Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. Text is from a speech by Anatoly Koshkin delivered September 30th at a conference on Russian military history in Moskva
In Western historiography, and often in the writings of Russian "overthrowers of the historical concepts of the totalitarian period," it is common to say that the success of the counteroffensive near Moscow "the Stalinist regime owes Japan." Which, allegedly, honestly fulfilling the obligations under the Soviet-Japanese pact of neutrality, made it possible at a critical moment to transfer the Siberian and Far Eastern divisions to the Soviet-German front, which ensured the victory.
This version is widespread in Japan itself. The Japanese authors of the book Milestones on the Way to the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Japan and Russia, published in Russian, write: "... Having transferred his troops from the Far East and from Siberia to the west, I. Stalin was able to fight the German army with full dedication, and Japan, for its part, was able to send the elite troops of the Kwantung Army to the south."
And the chairman of the pro-government Council on National Security (Ampoken), which published this propaganda book, professor of Russian studies Shigeki Khakamada agreed that the Russians should thank Japan for not entering the war.
However, the facts indicate the opposite - until the middle of 1943, overhanging its million-strong Kwantung Army (army group) over the Soviet Far East and Eastern Siberia, Japan fettered the Red Army troops stationed here, not allowing them to be used in the fight against the German fascist invaders.
As a result, up to a third of the Armed Forces of the USSR were unable to take part in the fight against the Nazi hordes.
This is confirmed by the following data: "As of December 1, 1941, out of 5,495 thousand people of the total composition of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the Far East and at the southern borders, there were 1568 thousand, or more than 28 percent. Of the 4495 tanks in service with the Red Army at that time, there were 2,541 tanks in the Far East and at the southern borders of the USSR, and 2,951 aircraft out of 5,274 aircraft remained there. By this policy of shackling with the threat of an attack of Soviet troops, coordinated with Berlin, Tokyo prolonged the Great Patriotic War, increasing the losses of the Soviet people.
Japan's planned attack on the USSR on August 29, 1941 did not take place not as a result of the alleged observance of the Soviet-Japanese pact of neutrality, as Japanese propaganda claims, but as a consequence of the failure of the German plan for a blitzkrieg and preservation even at the most critical moments on the Soviet-German front a large grouping of Soviet troops in the Far East and Siberia.
At the same time, preparations for the attack continued until 1943. By the document "Program for the implementation of the state policy of the empire," adopted on September 6, 1941 at a meeting of the top leadership of Japan in the presence of the emperor and the Supreme Commander of the Army and Navy Hirohito, it was decided to continue the seizure of the colonial possessions of the Western powers in the south, without stopping before the war.
A few days later it became known in the Kremlin.
"According to a source of Invest (Hotsumi Ozaki - A.K.), the Japanese government decided not to oppose the USSR this year, but the armed forces will be left in the MCG (Manchukuo - A.K.) the case of the defeat of the USSR by that time."
Note that in Russian sources, especially in the articles of publicists who, apparently, are not familiar with the full text of the message to Soviet spy Richard Sorge, the second part of the encryption is often omitted. But she mattered no less than the first. In fact, the Soviet intelligence officer warned that it was only about postponing the attack on the USSR, which, of course, was taken into account when determining the scale of the transfer of troops from the eastern regions of the country to Moscow.
Although Sorge reported the likelihood of an attack in the spring of next year, according to Japanese plans, the war in the south did not rule out an attack on the Soviet Union in 1941. The General Staff of the Japanese ground forces developed a version of the plan for the war against the USSR "Kantokuen" ("Special maneuvers of the Kwantung Army"), which was to be carried out immediately after the expected fall of Moscow and a sharp change in favor of Japan in the balance of forces in the Far East.
Given the complexity of offensive operations on all fronts in the autumn-winter period, the General Staff envisaged an initial strike in the eastern (coastal) direction. After the invasion of Primorye, the troops of the Eastern Front were to advance on Khabarovsk, capturing it before the onset of severe cold weather. At this time, the troops of the Northern and Western Fronts were to gain a foothold in the areas of the Small and Big Khingan, respectively, and await the onset of spring. With the beginning of ice melting, it was planned to force the Amur and develop an offensive to the west from the Rukhlovo - Bolshoi Khingan region in the direction of Lake Baikal.
In development of this plan, the command of the Kwantung Army proposed, with the start of an offensive on the eastern front, by forces of two or three divisions in the fall to force the Amur in the Khabarovsk region in order to facilitate the capture of the city.
Operations to seize Northern Sakhalin, Kamchatka and other regions, as well as the occupation of the Mongolian People's Republic, were to be carried out in accordance with the previous concept of the Cantokuen plan. Despite the preparations for the conduct of hostilities in the south, the Japanese Navy also retained a grouping of forces created specifically for the war against the USSR. They were consolidated into the 5th Fleet, which was based in the area of the northern port of Ominato.
