1st Army Corps After Action Report: OP2602-27-2 (Counterattack on Kabanino)

 RESTRICTED//OPERATIONAL SECURITY

1st Army Corps After Action Report: OP2602-27-2 (Counterattack on Kabanino)

TO:
Major General Yuri Stytskovsky, Commander, Chernarus 1st Army Corps
Major General Vassily Chernyakov, ChCOG Senior Staff Intelligence Analyst
Admiral Vadim Ivanov, Commander, Chernarus Coastal Operations Group

FROM:
Colonel Alexey Agopyan, Deputy Head of Intelligence Staff, 1st Army Corps

DATE: 1 March 2026

CLASSIFICATION: RESTRICTED//OPERATIONAL SECURITY

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On 28 February 2026, 2nd Battalion, Chernarus 4th Separate Light Mountain Rifle Brigade, reinforced by 1st Battalion, Chernarus 19th Separate Mechanized Cavalry Regiment, conducted Operation KABANINO (OP2602-27-2), a deliberate counterattack against separatist forces occupying the strategic village of Kabanino. The operation was conceived as a response to the failed meeting engagement at Rogovo (OP2602-20-5) on 24 February, which had resulted in a costly retreat.

The Kabanino counterattack achieved all operational objectives: the village was secured, enemy forces were routed with catastrophic losses, and four civilian prisoners—including two local agents—were recovered. Critically, the operation severs enemy lines of communication along the major east-west highway, denying separatists the ability to consolidate gains across Chernarus.

Friendly losses were light. Enemy losses, while not precisely counted, were described by participating units as "catastrophic" and sufficient to cause "considerable delay" in future separatist operations.

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1. SITUATION AND INTELLIGENCE

1.1 Strategic Context

The operation responded to the failed meeting engagement at Rogovo (OP2602-20-5) on 24 February, in which separatist forces committed every available vehicle to a massive attack that forced government forces to retreat. Damage to 2nd Battalion, 4th Separate Light Mountain Rifle Brigade was severe, requiring a minimum of one week to prepare for counterattack.

1.2 Enemy Situation at Kabanino

• Strategic Value: Kabanino sits atop a major east-west highway, controlling lines of communication across both eastern and western Chernarus

• Garrison: Reinforced following Rogovo success; composition included armor, infantry, and artillery assets

• Atrocities: Four civilians taken prisoner—two local friendly agents, two innocent civilians. Local agents reported hearing screams from prisoners, indicating torture

1.3 Intelligence Sources

• HUMINT: Local friendly agents confirmed reinforcement and provided prisoner location data

• Electronic Intercepts: Email and text message traffic supplemented agent reports

• Drone Overflights: Confirmed enemy dispositions and artillery positions

• Prisoner Exploitation: Post-operation debriefing of rescued civilians provided additional intelligence

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2. FRIENDLY FORCES

2.1 Task Force Composition

Unit	Element	Equipment	Role
2nd Bn, 4th Light Mountain Rifle Bde	2nd Squad	Dismounted infantry	Southeast penetration
2nd Bn, 4th Light Mountain Rifle Bde	3rd Squad	Dismounted infantry	Southeast penetration
2nd Bn, 4th Light Mountain Rifle Bde	4th Squad	Dismounted infantry	Southwest assault (church objective)
2nd Bn, 4th Light Mountain Rifle Bde	Command Squad	Dismounted infantry	Northern penetration / CP capture
1st Bn, 19th Mechanized Cavalry Regt	Tank Section	8x T-55 tanks	Main assault force
1st Bn, 19th Mechanized Cavalry Regt	Reinforcing Tanks	4x T-55 tanks	Troop transport / reinforcement
1st Army Corps Artillery	Rocket Battery	122mm multiple rocket launchers	Counterbattery / fire support
Corps Reconnaissance	Drone Section	4x UAVs	Target acquisition / BDA

2.2 Key Command Personnel

• Brigade Commander, 4th Separate Light Mountain Rifle Brigade: Colonel Alexey Lushnikov

• Task Force Commander: (Not specified in source)

• 1st Army Corps Artillery Commander: Colonel Pavel Gerasimov

• 1st Army Corps Counterbattery Commander: Colonel Evgeny Biyatov

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3. OPERATION CHRONOLOGY

3.1 Preparatory Phase (24-27 February)

Following the Rogovo defeat, Colonel Lushnikov requested reinforcement from 1st Battalion, 19th Separate Mechanized Cavalry Regiment, rather than launching an immediate counterattack. Corps Commander Major General Stytskovsky approved, granting time for intelligence preparation and operational planning.

