PROPOSAL FOR OPERATION STEADFAST DEFIANCE

 PROPOSAL FOR OPERATION STEADFAST DEFIANCE

TO: CDF High Command, Southern Sector
FROM: G-3 (Operations) and G-2 (Intelligence)
DATE: [Current Date]
SUBJECT: Proposal for a Spoiling Attack in the South Zagoria Sector

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces:
Separatist forces, under the operational command of a Russian captain from a headquarters established in Sinystok, have massed for a major offensive. Intelligence confirms the presence of a separatist Brigade conducting final preparations.

• Composition: The enemy force is a composite group including:

  • Conventional Armor: Medium and heavy tracked vehicles sighted moving through Vavilovo.

  • Professional Infantry: Training grounds established near Vavilovo.

  • Mercenary/Sponsor Forces: Unconfirmed reports of Iranian, Spanish-speaking, and Serbian regulars.

  • Special Operations Forces (SOF): Credible reports of Wagner Group operators and Russian Naval Infantry (Spetsnaz) presence.

  • Irregulars: Local armed civilians, potentially mobilized to battalion strength, a significant increase from previously encountered squad-level elements.

• Capabilities: The enemy can conduct combined-arms operations with artillery support and heavy armor. Their primary threat is a large-scale conventional assault supported by elite units.

• Intentions: The separatists are planning a spoiler offensive to seize the villages of Lopatino, Zabolotye, and Bogatyrka, likely to disrupt CDF defensive lines and establish a foothold before winter.

b. Friendly Forces:
CDF forces currently hold Lopatino. Local constabulary elements are conducting presence patrols but are not equipped for high-intensity conflict.

c. Civilian Considerations:
The enemy is actively using civilian populations in Lopatino and Vavilovo for intelligence gathering. We must anticipate that enemy irregulars will blend in with civilians, complicating targeting and maneuver.

2. MISSION

CDF forces will conduct a two-phase spoiling attack (Operation STEADFAST DEFIANCE) to disrupt enemy offensive preparations, destroy forward-deployed forces and logistics near Vavilovo, and secure the railway and highway crossroads northwest of the village. This operation is designed to seize the initiative and force the enemy to react to our terms.

3. EXECUTION

Concept of Operations: This operation is a deliberate, two-phased spoiling attack. The first phase is a feint to provoke a reaction and confirm enemy strength and positions. The second phase is the main effort, a decisive combined-arms assault to achieve the operation's objectives.

Phase 1: PROVOKE & DECEIVE (D-Day, H-Hour)

• Mission: A light infantry company (+) will conduct a deliberate, high-profile probe north from Lopatino.

• Tasks:

  • Engage and destroy any separatist forward security elements.

  • Simulate the beginning of a larger infantry assault.

  • Upon encountering organized resistance, or after reaching Phase Line (PL) "Iron," conduct a tactical withdrawal back to defensive positions in Lopatino.

  • Purpose: To draw enemy forces out of hiding, confirm the presence of irregulars at higher-than-expected strength, and make the enemy command in Sinystok believe the CDF main effort is an unsupported infantry attack. This will encourage them to commit their reserves prematurely.

Phase 2: DECAPITATE & DISRUPT (D-Day + 24 Hours)

• Mission: A combined-arms task force will launch a penetration attack from Lopatino, seize Vavilovo, and secure Objective "ANVIL" (the railway/highway crossroads 1km NW of Vavilovo).

• Main Effort: 1st Mechanized Battalion.

  • Tasks:

    1. Penetration: With armor and air support, break through any enemy forces reconstituted north of Lopatino. Focus on destroying the identified heavy armor assets.

    2. Seizure of Vavilovo: Clear the village of Vavilovo of enemy combatants, focusing on the logistics and training areas identified by intelligence. Rapid clearance is essential to prevent the enemy from using the town as a strongpoint.

    3. Assault to Objective ANVIL: Push immediately to secure the crossroads. This terrain is key to interdicting enemy supply lines (from Sinystok) and blocking any immediate counterattack route.

• Supporting Effort: CDF Artillery Group.

  • Tasks:

    • Provide counter-battery fire to suppress reported separatist artillery.

    • Conduct preparatory fires on Phase 2 assault routes.

    • Be prepared to deliver priority fires to defeat expected armored counterattacks.

• Air Support: CDF Air Force.

