Japan kept Soviet forces pinned down in the east during WWII

 

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. Text is from a speech by Anatoly Koshkin delivered September 30th at a conference on Russian military history in Moskva

 October 1, 2021 , 18:10 - REGNUM 

In Western historiography, and often in the writings of Russian "overthrowers of the historical concepts of the totalitarian period," it is common to say that the success of the counteroffensive near Moscow "the Stalinist regime owes Japan." Which, allegedly, honestly fulfilling the obligations under the Soviet-Japanese pact of neutrality, made it possible at a critical moment to transfer the Siberian and Far Eastern divisions to the Soviet-German front, which ensured the victory. 

This version is widespread in Japan itself. The Japanese authors of the book Milestones on the Way to the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Japan and Russia, published in Russian, write: "... Having transferred his troops from the Far East and from Siberia to the west, I. Stalin was able to fight the German army with full dedication, and Japan, for its part, was able to send the elite troops of the Kwantung Army to the south." 

And the chairman of the pro-government Council on National Security (Ampoken), which published this propaganda book, professor of Russian studies Shigeki Khakamada agreed that the Russians should thank Japan for not entering the war. 

However, the facts indicate the opposite - until the middle of 1943, overhanging its million-strong Kwantung Army (army group) over the Soviet Far East and Eastern Siberia, Japan fettered the Red Army troops stationed here, not allowing them to be used in the fight against the German fascist invaders. 

As a result, up to a third of the Armed Forces of the USSR were unable to take part in the fight against the Nazi hordes. 

This is confirmed by the following data: "As of December 1, 1941, out of 5,495 thousand people of the total composition of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the Far East and at the southern borders, there were 1568 thousand, or more than 28 percent. Of the 4495 tanks in service with the Red Army at that time, there were 2,541 tanks in the Far East and at the southern borders of the USSR, and 2,951 aircraft out of 5,274 aircraft remained there. By this policy of shackling with the threat of an attack of Soviet troops, coordinated with Berlin, Tokyo prolonged the Great Patriotic War, increasing the losses of the Soviet people. 

Japan's planned attack on the USSR on August 29, 1941 did not take place not as a result of the alleged observance of the Soviet-Japanese pact of neutrality, as Japanese propaganda claims, but as a consequence of the failure of the German plan for a blitzkrieg and preservation even at the most critical moments on the Soviet-German front a large grouping of Soviet troops in the Far East and Siberia. 

At the same time, preparations for the attack continued until 1943. By the document "Program for the implementation of the state policy of the empire," adopted on September 6, 1941 at a meeting of the top leadership of Japan in the presence of the emperor and the Supreme Commander of the Army and Navy Hirohito, it was decided to continue the seizure of the colonial possessions of the Western powers in the south, without stopping before the war. 

A few days later it became known in the Kremlin. 

"According to a source of Invest (Hotsumi Ozaki - A.K.), the Japanese government decided not to oppose the USSR this year, but the armed forces will be left in the MCG (Manchukuo - A.K.) the case of the defeat of the USSR by that time." 

Note that in Russian sources, especially in the articles of publicists who, apparently, are not familiar with the full text of the message to Soviet spy Richard Sorge, the second part of the encryption is often omitted. But she mattered no less than the first. In fact, the Soviet intelligence officer warned that it was only about postponing the attack on the USSR, which, of course, was taken into account when determining the scale of the transfer of troops from the eastern regions of the country to Moscow. 

Although Sorge reported the likelihood of an attack in the spring of next year, according to Japanese plans, the war in the south did not rule out an attack on the Soviet Union in 1941. The General Staff of the Japanese ground forces developed a version of the plan for the war against the USSR "Kantokuen" ("Special maneuvers of the Kwantung Army"), which was to be carried out immediately after the expected fall of Moscow and a sharp change in favor of Japan in the balance of forces in the Far East. 

Given the complexity of offensive operations on all fronts in the autumn-winter period, the General Staff envisaged an initial strike in the eastern (coastal) direction. After the invasion of Primorye, the troops of the Eastern Front were to advance on Khabarovsk, capturing it before the onset of severe cold weather. At this time, the troops of the Northern and Western Fronts were to gain a foothold in the areas of the Small and Big Khingan, respectively, and await the onset of spring. With the beginning of ice melting, it was planned to force the Amur and develop an offensive to the west from the Rukhlovo - Bolshoi Khingan region in the direction of Lake Baikal. 