Artillery and counterbattery staffs began coordinated preparations for defeating enemy artillery, utilizing drone reconnaissance for target acquisition.

3.2 Deployment (28 February, Approx. 0400-0600 hrs)

• Main Force: Eight T-55 tanks with four desant elements massed south of the rise south of Kabanino

• Reinforcing Tanks: Four T-55 tanks (Tanks 7, 8 plus two others) prepared to transport four small rifle squads as reinforcements

• Artillery: 122mm rocket battery positioned under Colonel Biyatov's command

• Drones: Four UAVs deployed for artillery spotting and BDA

3.3 Counterbattle Phase (Approx. 0600-0700 hrs)

Drone reconnaissance located enemy artillery positions. Counterbattery fire from 122mm rocket battery neutralized enemy artillery, enabling ground maneuver.

3.4 Ground Assault (Approx. 0700-0900 hrs)

Southeast Axis:

• 2nd and 3rd Squads dismounted and began penetration operations against enemy defensive cordon

• Four tanks provided direct fire support

Southwest Axis:

• 4th Squad dismounted early and advanced toward church objective

• Transport vehicles (Tanks 7 and 8) maneuvered west to overwatch position on main east-west road

Northern Axis:

• Command Squad dismounted and conducted penetration operation north

• Primary objective: Locate and eliminate civilian criminal command operatives

Western Overwatch:

• Two T-55 tanks positioned to observe main east-west road and open terrain to northwest

3.5 Key Objectives Secured (Approx. 0900-1000 hrs)

• Command Operatives: After brief but intense firefight, Command Squad advanced to known location of two civilian criminal command operatives; both eliminated

• Civilian Prisoners: Task Force Commander located prisoners; two female civilians evacuated south to Scout 1 (BRDM) for return to base

• Casualties Among Prisoners: Two civilians killed; one young female showed signs of severe torture

3.6 Tank Engagement (Approx. 1000-1010 hrs)

Two T-55 tanks on western overwatch engaged multiple enemy vehicles, devolving into a tank-versus-tank gunfight lasting approximately 10 minutes:

• Friendly Losses: One T-55 from 4th Squad destroyed; one T-55 from Command Squad destroyed

• Enemy Losses: At least four tanks destroyed by friendly armor

• Outcome: Enemy forces ceased counterattack attempts; clear loss of will to contest Kabanino

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4. CASUALTY ASSESSMENT

4.1 Friendly Losses

Unit	Equipment Lost	Personnel Losses
4th Squad	1x T-55 tank	Light (unspecified)
Command Squad	1x T-55 tank	Light (unspecified)
Infantry Squads	None	Light
TOTAL	2x T-55 tanks	Light

4.2 Enemy Losses

Field Count Limitations: Reliable aggregate count not available due to operational tempo and focus on prisoner evacuation. Participating unit reports consistently describe enemy losses as "catastrophic," including:

• Minimum 4 tanks destroyed (confirmed)

• Additional armored vehicles damaged/destroyed (unconfirmed)

• Infantry casualties severe

• Artillery assets neutralized during counterbattery phase

Operational Impact: Losses sufficient to cause "considerable delay" in future separatist operations.

4.3 Civilian Casualties

• Killed: Two civilians (executed by separatists prior to liberation)

• Tortured: One young female (survived, evacuated)

• Rescued: Two female civilians evacuated to base

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5. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

5.1 Operational Outcome

• Primary Objective Achieved: Kabanino secured; east-west highway denied to enemy

• Secondary Objectives Achieved: Command operatives eliminated; prisoners rescued

• Strategic Impact: Last operation of winter campaign concluded successfully

5.2 Critical Success Factors

1. Deliberate Preparation: Colonel Lushnikov's refusal to rush counterattack allowed proper intelligence preparation and force concentration

2. Corps Reinforcement: 1st Battalion, 19th Mechanized Cavalry Regiment provided critical mass

3. Artillery-Counterbattery Coordination: Gerasimov and Biyatov effectively neutralized enemy artillery prior to ground assault