  • Tasks:

    • Provide close air support (CAS) for the seizure of Vavilovo and the advance to Objective ANVIL.

    • Conduct armed reconnaissance to the north and west to monitor enemy reinforcement routes from Sinystok.

    • Be prepared to engage high-value targets, including the reported headquarters element if it moves.

4. ADMINISTRATION & LOGISTICS

• Supply: Priority of supply for Phase 2 will be main battle tank ammunition and anti-armor munitions to counter the expected heavy counterattacks.

• Medical: Establish a casualty collection point in Lopatino. Plan for mass casualty events given the reported presence of enemy heavy weapons.

• Personnel: Ensure all Phase 1 troops are clearly identified and briefed on the deception plan to ensure a convincing performance and a safe withdrawal.

5. COMMAND & SIGNAL

• Command Post: Main CDF Command will remain at [Current Location]. Forward Command Post will establish in Lopatino for the duration of Phase 2.

• Signal: Strict communications security (COMSEC) will be observed prior to Phase 2. Phase 1 radio traffic will be deliberately "sloppy" to feed enemy SIGINT collection as part of the deception plan.

• Succession of Command: Standard CDF protocol.

6. RISK ASSESSMENT & MITIGATION

• Risk 1 (Critical): The enemy SOF elements (Wagner, Naval Infantry) could conduct a flanking attack on our armor.

  • Mitigation: Air support and reconnaissance will maintain constant surveillance of the flanks. Reserve forces will be positioned to counter such a move.

• Risk 2 (High): Irregular forces using civilian shields in Vavilovo.

  • Mitigation: Use precision munitions where possible. Loudspeaker teams will be attached to lead elements to broadcast warnings to civilians in Russian to vacate the area. Rules of Engagement (ROE) will be reinforced.

• Risk 3 (High): The enemy headquarters in Sinystok launches an immediate, massive counterattack with all available forces before we can consolidate Objective ANVIL.

  • Mitigation: Speed is critical. We must seize the crossroads quickly and establish a strong defensive posture. Air power will be essential in attriting the second wave of enemy reinforcements before they reach our positions. Phase 1 is designed to make them overcommit.

Conclusion: Operation STEADFAST DEFIANCE directly addresses the imminent threat. By using a deception operation followed by a concentrated, combined-arms punch, we can disrupt the separatists' build-up, destroy their combat power forward, and seize key terrain, thereby regaining the initiative and securing the southern sector.

Brigade Commander Details Three Successful Strikes; Casualties "Moderate," Vehicle Losses "Irreplaceable"

In an exclusive interview, Colonel Igor Lifanov of the 10th Separate Tank Brigade provides a tactical account of recent operations while adhering to the strict constraints of the General Political Agreement.

By Svetlana Golikova, National Defense Writer, Zelenogorsk Pravda

ZELENOGORSK — In the fog of war that blankets the North Zagoria conflict zone, separating victory from defeat often depends on which headquarters is releasing the report. In an exclusive interview this week, I sat down with Colonel Igor Lifanov, Commander of the 10th Separate Tank Brigade, to get a ground-truth assessment of three controversial engagements that have sparked fierce debate among military observers.

Facing rumors ranging from catastrophic defeat to effortless victory, Colonel Lifanov provided a clear-eyed assessment of his brigade’s recent actions in the villages of Novoselovka Perviy, Volnovakha, and Yelenovka. The picture he paints is one of operational success achieved at a significant, and sometimes "irreplaceable," material cost.

"We have been successful in the last three operations in either capturing towns and villages held by the enemy or preventing the enemy from capturing friendly towns," Col. Lifanov stated, setting a definitive tone regarding the outcomes.

Clearing Novoselovka Amidst Atrocity

The first operation, conducted in the village of Novoselovka Perviy, saw a brigade task force assault and clear separatist forces. While the military objective was achieved, the operation was overshadowed by a horrific discovery made prior to the assault.

Colonel Lifanov confirmed that his tactical commanders were aware of intelligence regarding the massacre of civilians by separatist-aligned "local levies" before the battle commenced. These reports, some of which have surfaced on social media and in podcasts by local residents, detail armed men rounding up civilians, loading them onto a bus, and executing them just outside the village.

