Soviet intelligence activity in Asia in 1960–1980

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Soviet intelligence activity in Asia in 1960–1980

By Yuri  Totrov

This study focuses on the activities of Soviet intelligence in Asia in the second half of the Cold War, which was the result of a global confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. The article focuses on the US Central Intelligence Agency as the main object of foreign counterintelligence of the First Main Directorate of the KGB, as well as the activities of the CIA and various cover-ups that it used during this period in Asian countries.

If the first half of the Cold War (1949-1954) was marked by active subversive activities of the US and British intelligence services, which secretly sent their agents to the territory of the USSR by air, sea and land, then the wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan fell on its second half.

It is well known that Soviet intelligence tried to stay away from the Vietnam War. As for American intelligence, on the contrary, it took an active part in the Afghan war, providing all kinds of assistance to the Afghan Mujahideen.

From the very beginning of the war in Afghanistan, Soviet intelligence was also forced to take an active part in it. Special forces units played a special role here. On the Soviet side, the foreign intelligence of the KGB (First Main Directorate - PGU) and the military intelligence of the USSR Ministry of Defense (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff - GRU) were participants in a sharp confrontation with the intelligence services of the United States and their allies.

During this period, the main task of Soviet intelligence, assigned to it by the Politburo of the CPSU and the government of the USSR, was to obtain preemptive information about the preparations of the United States and NATO for a nuclear strike on the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries.

In this regard, the main objects of interest of the KGB and GRU residencies in Asian countries were American diplomatic missions, as well as the US military bases and facilities in these countries. Among the objects of interest of Soviet intelligence were also the headquarters of the military blocs SEATO and CENTO, located respectively in Bangkok and Ankara.

In addition to the American intelligence services, the British intelligence SIS / MI-6 also traditionally operated in Asian countries. But given the relatively small size of the British residencies in the British embassies, as well as the fact that Soviet intelligence directed its main efforts against the CIA and other American intelligence services, most of the KGB residencies in Asia, as well as in other countries during this period, unfortunately, practically did not pay due attention to SIS.

A. M. Sakharovsky (1956-1971), [1, p. 453-459] F. K. Mortin (1971-1974) and V. A. Kryuchkov (1974-1988). This was the period when Yu. V. Andropov, who came from the Central Committee, was appointed chairman of the KGB, paying special attention to the needs of intelligence. [2, p. eight; 4, p. 229-236]

The most famous heads of the operational departments that carried out reconnaissance operations of the PGU in Asian countries during this period were V. I. Startsev, Ya. P. Medyanik and Yu. I. Popov. All of them later became generals and deputy chiefs of intelligence. [3, c. 724, 620, 674; 4, p. 129, 131, 136-137]

In Soviet times, the party committees of departments, departments, Glavka, and the KGB took an active part in raising the level of operational work of the KGB residencies. At that time, it was quite natural that a resident or employee who was in the Center was invited by one or another party organ and offered, as a communist, to report on his intelligence work, without going into operational details. There were cases when the work of one or another residency was discussed even at the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and then appropriate decisions were made.

It was at this time that the Office of Foreign Counterintelligence - "K" - managed to prove that if our propaganda organs were waging an ideological struggle against "American imperialism", then the KGB had to deal with a real enemy - the American special services. In particular, Soviet intelligence abroad is confronted by a serious specific adversary - the US Central Intelligence Agency. And it is represented in each specific country by operational officers of the local CIA residency. In this regard, the Department "K" was tasked with identifying American intelligence officers working abroad under various covers, and their active development. The Office created a very effective system for identifying US intelligence officers and set up their targeted development, in particular, in Asian countries. [5; 6, p. 31; 7, p. 71]

In many Asian countries under American influence, Soviet intelligence had to overcome the "defense in depth" of the enemy intelligence services to acquire sources of information. This should include both the opposition of local security agencies, most of whose employees received special training in the United States, and the counterintelligence activity of the so-called "Soviet" sections or groups in the CIA residencies. And in those countries where American military bases or facilities were located, counterintelligence units of the US ground, air and naval forces also actively acted against Soviet intelligence officers (respectively, CIC army counterintelligence (CIC), Air Force Special Investigation Directorate (OSI) and Naval Investigation Service (NIS).