4. Drone Integration: Four UAVs enabled precise target acquisition and BDA

5. Tactical Flexibility: Western overwatch tanks successfully transitioned to anti-armor role

5.3 Key Lessons

• Counterattack operations require adequate preparation time regardless of political pressure

• Prisoner rescue missions can be integrated successfully with primary combat objectives

• Tank-versus-tank engagements remain decisive in open terrain

• Civilian atrocities by separatists confirm enemy disregard for Geneva Conventions

• Light infantry-armor coordination effective when properly supported

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6. RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Immediate Actions

• Exploit Success: Maintain pressure on retreating enemy forces with reconnaissance elements

• Secure Prisoners: Ensure rescued civilians receive medical care and psychological support; debrief for additional intelligence

• Battle Damage Assessment: Commit additional drone assets to confirm full extent of enemy losses

• Highway Security: Establish permanent checkpoint on east-west highway to prevent enemy re-infiltration

6.2 Future Operations

• Follow-On Exploitation: Consider limited objective attacks against retreating enemy columns

• Spring Campaign Planning: Use Kabanino as staging base for operations against remaining enemy strongholds

• Intelligence Exploitation: Analyze documents recovered from civilian criminal command operatives

6.3 Long-Term Recommendations

1. Formalize drone-artillery coordination procedures at brigade level

2. Expand counterbattery capabilities with additional rocket artillery assets

3. Develop rapid reinforcement protocols for light infantry brigades

4. Document enemy atrocities for war crimes prosecution

5. Preserve momentum through spring with reconstituted armored forces

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7. COMMANDER'S COMMENTS

The Kabanino counterattack demonstrates that with proper preparation, combined arms coordination, and intelligence integration, our forces can defeat separatist formations decisively while preserving combat power. Colonel Lushnikov's judgment in delaying the counterattack—despite political pressure—reflects mature command understanding and should be recognized.

The rescue of tortured civilians reminds us of the nature of our enemy and the moral imperative of our mission.

The winter campaign concludes with Kabanino as its final, successful operation. We enter spring with momentum.

— Maj. Gen. Yuri Stytskovsky
Commander, Chernarus 1st Army Corps

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8. DISTRIBUTION

• Commander, 1st Army Corps (Maj. Gen. Stytskovsky)

• ChCOG Senior Staff Intelligence (Maj. Gen. Chernyakov)

• Commander, ChCOG (Adm. Ivanov)

• Commander, 4th Separate Light Mountain Rifle Brigade (Col. Lushnikov)

• Commander, 19th Separate Mechanized Cavalry Regiment

• 1st Army Corps Artillery Command (Col. Gerasimov)

• 1st Army Corps Counterbattery Command (Col. Biyatov)

• 1st Army Corps Operations Staff

• 1st Army Corps Intelligence Staff

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Colonel Alexey Agopyan
Deputy Head of Intelligence Staff
1st Army Corps
Chernarus Defense Forces

CLASSIFICATION: RESTRICTED//OPERATIONAL SECURITY

Blood and Steel: The Battle for Krasnoye Pole

 Defense Correspondent for Zelenogorsk Pravda, Svetlana Golikova reports on the cost of victory in the northwest

ZELENOGORSK — The village of Krasnoye Pole is little more than a dot on the map of Northwest Chernarus—a scattering of homes along a muddy creek, a place where farmers once drove their tractors home at dusk. But on the evening of February 25, 2026, it became the epicenter of one of the most brutal armored engagements of this long conflict.

And the men of the 3rd Tank Brigade paid for it in steel and blood.

Zelenogorsk Pravda has obtained the classified after-action report from the battle, a document that paints a picture of tactical brilliance, fatal command decisions, and a victory that came at a price so steep it may take months to recover.

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'THEY WERE STARVING FOR FUEL'

It began with whispers—fragments of emails, social media chatter, the nervous reports of agents who risk their lives to slip information across contested lines. The separatists were planning something big.

"They were complaining for weeks about their fuel situation," one intelligence officer, speaking on condition of anonymity, told this reporter. "Critical shortages. Their vehicles were sitting idle. They needed grain, they needed fuel, and they knew exactly where to get it."

The target was Spornoye—the region's primary food processing center, a facility that handles thousands of tons of grain and fuel reserves. But to reach Spornoye, they first needed Krasnoye Pole.

