RESTRICTED//OPERATIONAL SECURITY
3rd Tank Brigade After Action Report: OP2602-20-7 (Krasnoye Pole)
TO:
Major General Vadim Nabokov, Commander 2nd Army Corps
Major General Vassily Chernyakov, ChCOG Staff Intelligence Analyst
Colonel Irina Volkova, ChCOG Staff Engineer Analyst
FROM:
Colonel Denis Rozhkov, Deputy Head of Intelligence Staff, 3rd Tank Brigade
DATE: 26 February 2026
CLASSIFICATION: RESTRICTED//OPERATIONAL SECURITY
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
On 25 February 2026, 3rd Tank Brigade conducted defensive Operation KRASNOYE POLE (OP2602-20-7) to prevent separatist forces from seizing the village of Krasnoye Pole as a staging point for a larger offensive against the critical grain processing center at Spornoye. Despite inflicting approximately 75% casualties on enemy armored forces, friendly forces sustained catastrophic losses including three T-72 tanks, both BMPs, and the task force commander. The operation succeeded in its primary objective of denying the enemy control of Krasnoye Pole, but at unacceptable cost due to command decisions extending the defensive perimeter beyond tactically defensible positions.
1. SITUATION AND INTELLIGENCE
1.1 Enemy Situation
Intent: Capture Krasnoye Pole as supporting effort to main offensive on Spornoye grain facility
Motivation: Critical fuel shortages requiring seizure of regional grain and fuel reserves
Composition: Combined arms force of approximately 20 vehicles (tanks, BMPs, technicals) plus infantry
Disposition: Initial elements had already occupied portions of Krasnoye Pole prior to friendly arrival
1.2 Intelligence Sources
Electronic Intercepts: Email and social media traffic indicated planned major movement toward southeastern Northwest Chernarus
HUMINT: Local friendly agents confirmed enemy intent to seize Krasnoye Pole
Interrogation Reports: Captured enemy agent confirmed operation was subsidiary to Spornoye offensive; enemy commanders had been complaining of critical fuel shortages for weeks
2. FRIENDLY FORCES
2.1 Task Force Composition
Armor: 3x T-72 tanks (Tanks 1, 2, 3) plus 1x reinforcing T-55 (Tank 4)
Mechanized Infantry: 2x BMP rifle squads
Reconnaissance: 2x BRDM scout cars
Command: Lieutenant Belobodorov, Task Force Commander
2.2 Mission Type
Meeting engagement with expectation enemy would reach objective first; limited clearance followed by defensive cordon establishment.
3. OPERATION CHRONOLOGY
3.1 Initial Deployment (Approx. 1800 hrs)
Tactical Plan: 2nd Squad occupy northeast village corner; Command Squad deploy along main north-south road
Enemy Situation: Multiple rifle squads already pushing through village, establishing southern-facing defensive cordon
3.2 Initial Contact
Action: Tank 2 supported Command Squad clearing enemy forces from village
Outcome: 2nd Squad advanced along east side; village initially secured
3.3 Brigade Command Intervention (Approx. 1900 hrs)
New Orders: Task force to advance 1 km north to disrupt reported enemy counterattack assembly
Commander's Protest: Lieutenant Belobodorov objected that new position would expose forces to heavy enemy fire without tactical benefit
Orders Overruled: Command Squad, 2nd Squad, Tank 3, and Scout 2 advanced north
3.4 Enemy Counterattack (Approx. 1930-2000 hrs)
Situation: Heavy tracked vehicle counterattack developed from northwest
Assessment: Task force deployment at northern position inadequate to defend
Order: Retreat to Krasnoye Pole to establish new defensive cordon
3.5 Disengagement and Destruction (Approx. 2015-2045 hrs)
Action: Task force moved southwest, destroyed abandoned enemy BRDM
Enemy Response: Two surviving enemy tanks engaged
Losses:
Lieutenant Belobodorov (KIA)
Tank 1 (destroyed)
Tank 2 (destroyed)
Reinforcing Tank 4 (destroyed)
Both BMPs (destroyed)
3.6 Withdrawal (Approx. 2100 hrs)
Order: New task force commander ordered general retreat from Krasnoye Pole to Spornoye
Surviving Armor: 1x T-72 tank
4. CASUALTY ASSESSMENT
4.1 Friendly Losses (Catastrophic)
| Unit | Equipment Lost | Personnel |
|---|---|---|
| Tank 1 | T-72 | Crew |
| Tank 2 | T-72 | Crew |
| Reinforcing Tank 4 | T-72 | Crew |
| BMP-1 | BMP | Squad |
| BMP-2 | BMP | Squad |
| TOTAL | 7 armored vehicles | Approx. 30+ KIA/MIA |
4.2 Enemy Losses (Heavy)
Vehicles Destroyed: 16 of approximately 20 committed
Armor Kills: 75% by infantry; 25% by friendly armor/air support
Surviving Vehicles: 4
5. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
5.1 Operational Outcome
Primary Objective Achieved: Krasnoye Pole denied to enemy; Spornoye protected
Cost: Catastrophic armor losses; task force effectively combat-ineffective
5.2 Critical Factors
Command Intervention: Brigade staff order to extend defensive cordon north created untenable tactical position
Enemy Flanking Maneuver: Enemy armor successfully executed oblique attacks, neutralizing friendly armor effectiveness
Force Dispersal: Meager deployment at northern objective inadequate for defensive mission
Commander's Judgment: Lieutenant Belobodorov's tactical assessment was correct; override proved fatal
5.3 Key Lessons
Defensive perimeters must remain within mutually supporting distance
Tactical commanders' on-scene judgment must carry weight in dynamic engagements
Enemy capable of coordinated armor-infantry combined arms operations
Infantry anti-armor effectiveness critical (75% of enemy armor kills)
6. RECOMMENDATIONS
6.1 Immediate Actions
DENIED: 3rd Battalion request for immediate counterattack (Brigade disapproval)
Rationale: Losses prohibitive; reconstitution time excessive
DENIED: Counterattack using mechanized cavalry units
Rationale: Units still reconstituting from previous operations
6.2 Pending Options
Air Assault Operation: Currently under discussion with 2nd Battalion, 31st Air Assault Regiment
Advantage: Bypasses contested terrain; rapid insertion
Consideration: Winter weather ending within days; spring conditions imminent
6.3 Long-Term Recommendations
Establish clear operational boundaries for tactical commanders with protest authority for unsound orders
Accelerate armor crew training on flank defense and anti-ambush tactics
Maintain minimum armor reserve for contingency operations
Improve intelligence fusion between electronic intercepts and HUMINT for predictive analysis
7. DISTRIBUTION
Commander, 2nd Army Corps (Maj. Gen. Nabokov)
ChCOG Staff Intelligence (Maj. Gen. Chernyakov)
ChCOG Staff Engineer (Col. Volkova)
3rd Tank Brigade Operations Staff
3rd Tank Brigade Intelligence Staff
31st Air Assault Regiment (for coordination)
Colonel Denis Rozhkov
Deputy Head of Intelligence Staff
3rd Tank Brigade
Chernarus Defense Forces
CLASSIFICATION: RESTRICTED//OPERATIONAL SECURITY
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