The Japanese troops allocated for the war against the USSR were not included in the battle plans in the south and were preparing for action in the north. Official Japanese sources indicate that both in the context of the outbreak of war against the United States and Great Britain, and in order to continue military operations in China, Japan retained up to 40 percent of divisions in Manchuria, Korea and the mother country for the war against the USSR.
There are other numbers as well. So, according to the information at the disposal of the Tokyo Tribunal, by December 5, 1941, about 50 percent of the infantry divisions, 75-80 percent of the cavalry units, about 65 percent of the tank regiments, half of the artillery and aviation of the ground forces were prepared for the attack on the Soviet Union.
The most anti-Soviet politicians and military officials openly declared that "the Japanese Empire must play its role in ending the German-Soviet war ." The influential Japanese magazine Kaizo published in the November 1941 issue of the article "A New Stage of the Soviet-German War and Japan," which said: "Japan rejoices in the victories of its ally, Germany, and wishes her further success. Japan must undoubtedly use the international situation created by Germany's victories to accomplish its own great cause."
Although by the end of November, at the cost of enormous efforts, Hitler's troops approached Moscow, contrary to the expectations of the Japanese command, even during this critical period the forces of the Red Army in the Far East were not weakened. Instead of the divisions that were leaving for Moscow, new divisions were immediately formed at the expense of local conscription. After a thorough analysis of the situation, the Japanese command was forced to come to the conclusion that it was advisable to postpone the date of the armed uprising against the USSR until the spring of 1942.
On December 3, the imperial headquarters sent order No. 578 to the Kwantung Army, which stated: "To provide the Empire with resources and create a new order in the Great East Asia, it was decided to start a war with the USA, Great Britain and Holland. It is envisaged to quickly conduct an offensive in important areas in the south and at the same time resolve the Chinese incident (this is how the bloody Sino-Japanese war unleashed in 1937 is called in Japan - A.K.); at this time, not to allow war with Russia."
Together with the order, headquarters directive No. 1048 was issued, in which the task of the Kwantung Army was set: "In accordance with the evolving situation, intensify preparations for operations against Russia. Be ready to start hostilities in the spring of 1942."
However, among the Japanese leadership, there was still hope that Hitler's troops would still be able to capture Moscow by the end of 1941. In this case, the Japanese offensive could begin in winter.
Therefore, on December 3, the headquarters also issued order No. 575 to the commander of the expeditionary army in China on the possible partial transfer of troops subordinate to him to the north. The order prescribed, with the beginning of hostilities against the Soviet Union, first of all to capture the Ussuri region, and if successful, to start an offensive on the Northern Front.
For this it was necessary to transfer six divisions from China to the Kwantung Army. To break through the Soviet defense line in the winter of 1941-1942. and crossing the Amur, Ussuri and other water barriers, additional artillery and engineering units were sent to the Kwantung Army. January 10, 1942.
The Kwantung Army understood that the decision to postpone the attack to the spring of 1942 was of a general nature, and continued to actively prepare for the expected "turning point" on the Soviet-German front.
After receiving the order of December 3, the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army at a meeting of formation commanders gave the following instructions: "To end the ongoing preparations for operations against the Soviet Union each army and joining the first line should make every effort to ensure that, watching the constantly occurring changes in state of war USSR and Mongolia, to be able to establish the true situation at any time. This is especially true in the present conditions, when more and more there is a need to establish the signs of a turning point in the situation."
In other words, it was about being in a state of constant readiness to fulfill the order to enter the war after the fall of Moscow. The strategy chosen by the Japanese generals was called the "ripe persimmon theory". Its meaning was to attack the USSR from the east, when, like a ripe fruit, it would be ready to "fall by itself at the feet of Japan."
However, the turning point that came in December 1941 was of a completely different content than the Japanese militarists had imagined. The unfolding counter-offensive of the Red Army ended with the defeat of the Nazi troops rushing to Moscow. This marked the beginning of a radical turn in the war. And this turn took place in favor of the USSR. The results of the Battle of Moscow demonstrated to the whole world that the German strategy of lightning war had failed.
The defeat of Hitler's troops near Moscow was a serious blow to Japanese plans for a treacherous attack on the USSR. The failure of Plan Barbarossa was convincing evidence that the Soviet Union, despite initial military setbacks, retained considerable power to continue the war, and the Red Army was capable of delivering devastating blows to the enemy in both the west and east.
This frightened the Japanese ruling circles, forcing them to assess with greater caution the prospects for the development of the world war, especially the situation on the Soviet-German front.