"The village sits like a sentinel on the southeastern approach," explained a senior analyst familiar with the terrain. "Whoever holds Krasnoye Pole controls the road to Spornoye."

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THE MEETING ENGAGEMENT

When intelligence confirmed the separatist plan, 3rd Tank Brigade assembled a task force with what they had available: three T-72 tanks, two BMP armored personnel carriers with rifle squads, and two BRDM scout cars. Their mission was what military planners call a "meeting engagement"—a race to an objective both sides want, with the expectation that the enemy will get there first.

Lieutenant Belobodorov commanded the task force. He was young for such responsibility, but experienced. He knew the odds.

"The tactical plan was sound," the after-action report states. "2nd Squad would occupy the northeast corner of the village while Command Squad deployed along the main north-south road. Clear, simple, defensible."

But as his forces approached, they found the enemy already there—rifle squads pushing through the village, setting up their own defensive cordon facing south. The meeting engagement had begun.

With Tank 2 providing fire support, Command Squad cleared the enemy positions while 2nd Squad advanced along the eastern edge. Within hours, Krasnoye Pole was back in government hands.

It should have been the end of the story.

It was only the beginning.

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THE ORDER

As Belobodorov's men began establishing their defensive perimeter, a new order arrived from brigade operations staff. Intelligence had detected an enemy assembly area approximately one kilometer north of the village—a tactical group preparing to counterattack. The task force was ordered to advance and disrupt it.

Belobodorov protested.

According to interviews with surviving officers, the young lieutenant argued forcefully that the new position would expose his forces to heavy fire from both infantry and armor without any tactical benefit. He was overruled.

Command Squad, 2nd Squad, Tank 3, and Scout 2 advanced north.

"The meager deployment at the new objective was completely inadequate to defend," the report concludes with grim understatement.

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THE HAMMER FALLS

What happened next unfolded in less than an hour.

The enemy counterattack came not from the north where expected, but from the northwest—a heavy column of tracked vehicles that flanked the exposed government forces. Belobodorov ordered a retreat back to Krasnoye Pole to re-establish the defensive cordon.

As his forces withdrew, he spotted an abandoned enemy BRDM scout car and moved southwest to destroy it. It was there that two surviving enemy tanks found him.

The engagement was brutal and brief. Tank 1, Tank 2, and Reinforcing Tank 4 were destroyed in succession. Both BMPs were hit before they could reach the village. Lieutenant Belobodorov was killed in the fire.

Of the four tanks and two BMPs committed to the battle, only one T-72 survived.

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THE PRICE OF VICTORY

Here is where the story takes a turn that defies conventional military logic.

Despite the catastrophic losses—and they were catastrophic, by any measure—the operation succeeded.

The after-action report notes that of approximately 20 enemy vehicles committed to the battle, only four survived. Fully 75 percent of those kills were achieved by infantry, not armor or air support. The separatist force that had hoped to sweep through Krasnoye Pole and on to Spornoye was shattered.

"Had the defensive cordon not been extended north, the enemy would have had sufficient forces arrayed to retake the town," the report states flatly. The extension cost three tanks, two BMPs, and a promising young officer. But it also cost the enemy 16 vehicles and their offensive capability.

"The subsequent retreat was the only correct course of action after it became clear our armor had been defeated," the report concludes.

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WHAT COMES NEXT

Battalion command staff immediately requested authorization for a counterattack to restore control of Krasnoye Pole. Brigade command denied it.

The reasons are written in the cold language of logistics: losses prohibitive; reconstitution time excessive; mechanized cavalry units still recovering from previous operations. Both sides, the report acknowledges, are suffering from the same shortages of fuel, equipment, and fresh troops.

"The only other option," the report states, "is an air assault operation from 2nd Battalion, 31st Air Assault Regiment."

That option is currently under discussion at battalion and brigade level.

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'THE ENEMY HAD TO BE STOPPED'

In the muddy fields outside Spornoye, survivors of the battle are still processing what they endured. One infantryman, his face scarred by shrapnel, put it simply:

"We knew what would happen if they reached the grain silos. They were desperate. Desperate men fight hard. But so do we."