However, the Americans themselves and, to some extent, the British, helped solve this very difficult task for Soviet intelligence to acquire sources of information. The fact is that in addition to “well-wishers, who were specially trained in large numbers by the US intelligence services, persistently trying to “set them up” for Soviet intelligence, as well as mentally deranged persons who periodically visited Soviet foreign missions, Soviet intelligence officers in Asian countries (as in other countries ) quite often came out American citizens who really had access to the secret information of interest to us. Here it must be frankly said that in most cases, the motivating motive for the willingness of such Americans to cooperate with Soviet intelligence, passing it secret information and documents, was a frank desire to "make money."There were, of course, those who agreed to such cooperation, risking their lives, purely for ideological reasons ...

In terms of size, the KGB and GRU residencies in Asian countries were much smaller than those of the CIA, and in some countries they were completely absent. Their size depends on many factors. At the same time, the presence in a particular country of important objects of the “main enemy”, i.e., played an important role here. USA, as well as the need to obtain information of a scientific and technical nature, which the Soviet industry and economy badly needed. However, often the main criterion in determining the optimal number of Soviet intelligence officers in a particular country was the level of relations between the USSR and this country, since most Asian countries that were in the orbit of US policy introduced a “quota” on the quantitative composition of diplomatic and other Soviet institutions.

The KGB residencies consisted mainly of employees of the linear (geographical) department, who were engaged in the collection of information of a political nature (“PR line” - political intelligence). Residents were usually also appointed from among the employees of this department.

In addition to political intelligence officers, in some KGB residencies there were also representatives of scientific and technical intelligence (“line X”), who were faced with the task of obtaining information about the latest achievements of foreign science and technology.

In most residencies there were also employees of foreign counterintelligence (Department "K", which until 1972 was called Service 2). These employees - "line K" - were responsible for the security of intelligence operations, as well as Soviet citizens and institutions in a given country. They were entrusted with the task of obtaining preemptive information of a counterintelligence nature about the preparation of hostile actions by local security agencies, anti-Soviet organizations, as well as the CIA and other American intelligence agencies against Soviet intelligence officers, citizens and institutions. [7, p. 70] In those Asian countries where there was an operational need, there were illegal residencies of Soviet intelligence.

As you know, from the very beginning of the Cold War, the United States began to create a network of its military bases, radio interception points and electronic intelligence stations along the perimeter of the border of the Soviet Union on the territory of a number of states bordering the USSR. In Asia, such military facilities have been equipped in Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, South Korea, Japan and Taiwan. In this regard, along with obtaining information about the policies of the governments of these countries, which is usually of interest to the Center, one of the priority tasks of Soviet intelligence in these countries was to penetrate the objects of the “main enemy” and obtain the information necessary to develop effective countermeasures.

Turkey

In addition to the CIA residencies under diplomatic cover in Ankara and Istanbul, our intelligence interests were also CIA special operations units in these cities under the cover of "research departments" under the Joint US Military Advisory Group (JUSMATT/Survey Unit). By the way, it was there, in Ankara, that Aldrich Ames first came into our field of vision. And a little earlier in Istanbul - Richard Stoltz, who later became the Deputy Director of the CIA and the head of the Operations Directorate. [8, c. 704; 9.]

Our residency in Turkey directed significant efforts to cover the activities of the US top secret facilities in Karamursel, Trabzon, Samsun, Diyarbakir, Sinop, Ankara, Kavak and a number of others. It was found that all these objects together constituted one "Big Ear" of the National Security Agency (NSA) of the United States, directed towards the USSR. So, in particular, it turned out that in the small town of Karamursel, located 37 miles southeast of Istanbul, there was one of the main objects of US electronic intelligence in Turkey. Its main target was the Soviet missile range at Tyuratam. Although the object belonged to the NSA, it was serviced jointly by specialists from the Air Force and the US Navy. Electronic intelligence bases in Trabzon and Sinop closely monitored the Kapustny Yar missile range, and established in 1964. 

At the Diyarbakir base, a powerful long-range radar was targeted at the Tyuratam missile test site. [10, p. 208-209] It must be said that the work of Soviet intelligence in this direction was seriously hampered by the Turkish special services themselves. Turkey is the most important strategic partner of the US and NATO on the southern flank of the European theater of operations. During the period under review, it had the largest army in Europe (about 900 thousand people). Since the beginning of the 60s, American Jupiter-type missiles (with a flight range of 2400 km) with nuclear warheads have been located here, which greatly worried the Soviet Union; finally, SAK strategic bombers aimed at the USSR were also based here. that the work of Soviet intelligence in this direction was seriously hampered by the Turkish special services themselves.