"We know from sources within the village... that armed men had gathered up a number of civilians, loaded them into a bus, drove in a short distance from the village, for them to dismount, and then they were shot," Lifanov told me, his tone grave. He stated that the Task Force commander on the ground was specifically ordered to document the site. Photographs of the mass grave were taken and have been forwarded to brigade and corps-level intelligence, as well as criminal investigation staffs. "At the moment, that is all we can say about it," he added, noting that tactical conditions prevented any forensic work at the time.

Daylight Assault and Armored Losses

Regarding the subsequent battles, Colonel Lifanov was transparent about the cost of victory. In Volnovakha, during a daylight battle to recapture the village, the brigade lost one T-72 tank permanently. Two others were damaged but, thanks to the skill of maintenance crews, were "quickly returned to service."

Similarly, in Yelenovka, where troops intercepted a major enemy force attempting to capture the village, the brigade inflicted significant damage on separatist mobile units but again suffered the loss of a T-72, with another damaged and repaired.

The heaviest material losses occurred during the initial operation at Novoselovka. "Our forces suffered heavy damage, with one T-72 lost and one BTR lost," Lifanov reported. "Both were irreplaceable losses."

Despite these losses, the Colonel characterized overall personnel casualties as "moderate," based on preliminary reports, though he acknowledged he has yet to receive final numbers. This contradicts unofficial reports that have suggested regional hospitals and clinics are overwhelmed with casualties.

The GPA Mandate: "We Do Not Hold Territory"

Perhaps the most critical aspect of the interview addressed the strategic reality of the conflict. Despite the blood and treasure spent to secure these villages, Colonel Lifanov confirmed that Chernarusan forces are no longer in control of them.

"As you must be aware from the General Political Agreement (GPA), our forces will not be present in any of these towns or villages once the operation is concluded," he explained. Reinforcements are typically withdrawn within 12 to 24 hours, leaving the villages in civilian hands, regardless of the military outcome.

So, do we control the ground we fought for? I asked.

"By law and by the terms of the GPA, our forces are not allowed to hold any of these locales," Lifanov clarified. "They must be and remain in civilian control. The only time our forces will be in control is when we are encountering enemy forces. In those cases, they will be defeated."

When asked what is next for the brigade, the Colonel’s answer was stoic and placed the onus back on the separatists. "What is next is up to them."

The interview confirms that while the 10th Separate Tank Brigade continues to fulfill its tactical missions effectively, the strategic landscape of North Zagoria remains a volatile patchwork, where victories are measured in enemy casualties inflicted rather than territory held, and where the ghosts of atrocities like the one in Novoselovka Perviy continue to haunt the battlefields.

From catastrophe to Victory: Air assault troops rescue civilians in daring Ivanovka campaign

 ZELENOGORSK PRAVDA

"Truth in Service of the Nation"

Senior Defense Correspondent Svetlana Golikova Reports on Three Battles That Defined the Regiment

ZELENOGORSK — In the frozen villages of the Ivanovka region, the men of the Chernarus 31st Separate Air Assault Regiment lived through every soldier's nightmare—and then they did something remarkable.

They learned.

Zelenogorsk Pravda has obtained the classified after-action report for three consecutive operations conducted in late February and early March: Troitskoye, Ryakovo, and Belorovka. Together, they tell a story of catastrophic failure, rapid adaptation, and ultimately, the rescue of innocent civilians from the hands of an enemy that showed them no mercy.

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PART I: TROITSKOYE — 'THE TANKS COMPLETELY SHOT US UP'

It began as a probe.

Intelligence from local agents, drone overflights, and intercepted communications had revealed that separatist forces were planning to push their front line southward by three to four kilometers. But first, they needed to know exactly where our defenses were positioned. Their chosen instrument was the village of Troitskoye.

"Past experiences at Troitskoye had shown that the enemy wanted to push their vehicles directly into town," the after-action report notes clinically. "But 2nd Battalion is primarily light infantry, so anti-tank weapons are not as effective."

The task force commander knew the risks. His plan was sound: transport helicopters would land 500 meters south of the village, infantry would advance, and six anti-tank teams would establish ambush positions for inbound enemy armor. Two Su-25 ground attack fighters and two Mi-24 gunships would provide support.

The enemy had other plans.

First came the infantry—multiple squads of special forces, including Wagner Group operators and Russian naval infantry. They were "highly motivated and prepared to breach the village's defensive cordon." Our rifle squads fought them back, driving them north with only moderate casualties.

Then came the armor.

