A Tactical Victory at Polana: Analysis of a Successful Defense

 ZELENOGORSK PRAVDA

Defense & Analysis Supplement
December 25, 2025

A Tactical Victory at Polana: Analysis of a Successful Defense
By Svetlana Golikova, Senior Staff Writer for Defense Issues

A recently concluded operation near the village of Polana offers a clear, tactical-level case study in effective defense, highlighting improved intelligence work and adaptive command, while also outlining the persistent challenges faced by Chernarus forces in the northern sector.

Intelligence as a Force Multiplier

The operation, conducted on December 24 by the 1st Battalion, 4th Separate Light Mountain Rifle Brigade, was predicated on what after-action reports describe as "highly accurate" pre-operational intelligence. Signals intelligence (SIGINT), including intercepted communications and emails, combined with human intelligence (HUMINT), provided a detailed forecast of the separatist offensive.

Critically, this intelligence did more than warn of an attack; it revealed the enemy's operational context. Intercepts indicated command frustration within separatist ranks stemming from "degraded logistics, poor recruit quality, and equipment shortages." The enemy’s aim for the Polana offensive was to "restore operational momentum." This understanding of adversary intent and pressure points allowed Chernarus commanders to anticipate the move with confidence.

Adaptive Execution Under Fire

The tactical execution demonstrated notable flexibility. Upon securing Polana at approximately 0735, the battalion command issued revised verbal orders at 0741, redirecting the main defensive force one kilometer northwest based on last-minute intelligence refinement. This real-time adjustment positioned the task force directly on the enemy's main axis of advance.

The ensuing engagement was a combined-arms action. Light scout elements conducted a controlled retreat, drawing in enemy armored vehicles. The core infantry elements, occupying the blocking position, engaged dismounted enemy infantry—identified in reports as including Wagner Group operators, Serbian, and Spanish regulars—at close range. The integration of precision artillery strikes on enemy concentrations and vehicles was cited as particularly effective.

Facing mounting pressure, the task force commander executed a phased withdrawal under smoke, utilizing scout elements for blocking maneuvers and calling in final artillery missions to disrupt pursuit. The action concluded with the enemy advance halted 500 meters from Polana and an orderly retreat of Chernarus forces to the village.

Assessed Outcomes and Implications

The confirmed material losses inflicted on the separatists are significant: three BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles, three heavy MRAPs, and six light armored technicals, alongside "significant infantry casualties." Chernarus forces sustained "moderate infantry casualties" but lost no vehicles and saw no squads rendered combat-ineffective.

The analysis within the report draws two primary conclusions. First, it validates a growing proficiency in intelligence synthesis and tactical agility among brigade and battalion-level commands. Second, it underscores a sobering reality: despite their logistical woes and qualitative issues, separatist forces retain the capacity to assemble and launch credible, combined-arms assaults involving foreign infantry specialists.

The Forward Outlook

The report's recommendations and forecast are pragmatic, anticipating no strategic shift from this tactical success. It calls for maintained alert levels, expanded reconnaissance, and sustained logistics to the Polana sector. The assessment states that while the offensive was a "serious setback" for the enemy, their "strategic imperative to regain initiative remains."

The victory at Polana, therefore, is not portrayed as a war-winning event, but as a successful defensive battle within a longer, grinding conflict. It highlights improved defensive capabilities but simultaneously confirms that the initiative in the northern sector remains contested, with further attacks expected as winter conditions stabilize. The enemy's increased reliance on foreign personnel marks a notable evolution in their force composition, one that will require continued analytical focus.

AFTER ACTION REPORT (AAR) Reference: OP2512-19-6

 TOP SECRET

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - INTELLIGENCE DISTRIBUTION

AFTER ACTION REPORT (AAR)
Reference: OP2512-19-6
Date of Operation: 24 December 2025
Reporting Officer: Colonel Alexey Agopyan, Deputy Head of Intelligence Staff, 1st Army Corps
Date of Report: [CURRENT DATE]

TO:
Colonel Aleksandr Bogomolov, Deputy Chief of Staff, 1st Army Corps
Major General Yuri Stytskovsky, Commander, Chernarus 1st Army Corps
Rear Admiral Igor Kasatonov, Commander Intelligence, ChCOG
Major General Vassily Chernyakov, Senior Staff Intelligence Analyst, ChCOG

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Operation OP2512-19-6, conducted by elements of 1st Battalion, 4th Separate Light Mountain Rifle Brigade, successfully defended the village of Polana against a significant separatist offensive. The operation, based on accurate intelligence, resulted in a decisive tactical victory, repelling enemy forces with substantial losses to their armored and infantry elements while preserving friendly forces and securing the objective.