Turkish intelligence agencies worked closely with the CIA and SIS. Since ensuring the security of military facilities was the unconditional prerogative of the Counterintelligence Directorate in the system of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces, in order to be interested in electronic surveillance objects, we had to first of all overcome the obstacles built by the Turkish military counterintelligence. No less dangerous for our agents were the employees of the Main Directorate of Internal Intelligence of MIT (Milli Istihbarat Teskilati) - the National Intelligence Organization, which until the early 1990s. was the basic unit that ensured the conduct of counterintelligence activities throughout the territory of the Republic of Turkey. The General Directorate of Security under the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Turkey (GDBT) actively cooperated with these special services.

Iran

When conducting intelligence operations in Iran, Soviet intelligence had to take into account the tough counterintelligence regime established by the local intelligence service SAVAK, which was created in 1956 with the help of the CIA and MOSSAD. Despite this, among the tasks of the KGB residency in Iran was the infiltration of both SAVAK and various US intelligence units in the country. These primarily included a fairly large CIA residency under the cover of the US Embassy, ​​as well as a special unit under the fictitious military cover of the "Research Support Group" (RSG). This unit worked closely with SAVAK to develop Soviet citizens and institutions in Iran. Some of the former employees of this unit then worked on the "Soviet line" in other countries and even in Moscow.

Considering the very advantageous strategic position of Iran, the US has deployed its electronic intelligence bases on its territory. And they, in turn, were the objects of penetration of the KGB residency. Soviet intelligence efforts revealed that the small mountain village of Kabkan, 840 miles east of Mashhad, was home to one of the most important NSA bases monitoring space launches and testing of Soviet missiles from the Tyuratam test site. This base was encrypted as "Tracksman 2" and, given its special importance, was used by the NSA in conjunction with the CIA.

Another important NSA electronic intelligence facility was located in Kuchan, 50 miles west of Mashhad. As if by chance, it was equipped not far from the Soviet border - 60 miles from the capital of the Turkmen SSR, Ashgabat.

The third point of electronic intelligence of the NSA-CIA was located in Behshahr, on the shores of the Caspian Sea. [10, p. 256, 258]

In 1979, during the Islamic Revolution, among the hostages of Iranian students who seized the US embassy, ​​along with other American diplomats, were members of the CIA station, headed by their resident Tom Ahern. The CIA station in Iran ceased to exist. At the same time, the Iranian authorities closed all American military installations. After that, the KGB residency, working in very difficult conditions, switched completely to collecting information about the course of the Islamic revolution and regularly gave its forecasts about the future situation in the country.

Japan

Japan, as a neighboring country, with which Russia had to fight twice for half a century, naturally, was of particular interest to Soviet intelligence.

One of the main obstacles to the successful work of the KGB residency in Japan was the constant surveillance of many Soviet citizens by the local counterintelligence and police, which had an extensive network of informers. It should also be noted that many employees of the Japanese police and the Office of Public Security Investigation of the Ministry of Justice (DOJ) were trained and retrained in American police academies, as well as in the CIA.

Despite the fact that in the CIA residency in Tokyo there was a special department for communications with local intelligence services that provided the Americans with all the information they were interested in about the USSR and specific Soviet citizens, it was very popular among Japanese police and counterintelligence officers to “earn money” as CIA agents.

It goes without saying that in order to ensure the successful activities of Soviet intelligence in Japan, as well as the security of Soviet institutions and Soviet colonies, the KGB residency had to seriously deal with the numerous US intelligence agencies in the country.

The CIA station in Japan has traditionally been the largest in Asia - Class A (with the exception of the station in Saigon, which during the Vietnam War, there were up to 800 people). Its quantitative composition can be judged from the fact that at the beginning of 1960, only the "Soviet" section under the leadership of Jacques Richardson consisted of 30 people - 24 regular and 6 contract employees of the CIA. [11, p. 127] It is established that at this time the total number of CIA employees in Japan reached 200 people.

Given the special role of the Japanese CIA station, high-ranking intelligence officers were usually appointed as its leaders in Tokyo. It is known that two of them later became deputy directors of the CIA, heading the Operations Directorate (William Nelson and William Wells).

The leadership of the residency operated under the cover of the US Embassy. Moreover, a significant number of CIA employees under the cover of the State Department were also located in the additional building of the embassy (the building "Mantetsu"), where until 1945 there was an office of the "South Manchurian Railway" (SMZhD) - "Mantetsu").

