RESTRICTED//OPERATIONAL SECURITY
31st Separate Air Assault Regiment After Action Report: Ivanovka Region Operations
TO:
Major Vyacheslav Abyshkin, Regimental Commander, 31st Separate Air Assault Regiment
Colonel Irina Volkova, ChCOG Senior Staff Engineer Analyst
Vice Admiral Boris Kravchuck, Deputy Commander, ChCOG
Rear Admiral Igor Kasatonov, Commander Intelligence, ChCOG
FROM:
Captain Ilya Kostritsa, Deputy Head of Intelligence Staff, 31st Separate Air Assault Regiment
DATE: 7 March 2026
CLASSIFICATION: RESTRICTED//OPERATIONAL SECURITY
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report analyzes three consecutive air assault operations conducted by 2nd Battalion, 31st Separate Air Assault Regiment in the Ivanovka region between late February and early March 2025:
OP2602-27-3 (Troitskoye) — Catastrophic losses; nearly 90% infantry and helicopter casualties
OP2602-28-7 (Ryakovo) — Successful clearance; enemy logistics destroyed; prisoners' hit lists recovered
OP2603-06-1 (Belorovka) — Successful rescue operation; civilian prisoners recovered; minimal casualties
The operations demonstrate the Regiment's ability to adapt and learn from catastrophic failure. Following the near-destruction of the task force at Troitskoye, tactical and intelligence lessons were applied immediately, resulting in two successive victories at Ryakovo and Belorovka. However, the current defensive line from Belorovka to Ryakovo remains thin and is not expected to hold in the coming weeks without reinforcement.
1. OPERATION TROITSKOYE (OP2602-27-3)
1.1 Intelligence Preparation
43rd Mountain Rifle Corps intelligence staff compiled information from multiple sources:
| Source Type | Intelligence Gathered |
|---|---|
| Local friendly agents | Scattered reports across northern tier villages in corps AO |
| Drone overflights | Incidental surveillance of enemy positions |
| Social media | Civilian and military accounts indicating enemy movements |
| Prisoner interrogations | Confirmation of enemy operational planning |
Key Finding: Separatists planned a series of operations to push their front line southward 3-4 kilometers. However, enemy command staffs remained uncertain of our frontline positions despite heightened reconnaissance. To resolve this uncertainty, separatist command ordered an operational-level probe into Troitskoye.
Enemy Tactical Pattern: Past experiences at Troitskoye demonstrated the enemy's preference for pushing vehicles directly into town to eliminate any forces encountered.
1.2 Friendly Forces & Limitations
Unit: 2nd Battalion, 31st Separate Air Assault Regiment
Composition: Primarily light infantry
Challenge: Anti-tank weapons less effective against heavy armor
Air Support: 2x Su-25 ground interdiction fighters, 2x Mi-24 gunships
1.3 Battle Plan
The task force commander ordered:
Insertion: Transport helicopters land 500 meters south of village; infantry advances into town
Deployment:
3rd Squad designated as fire brigade
2nd and 4th Squads positioned near main north-south road
Six infantry anti-tank teams inserted into village to establish ambush positions for inbound enemy armor
Final Preparation: Command Squad ordered to dig in and prepare to intercept inbound enemy vehicles
1.4 The Battle
Phase 1: Infantry Engagement
Enemy committed multiple squads of special forces, including:
Wagner Group operators
Russian naval infantry special forces
All were highly motivated and prepared to breach the village's defensive cordon
All three rifle squads performed well, driving back enemy infantry attacks to the north
Friendly casualties: Moderate
Phase 2: Armor Engagement
Enemy committed both wheeled and heavy tracked armor into the village
Infantry anti-tank teams destroyed many vehicles
Three enemy tanks could not be stopped
These tanks completely suppressed our infantry deployment
Casualties:
Infantry: Approximately 90%
Helicopters: Approximately 90%
Additional Factor: Battalion command failed to make reinforcing infantry available for Troitskoye
1.5 Enemy Losses (Troitskoye)
| Cause | Vehicles Destroyed |
|---|---|
| Infantry anti-tank | 5 |
| Air support (Su-25/Mi-24) | 7 damaged or destroyed |
1.6 Outcome
Remnants of the task force retreated to base. The operation was a catastrophic failure in terms of friendly losses, though it absorbed a significant enemy assault that might otherwise have been directed elsewhere.
2. OPERATION RYAKOVO (OP2602-28-7)
2.1 Intelligence Preparation
Immediately following the Troitskoye operation, intelligence staffs at corps and regiment level began collecting on subsequent enemy plans:
| Source Type | Intelligence Gathered |
|---|---|
| Tapped/recorded cell phones | Confirmed enemy intentions |
| Local friendly agents | Reported enemy takeover of Ryakovo |
Key Findings:
Enemy had occupied Ryakovo
They were establishing a logistical base
Village was reinforced with armor (specific types unknown)
Engineer Support: Corps-level engineer commanders attached a small engineer unit to the infantry, equipped with anti-vehicle mines. Their mission: plant mines along ingress routes to create mobility problems for enemy heavy armor and destroy light wheeled armor.