2. INTELLIGENCE APPRECIATION (PRE-OPERATION)
Brigade and Battalion intelligence staffs, utilizing signals intelligence (SIGINT) from tapped cell phones and hacked emails, coupled with HUMINT from local agents, accurately forecasted a major separatist push south toward Polana. Intercepts revealed enemy command frustration due to degraded logistics, poor recruit quality, and equipment shortages following successful summer campaigns by Chernarus forces. The enemy identified an offensive on Polana as a means to restore operational momentum, intending to employ a combined-arms assault led by light armored vehicles (technical, BMP-1, MRAP) followed by infantry.

3. CHRONOLOGY OF OPERATIONS

• 0700: Operation commenced with overland march by rifle squads.

• ~0735: Forward elements (Scout 1, Scout 2 BRDMs) secured Polana, finding it clear of enemy forces. Task force began preparing defensive positions.

• ~0741: Battalion Command issued new orders via verbal transmission, redirecting the task force approximately 1 km northwest of Polana based on intelligence indicating the main enemy axis of advance.

• Initial Contact: Scout 1 engaged an enemy BRDM on the northwest road and conducted a controlled retreat to a prepared ambush position, supported by Scout 2.

• Force Deployment: Task Force Commander retained 2nd and 3rd Squads in Polana with two reinforcing rifle squads. The Command Squad, 4th Rifle Squad, and two additional reinforcing squads (Reinforcing Squads 2 & 3) maneuvered to the new blocking position northwest of the village.

• Enemy Assault: Enemy launched main assault with BMP-1s and MRAPs, followed by dismounted infantry including Wagner Group operators, Serbian, and Spanish regulars. Enemy infantry maneuvered southwest in an attempt to cut the north-south road and isolate Polana.

• Engagement: Command Squad, supported by Reinforcing Squads 2 & 3, engaged enemy infantry at close range. A sustained 10-minute firefight ensued, supported by effective artillery strikes on enemy concentrations and vehicles.

• Controlled Withdrawal: Under increasing pressure, Task Force Commander employed smoke and ordered a phased withdrawal toward Polana. Scout elements conducted blocking maneuvers per SOP. Three final artillery strikes were called on enemy heavy MRAPs and technicals.

• Conclusion: Enemy advance was halted approximately 500 meters from Polana. Command Squad conducted an orderly retreat south along the main road. The village remained under friendly control.

4. ASSESSMENT OF RESULTS

• Enemy Losses (Confirmed):

  • Armored Vehicles: 3 x BMP-1

  • Protected Mobility: 3 x Heavy MRAP

  • Light Armor/Technicals: 6 units

  • Personnel: Significant infantry casualties, including specialized foreign operators.

  • Method of Destruction: Combined arms; direct anti-tank fire and precision artillery.

• Friendly Losses:

  • Vehicles: None.

  • Personnel: Moderate infantry casualties. No squads rendered combat-ineffective.

• Objective Status: SECURED. The village of Polana was successfully defended and remains under Chernarus control.

5. ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

• Intelligence Validation: Pre-operational intelligence was highly accurate regarding enemy intent, timing, and composition, enabling effective force positioning and tactical adaptation.

• Tactical Execution: The Task Force demonstrated flexibility in repositioning under changing orders and effective combined-arms coordination, particularly in the integration of direct fire, artillery support, and maneuver during the withdrawal.

• Enemy Capabilities: Despite command frustrations and logistical shortcomings noted in intercepts, the enemy demonstrated the ability to concentrate a credible, combined-arms force, including foreign infantry, posing a significant tactical threat.

• Enemy Intent: The failed offensive is assessed as a serious setback for separatist forces in the sector. However, their strategic imperative to regain initiative remains.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Maintain heightened alert and intelligence collection efforts in the northern sector. Separatist commands are likely to plan further offensive actions to regain momentum, especially as winter conditions stabilize.

2. Commend the leadership of the Task Force Commander and the performance of the 1st Battalion, 4th Separate Light Mountain Rifle Brigade. Their actions exemplify effective adaptive tactics under pressure.

3. Continue and expand artillery and aerial reconnaissance patrols to detect future enemy concentrations before they can launch coordinated attacks.

4. Logistics and reinforcement pipelines to the Polana sector should be maintained at current levels to deter and defeat subsequent attacks.

7. OPERATIONAL FORECAST
Brigade and Battalion staffs assess that separatist forces, though bloodied, retain offensive capacity. The victory at Polana is viewed as a critical defensive success, but further attacks are expected to continue as winter progresses. The enemy's reliance on foreign infantry specialists indicates a possible shift in their force generation strategy, warranting continued close intelligence scrutiny.

Report Ends.

Colonel Alexey Agopyan
Deputy Head of Intelligence Staff
1st Army Corps, Chernarus Armed Forces