It was noteworthy that of the several dozen of these "diplomats", only five were listed in the "Diplomatic List" for 1967 - the official list of foreign diplomats accredited to the Japanese Foreign Ministry. [12, p. 138-141]. However, the bulk of the CIA personnel in Japan worked under "military" covers. All of them were listed as "civilians" (civilians) of the Ministry of the Army, Air Force or Navy.

At various times, CIA units under fictitious names operated at various American military bases in Japan. So, the Field Research Unit (FRU) was stationed at the Yokosuka naval base. Atsugi Naval Air Station was home to a large branch of the Joint Technical Advisory Group (JTAG). For a while, a major CIA unit was also based at Pershing Heights in Tokyo. Tokyo's Washington Heights base near Meiji Park was home to the Composite Analysis Group (CAG) and Area Liaison Coordination Detachment (ALCD), which was the site of the Olympic Village during the 1964 Olympics. [13, p.11] In the Fukide-cho area, not far from the American embassy, ​​the Provost Marshal Liaison Division (PMLD) was located in a two-story mansion for some time. CIA officers worked in the 6-story Hardy Barax building next to the Aoyama cemetery and along with the army newspaper Stars and Stripes and Air Force counterintelligence (OSI). [14, p. 351-367] Fuchu Air Force Base was home to the Joint Plans & Programs Office (JPPO). Then the ALCD unit was partially relocated there. [fifteen; 16; 17.]

In 1968, under the cover of the American embassy in the Mantetsu building, a division of the CIA Regional Program Analysis Office (RPAO) began to function. His employees, although they were not under the cover of the State Department, had cars with diplomatic plates.

On the island of Okinawa, at the base of Chinan, under the cover of the US Army Composite Service Group (US CSG), a regional branch of the CIA Operational Equipment Service (Office of Technical Service -OTS) operated, whose employees served residencies in most Asian countries. [eighteen; 19]

The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), which first represented the Information and then the CIA Science and Technology Department, had its own branch at the Chitose base in Hokkaido. Then it was transferred under the roof of the US Embassy in Tokyo, and subsequently reorganized and relocated to Okinawa.

In 1975, an 11-story modern building was built in Tokyo on the site of the old two-story historic building of the US Embassy. Most of the CIA personnel operating under the cover of PMLD and ALCD were transferred there. They were located on the 8th floor. The Mantetsu building was also demolished, and instead of RPAO, a new cover appeared in the embassy - the US Army Support Office (USASO). It was located on the 6th floor. Employees under cover of the political section occupied the 9th floor. The CIA cryptographers were located on the 10th floor next to their State Department counterparts, but completely separate. Some CIA officers still continued to be stationed at Yokota Air Force Base. [twenty]

The KGB residency paid special attention to identifying the so-called "deep", or "unofficial, covers" of the CIA in Japan (non official cover - NOC officers). Since it was established that some of these "illegals" purposefully worked on Soviet citizens and institutions, special attention was paid to their development. At different times, more than 20 such covers were opened. Only at the beginning of the 80s, more than a dozen of them were installed. [21, c. 3; 22]

As for military intelligence, in addition to the intelligence department (J-2) of the headquarters of the US Armed Forces in Japan and the second (intelligence) departments of the headquarters of the army, navy and air force (G-2, N-2, and A-2), the object of interest of the KGB was also a large military intelligence unit "500th Military Intelligence Detachment" (500 MID), which was located at the North Camp Drake base. In Okinawa, the US Army Pacific Intelligence School functioned, where military intelligence and counterintelligence officers of Asian countries (US Army Intelligence School Pacific) were trained.

Among the objects of special interest of Soviet intelligence in Japan during this period of the Cold War were the US electronic intelligence units, which were purposefully engaged in intercepting and listening to Soviet communication lines of varying degrees of security. These facilities primarily included the Japanese branch of the National Security Agency (NSA), located at the highly guarded base "Camp Futinobe" a dozen miles west of Tokyo. This branch reported to the NSA Pacific Center at Camp Smith, north of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. [10, p. 216] At the northernmost tip of the island of Hokkaido in the Wakkanai region, 40 miles from the territory of the USSR, the US Army Electronic Intelligence Service (Army Security Agency - ASA) equipped its intelligence post on 185 acres. An even larger ASA radio interception center was located in the southern part of the island, 4 miles southwest of Chitose. The other two points were at the bases of Sakata (Honshu Island) and Hakata (Kyushu Island). *[10, c. 208]

The electronic intelligence service of the Navy did not lag behind the army. By the mid-60s, the world's largest US Navy electronic intelligence center (Naval Security Group Activity) was created on the basis of Kamisei, more than a thousand of whose employees were engaged in intercepting Soviet and Chinese communication lines. It also had a branch in Okinawa. [23, p. 156] At Misawa Air Force Base, US Air Force electronic intelligence officers were engaged in similar activities.