"The separatists threw their armor, both wheeled and heavy tracked, into the village. Many of those vehicles were destroyed by infantry anti-tank teams, but three of them our forces were unable to stop."

Those three tanks changed everything.

"The tanks completely shot up our infantry deployment, inflicting catastrophic casualties on our forces."

When the smoke cleared, the task force had suffered approximately 90 percent infantry casualties and 90 percent helicopter losses. Battalion command had failed to make reinforcing infantry available—a decision that would be hotly debated in the aftermath.

"We lost good people and valuable equipment," Regimental Commander Major Vyacheslav Abyshkin would later write. "But the Regiment did not break."

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PART II: RYAKOVO — MINES, LOGISTICS, AND HIT LISTS

The Regiment had less than 24 hours to process what had happened at Troitskoye before the next operation presented itself.

Intelligence staffs had been working through the night, tapping cell phones, debriefing agents, piecing together the enemy's next move. The separatists had taken over the village of Ryakovo. They were establishing a logistical base and reinforcing with armor.

This time, the Regiment would be ready.

Corps-level engineers attached a small unit to the infantry, equipped with anti-vehicle mines. Their instructions: plant mines along as many ingress routes as possible, causing mobility problems for heavy armor and outright kills for light wheeled vehicles.

The tactical plan called for troops to land in a straight line as close as possible within 500 meters, then penetrate the enemy's defensive cordon. All four rifle squads would then occupy north-facing positions and hold.

What happened next was almost lost before it began.

Two of the four transport birds were hit and shot down nearly immediately by enemy heavy tracked armor. The other two were seriously damaged and unable to continue.

But the four rifle squads had landed so close to the village—less than 250 meters for Command Squad—that they survived intact and began their penetration.

Command Squad advanced from the southwest, locating and eliminating two civilian criminal command operatives. In the process, they seized intelligence data that would send chills through the local population: a pair of hit lists targeting civilians.

As the infantry continued clearing the village, the commander marched his squad north. Their objective: enemy logistics. They found two ammunition vehicles and one fuel vehicle. All three were destroyed.

Before withdrawing, the commander moved to the main north-south road west of the area of operations and planted a series of M6 SLAM mines. Then he pulled his forces back into the village, established a defensive cordon, and awaited the counterattack that never came.

Battalion command ordered a withdrawal. The mission was complete.

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PART III: BELOROVKA — 'TORTURED AND KILLED'

The third operation in the series was different from the start.

Intelligence on enemy deployment at Belorovka was light. But local friendly agents sent urgent messages: three, possibly four civilians were being held prisoner in the village by an enemy counterintelligence unit.

At the time, planning staffs did not know who the prisoners were or their importance.

They would learn soon enough.

One of the female prisoners was a village chief from a nearby settlement, arrested earlier that day along with her husband and her sister. A fourth prisoner—another woman—would be discovered by our forces having been tortured and killed.

The task force commander, having learned the brutal lesson of Troitskoye, ordered transport birds to land no closer than 500 meters from the village edge. The terrain around Belorovka enabled forces to penetrate the enemy defensive cordon effectively.

Along the way, the task force encountered several Wagner Group operators. They were cleared away efficiently. The remainder of the force moved into defensible positions within the village as Command Squad continued pushing north.

M6 SLAM mines were deployed. Enemy counterattacks, when they came, were scattered and light.

When the order came from battalion command to withdraw, the task force boarded their birds. There were zero losses among transport helicopters, zero losses among gunships. Infantry casualties were very light.

And the village chief, her husband, and her sister were alive.

The fourth prisoner—the one who had been tortured—was not.

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THE LINE THEY HOLD

Today, our forces hold a thin line ranging from Belorovka to Ryakovo.

"It's not expected to hold in the coming weeks," the after-action report admits with brutal honesty.

But for the moment, it holds. And the civilians of those villages sleep in their own homes, not in separatist basements.

"The two air assault operations following the catastrophic Troitskoye operation were demonstrative of how flexible headquarters command and tactical command staffs are in wide-ranging operations," the report concludes.

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'THIS IS WHAT LEARNING LOOKS LIKE'

In his formal comments appended to the report, Regimental Commander Major Vyacheslav Abyshkin wrote words that deserve to be read by every citizen of Chernarus:

"The Troitskoye operation was a catastrophe. We lost good people and valuable equipment. But the Regiment did not break. Within days, we returned to Ryakovo and Belorovka and accomplished our missions with minimal losses.