In development of this plan, the command of the Kwantung Army proposed, with the start of an offensive on the eastern front, by forces of two or three divisions in the fall to force the Amur in the Khabarovsk region in order to facilitate the capture of the city. 

Operations to seize Northern Sakhalin, Kamchatka and other regions, as well as the occupation of the Mongolian People's Republic, were to be carried out in accordance with the previous concept of the Cantokuen plan. Despite the preparations for the conduct of hostilities in the south, the Japanese Navy also retained a grouping of forces created specifically for the war against the USSR. They were consolidated into the 5th Fleet, which was based in the area of ​​the northern port of Ominato. 

The Japanese troops allocated for the war against the USSR were not included in the battle plans in the south and were preparing for action in the north. Official Japanese sources indicate that both in the context of the outbreak of war against the United States and Great Britain, and in order to continue military operations in China, Japan retained up to 40 percent of divisions in Manchuria, Korea and the mother country for the war against the USSR. 

There are other numbers as well. So, according to the information at the disposal of the Tokyo Tribunal, by December 5, 1941, about 50 percent of the infantry divisions, 75-80 percent of the cavalry units, about 65 percent of the tank regiments, half of the artillery and aviation of the ground forces were prepared for the attack on the Soviet Union. 

The most anti-Soviet politicians and military officials openly declared that "the Japanese Empire must play its role in ending the German-Soviet war ." The influential Japanese magazine Kaizo published in the November 1941 issue of the article "A New Stage of the Soviet-German War and Japan," which said: "Japan rejoices in the victories of its ally, Germany, and wishes her further success. Japan must undoubtedly use the international situation created by Germany's victories to accomplish its own great cause." 

Although by the end of November, at the cost of enormous efforts, Hitler's troops approached Moscow, contrary to the expectations of the Japanese command, even during this critical period the forces of the Red Army in the Far East were not weakened. Instead of the divisions that were leaving for Moscow, new divisions were immediately formed at the expense of local conscription. After a thorough analysis of the situation, the Japanese command was forced to come to the conclusion that it was advisable to postpone the date of the armed uprising against the USSR until the spring of 1942. 

On December 3, the imperial headquarters sent order No. 578 to the Kwantung Army, which stated: "To provide the Empire with resources and create a new order in the Great East Asia, it was decided to start a war with the USA, Great Britain and Holland. It is envisaged to quickly conduct an offensive in important areas in the south and at the same time resolve the Chinese incident (this is how the bloody Sino-Japanese war unleashed in 1937 is called in Japan - A.K.); at this time, not to allow war with Russia." 

Together with the order, headquarters directive No. 1048 was issued, in which the task of the Kwantung Army was set: "In accordance with the evolving situation, intensify preparations for operations against Russia. Be ready to start hostilities in the spring of 1942." 

However, among the Japanese leadership, there was still hope that Hitler's troops would still be able to capture Moscow by the end of 1941. In this case, the Japanese offensive could begin in winter. 

Therefore, on December 3, the headquarters also issued order No. 575 to the commander of the expeditionary army in China on the possible partial transfer of troops subordinate to him to the north. The order prescribed, with the beginning of hostilities against the Soviet Union, first of all to capture the Ussuri region, and if successful, to start an offensive on the Northern Front. 

For this it was necessary to transfer six divisions from China to the Kwantung Army. To break through the Soviet defense line in the winter of 1941-1942. and crossing the Amur, Ussuri and other water barriers, additional artillery and engineering units were sent to the Kwantung Army. January 10, 1942. 

The Kwantung Army understood that the decision to postpone the attack to the spring of 1942 was of a general nature, and continued to actively prepare for the expected "turning point" on the Soviet-German front. 

After receiving the order of December 3, the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army at a meeting of formation commanders gave the following instructions: "To end the ongoing preparations for operations against the Soviet Union each army and joining the first line should make every effort to ensure that, watching the constantly occurring changes in state of war USSR and Mongolia, to be able to establish the true situation at any time. This is especially true in the present conditions, when more and more there is a need to establish the signs of a turning point in the situation." 