2.2 Battle Plan (OP2602-28-7)
Insertion: Troops landed in a straight line as close as possible within 500 meters of village
Initial Assault: All four rifle squads penetrate enemy defensive cordon
Defensive Position: Squads occupy north-facing positions and prepare to hold against enemy attack
Command Squad Insertion: Transport bird lands less than 250 meters from southern edge of village
2.3 Critical Incident
Two of four transport birds were hit and shot down nearly immediately by enemy heavy tracked armor
The other two transport birds were seriously damaged and unable to continue
All four rifle squads survived intact due to proximity to village edge and began penetration operations
2.4 The Battle
Command Squad Actions:
Advanced from southwest into village
Located and eliminated two civilian criminal command operatives
Intelligence Recovered: Critical documents including a pair of hit lists targeting local civilians
Logistics Destruction:
Command Squad marched north
Located enemy logistics assets:
2x ammunition vehicles
1x fuel vehicle
Destroyed all three, completely eliminating enemy logistics in the area
Mine Deployment:
Commander moved to main north-south road west of AO
Planted series of M6 SLAM mines
Withdrew forces back into village and established defensive cordon
Withdrawal:
Battalion command staff issued order to withdraw and return to base
Enemy counterattack did not materialize before extraction
2.5 Outcome
Successful clearance operation. Enemy logistics destroyed. Critical intelligence recovered.
3. OPERATION BELOROVKA (OP2603-06-1)
3.1 Intelligence Preparation
Intelligence on enemy deployment at Belorovka was limited. Primary intelligence came from local friendly agents reporting that 3-4 civilians were being held prisoner in the village by an enemy counterintelligence unit.
Prisoner Identification (Post-Operation):
Female village chief from nearby village
Her husband
Her sister
A fourth female prisoner discovered tortured and killed
3.2 Battle Plan
Based on lessons from Troitskoye:
Insertion: Transport birds required to land no closer than 500 meters from village edge
Terrain Advantage: Surrounding terrain enabled covered penetration of enemy defensive cordon
3.3 The Battle
Penetration:
Task force encountered Wagner Group operators during advance
Enemy cleared away efficiently
Remainder of task force moved into defensible positions within village
Command Squad Actions:
Continued push north
Deployed M6 SLAM mines to cover approaches
Enemy Response:
Counterattacks were scattered and light
Quickly defeated
Extraction:
Battalion command staff ordered withdrawal
Task force boarded transport birds
Village secured by reinforcing forces
3.4 Casualties
| Category | Losses |
|---|---|
| Infantry | Very light |
| Transport birds | Zero |
| Gunships | Zero |
3.5 Outcome
Successful rescue operation. Village secured. Civilian prisoners recovered (one deceased, tortured).
4. ENEMY LOSSES (AGGREGATE)
| Operation | Vehicles Destroyed (Infantry) | Vehicles Destroyed (Air) | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Troitskoye | 5 | 7 | Heavy enemy special forces commitment |
| Ryakovo | Unconfirmed | Unconfirmed | Logistics vehicles destroyed |
| Belorovka | Light | None | Scattered counterattacks |
5. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
5.1 Operational Progression
The three operations demonstrate a clear learning curve:
Troitskoye (Failure):
Over-reliance on anti-tank teams against heavy armor
Insufficient reinforcing infantry
Catastrophic losses: 90% infantry and helicopters
Ryakovo (Success):
Mine warfare integrated effectively
Logistics destruction achieved
Intelligence recovered (hit lists)
Belorovka (Success):
Proper insertion distance (500m)
Minimal casualties
Civilian rescue accomplished
5.2 Critical Success Factors
Intelligence Adaptability: Immediate collection on enemy follow-on plans after Troitskoye
Engineer Integration: Mines proved decisive at Ryakovo
Tactical Flexibility: Commanders adjusted insertion distances based on lessons learned
Air Support Coordination: Su-25 and Mi-24 effectively engaged armor at Troitskoye despite friendly losses
5.3 Critical Failures (Troitskoye)
Reinforcement Failure: Battalion command did not make infantry available
Armor Vulnerability: Light infantry insufficient against heavy armor without adequate support
Insertion Distance: 500 meters proved too close with enemy armor present
5.4 Current Situation
Friendly forces hold a thin line from Belorovka to Ryakovo
Assessment: Line is not expected to hold in coming weeks without reinforcement
6. RECOMMENDATIONS
6.1 Immediate Actions
Reinforce the Line: Commit additional infantry to Belorovka-Ryakovo sector immediately
Minefield Expansion: Deploy additional engineer assets to layer minefields along approaches
Intel Collection: Aggressive drone coverage to detect enemy buildup
6.2 Future Operations
Air Assault Doctrine Update: Mandate 500m minimum insertion distance when enemy armor confirmed
Anti-Tank Enhancement: Issue additional disposable anti-tank weapons to light infantry units
Reinforcement Protocol: Establish clear chain for requesting reinforcing infantry
6.3 Long-Term Recommendations
Develop dedicated anti-armor platoons within air assault battalions
Pre-position mine stocks at battalion forward operating bases
Integrate prisoner rescue protocols into standard operating procedures
Document and disseminate lessons from Troitskoye to all air assault units
7. COMMANDER'S COMMENTS
The Troitskoye operation was a catastrophe. We lost good people and valuable equipment. But the Regiment did not break. Within days, we returned to Ryakovo and Belorovka and accomplished our missions with minimal losses.
This is what adaptability looks like. This is what learning looks like.
We have identified the failures at Troitskoye. They will not be repeated.
The line from Belorovka to Ryakovo is thin. But it is ours. We will hold it until reinforcements arrive.
— Major Vyacheslav Abyshkin
Commander, 31st Separate Air Assault Regiment
8. DISTRIBUTION
Regimental Commander, 31st Separate Air Assault Regiment (Maj. Abyshkin)
ChCOG Senior Staff Engineer Analyst (Col. Volkova)
Deputy Commander, ChCOG (Vice Adm. Kravchuck)
Commander Intelligence, ChCOG (Rear Adm. Kasatonov)
43rd Mountain Rifle Corps Intelligence Staff
2nd Battalion, 31st Separate Air Assault Regiment
Captain Ilya Kostritsa
Deputy Head of Intelligence Staff
31st Separate Air Assault Regiment
Chernarus Defense Forces
CLASSIFICATION: RESTRICTED//OPERATIONAL SECURITY
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