"This is what adaptability looks like. This is what learning looks like.

"We have identified the failures at Troitskoye. They will not be repeated."

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WHAT COMES NEXT

The Regiment's after-action report includes a series of recommendations:

• Reinforce the Belorovka-Ryakovo line immediately

• Expand minefields along enemy approaches

• Maintain 500-meter minimum insertion distances when enemy armor is confirmed

• Issue additional disposable anti-tank weapons to light infantry units

For the families of those lost at Troitskoye, the recommendations are cold comfort. For the villagers of Belorovka who now sleep safely, they are everything.

And for the enemy who thought they could push our lines south, who thought they could torture and kill civilians with impunity, the message is clear:

The 31st Separate Air Assault Regiment learned from catastrophe. They adapted. They came back.

And they will come again.

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Contact Svetlana Golikova at s.golikova@zelenogorsk-pravda.chernarus

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Editor's Note: Some operational details have been withheld or altered at the request of Chernarus Coastal Operations Group. The names of certain personnel and rescued civilians have been omitted to protect operational security and individual privacy.

31st Separate Air Assault Regiment After Action Report: Ivanovka Region Operations

 RESTRICTED//OPERATIONAL SECURITY

31st Separate Air Assault Regiment After Action Report: Ivanovka Region Operations

TO:
Major Vyacheslav Abyshkin, Regimental Commander, 31st Separate Air Assault Regiment
Colonel Irina Volkova, ChCOG Senior Staff Engineer Analyst
Vice Admiral Boris Kravchuck, Deputy Commander, ChCOG
Rear Admiral Igor Kasatonov, Commander Intelligence, ChCOG

FROM:
Captain Ilya Kostritsa, Deputy Head of Intelligence Staff, 31st Separate Air Assault Regiment

DATE: 7 March 2026

CLASSIFICATION: RESTRICTED//OPERATIONAL SECURITY

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report analyzes three consecutive air assault operations conducted by 2nd Battalion, 31st Separate Air Assault Regiment in the Ivanovka region between late February and early March 2025:

• OP2602-27-3 (Troitskoye) — Catastrophic losses; nearly 90% infantry and helicopter casualties

• OP2602-28-7 (Ryakovo) — Successful clearance; enemy logistics destroyed; prisoners' hit lists recovered

• OP2603-06-1 (Belorovka) — Successful rescue operation; civilian prisoners recovered; minimal casualties

The operations demonstrate the Regiment's ability to adapt and learn from catastrophic failure. Following the near-destruction of the task force at Troitskoye, tactical and intelligence lessons were applied immediately, resulting in two successive victories at Ryakovo and Belorovka. However, the current defensive line from Belorovka to Ryakovo remains thin and is not expected to hold in the coming weeks without reinforcement.

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1. OPERATION TROITSKOYE (OP2602-27-3)

1.1 Intelligence Preparation

43rd Mountain Rifle Corps intelligence staff compiled information from multiple sources:

Source Type	Intelligence Gathered
Local friendly agents	Scattered reports across northern tier villages in corps AO
Drone overflights	Incidental surveillance of enemy positions
Social media	Civilian and military accounts indicating enemy movements
Prisoner interrogations	Confirmation of enemy operational planning

Key Finding: Separatists planned a series of operations to push their front line southward 3-4 kilometers. However, enemy command staffs remained uncertain of our frontline positions despite heightened reconnaissance. To resolve this uncertainty, separatist command ordered an operational-level probe into Troitskoye.

Enemy Tactical Pattern: Past experiences at Troitskoye demonstrated the enemy's preference for pushing vehicles directly into town to eliminate any forces encountered.

