Operational After Action Report: Combat Operations in North Zagoria

OPERATIONAL AFTER ACTION REPORT: COMBAT OPERATIONS IN NORTH ZAGORIA

REPORTING UNIT: 43rd Mountain Rifle Corps, Intelligence Staff

AUTHOR: Colonel Sergei Glukharev, Deputy Head of Intelligence Staff

DATE: 23 June 2025

REPORT PERIOD: 19 June - 22 June 2025 (Inclusive)

SUBJECT: Combat Operations Conducted by Chernarus 10th Separate Tank Brigade (3rd, 4th, 2nd Battalions)

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Elements of the 10th Separate Tank Brigade (3rd, 4th, and 2nd Battalions) conducted offensive operations between 19-22 June 2025 to disrupt and defeat separatist attacks aimed at capturing the village line Oktyabrsky-Volnovakha-Bogdanova. Operations resulted in the successful recapture and temporary holding of Oktyabrsky (3rd Bn) and Bogdanova (4th Bn) against determined enemy counterattacks. The operation against Volnovakha (2nd Bn) failed to secure the objective due to premature withdrawal orders from Battalion command, leading to the village remaining under separatist control and necessitating follow-on operations. Enemy forces, significantly reinforced with foreign personnel and equipment, displayed increased aggression and capability.

2. BACKGROUND / SITUATION:

Enemy Intent: Intelligence derived from SIGINT (email, text intercepts) and HUMINT (local friendly agents) confirmed separatist plans to launch coordinated attacks to seize and hold the villages of Oktyabrsky), Volnovakha, and Bogdanova. This offensive initiative was assessed as enabled by recent infusions of fresh troops, supplies (including heavy armor), and new leadership.

Friendly Intent: 10th Tank Brigade tasked subordinate battalions with conducting pre-emptive counter-offensives to recapture these villages before separatist attacks could consolidate, disrupt enemy plans, inflict maximum casualties, and liberate the objectives. Operations were to be executed sequentially as forces became available.

3. NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS:

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*   **a. Operation: OKTYABRSKY RECAPTURE (3rd Battalion - 19 June)**

    *   **Tactical Situation:** Separatist forces, including embedded North Korean regulars, Wagner Group operators, and Spanish regulars, occupied defensive positions within and around Oktyabrsky.

    *   **Friendly Actions:** 3rd Battalion assault squad launched a swift attack to seize the village. Initial penetration was achieved.

    *   **Enemy Actions:** Enemy forces mounted fierce, coordinated flanking counterattacks utilizing infantry and likely supporting fires. Resistance was significantly heavier than anticipated due to the presence of embedded foreign specialists.

    *   **Result:** The village was successfully recaptured. However, the assault squad sustained **heavy casualties** during the initial assault and subsequent counterattacks. Reinforcements were committed to consolidate the position. Three (3) local friendly agents, held captive by separatists, were successfully recovered during the operation and evacuated for debriefing. HUMINT gathered during/after the operation strongly indicated imminent separatist attacks targeting Bogdanova and Volnovakha. The initial 3rd Bn task force withdrew once reinforcing troops were in position. These reinforcing troops executed a planned withdrawal under cover of darkness approximately 12 hours later, having confirmed the disruption of the enemy's immediate plan against Oktyabrsky.

*   **b. Operation: BOGDANOVA STRIKE (4th Battalion - 20/21 June)**

    *   **Tactical Situation:** Separatist infantry had established a defensive cordon within Bogdanova in preparation for their planned offensive.

    *   **Friendly Actions:** 4th Battalion task force conducted a rapid and violent assault, penetrating the enemy's defensive perimeter.

    *   **Enemy Actions:** Separatist forces defended their positions but were overwhelmed by the speed and violence of the friendly assault. Enemy medium and heavy tracked armor units were committed in counterattack or were caught in position.

    *   **Result:** Bogdanova was successfully secured. Friendly infantry casualties were reported as **minimal**. While the initial Task Force Commander's summary lacked detail on enemy losses, subsequent debriefs of participating NCOs confirmed the destruction of a **prodigious number** of enemy medium and heavy armored vehicles (BMPs, BTRs, Tanks). The 4th Bn task force withdrew in good order once reinforcing troops were established in the village. The reinforcing troops later withdrew per operational plan.

*   **c. Operation: VOLNOVAKHA SECURE (2nd Battalion - 22 June)**

    *   **Tactical Situation:** Separatist forces occupied Volnovakha, consolidating for their offensive operation.

    *   **Friendly Actions:** Initial elements of the 2nd Battalion task force rapidly entered and secured sectors of Volnovakha. Reinforcing friendly infantry and armor units seized and established a hold on the northern edge of the village.