A tank commander who lost his vehicle but survived the engagement was more philosophical:

"The lieutenant was right. We shouldn't have gone north. But if we hadn't, they would have come through us anyway. Maybe from a different direction, maybe at a different time. The enemy had to be stopped. We stopped them. That's what matters, isn't it?"

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THE CALCULUS OF WAR

Military historians may debate the Battle of Krasnoye Pole for years. Was it a tactical blunder redeemed by strategic necessity? A necessary sacrifice poorly executed? A victory purchased at too high a price?

For the families of the dead, such questions are academic. For the strategists in Zelenogorsk and the Coastal Operations Group, they are matters of life and death for the next operation, and the one after that.

The after-action report, signed by Colonel Denis Rozhkov, Deputy Head of Intelligence Staff for 3rd Tank Brigade, contains no heroics, no patriotic flourishes. It is a document of brutal honesty, intended for the eyes of generals and analysts.

But in its stark accounting—tanks destroyed, men killed, ground held—it tells a story that every Chernarusi should understand.

The enemy is desperate. They are running out of fuel, out of options, out of time. And desperate enemies are dangerous enemies.

They threw 20 vehicles at Krasnoye Pole. Sixteen burned. Four escaped.

One T-72 came home.

The village held.

3rd Tank Brigade After Action Report: OP2602-20-7 (Krasnoye Pole)

 RESTRICTED//OPERATIONAL SECURITY

3rd Tank Brigade After Action Report: OP2602-20-7 (Krasnoye Pole)

TO:
Major General Vadim Nabokov, Commander 2nd Army Corps
Major General Vassily Chernyakov, ChCOG Staff Intelligence Analyst
Colonel Irina Volkova, ChCOG Staff Engineer Analyst

FROM:
Colonel Denis Rozhkov, Deputy Head of Intelligence Staff, 3rd Tank Brigade

DATE: 26 February 2026

CLASSIFICATION: RESTRICTED//OPERATIONAL SECURITY

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On 25 February 2026, 3rd Tank Brigade conducted defensive Operation KRASNOYE POLE (OP2602-20-7) to prevent separatist forces from seizing the village of Krasnoye Pole as a staging point for a larger offensive against the critical grain processing center at Spornoye. Despite inflicting approximately 75% casualties on enemy armored forces, friendly forces sustained catastrophic losses including three T-72 tanks, both BMPs, and the task force commander. The operation succeeded in its primary objective of denying the enemy control of Krasnoye Pole, but at unacceptable cost due to command decisions extending the defensive perimeter beyond tactically defensible positions.

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1. SITUATION AND INTELLIGENCE

1.1 Enemy Situation

• Intent: Capture Krasnoye Pole as supporting effort to main offensive on Spornoye grain facility

• Motivation: Critical fuel shortages requiring seizure of regional grain and fuel reserves

• Composition: Combined arms force of approximately 20 vehicles (tanks, BMPs, technicals) plus infantry

• Disposition: Initial elements had already occupied portions of Krasnoye Pole prior to friendly arrival

1.2 Intelligence Sources

• Electronic Intercepts: Email and social media traffic indicated planned major movement toward southeastern Northwest Chernarus

• HUMINT: Local friendly agents confirmed enemy intent to seize Krasnoye Pole

• Interrogation Reports: Captured enemy agent confirmed operation was subsidiary to Spornoye offensive; enemy commanders had been complaining of critical fuel shortages for weeks

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2. FRIENDLY FORCES

2.1 Task Force Composition

• Armor: 3x T-72 tanks (Tanks 1, 2, 3) plus 1x reinforcing T-55 (Tank 4)

• Mechanized Infantry: 2x BMP rifle squads

• Reconnaissance: 2x BRDM scout cars

• Command: Lieutenant Belobodorov, Task Force Commander

2.2 Mission Type

Meeting engagement with expectation enemy would reach objective first; limited clearance followed by defensive cordon establishment.