1.2 Friendly Forces & Limitations

• Unit: 2nd Battalion, 31st Separate Air Assault Regiment

• Composition: Primarily light infantry

• Challenge: Anti-tank weapons less effective against heavy armor

• Air Support: 2x Su-25 ground interdiction fighters, 2x Mi-24 gunships

1.3 Battle Plan

The task force commander ordered:

1. Insertion: Transport helicopters land 500 meters south of village; infantry advances into town

2. Deployment:

   • 3rd Squad designated as fire brigade

   • 2nd and 4th Squads positioned near main north-south road

   • Six infantry anti-tank teams inserted into village to establish ambush positions for inbound enemy armor

3. Final Preparation: Command Squad ordered to dig in and prepare to intercept inbound enemy vehicles

1.4 The Battle

Phase 1: Infantry Engagement

• Enemy committed multiple squads of special forces, including:

  • Wagner Group operators

  • Russian naval infantry special forces

• All were highly motivated and prepared to breach the village's defensive cordon

• All three rifle squads performed well, driving back enemy infantry attacks to the north

• Friendly casualties: Moderate

Phase 2: Armor Engagement

• Enemy committed both wheeled and heavy tracked armor into the village

• Infantry anti-tank teams destroyed many vehicles

• Three enemy tanks could not be stopped

• These tanks completely suppressed our infantry deployment

Casualties:

• Infantry: Approximately 90%

• Helicopters: Approximately 90%

• Additional Factor: Battalion command failed to make reinforcing infantry available for Troitskoye

1.5 Enemy Losses (Troitskoye)

Cause	Vehicles Destroyed
Infantry anti-tank	5
Air support (Su-25/Mi-24)	7 damaged or destroyed

1.6 Outcome

Remnants of the task force retreated to base. The operation was a catastrophic failure in terms of friendly losses, though it absorbed a significant enemy assault that might otherwise have been directed elsewhere.

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2. OPERATION RYAKOVO (OP2602-28-7)

2.1 Intelligence Preparation

Immediately following the Troitskoye operation, intelligence staffs at corps and regiment level began collecting on subsequent enemy plans:

Source Type	Intelligence Gathered
Tapped/recorded cell phones	Confirmed enemy intentions
Local friendly agents	Reported enemy takeover of Ryakovo

Key Findings:

• Enemy had occupied Ryakovo

• They were establishing a logistical base

• Village was reinforced with armor (specific types unknown)

Engineer Support: Corps-level engineer commanders attached a small engineer unit to the infantry, equipped with anti-vehicle mines. Their mission: plant mines along ingress routes to create mobility problems for enemy heavy armor and destroy light wheeled armor.

2.2 Battle Plan (OP2602-28-7)

1. Insertion: Troops landed in a straight line as close as possible within 500 meters of village

2. Initial Assault: All four rifle squads penetrate enemy defensive cordon

3. Defensive Position: Squads occupy north-facing positions and prepare to hold against enemy attack

4. Command Squad Insertion: Transport bird lands less than 250 meters from southern edge of village

2.3 Critical Incident

• Two of four transport birds were hit and shot down nearly immediately by enemy heavy tracked armor

• The other two transport birds were seriously damaged and unable to continue

• All four rifle squads survived intact due to proximity to village edge and began penetration operations

2.4 The Battle

Command Squad Actions:

• Advanced from southwest into village

• Located and eliminated two civilian criminal command operatives

• Intelligence Recovered: Critical documents including a pair of hit lists targeting local civilians

Logistics Destruction:

• Command Squad marched north

• Located enemy logistics assets:

  • 2x ammunition vehicles

  • 1x fuel vehicle

• Destroyed all three, completely eliminating enemy logistics in the area

Mine Deployment:

• Commander moved to main north-south road west of AO

• Planted series of M6 SLAM mines

• Withdrew forces back into village and established defensive cordon

Withdrawal:

• Battalion command staff issued order to withdraw and return to base

• Enemy counterattack did not materialize before extraction

2.5 Outcome

Successful clearance operation. Enemy logistics destroyed. Critical intelligence recovered.

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3. OPERATION BELOROVKA (OP2603-06-1)

3.1 Intelligence Preparation

Intelligence on enemy deployment at Belorovka was limited. Primary intelligence came from local friendly agents reporting that 3-4 civilians were being held prisoner in the village by an enemy counterintelligence unit.

Prisoner Identification (Post-Operation):

• Female village chief from nearby village

• Her husband

• Her sister

• A fourth female prisoner discovered tortured and killed

3.2 Battle Plan

Based on lessons from Troitskoye:

• Insertion: Transport birds required to land no closer than 500 meters from village edge

• Terrain Advantage: Surrounding terrain enabled covered penetration of enemy defensive cordon

3.3 The Battle

Penetration:

• Task force encountered Wagner Group operators during advance

• Enemy cleared away efficiently

• Remainder of task force moved into defensible positions within village

Command Squad Actions:

• Continued push north

• Deployed M6 SLAM mines to cover approaches

Enemy Response:

• Counterattacks were scattered and light

• Quickly defeated

Extraction:

• Battalion command staff ordered withdrawal

• Task force boarded transport birds

• Village secured by reinforcing forces

3.4 Casualties

Category	Losses
Infantry	Very light
Transport birds	Zero
Gunships	Zero

3.5 Outcome

Successful rescue operation. Village secured. Civilian prisoners recovered (one deceased, tortured).

