AFTER ACTION REPORT: REFERENCE NUMBER: OP2512-26-3

 AFTER ACTION REPORT

REFERENCE NUMBER: OP2512-26-3
DATE OF REPORT: 29 DEC 2025
REPORTING OFFICER: Colonel Sergei Glukharev, Deputy Head of Intelligence Staff, 43rd Mountain Rifle Corps

TO:
Brigade Commander, 10th Separate Tank Brigade: Colonel Igor Lifanov
Deputy Corps Commander, 43rd Mountain Rifle Corps: Colonel Nikolai Pisarev
Commander Intelligence, Chernarus Coastal Operations Group (ChCOG): Rear Admiral Igor Kasatonov
ChCOG Senior Staff Intelligence Analyst: Major General Vassily Chernyakov

1. SITUATION
a. Enemy Forces: Intelligence fusion from 1st Bn and 10th Sep Tk Bde, derived from SIGINT, HUMINT, and OSINT, indicated separatist preparations for a mobile offensive in Western North Zagoria. The enemy force composition consisted of a reinforced motorized rifle battalion-equivalent, including:

• Medium and light tracked armor (BMP, tank elements).

• Light wheeled armored vehicles.

• Significant infantry elements, assessed to include Russian militia and Wagner Group PMC operators.
  Intent: Seizure of Panteleimonovka via a movement-to-contact, exploiting a perceived gap in friendly patrol coverage.

b. Terrain: Panteleimonovka is situated in a SE-NW oriented valley with steep, chiseled slopes offering commanding positions over the valley floor. A small forest dominates the NW approach; a large, open area devoid of cover exists to the NE.

c. Friendly Forces: Task Force (TF) OP2512-26-3 was composed of:

• Armor: 3x T-72 (MBT), 2x T-55.

• Mechanized Infantry: 2x BMP Rifle Squads (24 personnel incl. crews).

• Scout: 2x BRDM (Scout 1, Scout 2).

• Dis-mounted Infantry: 4x Rifle Squads (2x Leg, 2x Tank Desant).

• Air Support: 1x Su-25 (on-call).

• CSS: 2x Repair Trucks, 1x Fuel Truck (attached during operation).

2. MISSION
Defend the village of Panteleimonovka against separatist attack on the night of 28 DEC 2025.

3. EXECUTION
At approximately 2200, the TF initiated a tactical road march. The TF Commander and 2nd Squad dismounted 300m south of the village at 2210, engaging and neutralizing an enemy militia screening element. The TF cleared the village against sporadic resistance, including Wagner dismounted operators.

At 2250, 10th Tk Bde Ops issued a FRAGO, directing the TF to establish a blocking position 1km NE of the village to preempt an expected enemy armored thrust. The TF Commander split his force:

• Main Effort (Command Squad + 2x Reinforcing Rifle Squads): Maneuvered to the NE objective and established a defensive perimeter.

• Supporting Effort (Remaining Elements): Continued to secure Panteleimonovka.

At the NE position, the element was engaged by successive enemy armor attacks (BMPs, tanks). At 2320, the TF Command element was neutralized by enemy rotary-wing attack (Wagner gunship). Intensive direct fire from a concentration of no fewer than 4x enemy BMPs inflicted approximately 50% casualties on the Command Squad.

Logistical support was interdicted. A Repair Truck responded to the disabled Command BMP; however, a following Fuel Truck was destroyed by enemy fire. With the position becoming untenable, the acting commander ordered a retrograde to Panteleimonovka at 0015.

The retreat was conducted under pressure. Elements consolidated in the village, mounting survivors on one serviceable BMP, and withdrew to the southern valley edge. One T-72 (Tank 2) was immobilized; recovery failed due to the loss of the second Repair Truck in a traffic accident. Surviving armor and Scout 1 conducted a fighting withdrawal to friendly lines.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT
Combat Service Support (CSS) was degraded and ultimately ineffective. Both Repair Trucks and the Fuel Truck were destroyed or rendered inoperative. This critically hampered vehicle recovery and sustainment during the defensive fight.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
Command and Control broke down following the elimination of the TF Commander and Executive Officer at the NE objective. Subsequent control was exercised by surviving senior NCOs. Communications with higher and supporting elements are assessed to have remained functional.

6. CASUALTIES & EQUIPMENT LOSSES
a. Friendly:

• Personnel: ~50% infantry casualties (KIA/WIA).

• Vehicles (Lost/Abandoned): 1x BMP (Cmd), 1x BRDM, 2x T-55, 1x T-72. All CSS vehicles destroyed.
  b. Enemy (Initial Field Assessment): 2x Tanks, 3x BMP, 3x Light Wheeled Armor destroyed.

7. ASSESSMENT & LESSONS LEARNED
a. Tactical Disposition: The FRAGO-mandated shift to the NE objective, while sound in intent to meet the enemy advance, forced an unfavorable division of forces and placed a subordinate element on open, defensively poor terrain.
b. Armor Employment: Friendly main battle tanks (T-72s) were effectively neutralized by terrain and range. The valley's crestline created a defilade position for approaching enemy armor, and winter night conditions degraded direct fire acquisition. The majority of enemy vehicle kills were achieved by infantry AT and BMP fire.
c. Enemy Tactics: The enemy demonstrated effective combined arms coordination, use of aerial assets for precision strikes on command elements, and aggressive exploitation of CSS vulnerabilities.
d. Intent: 10th Separate Tank Brigade staff is planning follow-on operations in northern sectors. Enemy forces, upon TF withdrawal, did not occupy Panteleimonovka in strength and subsequently retreated northwards.

8. RECOMMENDATIONS

• Review FRAGO issuance protocols to ensure mission feasibility and force preservation are weighted.

• Conduct training on winter/night armor engagement in defilade terrain.

• Enhance forward CSS security and redundancy.

• Analyze enemy use of PMC aerial assets for development of countermeasures.

GLUKHAREV
COL, CRF
Deputy Head of Intelligence, 43rd MR Corps

This is based on the Arma 3 wargame. The report and reporter are AI generated and represents no individual, living or dead. The text of the transcript, while AI generated, is based on data provided by the channel author.