In other words, it was about being in a state of constant readiness to fulfill the order to enter the war after the fall of Moscow. The strategy chosen by the Japanese generals was called the "ripe persimmon theory". Its meaning was to attack the USSR from the east, when, like a ripe fruit, it would be ready to "fall by itself at the feet of Japan." 

However, the turning point that came in December 1941 was of a completely different content than the Japanese militarists had imagined. The unfolding counter-offensive of the Red Army ended with the defeat of the Nazi troops rushing to Moscow. This marked the beginning of a radical turn in the war. And this turn took place in favor of the USSR. The results of the Battle of Moscow demonstrated to the whole world that the German strategy of lightning war had failed. 

The defeat of Hitler's troops near Moscow was a serious blow to Japanese plans for a treacherous attack on the USSR. The failure of Plan Barbarossa was convincing evidence that the Soviet Union, despite initial military setbacks, retained considerable power to continue the war, and the Red Army was capable of delivering devastating blows to the enemy in both the west and east. 

This frightened the Japanese ruling circles, forcing them to assess with greater caution the prospects for the development of the world war, especially the situation on the Soviet-German front. 

On January 15, 1942, Hirohito demanded from the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Hajime Sugiyama, a report on the results of the Soviet counteroffensive near Moscow. In his report, Sugiyama, assessing the state of the Soviet Union, especially emphasized: "The USSR, having retained about 40 percent of its industrial power, is consistently restoring production, and we should not underestimate it." 

Then, on January 22, answering the emperor's question about the timing of the operation against the USSR, Sugiyama said that, in his opinion, "at present, until the summer of this year, it is inappropriate to conduct an offensive operation in the north." 

The compilers of the 110-volume Japanese "Official history of the war in the Great East Asia" "Daitoa senso kokan shi" note a direct connection between the results of the Red Army's victory near Moscow and the forced decision of the leaders of militaristic Japan to revise the timing of the Japanese attack on the Soviet Union. 

They write: "The rallying of the Red Army with the population under Stalin's leadership to defend the homeland was very strong. Moscow and Leningrad stubbornly held out, the Red Army maintained a high fighting spirit, and there were no signs of internal collapse. The moment we expected to resolve the issue of the Soviet Union was receding over time. The failure of the winter campaign of the German army determined the collapse of Germany's grand strategy in the struggle against the USSR." 

The military successes achieved in the first period of operations against the armed forces of the United States and Great Britain gave rise to confidence in the soon victorious end of the war in the south. 

In the first months of 1942, the Japanese leadership believed that as a result of the seizure of sources of strategic raw materials, the empire could, if necessary, wage a long war against the Soviet Union. 

On February 18, Japan's Total War Institute presented the government with a strategic program for such a war. 

"In the event of a war with the Soviet Union," it said, "Use the strategic situation in the main theaters of the enemy’s war and remoteness from the main operational bases. To inflict the strongest first blow, to quickly destroy the existing forces and reinforcement units of the enemy, striving to resolve the military conflict in a short time, and then, seizing important areas, wage a protracted war." 

At the same time, the Japanese General Staff drew up an operational plan for offensive operations for 1942, which was maintained until 1944. 

Lieutenant Colonel Ryuzo Sejima, who was from 1940 to 1944 as an officer of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff, testified at the Tokyo trial: "Like the previous operational plans, the 1942 plan was offensive. The operations were to start suddenly. According to the plan, it was planned to concentrate about 30 divisions in Manchuria. The first front consisted of the 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 20th armies and had the task of delivering the main blow in the direction of Voroshilov (Ussuriisk - A.K.). 

These four armies were to simultaneously conduct a decisive battle in the vicinity of Voroshilov. The second front included the 4th and 8th armies. His task was to attack on the Svobodny - Kuibyshevka direction in order to defeat the Soviet troops and cut the railway (Trans-Siberian Railway - AK). " 

This was confirmed by the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, Major General Matsumura: "The General Staff instructed the command of the Kwantung Army to draw up a plan of operations against the USSR with the general goal of occupying Soviet Primorye and destroying air bases there.

Voroshilov was determined as the direction of the main attack. In the instructions of the General Staff of the Kwantung Army, following the occupation of Primorye, it was ordered to be ready for subsequent operations." For operations, it was planned to use 4 air divisions (1,500 aircraft) and about 1,000 tanks. 