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4. ENEMY LOSSES (AGGREGATE)

Operation	Vehicles Destroyed (Infantry)	Vehicles Destroyed (Air)	Notes
Troitskoye	5	7	Heavy enemy special forces commitment
Ryakovo	Unconfirmed	Unconfirmed	Logistics vehicles destroyed
Belorovka	Light	None	Scattered counterattacks

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5. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

5.1 Operational Progression

The three operations demonstrate a clear learning curve:

1. Troitskoye (Failure):

   • Over-reliance on anti-tank teams against heavy armor

   • Insufficient reinforcing infantry

   • Catastrophic losses: 90% infantry and helicopters

2. Ryakovo (Success):

   • Mine warfare integrated effectively

   • Logistics destruction achieved

   • Intelligence recovered (hit lists)

3. Belorovka (Success):

   • Proper insertion distance (500m)

   • Minimal casualties

   • Civilian rescue accomplished

5.2 Critical Success Factors

1. Intelligence Adaptability: Immediate collection on enemy follow-on plans after Troitskoye

2. Engineer Integration: Mines proved decisive at Ryakovo

3. Tactical Flexibility: Commanders adjusted insertion distances based on lessons learned

4. Air Support Coordination: Su-25 and Mi-24 effectively engaged armor at Troitskoye despite friendly losses

5.3 Critical Failures (Troitskoye)

1. Reinforcement Failure: Battalion command did not make infantry available

2. Armor Vulnerability: Light infantry insufficient against heavy armor without adequate support

3. Insertion Distance: 500 meters proved too close with enemy armor present

5.4 Current Situation

• Friendly forces hold a thin line from Belorovka to Ryakovo

• Assessment: Line is not expected to hold in coming weeks without reinforcement

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6. RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Immediate Actions

1. Reinforce the Line: Commit additional infantry to Belorovka-Ryakovo sector immediately

2. Minefield Expansion: Deploy additional engineer assets to layer minefields along approaches

3. Intel Collection: Aggressive drone coverage to detect enemy buildup

6.2 Future Operations

1. Air Assault Doctrine Update: Mandate 500m minimum insertion distance when enemy armor confirmed

2. Anti-Tank Enhancement: Issue additional disposable anti-tank weapons to light infantry units

3. Reinforcement Protocol: Establish clear chain for requesting reinforcing infantry

6.3 Long-Term Recommendations

1. Develop dedicated anti-armor platoons within air assault battalions

2. Pre-position mine stocks at battalion forward operating bases

3. Integrate prisoner rescue protocols into standard operating procedures

4. Document and disseminate lessons from Troitskoye to all air assault units

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7. COMMANDER'S COMMENTS

The Troitskoye operation was a catastrophe. We lost good people and valuable equipment. But the Regiment did not break. Within days, we returned to Ryakovo and Belorovka and accomplished our missions with minimal losses.

This is what adaptability looks like. This is what learning looks like.

We have identified the failures at Troitskoye. They will not be repeated.

The line from Belorovka to Ryakovo is thin. But it is ours. We will hold it until reinforcements arrive.

— Major Vyacheslav Abyshkin
Commander, 31st Separate Air Assault Regiment

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8. DISTRIBUTION

• Regimental Commander, 31st Separate Air Assault Regiment (Maj. Abyshkin)

• ChCOG Senior Staff Engineer Analyst (Col. Volkova)

• Deputy Commander, ChCOG (Vice Adm. Kravchuck)

• Commander Intelligence, ChCOG (Rear Adm. Kasatonov)

• 43rd Mountain Rifle Corps Intelligence Staff

• 2nd Battalion, 31st Separate Air Assault Regiment

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Captain Ilya Kostritsa
Deputy Head of Intelligence Staff
31st Separate Air Assault Regiment
Chernarus Defense Forces

CLASSIFICATION: RESTRICTED//OPERATIONAL SECURITY