    *   **Enemy Actions:** Enemy forces regrouped and launched strong combined arms counterattacks utilizing infantry and armor.

    *   **Friendly Command Decision:** 2nd Battalion Command Staff issued an order for the *entire task force*, including the reinforcing elements holding the northern edge, to withdraw back to base *prematurely*.

    *   **Result:** The premature withdrawal order left the reinforcing troops on the northern edge exposed and unsupported during their disengagement. These elements became **highly vulnerable** to concentrated enemy tank and infantry attacks during their retreat. Unable to maintain their foothold under pressure, friendly forces were driven back south. **Volnovakha remains under separatist control.**

4. ANALYSIS / ASSESSMENT:

Enemy: Demonstrated significantly enhanced combat power, coordination, and aggression due to foreign reinforcements (NK, Wagner, Spanish) and new leadership. Capable of launching determined, well-supported counterattacks. Their operational plan (seizing the 3 villages) was effectively disrupted at Oktyabrsky and Bogdanova. Losses in armor, particularly at Bogdanova, were severe.

Friendly:

3rd Battalion: Achieved the objective at Oktyabrsky but at high cost, highlighting vulnerability to complex enemy counterattacks and the effectiveness of embedded foreign specialists. Successful recovery of agents provided critical intelligence.

4th Battalion: Exemplary execution at Bogdanova. Achieved rapid penetration, minimized friendly losses, and inflicted devastating damage on enemy armor. A model operation under the circumstances.

2nd Battalion: Initial tactical success in securing parts of Volnovakha was squandered by poor command judgment at the Battalion level. The premature withdrawal order disregarded the tactical situation of committed reinforcing troops, leading directly to their vulnerability, failure to hold ground, and the loss of the objective. Command Staff decision-making requires urgent review.

Intelligence: SIGINT and HUMINT provided accurate warning of enemy intentions and objectives, enabling pre-emptive operations. Agent recovery in Oktyabrsky yielded timely confirmation of secondary targets. Effectiveness of enemy foreign reinforcements was confirmed in combat.

Volnovakha Failure: The primary cause was the ill-timed withdrawal order from 2nd Battalion Command Staff. This decision ceded the initiative, abandoned a tenable foothold, and exposed withdrawing troops unnecessarily. The responsibility for this failure rests clearly at the Battalion command level.

5. CONCLUSIONS:

The 10th Tank Brigade successfully disrupted the separatist offensive plan at Okyabrsky and Bogdanova, inflicting significant losses, particularly in armor at Bogdanova.

The operation at Volnovakha was a failure directly attributable to faulty command decisions by 2nd Battalion Command Staff.

Enemy forces, bolstered by foreign personnel and supplies, remain a potent threat capable of complex counterattacks.

The recovery and intelligence from local agents proved highly valuable.

The failure at Volnovakha necessitates an immediate follow-up operation by 2nd Battalion to seize the objective that should have been secured on 22 June.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS:

2nd Battalion Command Review: Immediate investigation and review of the command decision-making process within 2nd Battalion Command Staff that led to the premature withdrawal order from Volnovakha. Consideration of remedial training or personnel changes as warranted.

Reinforce 2nd Battalion: Ensure 2nd Battalion receives adequate resources (potentially including Corps-level assets) and a robust plan for the imminent operation to recapture Volnovakha. Emphasis on maintaining the objective once seized.

Foreign Adversary Tactics: Disseminate detailed lessons learned regarding tactics employed by embedded North Korean, Wagner, and Spanish elements encountered at Okyabrsky to all Brigade and Corps units. Adapt training accordingly.

HUMINT Network Sustainment: Continue efforts to support and expand the local friendly agent network in North Zagoria. Their contribution was operationally significant.

Continued Vigilance: 10th Tank Brigade and Corps Intelligence must maintain high alert for indications of further enemy reinforcement or shifts in strategy following these setbacks.

7. NEXT STEPS: 10th Separate Tank Brigade will continue offensive operations in North Zagoria during the coming week, with the recapture of Volnovakha by 2nd Battalion being an immediate priority. Corps Intelligence will continue monitoring enemy communications and agent reports for shifts in force disposition or intent.

ATTACHMENTS: None referenced in this summary. (Note: Full Tactical Summaries from Battalion Commanders, Agent Debrief Summaries, SIGINT reports, and detailed CASREP/Loss reports would typically be appended or available separately).

// SIGNED //

COLONEL SERGEI GLUKHAREV

Deputy Head of Intelligence Staff

43rd Mountain Rifle Corps

This is based on the Arma 3 wargame. The report and reporter are AI generated and represents no individual, living or dead. The text of the transcript, while AI generated, is based on data provided by the channel author.