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3. OPERATION CHRONOLOGY

3.1 Initial Deployment (Approx. 1800 hrs)

• Tactical Plan: 2nd Squad occupy northeast village corner; Command Squad deploy along main north-south road

• Enemy Situation: Multiple rifle squads already pushing through village, establishing southern-facing defensive cordon

3.2 Initial Contact

• Action: Tank 2 supported Command Squad clearing enemy forces from village

• Outcome: 2nd Squad advanced along east side; village initially secured

3.3 Brigade Command Intervention (Approx. 1900 hrs)

• New Orders: Task force to advance 1 km north to disrupt reported enemy counterattack assembly

• Commander's Protest: Lieutenant Belobodorov objected that new position would expose forces to heavy enemy fire without tactical benefit

• Orders Overruled: Command Squad, 2nd Squad, Tank 3, and Scout 2 advanced north

3.4 Enemy Counterattack (Approx. 1930-2000 hrs)

• Situation: Heavy tracked vehicle counterattack developed from northwest

• Assessment: Task force deployment at northern position inadequate to defend

• Order: Retreat to Krasnoye Pole to establish new defensive cordon

3.5 Disengagement and Destruction (Approx. 2015-2045 hrs)

• Action: Task force moved southwest, destroyed abandoned enemy BRDM

• Enemy Response: Two surviving enemy tanks engaged

• Losses:

  • Lieutenant Belobodorov (KIA)

  • Tank 1 (destroyed)

  • Tank 2 (destroyed)

  • Reinforcing Tank 4 (destroyed)

  • Both BMPs (destroyed)

3.6 Withdrawal (Approx. 2100 hrs)

• Order: New task force commander ordered general retreat from Krasnoye Pole to Spornoye

• Surviving Armor: 1x T-72 tank

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4. CASUALTY ASSESSMENT

4.1 Friendly Losses (Catastrophic)

Unit	Equipment Lost	Personnel
Tank 1	T-72	Crew
Tank 2	T-72	Crew
Reinforcing Tank 4	T-72	Crew
BMP-1	BMP	Squad
BMP-2	BMP	Squad
TOTAL	7 armored vehicles	Approx. 30+ KIA/MIA

4.2 Enemy Losses (Heavy)

• Vehicles Destroyed: 16 of approximately 20 committed

• Armor Kills: 75% by infantry; 25% by friendly armor/air support

• Surviving Vehicles: 4

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5. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

5.1 Operational Outcome

• Primary Objective Achieved: Krasnoye Pole denied to enemy; Spornoye protected

• Cost: Catastrophic armor losses; task force effectively combat-ineffective

5.2 Critical Factors

1. Command Intervention: Brigade staff order to extend defensive cordon north created untenable tactical position

2. Enemy Flanking Maneuver: Enemy armor successfully executed oblique attacks, neutralizing friendly armor effectiveness

3. Force Dispersal: Meager deployment at northern objective inadequate for defensive mission

4. Commander's Judgment: Lieutenant Belobodorov's tactical assessment was correct; override proved fatal

5.3 Key Lessons

• Defensive perimeters must remain within mutually supporting distance

• Tactical commanders' on-scene judgment must carry weight in dynamic engagements

• Enemy capable of coordinated armor-infantry combined arms operations

• Infantry anti-armor effectiveness critical (75% of enemy armor kills)

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6. RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Immediate Actions

• DENIED: 3rd Battalion request for immediate counterattack (Brigade disapproval)

  • Rationale: Losses prohibitive; reconstitution time excessive

• DENIED: Counterattack using mechanized cavalry units

  • Rationale: Units still reconstituting from previous operations

6.2 Pending Options

• Air Assault Operation: Currently under discussion with 2nd Battalion, 31st Air Assault Regiment

  • Advantage: Bypasses contested terrain; rapid insertion

  • Consideration: Winter weather ending within days; spring conditions imminent

6.3 Long-Term Recommendations

1. Establish clear operational boundaries for tactical commanders with protest authority for unsound orders

2. Accelerate armor crew training on flank defense and anti-ambush tactics

3. Maintain minimum armor reserve for contingency operations

4. Improve intelligence fusion between electronic intercepts and HUMINT for predictive analysis

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7. DISTRIBUTION

• Commander, 2nd Army Corps (Maj. Gen. Nabokov)

• ChCOG Staff Intelligence (Maj. Gen. Chernyakov)

• ChCOG Staff Engineer (Col. Volkova)

• 3rd Tank Brigade Operations Staff

• 3rd Tank Brigade Intelligence Staff

• 31st Air Assault Regiment (for coordination)

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Colonel Denis Rozhkov
Deputy Head of Intelligence Staff
3rd Tank Brigade
Chernarus Defense Forces

CLASSIFICATION: RESTRICTED//OPERATIONAL SECURITY