Soviet military intelligence was interested in the US naval bases of Yokosuka and Sasebo, where naval ships were based, including nuclear aircraft carriers and submarines.

In order to gain access to the secrets that were located at the above American facilities, Soviet intelligence had to overcome the security system carefully designed by the Americans, which, in addition to their own security services for the facilities, was actively engaged in army counterintelligence of the army, air force and navy. These special services constantly tried to infiltrate their double agents into the KGB agent network in order to divert the attention of Soviet intelligence to an “unusable object”, bring directed misinformation to it, inflict material damage on it, and if the opportunity presents itself, then organize a capture “red-handed” our intelligence officers and launch another campaign of spy mania in the press.

As you know, in Japan, in addition to American military personnel, there were always a large number of civilians. And for some reason, a certain percentage of this huge number of Americans definitely wanted to "earn extra money" or "get rich" with the help of the KGB or the GRU. Moreover, as they say, such a trend appeared already from the beginning of 1946. In this regard, our residency had to spend a lot of time and effort to figure out with whom it was dealing: with a genuine "initiator" who had access to classified information, or with "set-up" of the American intelligence services. Ultimately, Soviet intelligence managed to develop a fairly effective system for quickly identifying the "setups" of the enemy. Moreover, given the persistent desire of American intelligence to acquire agents from among the citizens of the USSR,

Despite the fact that American intelligence in Japan had an overwhelming numerical superiority over the KGB and GRU residencies combined, and also had a powerful operational resource of Japanese counterintelligence acting in close contact with the Americans, the CIA, in its secret confrontation with Soviet intelligence, basically adhered to the unwritten " rules of the game." However, there were also exceptions. Such exceptions include the so-called “Pokrovsky case”.

In 1966, David Murphy, head of the CIA's "Soviet" department, and Thomas Ryan, head of the KGB section of this department, arrived in Tokyo under the guise of "tourist businessmen". Both are Japanese. Murphy worked in Japan from the founding of the CIA from 1947 to 1950. Ryan in 1957–1961 also served in Japan under military cover. According to an employee of the "Soviet" department of the CIA, George Kizewalter, Murphy intended to "talk" with Pokrovsky. [24, p. 213-214]

After Washington and Delhi, where Georgy Petrovich Pokrovsky proved himself to be an active intelligence officer, in Japan he, as a resident of the KGB, was in the development of the CIA, in which, among its agents, as it became known, it used the Colombian José Miguel Monev Calderon and the Japanese Matsumoto Masaki. Murphy, as the head of the "Soviet" department, was going to "show the guys how it's done." However, from the very beginning, this CIA operation, which could have ended in the kidnapping of a Soviet intelligence officer, thanks to the courage and decisive actions of Pokrovsky, went “wrong” and ended in an international scandal. 

An attempt to “talk” with Pokrovsky resulted in a brawl, during which Pokrovsky’s wife beat one of the Americans with an umbrella, breaking his glasses. And then another had to give an expensive Swiss watch for repair. But the most offensive for the Americans was that, although this operation was prepared in advance, the Japanese police, who appeared at the scene of the fight, took the CIA officers to the Takanawa district police station, where they had to sit "uncomfortable" all night until the morning, until representatives of the embassy arrived for them. [6, c. 33; 25, p. 371, p.33; 26; 27; 28.]

This failure of the CIA in Japan occurred under CIA Resident William Nelson. However, despite this, upon his return to the United States in 1968, he received the highest rank of GS-18 and was appointed head of the Asia Department, and in 1970 headed the CIA Operations Directorate. The "scapegoat" for this failure Murphy apparently decided to make Thomas Sawyer, who since 1964 represented the "Soviet" department in the residency and the US Embassy in Tokyo. After leaving Japan in 1966, he "rested" for four years from business trips abroad in America, until he was sent to residency in Moscow under the cover of a security officer. Yes, and here he worked for only a year ...