The headquarters of the Kwantung Army developed a schedule for conducting operations against the USSR in the spring of 1942:

the beginning of the concentration and deployment of troops - day X minus 5 days;

Completion of deployment - day X minus two days;

border crossing - day X;

going to the southern bank of the Suifenhe River (Pogranichnaya) - day X plus 8-10 days;

completion of the first stage of the offensive - day X plus 21 days.

According to the General Staff's plan, the decision to start the war was to be made in March, and hostilities would begin in May 1942. To successfully implement such a schedule, the Kwantung Army's troops were tasked with "getting ahead of the enemy in preparing for war and creating a position that would allow, at their discretion, to strike first at a time favorable for resolving the northern problem." 

However, by the spring of 1942, the significant reduction in the number of Soviet troops in the Far East and Siberia, expected by the Japanese command, did not occur. In February, the intelligence department of the General Staff submitted a report to the Japanese high command that "the transfer of Soviet troops from east to west does not lead to a weakening of the Red Army grouping, which was replenished from local reserves." 

In this regard, the command of the ground forces appealed to the emperor with a recommendation to suspend hostilities in the south, to gain a foothold in the occupied areas in order to transfer four divisions to the north. 

According to the plans of the Japanese General Staff, it was envisaged to leave in the southern direction only such a number of troops that would ensure the maintenance of public order and the conduct of operations on the external borders. The released troops, as required by Directive No. 1073, were to be transferred to Manchuria and China, and also partially to the metropolis. 

Contrary to claims that "the elite troops of the Kwantung Army were sent south", in reality, the opposite was happening - in the spring of 1942 the Kwantung Army was reinforced again (two additional divisions were sent here), reaching its maximum strength, exceeding a million soldiers and officers. 

The defeat near Moscow forced Hitler and his generals to toughen demands on Tokyo for Japan to attack the USSR from the east. The US President considered it necessary to warn Moscow about this. 

In a report from Washington, Ambassador Maxim Litvinov reported on March 12, 1942 about a conversation with Franklin Roosevelt: "The American government received information that Hitler was pressing hard on Japan to time her attack on us for his spring offensive, but Japan replied that it is necessary to transfer your troops from Malaya and Burma." 

American intelligence confirmed information about the plans of the Japanese, which the Soviet intelligence received from many sources. The Americans also used intelligence about the possibility of a Japanese attack on the USSR in order to induce Stalin to change his policy of neutrality towards Japan. This was done in order to get airbases on Soviet territory from which the Japanese islands could be bombed. 

In his message to Stalin on June 17, 1942, Roosevelt wrote: "The situation that is developing in the northern part of the Pacific Ocean and in the Alaska region clearly shows that the Japanese government may be preparing for operations against the Soviet Primorye. If such an attack is carried out, the United States is ready to provide the Soviet Union with air force assistance, provided that the Soviet Union provides these forces with suitable landing sites in Siberia." 

The warnings about the danger of a Japanese attack on the USSR, as shown above, were well founded, they could not be regarded only as Roosevelt's desire, in his own interests, to quickly involve the Soviet Union in hostilities in the Far East. Undoubtedly, the increase in Japanese troops in the north, recorded by the intelligence services of both countries (the USSR and the USA), was associated with Japan's plans to attack the USSR if Germany's summer military campaign was successful. 

The information about Hitler's strong pressure on Japan in order to hasten its attack in the north was also correct. On May 15, 1942, Ribbentrop telegraphed to Tokyo: "Without a doubt, the seizure of the Siberian coastal provinces and Vladivostok, so vital to the security of Japan, will never be as favorable an opportunity as at the moment, when the combined forces of Russia are extremely tense on the European front." 

However, Stalin, having his own reliable information about Japan's policy, knew about the existence among the Japanese leadership of serious doubts about Japan's ability to simultaneously wage war on three fronts - Anglo-American, Chinese, and even Soviet. It was also clear that the Japanese would make a decision to attack the Soviet Union only taking into account their assessment of the balance of forces on the Soviet-Manchu border. Therefore, numerous Soviet troops remained in the Far East, which were so necessary in the west during this period. 

Among the Japanese generals, there were many who believed that Japan should join forces with allied Germany in the fight against the traditional enemy - Russia. 

