A scathing after-action review by the 43rd Mountain Rifle Corps (dated February 3) highlights institutional failures:

1. Leadership Deficits:

   • Officers lacked flexibility to adapt to fluid battles.

   • Poor discipline (e.g., squads “bogged down” or refusing orders).

2. Outdated Arsenal:

   • T-34 tanks and undergunned BTRs struggled against modern insurgent technicals and drones.

3. Intelligence Gaps:

   • No warning of foreign militias (Spanish/Serbian troops) in Ast.

4. Logistical Neglect:

   • Armored vehicles lacked anti-UAV systems, leaving squads vulnerable.

The report mandates urgent reforms: retraining officers, upgrading equipment, and preempting separatist moves using captured intel.

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Implications: A Military at a Crossroads

While Ast secured Chernarus’ hold on Cham, the 43rd Corps warns that “ad hoc adaptations” cannot offset poor planning. The leaked files expose a force reliant on Soviet-era hardware and fractured command chains—a stark contrast to separatists leveraging foreign fighters and agile tactics.

Local Impact:
Civilian accounts from Trosendorf describe a village scarred by bombardment, now occupied by Chernarus troops. Meanwhile, the recovered separatist documents suggest looming battles for nearby towns.

Questions Unanswered:

• Why were reinforcements delayed in Trosendorf?

• Will the Defense Ministry act on the 43rd Corps’ recommendations?

The Defense Ministry has not commented on the leaks.

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Conclusion:
These documents paint a grim portrait of courage hamstrung by bureaucracy. For the soldiers of the 33rd Brigade, victory in Ast came at a horrific price—one that could repeat unless Chernarus confronts its military’s deepening crises.

Svetlana Golikova is an investigative reporter for Zelenogorsk Pravda specializing in defense affairs. Additional reporting contributed by open-source intelligence analysts.

This is based on the Arma 3 wargame. The report and reporter are AI generated and represents no individual, living or dead. The text of the transcript, while AI generated, is based on data provided by the channel author.