Joseph Smith, who replaced Nelson in 1968, was more peaceful. On his initiative, an informal meeting was held with KGB resident Yu. I. Popov, during which an agreement was reached that both sides would behave in a “civilized” manner. This, of course, did not mean that the CIA and the KGB stopped their intelligence work against each other. Both sides continued to use any mistake of the enemy to their advantage. And if Soviet intelligence officers were caught on “set-ups” or as a result of their operational errors, then they were expelled from Japan or arrested, and a campaign of spy mania against Soviet intelligence was inflated in the local press.

Against some particularly active Soviet intelligence officers, the CIA organized "active measures" in the press, believing that Moscow should immediately recall such "deciphered" KGB officers. However, such actions of the Americans were not always successful. In response, the KGB organized the publication of materials exposing the activities of the CIA in Japan and other Asian countries. Naturally, it was still better and more “civilized” than kidnapping each other…

It should be noted that the KGB station in Tokyo during this period also had to obtain information about the very large CIA stations in Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and also in the Philippines, where there were no Soviet representatives at that time.

Vietnam, Laos, Thailand

During the Vietnam War, the government of the USSR, at the request of the government of the DRV, provided certain military assistance to the Vietnamese side. Thus, in particular, air defense missile systems were sent to Vietnam to repel American air raids on Hanoi and other vital facilities. The training of the Vietnamese anti-aircraft gunners serving these installations was carried out by Soviet specialists. This is where Soviet intelligence information, obtained from reliable sources, came in handy, allowing combat crews of Vietnamese air defense missile systems to prepare in advance for American air raids. Even the former CIA resident in Vietnam, Theodore Sheckley, drew attention to this in one of his interviews.

The CIA station in Vietnam, which had its own sub-residences, branches and representatives in various areas of South Vietnam, sometimes numbered up to 800 people. The Americans were very lucky that, for a well-known reason, during this period there were no close relations between Soviet intelligence and the intelligence of the DRV. Otherwise, a number of CIA facilities, such as the Duk Hotel in Saigon, where only CIA employees lived, would definitely have been targeted by Viet Cong saboteurs ...

For the same reason, the staff of the SIS station in Hanoi, who served in the DRV as "eyes and ears" for their "senior partners", were able to work quietly under consular cover.

During the Vietnam War, Vietnam's neighboring countries of Laos, Thailand, and Cambodia became springboards for subversive operations against both the South Vietnamese Liberation Front and the DRV. Soviet intelligence residencies in these countries received documentary evidence of this. A special role in these operations was played by the CIA station in Laos, the quantitative composition of which reached 300 people. One of the main CIA fronts in Laos was the RMB (Research Management Branch) of the Office for International Development - UID (USAID). In addition to Vientiane, the CIA had its stations in Pakse, Savannaket, Long Tien, Luang Prabang, Xianglom and Nam Yue. To conduct reconnaissance and sabotage operations against the Armed Forces of the Viet Cong and the Pathet Lao, the CIA trained and armed numerous detachments of the Hmong mountain people, led by General Vang Pao.

Although most American intelligence officers in Laos were directly involved in the Vietnam War, a large "Soviet" section was active in the CIA station in Vientiane. Its employees, staffed mainly by veterans of the "Soviet" department, were engaged in the development of Soviet institutions and citizens in Laos, with an emphasis on intelligence officers. The "Soviet" section even had its own surveillance team, consisting of specially trained and equipped Thais. [29] After the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, Thailand began to play a special role in the military-strategic plans of the United States. With the beginning of American military operations in Vietnam, the CIA residency reached a very large size. In addition to the State Department and the SID, the CIA in Thailand also used the military cover of MASTHAI (groups of military advisers),

As part of the CIA residency in Bangkok, a large "Soviet" section was also active. At her service were always employees of the Thai counterintelligence "Santiban" (Special Branch), which had long had the closest contact with the American intelligence services.

Afghanistan

The Soviet Union has always maintained friendly relations with its southern neighbor Afghanistan. The situation in this country favored the work of Soviet intelligence. During the Cold War in Afghanistan, as in other countries of the world, an active struggle unfolded between Soviet and American intelligence.