The increase in the grouping in the north was directly related to plans for Japan to enter the war during the expected summer military campaign of Germany, on which high hopes were pinned in Tokyo. Here they closely followed the German army's offensive unfolding in mid-July in the southern sector of the Soviet-German front with the aim of breaking through to the Volga in the Stalingrad region, capturing this important strategic point and a large industrial region and thereby cutting off the center of the USSR from the Caucasus. 

The success of the German offensive was to be the signal for the beginning of the Japanese attack. For this, the Japanese General Staff developed a plan "Operation No. 51", according to which 16 infantry divisions of the Kwantung Army, as well as three infantry divisions stationed in Korea, were to be used against Soviet troops in the Far East. In addition, it was planned to transfer seven infantry divisions from Japan and four from China to Manchuria. 

In the first period of the operation, it was planned to use 24 out of 30 allocated divisions: in the eastern (seaside) direction - 17, in the north - six, in the west - one. The 1st Tank Army, consisting of three tank divisions, was to take part in the offensive in Primorye. 

The idea of ​​the operation was to destroy Soviet aviation by inflicting a surprise air strike on airfields and, having achieved air supremacy, by the forces of the 1st front (three field armies) to break through the defense line of Soviet troops in the eastern direction - south and north of Lake Khanka and capture Primorye. 

At the same time, the forces of the 2nd front (two field armies) force the Amur, break through the Soviet defense line in the northern direction (west and east of Blagoveshchensk) and, having seized the railway on the Svobodny-Zavitinsk sector, prevent the approach of reinforcements from the west. The operation was supposed to be carried out within two months. 

However, the existence of this plan did not mean that the Japanese leadership had a unanimous opinion about entering the war with the Soviet Union. The serious defeat of the Japanese in June 1942 in the battle for Midway Island indicated that the war in the south against the United States and Great Britain would require the concentration of all the forces of the empire. 

On July 20, 1942, Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff Xingichi Tanaka wrote in his diary: "At the present time it is necessary to resolve the issue of the principles of war leadership as a whole. Apparently, in 1942-1943. it would be advisable to avoid decisive battles and wage a protracted war. An operation against the Soviet Union is currently inappropriate." The Japanese ambassador to Moscow, Yoshitsugu Tatekawa, also did not recommend opposing the USSR. 

The defeat of the Nazis at Stalingrad meant the beginning of a radical change in the course of the entire Second World War. After the Battle of Stalingrad, the ruling circles of Japan were once again forced to postpone their plans for active military operations against the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, there was no complete rejection of aggression in the north. In Japan, there were still hopes for the arrival of some "favorable moment" for the seizure of Soviet Far Eastern lands. 

It is no coincidence that the plan of operations against Soviet troops in the Far East for 1943 again provided for an offensive from the Manchurian region with the main forces (17 infantry divisions) in the eastern direction and part of the forces (five infantry and two tank divisions) in the northern direction. 

The guidelines for continuing the preparation of the fleet for a war against the USSR did not change either. In the directive of the chief of the main naval headquarters No. 209 of March 25, 1943, it was prescribed: "At the very beginning of the war, the united fleet by the forces of the fleet aviation, using some of the ground-based aircraft, to suppress the enemy's aviation in the Kamchatka region and the southern part of Sikhote-Alin ... at the very beginning of the war, the ports of Okha and Petropavlovsk." 

But the chances for the implementation of these plans remained less and less. Amid the defeat of Nazi Germany on the Soviet front, the dragging out of the war in the south and the continuation of hostilities in China, the Japanese supreme leadership already at the end of 1942 began to think that "before the end of the war against the United States and Great Britain, a march in the north is dangerous." 

The last hopes for success in the war of the participants of the Triple Pact (Germany, Japan and Italy) in Tokyo were associated with the general offensive of the German troops in the summer of 1943. At this time, the Japanese generals still did not rule out the possibility of providing direct military assistance to their ally, Germany. Chief of General Staff Sugiyama said in a report to the emperor: "The situation in Germany could change dramatically for the better in the event of an attack by Japan on the USSR."... It was only after the victory of the Red Army in the Battle of Kursk that the Japanese ruling circles were forced to finally admit that their plans to crush the Soviet Union and divide its territory with Germany along the Omsk meridian were not destined to come true. For the first time in the history of its existence, the General Staff began drawing up a plan for 1944, which provided for defensive rather than offensive actions in the event of a war with the USSR.