The CIA station in Kabul became one of the main targets of Soviet intelligence. Having information that American intelligence was persistently trying to acquire a source from among Soviet citizens, the KGB residency decided to "help" the Americans in this matter. The CIA operation initially developed quite successfully. The local resident was already rubbing his hands. For the final recruiting conversation, an experienced CIA officer who speaks Russian arrived from neighboring Iran. However, in the end, this operation, which was under the control of foreign counterintelligence, fell through with the Americans. Since the American recruiter introduced himself to a Soviet citizen under a false name, he was detained by local intelligence agencies, who were conducting a roundup of criminals, to determine his identity. After presenting his diplomatic passport, he was released and immediately left Afghanistan. The failure of this operation had negative consequences for a number of CIA employees who participated in its preparation. It is believed that one of them, hard experiencing this failure, even shot himself.

After December 27, 1979, when the Amin regime was overthrown in Kabul, the nature of the confrontation between the Soviet and American intelligence services in Afghanistan changed radically. It should be clarified that Amin was actually overthrown and liquidated by Soviet intelligence by decision of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. As a result of this short-sighted decision, the Soviet Union was drawn into an exhausting and bloody war, from which it hardly emerged 10 years later with huge human, material and moral losses...

The author does not have documents showing which of the four leading figures of the Politburo - Brezhnev, Andropov, Gromyko or Ustinov - was the initiator of the removal of Amin and the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. However, it is reliably known that in November 1979, the head of the PGU, V. A. Kryuchkov, summoned his deputy, Lieutenant General V. A. Kirpichenko, and, given the information received that the Afghan dictator Amin, "an inveterate executioner and fascist", intending to reorient in his policy on the United States, instructed him to fly to Kabul to help the opponents of the dictator "do away with him." [25, c.350-365]

In early December, Kirpichenko was already in Kabul. Preparations for the overthrow of President Amin were in full swing. Approximately a week before "Day X" - December 27 - to the KGB office, headed by Lieutenant General B. S. Ivanov, the chief military adviser, Colonel General S. K. Magomedov and the senior representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, it was proposed, together with Amin's opponents, to eliminate the dictator. Given the special secrecy of the operation, neither the Soviet ambassador nor the GRU resident were informed about it.

According to the plan of the operation, key objects were outlined, which were to be occupied by units of the GRU special forces under the command of Colonel V. V. Kolesnik, PGU special forces under the leadership of Major General Yu. Major General I. F. Ryabchenko.

The development of an operation plan to take the well-fortified Amin's palace was entrusted to Kolesnik. The chief military adviser, Magomedov, and the chief representative of the KGB, Ivanov, verbally approved the final version of the Storm-333 operation plan, but refused to sign it. Kolesnik, in their presence, made an appropriate entry on the plan, set the date, time and signed. The general management of the operation was entrusted to Colonel Kolesnik, General Drozdov was appointed his deputy.

The operation to capture the palace and eliminate Amin was carried out successfully - with minimal losses and in the shortest possible time. On December 31, 1979, KGB generals Kirpichenko and Drozdov were already reporting to KGB Chairman Yu. V. Andropov in Moscow on the results of the operation in Kabul. And on January 3, 1980, Kolesnik reported to the head of the GRU, P.I. Ivashutin. The next day, he was already reporting to Minister of Defense Ustinov. By this time, the “Muslim battalion” of the GRU special forces, which, under the leadership of Kolesnik, stormed the Taj-Bek Palace, had already returned to Tashkent, and units of the 40th Army entered Afghanistan. The Afghan war began. [thirty; 31, p. 140; 32.] 

For Soviet intelligence, Afghanistan became the main objective. In the leadership of the PSU, four people were engaged in Afghan affairs from morning to evening - Kryuchkov himself and his three deputies - Kirpichenko, Medyanik and Drozdov. Among the primary tasks that the KGB had to solve was the need to strengthen the Afghan security agencies. Experienced intelligence and counterintelligence officers of the KGB were sent to Afghanistan as advisers. At the same time, hundreds of personnel for Afghan intelligence and counterintelligence began to be trained on the territory of the USSR and Afghanistan.

The representative office and residency of the KGB in Afghanistan switched to round-the-clock operation.

The local CIA residency, which practically found itself at the forefront of not the “cold”, but the real “hot” war, immediately felt tighter control from the Afghan counterintelligence, feeling the familiar “hand of the KGB”. In this regard, the CIA in Afghanistan was forced to drastically change its style of work, as well as the forms and methods of communication with agents. The term of the "voluntary" business trip of CIA officers to this "hot spot" was set at 18 months. CIA officers appeared in Afghanistan, immigrants from the republics of Soviet Central Asia, who during the Great Patriotic War became deserters and served in Hitler's "Muslim division". In its intelligence work in Afghanistan, the CIA placed special emphasis on agents from among third-country nationals, including employees of international organizations, as well as from among thrill-seekers, ready to perform a one-time task for a reward of 1000 dollars, visiting a certain area of ​​Afghanistan under the guise of a journalist, photojournalist, etc. The local KGB residency and the Afghan intelligence services, for their part, continued to successfully infiltrate their people into the CIA agent network. As a result of the implementation of such operations, the failed American intelligence officer was declared persona non grata and left Kabul.

A special place in the CIA's intelligence operations in Afghanistan was occupied by the electronic intelligence station at the US Embassy, ​​whose employees were camouflaged as State Department communications specialists. The employees of this point, who spoke Russian, were engaged in radio interception and listening to the communication channels of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The information obtained in this way was then transferred to the CIA by the Pakistani intelligence, which led the actions of the Mujahideen, or to some of the leaders of the Mujahideen, who were directly in the pay of the Americans.

An important role in the "Afghan operation" of the CIA was assigned to the Pakistani station in Islamabad. One of its main tasks was to establish the closest contact with the Pakistani intelligence ISI, which created bases for training Afghan Mujahideen combat groups on its territory and threw them into the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. It was quite difficult for the CIA resident sinologist John Regan to solve this problem quickly. He arrived in Pakistan in mid-1979, and in November he already witnessed an attack by a raging mob of Muslim fanatics on the American embassy. Nevertheless, he was actively involved in organizing the supply of modern weapons to the Afghan Mujahideen. Active assistance to Regan in this matter was provided by the SIS station in Pakistan, headed by Nicholas Adamson.

In early 1980, a BND station was opened in Islamabad. It was headed by Jan Kleffel, a former deputy. resident in Japan, who came to intelligence from the Bundeswehr. West German intelligence was assigned a specific role in working with the Afghan Mujahideen. [33]

CIA assistance to dushmans fighting the Soviet army reached particular activity and scope under Howard Hart, who replaced Regan in May 1981. Its scale can be judged by how the CIA residency budget grew over the three years under Hart. If in 1981 it was about 30 million dollars, then in 1984 it already reached 200 million. It should also be taken into account that, by agreement between President Reagan and the royal family of Saudi Arabia, the latter agreed to provide the Afghan “fighters against communism” with the same amount. (In 1986, under resident Milt Bearden, the annual budget for the CIA station in Pakistan already reached a billion dollars!) [34, p. 219] Under the new SIS resident, the energetic Peter Price (Prhees), who arrived in Islamabad in 1982,

In connection with the information received by the KGB about secret deliveries of weapons to dushmans from Pakistan and Iran, as well as the activation of various bandit groups that commit sabotage, terrorist acts against supporters of the Karmal government, attacks on government institutions, etc., it was decided to send a special unit to Afghanistan with codenamed Cascade. In this combat unit, there were more than 700 people. In addition to Kabul, where the headquarters of the Cascade was located, its branches were also in the seven main provinces of the country. Among other tasks, Cascade was instructed to provide the army command with information about impending terrorist attacks and sabotage, to detect the bases of dushmans, their weapons and ammunition depots, and to identify ways to deliver weapons and equipment from Pakistan. By the nature of their activities, the employees of the "Cascade" had to engage in both intelligence and operational work, and participate in military operations against Afghan militants. A number of KGB officers were killed in such operations.

In 1984, the leadership of the KGB decided not to send Cascade units to Afghanistan anymore.

Sober-minded heads in the KGB intelligence leadership did not approve of the Politburo's decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan as soon as they learned about it. Very soon, a number of generals who were directly involved in the preparation of the December 1979 events in Kabul realized the fallacy and tragedy of this decision. And only the leadership of the KGB could not realize in any way what grave consequences for the country the further continuation of the Afghan war could lead to.

In September 1987, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze informed Secretary of State Shultz of his intention to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan. However, the CIA did not believe this. On New Year's Eve in one of the Washington restaurants and. about. During a lunch with Deputy Secretary of State Armacost, CIA Director Robert Gates, relying on the forecasts of his analysts, bet him for 25 dollars. However, on February 15, 1989, the last Soviet soldier left Afghanistan, and Gates, as the loser of the bet, had to pay… [35, p. 169]

According to the former deputy of the PGU, Lieutenant General V. A. Kirpichenko, "it was not the entry of troops into Afghanistan itself, but their presence there for ten years, that was a tragic mistake." [25, p. 348]

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August 24, 2022

Yuri Totrov